
Class. 
Book 



0)4^ 



Copyright ]\^^^ 



COPYRIGHT DEPOSm 



MODERN GERMANY 



MODERN 
GERMANY 

IN RELATION TO 

THE GREAT WAR 

BY VARIOUS GERMAN WRITERS 
TRANSLATED BY 

WILLIAM WALLACE WHITELOCK 

A.B., Johns Hopkins University 
Ph.D., University of Munich 



® 



NEW YORK 
MITCHELL KENNERLEY 

1916 






COPYRIGHT I916 BY 
MITCHELL KENNERLEY 



4 






PRINTED IN AMERICA 

M 20 1916 
©CI.A4334il 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 
INTRODUCTION 3 

BOOK I— GERMANY'S POSITION IN THE WORLD 

CHAPTER 

I. GERMANY AND THE WORLD POWERS, BY PROFESSOR OTTO HINTZE, OF 

THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 9 

II. THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN KULTUR, BY PROFESSOR ERNST TROELTSCH, 

OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 56 

ni. Germany's international economic position, by professor Her- 
mann SCHUMACHER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BONN 89 

IV. Germany's colonial policy, by dr. wilhelm solf, secretary of 

STATE FOR THE COLONIES I4I 

V. THE GERMAN MILITARY SYSTEM, BY PROFESSOR HANS DELBRUCK, OF 

THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 1 69 

VI. THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF GERMAN INSTITUTIONS, BY PROFESSOR 

GUSTAV VON SCHMOLLER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 1 84 

VII. THE SPIRIT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY, BY DR. HANS LUTHER, 

CITY COUNCILLOR OF BERLIN 2X8 



BOOK II— GERMANY'S ALLIES 

I. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

A. THE INNER STRUCTURE OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MON- 

ARCHY, BY PROFESSOR FRIEDRICH TEZNER, OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA 237 

B. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S FOREIGN POLICY, BY PROFESSOR OTTO- 

CAR WEBER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PRAGUE 246 

n. TURKEY, BY PROFESSOR CARL BECKER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BONN 265 

BOOK III— OUR ENEMIES' POLICY OF FORCE 
I. England's policy of force, by professor erich marcks, of the 

UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH 293 

n. France's policy of force, by professor paul darmstadter, of 

THE LTNIVERSITY OF GOTTINGEN 318 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER PAGE 

ni. BELGIUM AND THE GREAT POWERS, BY PROFESSOR KARL HAMPE, OF 

THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG 34O 

IV. RUSSIA AND PAN-SLAVISM, BY PROFESSOR HANS UEBERSBERGER, OF 

THE UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA 38 1 

V. Serbia's role, by professor hans uebersberger, of the univer- 
sity OF VIENNA 410 

VI. THE GREAT POWERS IN EAST ASIA, BY PROFESSOR OTTO FRANKE, OF 

THE COLONIAL INSTITUTE OF HAMBURG 42O 



BOOK IV— THE CAUSES AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 

I, THE EVENTS THAT LED UP TO THE WORLD WAR, BY PROFESSOR HER- 
MANN ONCKEN, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG 443 

II. THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR, BY PROFESSOR HERMANN ONCKEN, OF 

THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG 508 

III. Belgium's neutrality, by professor walter schoenborn, of the 

UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG 531 



BOOK V— THE SPIRIT OF THE WAR 

I. KUL TUR, THE POLICY OF POWER AND MILITARISM, BY PROFESSOR FRIED- 
RICH MEINECKE, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 559 

n. THE WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, BY PROFESSOR ERNST ZITEL- 

MANN, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BONN 584 

III. THE MEANING OF THE WAR, BY PROFESSOR OTTO HINTZE, OF THE 

UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 615 

MEN WHO WROTE 'THIS BOOK 625 



INTRODUCTORY NOTE 

This book is a translation of Deutschland und der Weltkrieg, 
which was published in Germany in 191 5. It is a collection 
of essays by a number of leaders of thought in modern Ger- 
many, and in each case the man is a master of the subject he 
is chosen to discuss. The writers are, in nearly every instance, 
professors in German and Austrian Universities, many of them 
past or present servants of the state in certain capacities in their 
university work ; the exceptional instances are government officials 
who are in charge of the state activities about which they write. 

The various chapters, which go to make up the book as a whole, 
were completed, for the most part, in March of 191 5. At that 
time Italy had not seceded from the Triple Alliance, and entered 
into the war on the side of the Allies ; and for that reason Italy 
has not been included in the discussion of the war, except in 
references in footnotes. The effect, therefore, has been that 
Italy is treated as a neutral state. 

A literal rendering of the title of the book, of course, would 
be Germany and the World War. The book, however, is very 
much more than a discussion of Germany and the world war. It 
is a presentation of the civilization or Kultur of Germany and 
Austria-Hungary in our modern civilization; of Germany's posi- 
tion in the world-order, and of what Germany is striving toward 
today. It reveals, as does no other book available, the historical, 
cultural and social foundations of modern Germany — the mind 
of Germany at work. It shows us the things Germany is doing 
and anticipating, in the fields of science, industry, and social and 
state functions, the significant and important things that are 
implied in German Kultur, and how this great urge arose out of 
the very springs of the life of the Teutonic peoples and was 
determined by the necessities of a growing nation in a circum- 
scribed territory. 

While the title of the book is Germany and the World War, 
and while of course the war in most of its varying phases is 
dealt with in many of the chapters, it is perhaps well to call 
attention to the fact that the war is of secondary importance 
to the general purpose of the book, which is to reveal and express 
Germany to the world in terms of German civilization and 
German social vision. 



4 INTRODUCTORY NOTE 

The book is an outgrowth of the conclusion reached by the 
highest intellects in Germany that Germany and Germany's 
aims ought to be interpreted to the world with honesty and 
understanding. The leaders of German thought were agreed 
that Germany owed it to herself as a duty to interpret herself 
to the world, and they undertook the task in that spirit. This 
book, therefore, growing out of such an agreement and determi- 
nation, represents the best expression of German thought to-day. 

There are certain details to which attention must be called 
in which this translation varies from the original German book. 

First, the little foreword to the German book, addressed to the 
German public, and possessing no value to American readers, has 
been omitted, and, in its place, has been substituted this introduc- 
tory note endeavoring briefly to indicate the spirit of the book, and 
its importance and value to American readers. 

Secondly, the chapter in the German edition of the book enti- 
tled Krieg und Menschlichkeit Bearbeitet auf Grund amtlichen 
Materials ("War and Humanity, Prepared From Official Pa- 
pers") has been omitted. It is a record and an interpretation 
of official papers which are already sufficiently known to Ameri- 
can readers; and in effect a restatement of the attitude of Ger- 
many on questions of international law which are thoroughly 
discussed in the chapter included herein entitled **The War and 
International Law." The value of this book does not lie in 
official papers so much as it does in the fact that it is an expression 
of the view taken, by German philosophers, of Germany in rela- 
tion to our world of to-day. 

Thirdly, a great many footnotes in the original book have 
been omitted from this American edition. It is a habit of the 
very learned, especially of the German philosopher, in his desire 
to be comprehensive and even encyclopedic, to use footnotes to 
a greater extent than is customary in America, except perhaps in 
scientific, legal and technical publications. In some instances 
the matter in the footnotes has been incorporated in the text. 
For the most part, however, all footnotes that give authority for 
statements of fact or that give the source of quotations, hav^ been 
included. In cases where the subject of the footnote, or the 
publication quoted, is already known in America, the footnotes 
have been omitted. The rule has been merely to use footnotes 
to give sources of information and authority not readily available 
to the American reader, and in many cases explications of the 
book or publication cited are given. 

In one instance the variation from the original is in new 
matter included in this edition. The chapter entitled "Ger- 



INTRODUCTORY NOTE 5 

many's International Economic Position," by Professor Hermann 
Schumacher, was written, in common with the rest of the book, 
at the beginning of 191 5; but at the time this translation was 
in preparation there was available much more complete, as well 
as later, information in relation to loans and other details of 
finance and economics, and this later information has been gath- 
ered and incorporated in this chapter under direct authority of 
Professor Schumacher. 

Another matter to which it is perhaps well that attention 
be called is the use of one or two German terms in the trans- 
lation. The chief instance of this is in the retention of the Ger- 
man word Kultur, This word, in its German significance, in its 
inclusiveness, expressing as it does the German attitude toward 
race development, is essentially untranslatable. It would have 
been necessary to use an entire phrase to render its meaning in 
English. In its German form, however, the word Kultur has 
come to have for Americans something of its true German sig- 
nificance. 

In certain instances the word Kultur has been used in relation 
to the civilization and racial progression of other peoples, such 
as those of France, England and Belgium. In these cases the 
word has been adopted in the English version because it is used 
in the German sense, embracing so many things in these civiliza- 
tions, and thus seemed to express the meaning more satisfactorily 
than an English equivalent. 

Kultur — the true significance of that misinterpreted word, and 
all that it means to the German people, is thoroughly revealed 
in the second chapter in the book entitled ''The Spirit of Ger- 
man Kultur," by Professor Ernst Troeltsch. 

The word Dreibund is used in this English version to provide 
against the possible and quite easy confusion of the Triple Alli- 
ance and the Triple Entente. 

In these remarks it has been kept in mind that the chief pur- 
pose of this book is to interpret Germany, but it is perhaps well 
to remember that the book also seeks to interpret Germany's 
allies, and especially Austria-Hungary, to the world, and, in this 
translation, to America. 



BOOK I 

GERMANY'S POSITION IN THE 
WORLD 



MODERN GERMANY 

CHAPTER I 

GERMANY AND THE WORLD POWERS 
PROFESSOR OTTO HINTZE, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 



Germany's Historical-Political Growth 

THE political character of Germany is frequently misunder- 
stood in foreign countries, and Germany falsely judged in 
consequence. In America, especially, there is an inclination to 
adopt the English viewpoint, and to measure Germany according 
to the standards of a state existing under diametrically opposed 
conditions. The statement is scarcely open to challenge that the 
spirit and character of a nation depend not alone upon its in- 
ternal social structure, but in even greater degree upon the politi- 
cal necessities that spring from its geographical position and its 
relation to other states and Pov^ers; but, in judging Germany^ 
this truth has generally been lost sight of. 

The bases for a secure national existence are quite other on 
the European Continent than in England or America. In the 
latter countries the nation pursues its course in relative seclu- 
sion, protected by the sea and undisturbed by the immediate 
neighborhood of equally pow^erful states v^^hose enmity may, 
under given conditions, become a serious menace; on the Euro- 
pean Continent, on the other hand, in a space approximately 
equal to the territory of the United States, are crow^ded to- 
gether five Great Powers, besides a dozen smaller states, most 
of them saturated with ancient traditions and civilization, all 
armed to the teeth, and all filled with an intense longing for 
national independence and power, that finds expression in jeal- 
ously guarded borders and in uncompromising agricultural and 
politico-military competition. The very spirit of international 
relations in the different countries is to a great degree influenced 
by these differing life conditions. Neither Englishmen nor 



lo MODERN GERMANY 

Americans have ever been forced to keep so watchful an eye on 
their neighbors or to observe so carefully as we the change of 
pressure in the gauge of international politics, caused by military 
preparations and diplomatic moves. In the feeling of relative 
security, instead of having to protect their borders, they have 
been free to devote themselves to the advancement of their wel- 
fare, and to make their commercial interests the pivot of their 
political activity. The Continental states of Europe, on the other 
hand, are filled with a spirit of suspicion and rivalry, that leads 
them to regard a strong military organization as the absolute 
prerequisite to their national safety, and hence to their prosperity 
and civilization. Germany in especial is subject to so relentless a 
politico-military pressure on her borders that, before all things, 
she is forced, through the imperative law of self-preservation, so 
to strengthen herself in a military sense as to be able, in case of 
necessity, to maintain herself in the face of a world of enemies. 

France Is free from danger on the Pyrenean border, while to 
the west she Is protected by the sea. Russia enjoys on the Asiatic 
side, as well as toward the north and south, not alone perfect 
security, but more or less favorable opportunity for expansion. 
Each of these states has but one border to protect. Germany 
must protect herself on two borders, east and west, and were It 
not for the alliance with Austria-Hungary, she would be Imper- 
iled on still a third side. This position of our country. In the 
centre of Europe, without other natural boundaries than those 
furnished by the sea-coast on the north and by the Alps and the 
border mountains of Bohemia on the south, Is the decisive factor 
In our political geography ; nor would it be difficult to trace much 
of our peculiar political character to this source: not alone the 
monarchic-military basis In the structure of the state and the 
framework of our national life, but likewise the indisputable but 
often misunderstood and distorted fact that our potential military 
strength can be called forth in Its entirety only for defense, not 
for attack. 

Our Intellectual life, also. Is plainly under the Influence of 
this central geographical position. Many good points as well as 
many weaknesses of our national character result from It: our 
open mind for foreign art and foreign ideas ; our receptiveness to 
the good and beautiful, without regard to Its national source; 
a cosmopolitan spirit ever ready to hearken to the call of other 
nations and whose dream Is of a republic of letters ; a frequently 
exaggerated recognition of, and admiration for, the characteris- 
tics and accomplishments of other peoples ; a facility In the adop- 
tion of their customs and manners ; an extreme, one might almost 



MODERN GERMANY ii 

say, unworthy, delight in foreign words and things, which mars 
the noble simplicity of a truly national style in speech and life. 
In the last analysis, this results from the fact that ours is the 
central European country and nation, open in all directions to 
the outside world, at no point thrown back upon itself through 
the existence of natural boundaries, as, for example, is England 
in her insular position. The latter country, with its immoder- 
ately developed individuality, is not alone incapable of sympa- 
thetic and deep study of foreign character, but is all too prompt, 
without other than superficial understanding, to criticize and be- 
smirch the character of other nations, as at the present moment 
that of the Germans, when political and commercial advantage is 
to be gained thereby. And here again our peculiar geographical 
position leads to a manifold echoing of this malevolent censure. 
Let us be under no misapprehension : the number of Germany's 
friends is small, the number of her enemies, even in neutral 
countries, is large. Foreign observers have sought to explain this 
widespread and regrettable dislike of us by the fact that in inter- 
course with representatives of other nations Germans often exhibit 
an exaggerated self-consciousness, accompanied by bad manners, 
that betrays the parvenu. As opposed to this view, may be cited 
the not uncommon experience that our fellow-countrymen are only 
too inclined, when abroad, to adopt the foreign manner of life, 
as though it were superior to their own. On the other hand, 
we have no desire to deny the fact that the German, ever ab- 
sorbed with the essence of things, rather than with the form, 
not infrequently neglects to present his own personality in a 
favorable manner; as a result, his ofttimes more or less uncon- 
ventional exterior makes a less pleasing impression than that 
resulting from the polished courtesy of the Frenchman — ^which, 
however, promptly ceases with the stirring of chauvinism — or than 
that made by the firm though somewhat tiresome manners of the 
Englishman. There may, therefore, be some truth in this re- 
proach, although the spitefully exaggerated form in which it is 
generally presented renders it as untrue as are other sweeping 
judgments of the character of entire nations numbering millions. 
But only grudging ill-will can be satisfied with this explanation. 
More important is the justification for aversion which the advo- 
cates of democratic principles, whose influence is dominant in 
the majority of countries, discover in our institutions. They fail 
to find their personal ideal of political freedom realized in Ger- 
many, especially in Prussia, owing to the fact that with us the 
monarchic military authority has not yet surrendered to the civil 
or social-democratic majority. This consideration, to be sure, 



12 MODERN GERMANY 

has in no wise prevented our enemies from sympathizing with 
Russian despotism. I w^ould recommend for their perusal cer- 
tain passages in Sir Robert Seeley's political lectures. The tend- 
ency there is to show that conceptions of political freedom 
differ and that the outward form of a government must be 
adapted to the vital political requirements of the state. A nation 
which, like the German, is surrounded on all sides by the strong- 
est military powers, without natural protective boundaries, can- 
not have the same institutions as England in her insular security. 
The degree of political freedom permissible in the forms of 
government must evidently be inversely proportional to the 
political and military pressure exerted against the boundaries of 
the state. Disregard of this rule entails upon a country the 
fate of Poland in the eighteenth century, when that state paid 
for undue freedom from political restrictions with its national 
existence. We Germans, on the other hand, enjoy an intel- 
lectual and personal freedom by no means inferior to that of 
Englishmen or Americans, but which, in some respects, is su- 
perior. And the fact that our form of government is neither 
parliamentary nor republican should awaken in the breasts of 
members of those nations w^ho are capable of political judgment 
merely the perception that the national requirements under which 
we live are different from their own; it should not be a cause 
either for dislike or contempt. Tolerance, not only in religious 
but also in political life, is a virtue that is generally the result 
of a higher capacity for discrimination and the lack of which 
gives proof only of vulgar narrow-mindedness and mental limi- 
tations. 

The fact that we Germans are less favorably criticized in the 
press and by public opinion in foreign lands than either the 
English or French is in great part to be explained, furthermore, 
by the circumstance that we are in a lesser degree the creditors of 
other nations than they, and that we have lacked their skill in 
purchasing the venal press of the various countries. Even in 
regard to Russia, mental and verbal criticism is less severe where 
the power of the ruble is felt than w^here it is absent. Within 
the Empire we are in the habit of devoting our money to our 
own undertakings, and our education in conceptions of honor 
and incorruptibility has been too uncompromising for us to under- 
stand, in the manner of Englishmen, Frenchmen and Russians, 
the art of influencing public opinion in our favor. Democratic 
parliamentarism is in this respect as greatly our superior as is 
Russian bureaucracy. 

The principal cause, however, of the dislike of Germans, is 



MODERN GERMANY 13 

generally overlooked. It lies in the simple circumstance that we 
live at the centre of Europe and have more neighbors than 
any other nation. Propinquity, in view^ of the tension in inter- 
national relations, is generally synonymous with rivalry or 
enmity. So deep a feeling of distrust, of fear, of covetousness, 
of race-antagonism, and of a perhaps even sharper enmity of kin- 
dred peoples and races, are bound up in our thousand-year-old 
history with this sense of nearness, so many motives of envy, jeal- 
ousy, of implacable desire for revenge, that such an excess of 
malevolence must, in the end, inevitably pass beyond our neigh- 
bors and exert its influence also upon distant peoples. The fact 
that Englishmen in this respect are more fortunate is due neither 
to their greater amiability nor to their superior manners — the 
latter, we believe, are open to a good deal of criticism — nor is it 
due to their old and established reputation as a European Power, 
nor to the respect paid to their political institutions, that have 
served as models for so many nations. In great part it results 
simply from the aristocratic exclusiveness of their position in 
Europe, like that of some dweller in a private manor, whereby 
they are removed from the countless frictions and misunderstand- 
ings to which Germans, living as it were in the midst of an over- 
crowded tenement, are exposed a thousand times daily. 

This fact cannot be sufficiently emphasized: Our historico- 
political destiny lies in our geographical position. Living at the 
centre of the Continent, surrounded by Slav and Romance peo- 
ples, as well as by remnants of Germanic races, we find ourselves 
forced to maintain an attitude of self-reliance calculated to in- 
spire respect, if we wish to escape being trodden down and 
crushed in the struggle of nations — as unfortunately was our 
fate for so many centuries. 

In former times, before the crystallization of effective national 
consciousness and while the sense of religious unity formed a 
strong political bond among the undeveloped peoples of Chris- 
tian Europe, this central position, together with the lack of 
strong natural boundaries, may possibly have operated as a fac- 
tor favorable to the spread of the German race and to its influ- 
ence in the world. In the south, the gentle approaches to 
the Alps lured ever onward across the mountains, in contrast 
to their abrupt descent on the Italian side. During the 
Middle Ages the German emperors were the standard-bearers 
of the idea of a universal Christian Empire, which for centuries 
furnished the basis for European civilization. This was the 
real imperial epoch of our history. It lies buried in the distant 
past; but we may be permitted to recall it, to recall its heroic 



14 MODERN GERMANY 

splendor and its contribution to civilization, when other nations 
are disposed to see in Germany the upstart among the European 
congeries of states. Our emperors marched at the head of their 
German legions toward Rome, whence they directed the des- 
tinies of the Christian world, at a time when the tottering An- 
glo-Saxon monarchy was about to fall a victim to a handful of 
Norman raiders, when the Capetians were but beginning to 
conquer for themselves a modest local authority in the Isle de 
France, and when Russia still lay shrouded in the obscurity of 
pre-historical barbarism. The German nation was at that time 
the exponent of the great ideas which controlled the world; 
but for its own national future it failed to provide. The neces- 
sity of maintaining a firm grasp on Italy, and if possible on 
Burgundy, the great struggle between emperor and pope that 
resulted therefrom — all these were factors which preventeid 
Germany from laying a firm national foundation, such as Eng- 
land and France were preparing for themselves during this 
long period of strife. The princes of the Empire gained an 
unduly powerful, semi-independent position, the empire itself 
fell to pieces, and with the coming of the Reformation — that 
drew its best strength from Germany and found its greatest pro- 
tagonist in the person of a German — the political powers in 
the Empire were too weak either to smother the movement or to 
carry it to complete triumph. The religious dispute split the 
nation permanently and completed its political disintegration. 
While religious freedom and tolerance gradually, and as the 
fruit of bitter strife, gained the upper hand, political power was 
lost, precisely at the moment when the European system of 
states was in process of formation. Two remnants only of the 
German people, Austria and Prussia, achieved or maintained 
the position of Great Powers. But Austria was too heavily 
handicapped with non-German territory and clung too tena- 
ciously to an all-embracing Catholicism permanently to retain the 
leadership of the German people. The future of Germany de- 
pended rather on Prussia, even at a time when the Hohen- 
zollern rulers had not yet begun to dream of a universal Ger- 
man polity. 

But only through unexampled energy and economy of its 
military and financial resources was Prussia able, in the midst 
of the European states, to raise itself to independence and power. 
It was compelled to assume a political structure consonant with 
the conditions under which it had arisen, and to adapt itself to 
general political conditions and to the resulting requirements. 
Hence the origin of so-called Prussian militarism. It is a form 



MODERN GERMANY 15 

of government which does not seek primarily the comfort and 
happiness of the individual, but rather the power and great- 
ness of the state, since without the latter, general prosperity can- 
not be regarded as secure. This system has made the rela- 
tively large standing army the backbone of a central adminis- 
tration that takes cognizance of every man and every penny, that 
teaches self-denial, order and conscientiousness in civil as well 
as military life, and that has accustomed its citizens rather to 
fulfill their political duties than to aim at the increase of their 
political rights. It safeguarded the intellectual freedom of the 
individual at an earlier period than any other European govern- 
ment. The "Common Law" of the Prussian state, which came 
into being during the period of the promulgation of the Ameri- 
can constitution and of the French Revolution, contains the 
fundamental guarantee of the most important personal rights, 
such as religious freedom, personal liberty and security of prop- 
erty against unlawful administrative encroachment. The differ- 
ence is that there was no question here of the promulgation of the 
universal rights of man — it was simply a codification of limita- 
tions which the state had voluntarily imposed upon itself in its 
relations with its subjects during the ''age of enlightenment." 
Public education and enlightenment have been so successfully 
advanced under the system of Prussian militarism that to-day 
the state is practically without illiterates, and like the other 
German states in this respect it leads all other great countries 
of the world, notably France and England, not to speak of 
Russia. This system of government, which has by no means 
been inimical to the conceptions of true freedom, despite its com- 
pulsion to order and the fulfilment of duty, has proved itself 
highly adaptable to the transition from enlightened absolutism 
to the modern constitutional state, with parliamentary control, 
freedom of the press, the right of assemblage and a healthy form 
of local self-government. It has developed the fundamental 
conception of the equality of citizens before the law; in a 
much higher degree than usually assumed, it has made a reality 
of Chancellor Hardenberg's demand of 1807: "Democratic in- 
stitutions under a monarchical form of government." But it 
opposes a transformation that would place the government in 
the hands of changing majorities and subject the army to corrupt 
parliamentary influences — a statement true not alone of Prussia, 
but of entire Germany. France may indulge in such experiments ; 
our position is too precarious to admit of the attempt. 

Since the time of Frederick the Great, the Prussian name has 
enjoyed respect and consideration throughout Germany. Goethe 



i6 MODERN GERMANY 

speaks approvingly of the "worth, dignity and perseverance of 
the Prussians." Since the enthusiastic revolt against Napoleon 
In 1813, since the impressive sacrifices and achievements of the 
Wars of Liberation from 181 3 to 1815, in the eyes of German 
patriots Prussia has stood as the future leader in the struggle 
for German unity. Unfortunately, this unity could be achieved 
only through separation from the kindred German races of 
Austria; but the painful operation that severed the Hapsburg 
Dual Monarchy from the German Empire was nevertheless In 
the final analysis salutary. It rendered possible a permanent in- 
ternational union of the two powers, much closer and freer from 
misunderstandings and rivalries than would have been the case 
had the old political bond been renewed by means of a loose 
and artificial federation. Even without such a formal union, 
Germany and Austria-Hungary are united for better or for 
worse. Mutually they uphold and support each other in their 
positions as great World Powers. But Prussia Is, in its relations 
to the outside world, an absolute unit with the rest of Germany. 

Foreigners find difficulty in grasping the political peculiari- 
ties of the German Empire, since this is possible only when seen 
against the background of the country's complicated history. 
Even such distorted views are encountered as that the other 
German states have been conquered by Prussia and forced into 
the union. The only force exercised in this connection was that 
which existed In the will of the people and in the historico-po- 
lltical necessity of the moment driving them toward unity. 
There is between Prussia and the other federal states no greater 
opposition than, for example, between Massachusetts and Vir- 
ginia. To speak of ''Prussia" and ''Germany" in antithesis Is 
misleading. This mode of expression dates from the period of 
the Confederation of the Rhine, when the German states other 
than Prussia and Austria which were under the immediate pro- 
tection of Napoleon, were pleased to call themselves "the real 
Germany." It is rooted in the thoroughly mistaken conception 
of a fundamental difference between Prussia and Saxony or Ba- 
varia or Wiirttemberg, in regard to race and civilization. There 
are, to be sure, racial diiferences within the boundaries of Prus- 
sia, as within those of the rest of Germany, but they serve to 
enrich rather than to Impoverish the national life, and retard 
in no wise the fusing of all Into a unified whole. In the eigh- 
teenth century, at the time of Goethe and NIcolal, It may still 
have been possible to speak of an antithesis In the intellectual 
life and culture of Weimar and Berlin; but since the days of 
Humboldt, Fichte and Schlelermacher this antithesis has been 



MODERNj GERMANY 17 

eliminated. The various currents of German life have united and 
merged to form a fuller and stronger stream. The thought and 
culture of the German people is to-day quite the same in Berlirt 
as in Weimar, Munich, or Heidelberg. The endless variety of 
provincial peculiarities are reconciled to form one great whole 
through the bond of a common national interest. The industrial 
west and the agrarian east, despite their difference in customs 
and social structure, long since perceived their mutual interde- 
pendence and realized that only in union could they hope to 
survive. Great civic republics and centres of trade, like Ham- 
burg and Bremen, feel themselves to be integral parts of this 
national civic and economic federation, in the same manner as 
the agricultural territories of Bavaria, Hanover and Oldenburg. 
The inhabitants of the southern and central mountain districts, 
whence our rivers find their way to the sea, look with precisely 
the same pride upon the flag at the masthead of our ships of 
war and commerce as do the North-Germans of the plains and 
sea-coast. Everywhere, together with self-conscious pride in 
characteristic local peculiarities, is to be found in the same bos- 
oms the realization and conviction that only in a firm and har- 
monious union of all the racial stems and provinces are freedom, 
prosperity and power to be secured for the German people. The 
significance of Prussia for the German Empire lies in the fact 
that her firm political structure, welded upon the anvil of neces- 
sity, has furnished the strong backbone for the new national or- 
ganism. Prussia's political spirit has become the spirit of the 
new German Empire. Bavaria, Wiirttemberg and Saxony fight 
for the same national possessions with the same patriotic devo- 
tion as the men from Brandenburg, Pomerania and East 
Prussia. 

The unifying of Germany and the formation of the Empire 
was not possible by peaceful means. These blessings had to be 
gained upon the field of battle against the opposition of power- 
ful European states; for, in view of our central geographical po- 
sition, a fundamental change in international relationships was 
thereby brought about. The new order, therefore, was not to 
be achieved merely as the result of a national movement, through 
patriotic gatherings and manifestoes — what w^as required to real- 
ize it, was a bold and far-sighted policy, under monarchical guid- 
ance and with military emphasis. This fundamental considera- 
tion gives the key to the whole form of our national existence. 
Conditions being thus, Prussia, as the strongest German state, 
was called upon to assume and retain the leadership ; and the 
Prussian government found itself forced in secret to gather mili- 



i8 MODERN GERMANY 

tary strength for this great task, in the face of the keenest oppo- 
sition by the democratic parties. From this fact arose the neces- 
sity of emphasizing strongly the monarchic-military factor in 
Prussian life, and of making it secure for the future against par- 
liamentary majorities. The leadership of the Empire could be 
given into the keeping of no other hands than those which ruled 
Prussia. Therefore the Kaiser, invested with the uncurtailed 
power of a genuinely ruling Prussian king, stands to-day at the 
head of the federated governments of the Empire. The impor- 
tance of the Bundesrat, or Federal Council, is frequently under- 
estimated abroad, as its activity does not force itself on the 
public; but since the founding of the Empire its federative char- 
acter has remained intact. Germany is a federal state, with 
strongly marked characteristics and self-consciousness in its indi- 
vidual members. The tendency toward unity is perhaps less 
strong than in the North American Union. The far-reaching 
administrative decentralization in this form of constitution needs 
as a counter-balance a strong and uniform direction in the conduct 
of its foreign policy, and this must of necessity be placed in the 
keeping of the Emperor, acting under the advice of the Imperial 
Chancellor. 

The Empire is thus provided with a strong monarchic head; 
nor is the power of the Emperor or that of the King of Prussia 
the impersonal shadowy prerogative of a parliamentary ruler — 
it is a real, living, directing force. In the minds of foreigners 
the conception of a personal government is generally bound up 
with the picture of arbitrary power, lawlessness and despotism. 
They are too unfamiliar with our history and the spirit of our 
institutions to understand that a free constitution and a strong 
monarchic power are by no means irreconcilable. The English 
constitution is based upon the fact that the various classes of 
society, under the leadership of the aristocracy, succeeded in re- 
ducing the royal power to a state of impotence. Conversely, our 
constitution has crystallized about the monarchy as a centre, 
around which the various classes of society — nobles, burghers 
and peasants, and in addition already a considerable percentage 
of workingmen — have formed themselves in a body, the whole 
permeated and held together by the different elements of the 
civil service and the officers and the army in general. This in- 
ner growth of our organic political life is still in process of de- 
velopment, and is now, under the influence of the present great 
events, approaching a happy consummation. Our rulers declare 
themselves to be such "by the grace of God," but not in the 
sense in which Englishmen understand the notorious jure divino 



MODERN GERMANY fi9 

of the Stuart kings. The meaning of this characterization from 
the viewpoint of political law is simply that the royal power was 
not granted by the people, but that it rests upon ancient, his- 
torical right that has grown and ripened coincident with our 
history, thus proceeding from a combination of factors which 
piety may be inclined to ascribe to a higher dispensation. Ex- 
alted, mystic conceptions, such, for example, as those indulged 
in by Frederick William IV, are of a purely subjective, indi- 
vidual nature and without the faintest constitutional significance. 
The monarch is not, in our eyes, the representative of God upon 
earth, but merely, as Frederick the Great expressed it, the first 
servant of the state. And when William II takes pleasure in 
acknowledging himself to be the instrument of the Most High, 
this is intended in no other sense than might be employed in the 
religious conception of any other calling. It intensifies moral 
elevation and the sense of responsibility, but does not in any 
manner touch constitutional prerogatives. 

By the side of the Emperor and the federated governments 
stands the Reichstag, a representative body of the German people, 
resting upon the broadest democratic basis, with whom the former 
powers must agree on such matters as the appropriations for army 
and navy and the levy of indirect taxes and customs duties. But 
universal, direct, equal suffrage, with secret ballot, which is the 
basis of this parliamentary body, could not with equal justice be 
claimed for the Prussian legislature. In the Empire equal suffrage 
rights may be regarded as the corresponding equivalent of the 
universal duty to bear arms and of the burden of universal in- 
direct taxation. In Prussia, on the contrary, where the Land- 
tag, or legislature, decides on questions of direct taxation, from 
which a large part of the electors are exempt, such equal rights 
might, at times, lead to serious injustice. It must, nevertheless, 
be admitted that the present arrangement, which rests upon the 
principle of a suffrage graduated according to tax liability, has 
with the passage of time degenerated in favor of plutocracy and 
is in need of a thorough revision. Absolute universal suffrage, 
however — which, by the way, has not yet been realized even in 
England — is not practicable in Prussia, for the reason that par- 
liamentary friction could not be still further increased without 
seriously disturbing the smooth working of our already highly 
complicated governmental machine. Government with us is 
more difficult than in parliamentary states, or than in such states 
as recognize the separation of the various powers, as in America. 
Our German governments are forced to resort to compromises 
with the various political parties, in order to gain a majority to 



20 MODERN GERMANY 

support them in the main outlines of their policy. Transcen- 
dental government (above parties) presupposes a much higher 
degree of knowledge, application and skill on the part of respon- 
sible circles than government by means of party rule. In Prussia 
It is, nevertheless, necessary to have a government that stands 
above parties, not alone for the reasons already given, which 
spring from our peculiar political position, but owing to the 
nature of the parties themselves. The division of the various 
factions has been carried much further with us than in England 
or America; the divergence of principles Is sharper, the spirit of 
criticism Is much more highly developed than is the actual ad- 
ministrative ability. It would scarcely be an exaggeration to 
say that the German parliamentary parties represent rather the 
various interests of civil society than real political ideas or prin- 
ciples. With these social Interests, however, are bound up op- 
posing views of religion, of cosmic conceptions and of nationality 
in so complicated a manner as scarcely to be understood by a 
foreigner. 

Closer examination of the various sections of the Conserva- 
tives and Liberals need not be entered upon here; but some 
observations seem appropriate in regard to parties like the Centre 
and the Social Democrats, which may be characterized as 
international and which in fact form the complement to the 
pronounced nationalistic side of our public life. One may be 
permitted to characterize the ideals which they represent as "su- 
pernational." These tw^o political parties are a palpable mani- 
festation of the ineradicable cosmopolitan idealism that is Inher- 
ent in German blood. The ideal of the Centre Party is the 
unity of the Cathohc Church with the Pope as leader. The 
Ideal of Social Democracy Is the brotherhood of the working 
classes of all countries, the triumph of labor over capital, of the 
cooperative system of organization over that of a master class — 
m the last analysis, the metamorphosis of the world Into one 
great cooperatively governed commonwealth of producers and 
consumers. That such ideals, despite doctrinaire exaggerations, 
are nevertheless quite reconcilable with stanch national convic- 
tions was demonstrated long since by the Centre Party, through 
its practical cooperation in parliamentary work; w^hlle the patri- 
otic attitude of the Social Democrats at the outbreak of the war 
justified the opinion of those who had claimed that members 
of this party were from every point of view worthy to be con- 
sidered a valuable and indispensable part of the nation. It Is the 
party of radical opposition in all questions of domestic policy, a 
natural phenomenon of reaction called forth by the strongly 



MODERN GERMANY 2i 

developed, yet politically necessary, monarchic-military principle 
in our form of government. The intensity of opposition is 
greater than in any other state, but it is unavoidable; and, al- 
though the conduct of government is thereby rendered extremely 
difficult, nevertheless in many respects it has proved a beneficial 
incentive to the w^hole body politic. Without the Social Demo- 
cratic Party, social conscience could scarcely have been awak- 
ened as has been the case. The idea of social justice has gained 
a power in our legislation and administration that permits the 
Government to take up the fight on any question of social poli- 
tics with a good conscience, while it has, on the other hand, not 
been without beneficial influence on the working classes. Our 
legislation for the insurance of workingmen, the state-socialistic 
spirit of which was at first the subject of foreign derision, is 
now generally imitated, even in England, which originally 
seemed furthest from such ideas. Our legislation for the pro- 
tection of workingmen, for which England may be said to have 
furnished the model, has gone further than the original. Eng- 
lish labor commissions have been astounded by the general con- 
dition and the high standard of living of our workers, which is 
unmistakably and continually improving. The hopeless doc- 
trine of the "iron law of wages" has long since been thrown 
onto the scrap heap. 

In no other country, taken by and large, is the system of 
taxation more just than in Germany. Especially Prussia, with 
its progressive income and supplementary property tax, in 
this respect towers high over the French Republic. We cannot, 
of course, avoid social conflicts in the future, but they will 
be fought out, we hope, along the lines of common national 
interests, even though the international sympathies of the leaders 
of labor may not entirely disappear. The workers will 
perceive more and more the significance of the state for them 
as for others; casting aside prejudice, they will learn to 
acknowledge and appreciate more and more the Government's 
spirit of justice, and the readiness of self-sacrifice of the pros- 
perous classes, who in 19 13 without a murmur assumed the 
burden of a defense contribution of a billion marks. And, al- 
though our Social Democrats reject militarism on principle, 
nevertheless in practice they are excellent soldiers. The stern 
discipline of the army has raised the political and unionist or- 
ganizations of our workers to an exceedingly high plane. 

Less significant than the social and religious divergencies 
in our party life are those of a national character, which are 
bound up with certain abnormal aspects of our history. The 



22 MODERN GERMANY 

German Empire is a national state of a peculiar kind: its boun- 
daries are not identical with those of the German race and of 
the German language. At many points they fall considerably 
short of these; at others they extend somewhat beyond them. 
As early as the sixteenth century certain important outlying 
portions seceded from the great German territory, coherent eth- 
nologically and linguistically as it existed in the Middle Ages 
at the time of the old empire, but as yet without the bond of a 
common written language. This secession was due to the fact 
that the centrifugal tendencies resulting from international con- 
ditions were stronger than the unifying power of the weakened 
and disrupted empire. Toward the southwest the Swiss fell 
away in order to form, with certain Romance elements, a sepa- 
rate state of strongly marked individuality; but numbering as 
they do to-day more than two and a half millions, they continue 
to use, in addition to their Allemanic dialect, the German lit- 
erary language, and have remained in close and uninterrupted 
touch with German thought. In the northwest descendants of 
the Frisians and Franconians have attained not alone an inde- 
pendent political existence, but have developed also an indi- 
vidual language, and regard themselves as a separate people. In 
addition to the six million and odd inhabitants of the Protestant 
Netherlands, under this classification are to be reckoned nearly 
four millions of Flemish residents in Belgium. Besides the 
above loss through segregation of boundary districts, many mil- 
lions of Germans have been lost to the Fatherland by the exten- 
sive colonization of former times, and especially through the 
prodigious emigration of the last century. They are to be 
found in Transylvania and Hungary, in Russia, and above all 
in the United States, all of which received during the nineteenth 
century an influx reckoned by millions, that brought to them a 
valuable Teutonic element in the upbuilding of their national 
life. 

The formation of the German Empire and the resulting eco- 
nomic prosperity has gradually served to check this feverish 
movement toward foreign countries. But the political rebirth 
of Germany was not accomplished without an extremely serious 
and significant loss of Teutonic national territory: the Germans 
of Austria, living in immediate contact with their brothers of 
the neighboring land, were excluded from the boundaries of the 
Empire. They number to-day approximately ten millions, and 
belong to us through language and education. Their sympa- 
thies strengthen the bond that unites us to the Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy. 



MODERN GERMANY 23 

These kindred German elements on foreign territory, how- 
ever, have never served as an excuse for a policy of "irreden- 
tism" on our part. Political considerations and also, to an 
extent, the emphatic disinclination of these disrupted border 
remnants of our nation, have always precluded such plans from 
being entertained by serious and responsible politicians in Ger- 
many. Our sympathies naturally extend to our fellow-country- 
men in other lands, especially to those who, surrounded by 
foreign elements, are in danger of losing their national charac- 
teristics. We strive to aid them to maintain the German 
language, customs and education. This absolutely non-political 
cultural design has been pursued for many years by the Associa- 
tion for German Ideals in Foreign Countries {Verein fiir das 
Deutschtum im Auslande), previously known as the German 
School Association, in view of the nature of its chief activities. 
The results of such an educational movement have naturally 
been favorable to the standing and interests of the German 
nation abroad. Valuable influence may in this manner be ex- 
erted, especially upon commercial interests, for trade follows 
not alone the flag, but the language as well. When on occasion, 
however, nationalistic jingoes and hotspurs have overstepped 
these boundaries, they have promptly not only met with an 
emphatic rebuff in responsible governmental quarters, but in 
addition have learned that the great majority of the leaders of 
public thought will have nothing to do with such plans. 

On the other hand, in the course of history the inclusion into 
the German state of certain border territory w^ith foreign ele- 
ments has proved unavoidable, as in North Schleswig, in Al- 
sace-Lorraine, and especially in Poland and Upper Silesia. 
Such elements, however, form together only about seven per cent 
of our entire population, which, according to the last census 
(1910), numbered approximately sixty-five millions, and which 
to-day must have reached nearly the seventy million mark. This 
element, therefore, cannot be regarded as exercising any seri- 
ously adverse influence on the national character of the German 
Empire. An absolute separation of nationalities at the frontiers 
is quite impracticable, since Germanic and foreign elements are 
in many cases inextricably mixed; and the political necessity for 
the inclusion of such elements is dictated by the need of a 
boundary, not favorable, perhaps, but tenable from a military 
point of view. In Alsace-Lorraine, where approximately two 
hundred thousand of the inhabitants speak French, the national 
question is complicated by the still continuing protest against 
the annexation of the provinces — although this step was the 



24 MODERN GERMANY 

result not alone of an irresistible nationalistic demand, but was 
dictated by military necessity for the protection of our bound- 
aries against France. It must never be forgotten that it is 
here a question of former Germany territory that was illegally 
torn from us at the time of our greatest weakness. Metz and 
Strassburg in French control represent sally ports against Ger- 
many, whereas under German dominance they are a bulwark 
for the protection of our borders. Many observers are of the 
opinion that the placing of these territories upon a footing of 
approximate equality with other Federal States of the Empire 
has proved a detriment rather than an advantage; but other im- 
partial critics declare that the process of amalgamation, con- 
strained by its very nature to be slow, is progressing normally. 
At all events, we are justified in the hope that the experience 
of this war and the resulting elimination of the most embit- 
tered nationalistic propagandists may pave the way to perma- 
nent improvement and final settlement of the conditions. 

The one important national problem of Prussian and German 
politics is Poland. As a state Poland could not live, as a nation 
it cannot die. At the time of the various divisions national sen- 
timent did not yet exist. As regards the dismemberment of the 
land, Prussia found herself on the horns of a dilemma. She faced 
the alternative either of becoming a partner in it or of surren- 
dering the entire booty to Russia, and thereby of permitting this 
dangerously strengthened neighbor to advance her boundaries 
close to Berlin. The territory taken by Frederick the Great 
had previously been the home of German civilization ; that added 
by his successors transformed Prussia temporarily into a half- 
Slavic state. In our opinion it is fortunate that the main por- 
tion of these Polish provinces did not remain in Prussian pos- 
session. It is a fact, however, that the Prussian Government 
was desirous of retaining a larger share of these former Polish 
possessions than Russia was willing to grant. The motive for 
this desire was the need of a more or less satisfactory boundary 
in that great plain which possesses but few natural lines of de- 
fence. One must admit that the portion finally awarded to 
Prussia, and which to-day forms the province of Posen, was for 
this reason the very least that could be demanded. Even so, 
the boundary, with the deeply encroaching Russian salient be- 
tween Silesia and East Prussia, is so unfavorable, from the mili- 
tary point of view, as to admit of defence only through great 
superiority in numbers or in generalship. Together with this 
boundary line, Prussia acquired a Polish population, whose Ger- 
manizing, at that period of growing nationalistic tendencies, was 



MODERN GERMANY 25 

from the start practically out of the question. It numbers to-day, 
with the inclusion of other elements, notably those of the more 
ancient Upper-Silesian stock, four millions of people, who form 
a kind of separate community within the German state. The 
position of Prussia is different from that of Austria in regard 
to the Poles of Galicia. Prussia Is and must remain a strongly 
centralized and uniform state; it cannot grant to the Poles a 
separate political existence, but on the contrary must see to it 
that the youth of the country, who of course are subject to the 
universal duty of bearing arms, do not constitute a useless for- 
eign element in the German army. They must understand the 
German language, and the German school and German adminis- 
tration are the sole means to this end. It is mainly this necessity 
that has constantly brought about fresh conflicts. There is room 
for discussion as to the possible extent of concessions to be made 
to nationalist feeling, but the problem is how to satisfy in a just 
manner the national demands of our Polish citizens, without at 
the same time losing sight of Prussian and governmental exigen- 
cies. That problem up to the present no one has succeeded in 
solving. The present crisis bears with especial weight upon this 
sensitive point in our national and political life. The Polish 
question, in view of the changes which the war has rendered 
possible, must in the future be earnestly and sympathetically con- 
sidered. As a factor in the outbreak of hostilities it was of no 
moment, and in the struggle itself our Polish-speaking citizens 
have done their full duty. 

The German nation, despite its long history, is nevertheless 
not an ancient race. In point of age it lies midway between 
France and Russia, as do likewise Austria-Hungary and Great 
Britain, although these two countries may be said to approach 
the French rather than the Russian extreme. France, with an in- 
crease of population of but 1.8 per thousand, shows unmistakable 
signs of degenerative age; Russia, with an increase of 21 per 
thousand, those of effervescent youth ; while Germany, whose 
increase is 13.6 per thousand, represents what may be described 
as the prime of life. Perhaps w^e have already passed the highest 
point of our increase in population — until 19 10 it stood at 14.5 
per thousand, recently it has fallen slightly — but in any event 
we stand well above the United Kingdom, which shows only 
an increase of 8.7, about the same as that of Austria-Hungary. 
Our increase, therefore, is about 900,000 yearly; and only a far- 
seeing and unrelaxing economic policy can solve the problem of 
feeding this ever-rising population on a fixed territory. That 
we have been successful is proved by the fact that emigration has 



26 MODERN GERMANY 

steadily decreased since the eighties, until in 191 3 but 25,800 
persons left the country — that is to say, less than accretions 
through immigration. The constantly increasing capacity to sup- 
port our growing population has been gained not alone through 
mechanical and industrial advance, but also through the progress 
of agriculture. German economic life is characterized by the 
union of agriculture and manufacturing industry, not by their 
opposition. But it lies in the nature of things that the results of 
progress and industry are more perceptible in the manufacturing 
field. In this, German energy, mature yet still youthful, mani- 
fests itself very clearly. France has long since passed the 
zenith of her industrial development ; she is the t) pical capitalistic 
nation, retired from business, as it w^ere, and living on her 
savings. Russia is, in this respect also, still in youthful im- 
maturity. England in recent years has seemed likewise on the 
point of passing into the class represented by France. We are 
in the ascending scale; commercially also we arc about to become 
a World Power. 



II 

Character of Germany's World Policy Contrasted with the 
Imperialism of Her Enemies 

At the time of the founding of the German Empire, Europe 
was still the political world beyond which the eyes of its states- 
men scarcely strayed. The new state became ^ member of the 
European system, assuming the position among the Great Powers 
which Prussia had hitherto held. With the resurrection of the 
imperial dignity no thought was given to a revival of the old 
ideas of the earlier imperialism. On the contrary, the new Em- 
pire was created in conscious opposition to this ideal of the Mid- 
dle Ages. The German people and its leaders had not failed 
to profit by the history of a thousand years. They were fully 
aware that a policy aiming at world dominion easily carries the 
nation which represents it into paths of degeneration and deform- 
ity, economically as well as politically. The German Empire 
aimed to be nothing but an equal among the other Great Powers 
of the world. The paramount prestige which it temporarily en- 
joyed among the European states was only the natural effect of 
the deep moral and political impression made by its remarkable 
achievements and successes, and especially by the impressive per- 
sonality of its great statesman. But an actual dominance, threat- 



MODERN GERMANY 27 

ening the interests of other states, was not the corollary of this 
prestige. 

The European system has been based, from its inception, upon 
the principle that the component states recognize each other's 
entire independence, and that a certain number of these powers — 
previously five, since the advent of Italy, six — preserve among 
themselves a species of balance, so that no one of them can exer- 
cise exclusive or excessive power. 

This system of Great Powers, enjoying equal rights and mu- 
tually respecting each other, this international commonwealth 
upon which rests the European civilization of the last four hun- 
dred years, is a new phenomenon in the history of mankind which 
developed only during the period from the sixteenth to the nine- 
teenth century. Neither the history of ancient times nor that of 
the great Oriental states knows this principle of equality and of 
mutual recognition in an international community of powers. It 
came into existence as a result of the community of religious and 
cultural interests among the states of the Christian Occident, 
following the shipwreck of the imperial and papal dreams of 
universal power. But this idea did not develop spontaneously 
and in peaceful harmony ; it was born rather of the struggles of 
rivalling interests in the uninterrupted continuance of which remi- 
niscences of the imperialistic idea of the Middle Ages played a 
considerable part. The clashing of the tendency towards a uni- 
versal monarchy with the conception of the autonomy of the na- 
tions is what has called into being the European idea of the bal- 
ance of power. This has proved, it is true, an uncertain bal- 
ance, but the many disturbances which it has suffered have at no 
time led to a permanent dominance of any one single state. This 
relationship of the Powers was previously confined to the Conti- 
nent of Europe. The colonial world, as well as commercial and 
maritime interests, were excluded from its purview. In this field 
England, the outlying member of the European system, had in 
the course of the eighteenth century gained an almost exclusive 
ascendency. But this condition, which had resulted concomitant 
with the great development of states since the sixteenth century, 
though considered unwelcome was not keenly or universally 
felt to be a disturbance or menace to the balance of power, so 
long as the maritime interests of the Great Powers remained too 
unimportant seriously to influence the general political situation. 
Not until recently did a change take place in this respect. 

England's conception of the European balance of power was 
to the effect that it should be the means of increasing and main- 
taining her maritime ascendency. It meant that the Continental 



38 MODERN GERMANY 

Powers should destroy each other by constant warfare, in order 
that England might have a free hand at sea and in the colonies. 
Throughout the centuries of modern history it has been the 
relentless principle of British policy to fight the strongest Power 
of the Continent by means of the others. 

The mutual rivalry of the Continental states at all times 
furnished England with a convenient handle for such a policy. 
Moreover, this political maxim of hers helped to prevent the 
Continent from ever finding peace and to perpetuate and in- 
tensify the differences of the various Powers. In this connec- 
tion, however, it cannot be denied that at the time of Louis 
XIV and Napoleon I, Europe's balance of power and her free- 
dom were seriously threatened, or even almost destroyed, and 
that it was due to the assistance of England that they were 
maintained and restored. Especially in the person of Napoleon 
was there a decided recrudescence of the old imperial conception, 
of the dream of universal monarchy. Not alone the political 
exigencies resulting from the struggle with England endowed 
his plans with an all-embracing scope looking to the subjection 
of the entire European Continent; but bound up with these per- 
sonal aims we find ambitions which were an inheritance from the 
past of France and Europe in general, and which through the 
personal lust for power of the Corsican assumed gigantic propor- 
tions. But the moment which, through the cooperation of the rest 
of Europe with England, saw the thwarting of this mighty 
attempt to found a Continental despotism, brought with it the 
consummation of England's undisputed sway over the seas, com- 
merce and colonies. The European balance of power was, and 
remained, for England primarily a means to this end; it became 
more and more a deceptive catch-word intended to mislead 
public opinion by the fetich of European freedom and to conceal 
the fact that it was the discord of the Continental Powers that 
smoothed England's way to world-dominion. 

The European system is to-day an obsolete notion. The 
surface of the earth, through the vast increase in international 
intercourse, has assumed a unified aspect from the economic and 
political standpoint. A new system of World Powers is coming 
into being. All the Great Powers to-day have interests across 
the seas much the same as England, with whom they have come 
into more or less keen competition, unless content to shape their 
course according to the latter's dictates. To the six European 
Great Powers have been added the United States and Japan. 
In the same manner as the medieval states, those of to-day are 
beginning to group themselves and to delimit the spheres of 



MODERN GERMANY 29 

their influence and interests. As in the period of mercantilism, 
an important role is again being played by the commercial seclu- 
sion of the various states and by the endeavor to gain for them- 
selves greater and self-sufficing trade territory. Not w^ithout 
justice has this been spoken of as the New Mercantilism. The 
spirit of commercial competition and political rivalry has arisen 
anew^, with a strength long unknown. A struggle identical 
with that which, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
resulted in the creation of the European Great Powers, is to-day 
being waged to determine the World Powers in the future system 
of states. In this connection the fact of England's command 
of the seas stands forth with new significance. In former 
times England, through her maritime interests and colonial 
possessions, reached far beyond the confines of the European 
system of states of which she formed in a measure an 
extraneous part; her existence was dual: she was at the same 
time a European and a World Power. Now, to the full 
extent of her possessions and interests, she has become an integral 
part of the new and greater system of states, and in this new 
setting the successful maintenance of her claim to the sole ruler- 
ship of the seas would mean nothing less than world-domination. 
Sir Walter Raleigh's saying: ''Who rules the seas, rules the 
world," has gained a new significance to-day. The ocean, which 
in this age of extended steamship traffic, of cables and wireless 
telegraphy, forms one vast unit, has in truth become to-day, as 
Friedrich List foresaw, "the highway of international inter- 
course." To seek to control this element is as though one were 
to say to the inhabitants of a city: "In your houses you may 
do as you will, but when you step into the street you must act 
according to my rules and interests." 

Here is the great problem of the future: Will the principle 
of the equality of the various states govern the new world system 
as it did the old European system ; or will a single Power, namely 
England, finally succeed in founding upon the basis of her 
predominance at sea a w^orld dominion that will seriously limit 
the independence of the other Powers, that may prevent them 
under certain circumstances from pursuing their vital interests, 
and that will grant them only so much space and freedom of 
movement as seems consonant with her own interest and 
convenience ? 

In the answer to this question all the Powers are interested, 
but none so vitally as Germany. 

With the new era of imperialism Germany finds herself 
placed in an extremely difficult position. No sooner had we 



30 MODERN GERMANY 

succeeded in gaining for ourselves a normal national existence, 
such as France and England had enjo3^ed for centuries, than 
the foundations upon which it rested, namely the European state 
system, with its old inherited standards and relationships, changed 
and expanded into the system of world states. In this latter 
system a continuous rise in the scale of national and international 
life again threatens our painfully won commercial and political 
position. We are surrounded by states, many of which have 
grow^n to gigantic stature, while we, confined at the centre of 
the civilized and overcrowded Continent, were cut off from free 
access to the seas by the barricade of the British Isles. We 
were, therefore, unable to gain, or even to aspire to, such expan- 
sion of our territory as would have corresponded to the example 
of other nations or to our increase in population. This we could 
have done only by exposing ourselves to the dangers of a world 
war, in which, presumably, the surrounding Powers, unhampered 
in their expansion, would have leagued themselves against us. 
Such is, approximately, the situation to-day; and not alone our 
enemies, the English, but even the Americans, influenced by 
them, have disseminated the view that in the last analysis it 
was the impulse of the German people toward expansion that 
brought about the war. As disproof of this legend, the fact 
must be emphasized that for many years the German Emperor 
and his advisers have systematically and unswervingly pursued 
the policy of avoiding all attempts at an expansion which could 
have been bought only at the price of a world war. Conditions 
were unfavorable to us owing to the fact that the most valuable 
colonial territory was already in firm possession at the time when 
we appeared upon the scene. Germany's advent was too long 
delayed for her to profit in the division of the world as her 
interests demanded. That was not our fault, but our destiny. 
Even after 1871, for more than ten years Germany's interior 
as well as exterior condition was not such as to permit her to 
undertake far-reaching plans of expansion, without serious danger 
to herself and with the prospect of success. The contemptuous 
charge which English writers now bring against Bismarck that, 
in the blind passion of war against the opposing Clericals and 
Social-Democrats, he missed the favorable moment to found 
a great colonial empire for Germany, betrays entire misappre- 
hension of the difficulties of our foreign policy at that time. 
Not until the formation of the Dreibund, and the signing of 
the treaty of 1884 with Russia, was Bismarck free to take up 
the question of a colonial policy. And if he undertook this 
only with the greatest caution, with the guiding principle of 



MODERN GERMANY 31 

allowing the flag to follow commerce, so to speak, his policy 
was based upon the clear perception of Germanj^'s peculiar 
position in the world, w^hich has not changed materially since 
then and which may be summed up in two sentences. First, 
we lack the natural basis for the up-building and control of a 
great colonial empire, such as France and Russia possess, thanks 
to the propinquity of the territory which they are colonizing, 
or such as England enjoys through her maritime position and 
her long mastery of the seas; second, colonial and foreign 
complications in which the interests of the various Powers are 
involved, react with especial force and in a dangerous manner 
on Germany, in view of her central position, which subjects her 
to a concentric pressure from the other states and thereby 
threatens her very existence. This circumstance has not ceased 
to be of importance to-day, when through the increase of our 
transoceanic interests, w^e find ourselves face to face with the 
necessity of changing from a European Power Into a World 
Power. It is this difficult position of Germany at home that im- 
parts to her foreign policy a peculiar character, frequently misun- 
derstood and falsely judged, not alone in other countries, but even 
among ourselves. It becomes thereby, in a degree, experimental, 
uncertain, and calls for extreme caution. There is no other 
course than to determine by experiment what gains are possible 
without precipitating armed conflict. The unchanging principle 
which has guided German policy has been the avoidance of a 
world war for the sake of colonial expansion; it has sought, 
instead, to advance the interest of the nation by peaceful means. 

This fact has impressed upon Germany's world policy its 
special character, which is strikingly different from the imperial- 
ism of England, France, Russia and the other Powers. 

French imperialism resulted rather from the desire to recover 
through great and successful colonial enterprises the prestige 
lost in the w^ar of 1870 than from the natural impulse toward 
expansion of a healthy, sturdy race. It created a great colonial 
empire in Southwestern Asia, in Madagascar, in Senegambia, 
and especially in Northwest Africa in conjunction with Algeria, 
without being driven thereto through increase of population or 
by the needs of export. The aim of this policy was political 
rather than commercial, an important consideration in the expan- 
sion and development of the northwest African territory being 
the hope of finding in the Moorish soldiers a substitute for the 
numerically insufficient recruits at home. 

Russian imperialism is of a healthier and sturdier nature. But 
in her case it is even more apparent that aims of political power, 



32 MODERN GERMANY 

not commercial considerations, are the dominant factor. The 
question is here not of founding a distant colonial empire, but of 
advancing the country's boundaries in all directions. It is 
Russia's destiny, one may say, to be forced to seek expansion 
to the proportions of a continent, thereby becoming a menace 
to all its neighbors. Vital interests urge this vast continental 
power in every direction tow^ard the sea. Peter the Great 
opened a w^indow on the Baltic for the ancient Muscovite em- 
pire; Catherine II succeeded in reaching the coasts of the Black 
Sea. But these confined, inland seas fail to satisfy the greater 
commercial and political needs of the present. For a long time 
Russia's chief aim has been the straits upon vi^hich stands Con- 
stantinople, and u^hich by the treaty of 1841 are closed to her 
ships of w^ar, as to those of all other nations. She regards the 
Dardanelles as the key to her house, and would fain transform 
the Black Sea into a Russian Mediterranean, in order to bring 
the coasts of Asia Minor and Europe under her mediate or 
immediate authority. This political desire for expansion has 
a religious background, which renders it holy in the eyes of the 
orthodox Russian nation: namely, the expulsion of the Mo- 
hammedans from the Cathedral of St. Sophia. But bound up 
with this is an extremely important commercial consideration^ 
Two-thirds of Russia's grain export, which represents billions 
of rubles and which is of the most vital importance in the preser- 
vation of her domestic economic welfare, must pass through the 
Dardanelles; therefore the closure of this passageway, a thing 
which may happen in every Balkan war, has the most serious 
results for her domestic and foreign trade. Hence Russia's 
claim for the political control of these straits. This considera- 
tion determines her attitude toward the Eastern question. 

Free access to the Mediterranean would, however, not per- 
manently satisfy Russia; she would seek also to open a way past 
Gibraltar and through the Suez Canal, in order to be enabled to 
dispatch her fleet to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, Toward the 
north, likewise, she feels the need of gaining a free passage from 
the Baltic into the ocean. Since the control of the Danish straits 
would be difficult to acquire and retain, Russia has of late 
years turned her eyes toward Sweden and Norway, which, owing 
to the Gulf Stream, possess ports free from ice throughout the 
year. Her strategic railways in Finland — one near the coast, 
the other somewhat inland — could easily transport troops and 
munitions in either direction. The possession of Narwik would 
be of great value to Russia. Her fleets would then be able to 
cooperate in the Atlantic, from south and north. But this is 



MODERN GERMANY 33 

only one side of Russia's efforts at expansion. More important, 
perhaps, even than the European field is the Asiatic. The entire 
history of Russia consists of a gradual extension into the vast 
territory of forests, moors and steppes beyond the Ural Moun- 
tains and the Caspian Sea. This is at one and the same time 
a process of agricultural and military settlement, very different 
from the colonizing of the West-European maritime nations. 
The Russians are fond of emphasizing the fact that their advance 
into Asia brings them into contact with peoples who neither in 
customs nor feelings are foreign to the simple Russian peasants 
and Cossacks, as they are to the West-European colonists and 
pioneers of civilization; they say that they are able to under- 
stand the soul of the Orient and are therefore its natural leaders. 
The only limit to this advance is the sea; but the ocean itself 
holds an invitation to further expansion. A gateway to the 
sea was gained in Siberia and in the Province of Amur. But the 
harbor of Vladivostok, which is closed to shipping part of the 
year, could not satisfy the desire for an open port on the Pacific 
Ocean ; therefore Port Arthur was seized — and then lost. The 
war with Japan temporarily checked the advance in this direc- 
tion and produced a fundamental change in the situation. Like- 
wise the movement toward India and along the Persian Gulf, 
as a result of these events, has come to a temporary standstill. 
Russian imperialism has again turned toward Europe. Never- 
theless, its Asiatic aspect is sure to assume prominence anew; 
its aim is to bring under the rule of the "White Czar" the 
entire European-Asiatic territory that has not yet assumed the 
established form of a modern state and to whose Oriental 
inhabitants this yoke may not appear oppressive. 

The maritime imperialism of England is not less far-reaching 
than that of Russia. The world domination that she has built 
up and that she still seeks to extend and strengthen, rests upon 
the basis of her mastery of the seas. An English historian has 
characterized his country as "Oceana"; another calls it a "world- 
w^ide Venice," in which colonies are city districts and oceans are 
canals. In a double ring the colonies are grouped around the 
motherland. From the constitutional point of view, an inner 
ring may be said to be formed by the great dominions with 
representative government, which are autonomous states within 
the boundaries of the Empire. The endeavor which the Imperial 
Federation League has sought to realize is to weld them into 
a commercial and military union under common direction; but 
this ambition seems likely to encounter insurmountable obstacles. 
The remaining colonies, with the Indian Empire, constitute the 



34 MODERN GERMANY 

outer ring. It is the duty of certain of them to render secure 
for England the great ocean lanes, upon which depend both 
her commerce and her safety. From Gibraltar stretches such a 
chain of stations, by way of Malta, Cyprus, Egypt and the Suez 
Canal, thence from Aden and Koweit to the confines of India, 
and then through the Straits' Settlements to Singapore and East 
Asia. Egypt plays a special role in the scheme of the British 
Empire: it is the point at which England's African and Indian 
interests unite. Cecil Rhodes' gigantic conception of giving a. 
firm central support to British influence in Africa by means of 
a Cape-to-Cairo railroad fits into this scheme, as does also the 
recently exposed desire of England to bring the Persian and 
Arabian coasts under her control and to turn the Indian Ocean, 
together with the Persian Gulf, into a British lake, guarded by 
her possessions in East Africa, Southern Asia and Australia. 

Such is the imperialism of our enemies. How modest in 
comparison seems that which Germany has striven for and 
achieved! There is not only a difference of degree, but like- 
wise of kind. That which we call "world policy" is something 
quite different from the imperialism of the other Powers, despite 
a certain superficial similarity. It has not been our chief aim, 
in the manner of these states, to build up a great colonial empire 
by which to increase our power among the nations of the world ; 
rather has our endeavor been, in keeping with our peculiar 
geographical and political position, before all things to secure and 
advance our industrial and export interests. As Bismarck de- 
sired, our colonial undertakings have been the organic result 
of our commercial needs. The main incentive has been furnished 
by the increase in our population and the necessity of providing 
them with food. One may endeavor to provide for a growing 
population in two ways: either through the acquisition of new 
territory into which it can overflow, or through an increase in 
industrial activity, which brings a greater volume of food into 
the country in exchange for exports and which renders it possible 
for the nation to increase within its limited territory. We were 
forced to choose the second way, since the first seemed to us 
impracticable. It led us, however, to the goal which we had 
set ourselves: emigration has ceased, and our people are content 
and prosperous. Though not underestimating our colonial pos- 
sessions, we cannot say that they form an empire of political 
im.portance like those of France, Russia or England. The terri- 
tory which they offer our people is neither suitable nor sufficient 
for purposes of settlement; they provide but a fraction of our 
need in tropical food products and in raw material for manu- 



MODERN GERMANY 35 

iactures; nor do they furnish a market worth mentioning for 
our exports. The hopes which are entertained as to the possi- 
bility of future development do not materially alter this opinion. 
Despite this fact, we have made no effort to secure by force 
great or more valuable colonies. The misfortune of a 
world war has always seemed greater to us than the possible 
resulting gain. We were content to have obtained a footing 
at different points throughout the w^orld and to possess a training- 
school for colonial administration. Our main object has always 
been the establishment of the principle of the open door in the 
great commercial districts of East Asia, South America and 
Morocco. In these places we desired to be able to trade under 
the same conditions as the French and English, in order to 
advance our export interests. In this connection we have con- 
sistently championed the independence and Integrity of the exotic 
countries, whenever their measure of civilization seemed to hold 
out a promise of well regulated and secure relations. We opposed 
in general the proposition that it is necessary to control such 
countries politically in order to enjoy advantageous commercial 
intercourse with them. According to English imperialism, 
^'peaceful penetration" of a country means nothing less than the 
preliminary step to Its political subjugation. Hence the readi- 
ness in Anglo-American circles to interpret our relation to 
Turkey as in the nature of England's to Egypt, or of France's 
to Morocco. At the time of the granting of the concession to 
Germany for the building of the Bagdad railway. In 1903, Sir 
Harry Johnston, an English colonial expert, conceived the fan- 
tastic plan of encouraging Germany in the founding of a great 
eastern empire, embracing the districts traversed by the railway, 
namely Austria-Hungary, the Balkan states and Turkey. They 
Avere all to be brought under German suzerainty. The basis for 
this plan was the expectation that Germany's ambition and desire 
for expansion would in this manner be diverted Into channels 
innocuous to England. Doubtless, also, there existed the gener- 
ous Intention of arousing distrust among Germany's threatened 
friends and of involving her in deadly conflict with Russia. 

This scheme, which at the time was most severely criticized 
even by the Pan-Germanists and rejected as a "gift of the 
/ Greeks," still haunts the brains of Englishmen and Americans, 
' and has given birth to such grotesque imaginings as Usher's book 
on "Pan-Germanism." It is self-evident that neither the German 
Bank nor the Minister for Foreign Affairs ever indulged In such 
fantastic dreams. Our Interests In Asia Minor and Mesopotamia 
were limited to gaining for ourselves at these points an important 



36 MODERN GERMANY 

market, capable of great development, and a source from which 
raw material might be obtained for our manufactures — there 
was no question of German colonization or of political domina- 
tion. The Bagdad railway was a purely commercial undertaking, 
and if it possessed any political significance it was solely that 
Turkey might by its construction be strengthened along com- 
mercial and military lines and placed in a position to be better 
able to resist possible imperialistic encroachment by Russia or 
England. It was not fear of Germany's imperialistic plans that 
inspired England's relentless opposition to this undertaking; 
rather was it her disinclination to see Turkey strengthened, and 
in addition the dread lest this shorter rail route to the Persian 
Gulf might prove a successful competitor with the waterway 
through the Suez Canal. To this was added the general appre- 
hension of seeing England's absolute and exclusive preeminence 
challenged on these coasts, which serve as a connecting link 
between India and Egypt. Germany's readiness to make conces- 
sions in this affair is a matter of general knowledge. We met 
England's desires in regard to the last section of the road, from 
Bagdad to Koweit, and agreed to place it under international 
control. Further, we agreed with Russia to take steps for 
connecting the Bagdad railway with the branch planned for 
Persia. 

Germany's foreign or world policy is thus seen to be quite 
different from that of England, Russia or France. It was 
not given to us to create a great colonial empire comparable 
to those of our enemies ; but neither has that been our endeavor, 
since the conditions to such an end were from the start too un- 
favorable, owing to our geographical and political position and 
to the previous distribution of colonial territory. We have in 
the main contented ourselves with striving to advance our vital 
interests in the economic sphere by trying to secure "a place in 
the sun" with the other World Powers, in order to increase and 
maintain the export trade necessary to provide the nation's 
food supply. An unfriendly observer might perhaps say that 
the grapes were too sour. And why should we not admit having 
made a virtue of necessity in proceeding along moderate lines 
in our foreign policy? Did we not wish voluntarily to be ex- 
cluded from the list of World Powers, there was no other course 
for us on the occasion of the last act in the division of the world 
but to raise our voice and now and again to demand our por- 
tion. But in doing this we have on principle avoided war with 
other Colonial Powers, and even the most unfriendly judge 



MODERN GERMANY 57 

must admit that the preservation of peace has been the golden 
thread in our world policy. 

Si vis pacem, para bellum. He who desires peace must prepare 
for war. The German government has made this approved 
saying its guiding principle. The caution with which it avoided 
dangerous disputes went hand in hand with the thorough-going 
preparation for the eventuality of an unavoidable conflict, which 
it did not wish for, but faced without fear. A policy of peace 
without preparation is a sign of weakness and impotence. 
Thorough preparation creates quiet self-confidence and that de- 
gree of respect in the eyes of the world requisite for sober self- 
restraint in the interest of peace, without the danger of exposing 
the state to the loss of its dignity and power. Our aim has been 
so to strengthen ourselves in a military way that any possible 
desire of our enemies to attack us might thereby be held in 
check. In this attempt we could not limit ourselves to our 
army; it was necessary for us to possess a fleet in keeping with 
our position, our maritime interests and our place as a World 
Power. Unobstructed access to the sea is for us, as for every 
World Power, an absolute necessity. The way to the ocean lies 
through the English Channel, unless our ships are to follow 
the long and costly course around the Shetland Islands, which 
is by no means devoid of danger during the stormy months of 
winter. The English, and even the French fleet, in certain 
circumstances, might block this course for us. In the Baltic 
Sea we are threatened by the third great navy, that of Russia. 
In distant lands and seas the German merchant and sailor, the 
settler and missionary need the protection of German cruisers. 
In the present condition of the world only that state which 
possesses a strong high-seas' fleet can maintain its position in 
the foremost rank. Our Emperor was the first to perceive this 
simple truth and to draw the logical conclusion from it. In 
Admiral Tirpitz he found the discriminating aid who has created 
a German fleet capable of inspiring respect. In the naval 
program of 1900 our aim is plainly stated. Our fleet was to 
be sufficiently strong to cause even the greatest naval Power 
to hesitate to attack us or to attempt injury to our vital interests, 
since the probable loss which it would sustain in case of war 
would threaten its own superiority. It was the least with which 
we could be content; the present state of affairs furnishes the 
proof of this. The defensive aim of our naval preparations 
could not have been more clearly expressed. In our threatened 
position we could not feel even measurably safe unless able on 
land and water to offer adequate resistance to the political and. 



38 MODERN GERMANY 

military pressure exerted by our enemies against our borders. 
In order to secure peace we had to make them respect us. In 
this sense we have always regarded the high cost of our military 
preparedness in the light of an insurance premium against the 
danger of war. This preparedness and the prudent circumspec- 
tion of our policy has resulted in the preservation of peace during 
forty-three years. 

This circumspect and restrained foreign policy, content to 
renounce great and brilliant successes for the sake of preserving 
peace, and limiting itself to the minimum of development of 
German influence in foreign lands consonant with the nation's 
welfare, has encountered much public opposition. Especially 
has the Pan-German Society, since its founding in 1890, with 
varying emphasis but unceasingly, opposed the Foreign Office. 
It complained that this policy showed a lack of boldness, of 
''the will to power," of decisive success. The Imperial Chan- 
cellor von Billow on one occasion reproached this doubtlessly 
patriotic group of political critics with acting rather under the 
influence of a warm heart than of a clear head, and with allowing 
themselves, freed from any shackles of responsibility, to be car- 
ried away on the wings of their fancy. To decide whether a 
political move was wise or the reverse is always an extremely 
difficult matter for an uninitiated observer. Such a one lacks, 
at any given moment, the ability to take in at a glance the entire 
political chess-board and hence fails to grasp the general situa- 
tion, especially as the facts known to the public are always 
capable of divergent interpretation and explanation. Notably 
in criticising Germany's world policy are the dangers frequently 
lost sight of which every single step is apt to entail upon our 
European position, that lays us open to joint pressure from 
without. Had we acted according to the desires of the Pan- 
Germanists, peace could scarcely have been preserved so long. 
Nor should we have felt, as to-day, so strongly and unanimously 
that we have drawn the sword in justifiable self-defence, that 
we have been attacked by our enemies and are forced to fight for 
our existence. 

As a general proposition, it is undoubtedly laudable to accustom 
the public, with disregard of domestic party questions, to inde- 
pendent discussion of the great problems of our foreign policy 
from a broad national basis. For we Germans have hitherto 
been only too prone in the press and in the forum to thresh out 
party questions, leaving the responsibility for the power and 
greatness of the Fatherland in the experienced hands of the 
Government. Our history under Bismarck's guidance showed us 



MODERN GERMANY 39 

the frequent folly of the criticism of the great problems of states- 
manship by uninitiated publicists and parliamentarians, who were 
slaves to party doctrines. On the other hand, the successes 
of his policy accustomed us in international questions to trust 
blindly in the guidance of the Government. The successors of 
the great chancellor have not enjoyed the confidence of the 
public to the same degree. It is easy to understand their sensi- 
tiveness under the spirit of criticism that awoke among un- 
initiated and irresponsible fault-finders. No one desires to see 
in public discussions a cessation of interest in international ques- 
tions; but with the growth of political training and under- 
standing, there comes a corresponding discretion in the expression 
of opinion and in the award of praise and blame. The difficul- 
ties of a country's foreign policy increase in direct proportion 
with the possibilities for embarrassing complications and with the 
resulting need for the exercise of prudence. It is less difficult 
for an Englishman or American, even for a Frenchman or 
Russian, to discuss the problems of his country's foreign policy 
than for a German, since ours is the most difficult international 
position. The politicians of the Pan-German Society cannot be 
said in such discussions to have displayed on the whole a percep- 
tion of the attainable or to have been sufficiently careful to 
avoid fantastic excesses; but in other national patriotic circles, 
also, displeasure over the apparent failures of the Government 
and the decrease of German influence in the world has expressed 
itself in noisy emphasis of the "will to power," at times even 
with threats and rattlings of the sword. 

In the famous book of General von Bernhardi the necessity of 
a **w^ar of prevention" is urged with a frankness that does credit 
rather to the soldier than to the statesman. Torn from their con- 
nection and more or less distorted, his statements are quoted in 
numberless pamphlets and newspaper articles, especially in those 
from English and American sources. Such books as Bernhardi's 
are made use of by our enemies to convince neutral countries that 
Germany not only desired the war but wantonly brought it about 
in order to escape from an untenable position. It is impossible to 
over-emphasize the fact that such writings are in no sense the ex- 
pression of our official policy and that they had nothing to do with 
the outbreak of the war. They are, on the contrary, in direct 
contrast w^ith the peaceful and restrained policy of the Emperor 
and his government. Whoever knows Kaiser Wilhelm II 
realizes that he uttered the absolute truth in solemnly declaring 
that he was forced by his enemies to draw the sword. The 
history of his reign of twenty-five years gives proof of his 



40 MODERN GERMANY 

steadfast desire to preserve peace as long as it was compatible 
with the honor of the German name and the interests of the 
Empire. This is an indisputable fact, which rises to confute our 
enemies in their attempt to throw the responsibility for the 
war upon us. They have sought to avoid this difficulty by 
inventing and spreading the fiction that the peace-loving Emperor 
was forced into the war by a military clique. The English in- 
ventors of this fable, in their absolute and characteristic ignor- 
ance of German conditions, must have confused Berlin and 
Petrograd. But the fertile political imagination of the English 
is not satisfied with a single version. The author of one of the 
Oxford pamphlets thinks himself better informed. It was not 
the work of the military clique of Potsdam (whose existence 
seemed a trifle too misty), but that of the 'Tan-German League." 
An anonymous writer, under the cloak of "Daniel Frymann," 
had ofFered the suggestion in a pamphlet, "If I were the Kaiser," 
that Germany would do well, if her foreign office could not 
be better managed, to introduce parliamentary rule like that 
of England and France. From this suggestion promptly and 
with easy facility, the English writer draws the conclusion 
that the Pan-German League had threatened the Emperor with 
dethronement and thereby forced him to renounce his peace 
desires. And the same author claims to have discovered still 
another reason for Germany's eagerness for war, and this the 
strangest of all. The country, he declares, was on the verge 
of a great economic collapse, owing to the lack of markets for 
its accumulated and unsalable wares, and it began the war in 
order to relieve its desperate plight. These arguments are pure 
inventions, absolutely without foundation, and give evidence of 
such childlike ignorance of conditions in Germany that they 
serve only to amuse us, despite the seriousness of the subject 
and of the present moment. The motive for such inventions is 
a wicked desire to libel us and the author betrays unmistakably 
his attitude of mind when at one point he represents as highly 
plausible, in view of the Archduke's friendliness for the Slavs, 
the assumption that the murders at Serajevo were planned in 
Berlin rather than In Belgrade! How desperate must be our 
enemies' case if they must needs have recourse to such weapons. 
But even in apparently unbiassed American writings — which 
are, however, really governed by English ideas — we encounter 
the widespread and evidently generally accepted explanation 
that Germany found herself forced into the war by reason of her 
restricted position and the paralyzing pressure exerted by Eng- 
land and her allies upon the country's commercial and political 



MODERN GERMANY 41 

freedom of movement. Whatever may have been the Imme- 
diate occasion for hostilities, Germany, it is claimed, w^as the 
actual aggressor, in the eflFort to escape from her untenable 
position and to improve her position in the u^orld through the 
defeat of England and France. The genesis of this explanation 
is quite evident. Germany's constricted position and the pres- 
sure exerted for many years by England and her allies upon 
the country's vital activities are well-known facts; nor wnll any 
one be convinced by the English attempts at denying the invldi- 
ousness of Great Britain's policy towards Germany when it is 
so apparent as in the Morocco question. Support for the above- 
mentioned explanation may have been found in the fact that 
writings such as General Bernhardi's seemed to expound the 
same ideas. 

Yet, such a construction is absolutely false. The w^eak point 
is the assumption of Germany's untenable and desperate posi- 
tion. A political extremist who measures his demands by the 
unprecedented successes of Bismarck's times and who entertains 
the naive belief that things can continue indefinitely in 
the same manner, may, perhaps, regard as unfavorable the 
political position of the German Empire, in view of the 
lack of similar successes and achievements in this vastly more 
difficult period of "w^orld politics." But he who limits his 
demands to a normal and sensible standard must admit that 
we have by no means fared badly considering our extremely 
difficult position. It is impossible to deny that we had entered 
upon a period of remarkable economic advance. The problem of 
adequately employing and feeding our growing population within 
the boundaries of the Empire itself, since we possess no colonies 
fit for settlers, much less a great colonial empire, had been solved 
for a long time to come. Agriculture and industry had been 
brought into harmony, and so close an approach made to Aris- 
totle's ideal of "autarchy," or national self-sufficiency, that 
its complete realization in the future scarcely seems unlikely. 
We had taken measures for the welfare of our w^orkers as no 
other country in the world has done; the national w-ealth show^ed 
most satisfactory improvement. And yet, in addition to all this, 
w-e did not omit to complete our military preparations on land 
and sea. The balance of our debit and credit w-hich was taken 
in 19 1 3, on the occasion of the celebration of the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the Kaiser's reign, show^ed satisfactory progress 
in all departments. Despite the jealousy and ill-will of our 
neighbors we had become richer and stronger from year to 
year. 



42 MODERN GERMANY 

Our development into a World Power bj^ the side of our 
more favorably situated neighbors had continued slowly but 
steadily. It was our hope through industry to maintain the 
''place in the sun" which we had w^on with such difficulty. We 
hoped likewise that increasing strength would inevitably bring 
with it freedom of commercial activity. Our position was far 
from untenable; least of all could we look forward to its im- 
provement through a world war on the result of which would 
depend the very existence of our race and its position in the 
world. None of the Great Powers in a general war would have 
as much to lose as we, even with Austria-Hungary as our ally. 
The situation was unmistakable — war was to be thought of for us 
only in the event of compulsion. With anxiety we saw this 
compulsion ripening in the growing enmity of the Powers which 
opposed us. Therein alone lay our danger, and despite the 
moderation and caution of years, we were not able to avoid it. 
As an obstacle in the path of England's and Russia's imperialistic 
ambition our strength as a World Power had to be crushed. 
Although naturally opposed to each other, these two Powers, 
through the great changes in international relations and through 
their mutual understanding with France, our old irreconcilable 
enemy, had been gradually brought to form the fatal alliance, 
which from the start was aimed at us. Finally, following the 
bloody tragedy at Serajevo, the critical moment arrived when, 
after frequent increase and relief of the tension and after repeated 
strengthening of military preparations, Russia, the strongest 
military power among the allies, hurled the fire-brand from its 
hand and precipitated the world conflagration. 



Ill 

Germany's Foreign Relations Since iSyi 

France had never unreservedly accepted the conditions of 
the Peace of Frankfort. Her statesmen and patriots had re- 
mained true to Gambetta's watchword: Never to abandon the 
thought of revenge, even though they did not speak of it. The 
recovery of Alsace-Lorraine appeared to them as a kind of 
national duty ; and even during the period before the disputes 
with England in colonial matters had been adjusted, their eyes 
remained fixed threateningly on Germany. After 1871 Bis- 
marck was never without the fear of the forming of a coalition 
against the Empire, the natural centre of which was France. 



MODERN GERMANY 43 

In order to weaken pressure from this direction, he left no stone 
unturned to promote the consolidation of the Republic, which 
he assumed would be less militaristic than a restored Bourbon 
monarchy. For the same reason, he welcomed and embraced 
the opportunity to divert the ambition and energy of the country, 
which had shown such astounding powers of recovery, into 
colonial undertakings on a great scale. But the Republic adopted 
the militarism of the empire, and developed it to a higher degree 
than would have been possible to a monarchical government. 
Further, colonial imperialism by no means forced the hopes of 
revenge permanently into the background ; on the contrary, in 
the end it served to vitalize them anew. The deep hatred for 
the conqueror of 1870, which smouldered in the hearts of most 
Frenchmen, kept alive the legend nourished by the country's 
conscienceless jingoes that Germany was constantly on the point 
of attacking France. We can state with absolute sincerity that 
this has never been the case since 1871, not even in 1875, despite 
diplomatic gossip to that effect. Especially in recent years has 
Germany's strongest desire been to enter into an understanding 
with France on the basis of neighborly confidence and security 
from hostilities, which would have enabled her with a free and 
undisturbed mind to promote the development of her commercial 
interests in the world. The courteous attentions and attempts 
at rapprochement of our "Peace Emperor" seemed excessive to 
the national pride of many Germans. He succeeded thereby in 
elevating the tone of international intercourse, but failed to change 
French sentiment. Blood revenge, which has been eliminated in 
personal relations in civilized countries, seems to be irrepressible in 
the relations of states to each other. France thus became the 
country in w^hich Europe's hatred against Germany was nursed. 
New hatred displaced the old. In order to strengthen herself 
against Germany, France finally abandoned her colonial rivalry 
with England. The humiliation in the Fashoda Affair (1898-99), 
resulting in the renunciation of all claim to the territory of the 
sources of the Nile and therew^ith the abandonment of her 
former Egyptian ambitions, paved the way for the later under- 
standing with the mistress of the seas. The real pivot, however, 
on which the policy of France turned was the alliance with 
Russia. It was an old political conception of the days of Napoleon 
and Alexander I, that had never quite been lost sight of but 
which, since the eighties, had become the chief support of the 
hope for revenge. So greatly had the patriotic imagination of 
French speculators and money-savers been excited and blinded 
by this idea that in the course of twenty years they invested 



44 MODERN GERMANY 

at least seventeen billion francs in Russian bonds. Without 
this sum, Russia's recent development of her agriculture, manu- 
factures and railways would have been quite impossible. 

During the critical years from 1863-70 Russia served as the 
protector of Prussia's rear. The traditional union of the two 
ruling houses was further strengthened by the personal con- 
fidence which Bismarck enjoyed at the court of Alexander II 
and which the jealous intrigues of Gortschakow failed to under- 
mine. Prussia's attitude toward the Polish insurrection of 1863 
had shown Russia that it possessed a trustworthy friend in the 
former state. But in Russia they seemed unable to forget the 
role which Nicholas I had once played in Germany, and believed 
themselves justified in claiming Germany's aid in Russia's policy 
of expansion and desire for power, the recognition and satis- 
faction of which would gradually have brought Germany into 
a position of dependence, in fact, of servitude. Austria's atti- 
tude during the Crimean War and the ancient rivalry of the two 
states regarding influence in the Balkans, which had been intensi- 
fied by Austria's elimination from Germany and Italy, had made 
Russia more determined in her hostile feeling toward the Haps- 
burg monarchy. The result of this since 1876 had been a 
gradual troubling of Germany's relations with Russia. Bis- 
marck was firm in the conviction that a strong Austro- 
Hungarian state was a vital necessity for Germany, in the face 
of the growing Russian power. From his ^'Memoires" we 
know that in 1876 he opposed the Russian plan of a war of 
extermination against Austria, and that the Russian government 
thereupon came to an understanding with Austria, with the 
result that the storm-centre shifted from the Carpathians to the 
Balkans. Again at the Congress of Berlin Bismarck's attitude 
was not such as his Russian friends believed they had a right 
to expect. Bismarck likens Russia to an exacting woman who 
expects her suitor to divine and execute her unexpressed wishes. 
What Russia expected was that Germany should throw the full 
w^eight of her authority into the scale, in order to obtain for 
her neighbor a predominance in the Balkan Peninsula. But 
this would have increased Russia's power in a very dangerous 
manner, while at the same time it would have rendered Ger- 
many's relations to the other Powers extremely unpleasant. As 
is well known, Bismarck contented himself with the role of 
the honest broker, and it was with his indulgence that, owing 
to England's protest, the peace treaty of San Stefano was not 
carried out but was revised in favor of Turkey. As in the 
Crimean War, Russia had once more been checked in her vie- 



MODERN GERMANY 45 

torious march toward Constantinople. Her opposition to Eng- 
land, about which international politics turned in the nineteenth 
century, as they had turned about the enmity of France and 
England in the eighteenth, had been dangerously increased. This 
found expression in Russia's advance into Asia toward the bor- 
ders of India. At the same time the friendship between Russia 
and Germany had suffered a severe strain, which, it is true, was 
temporarily concealed but which did not admit of real cure. In 
view of France's irreconcilable attitude, Bismarck realized the 
necessity, as a safeguard against the resentment of Russia, of 
a union w^ith the state which the Czar has just threatened with 
annihilation. 

In 1879 the alliance was entered into with Austria-Hungary, 
whereby each of the contracting parties pledged itself to come 
to the aid of the other in the case of an unexpected attack 
by Russia, which they hoped to avoid. Nothing was further 
from Bismarck's desire than thereby to render the break with 
Russia complete. On the contrary, he took great pains to 
bring about a renewal of friendly relations with that Power, so 
as to preclude the danger of an armed conflict. And following 
Italy's entrance into the German- Austrian alliance in 1882, as 
a result of her resentment at France's occupation of Tunis, he 
succeeded in realizing the treaty with Russia, in which the latter 
country promised, in the event of war between Germany and 
any other Power, to maintain an attitude of benevolent neu- 
trality. Russia's motive for entering into this agreement was her 
desire to gain protection against England on the Continent. 
Bismarck had won through the friendly understanding with 
Russia the opportunity for freedom of action in the Balkans. 
Conditions at that time still justified his guiding principle that 
the Balkan question did not concern Germany and that it was 
not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier. Bismarck's 
chief gain, however, was that through the agreement he held 
Russia back from responding to the friendly advances of the 
French Republic. He had succeeded in isolating England and 
France, while drawing the three eastern empires more closely 
together. Upon this basis, also, rested the possibility of Ger- 
many's assuming an active part in international politics and 
of entering upon a course of colonial acquisition, at first in Africa. 
The Berlin Congo Congress of 1884 is an event which demon- 
strates the new aspect of affairs. 

The march of events in Bulgaria from the year 1885 on soon 
brought Russia again into sharp opposition with Austria, and 
this reacted also upon her relations with the Gernjan Empire. 



46 MODERN GERMANY 

The suspicion that Germany was attempting to play a part in 
the Balkan question was fostered and strengthened by forged 
letters which reached the Czar from French sources. Even 
without this, Alexander III, who had had no personal experience 
of dynastic relations with the Prussian rulers and who had been 
guided into other channels by his Danish wife, was easily Inclined 
to distrust Germany and much more susceptible to Russian na- 
tionalistic and Pan-Slavic Influences than his predecessor. Bis- 
marck, however, was able, in the course of a personal Interview 
In 1887, to demonstrate that the documents In question had 
been forged and thereby remove a pregnant source of distrust 
from the Russian side. The crisis of 1887 was safely passed, 
but the state of mind which had rendered it possible remained 
as a continuing danger. It was a characteristic sign of the 
times that at this moment the high tide of the Boulanger move- 
ment coincided with the Russian anti-German press campaign. 
From both camps came the demand for an alliance of the two 
countries against Germany, and In Russian nationalistic and Pan- 
Slavic circles the saying began to be heard that the road to 
Constantinople led by way of Berlin and that the settlement of 
differences in the Eastern question was to be sought on the 
Rhine and the Oder. 

Yet Russia's main interest lay In her expansion in Central 
and East Asia. The consequent danger of a conflict with Eng- 
land caused the Russian government, despite the growing un- 
friendliness toward Germany of natlonalistically Influenced pub- 
lic opinion, to consider the renewal of the agreement with this 
country for three years valuable enough to prefer It to an un- 
derstanding with France. Kaiser Wilhelm II likewise has 
taken all possible pains to cultivate and maintain the tradi- 
tional relations with Russia which his grandfather urged upon 
him on his death-bed, Bismarck's retirement, however, Intro- 
duced a change In the political program In as much as his suc- 
cessor, Caprlvl, did not attribute the same importance to the 
formal signing of a treaty as the originator of the Russo-German 
Treaty had done. The machinery seemed to him too compli- 
cated; he feared, above all, to arouse Austria's distrust in case 
the secret agreement should become known. It was thus chiefly 
out of consideration for the Austrian alliance that the renewal 
of the Russian convention in 1890 was abandoned. It was 
thought that friendly relations with Russia might be maintained 
and cultivated even without such a formal basis, which, further- 
more, had had no value as a counterbalance against the anti- 
German sentiment of the public. 



MODERN GERMANY 47 

It is a question of opinion whether this view did not under- 
estimate the importance of the treaty. At all events, there now 
became manifest in Russia an increasing desire to welcome 
French advances, in order not to face England and the Dreibund 
quite isolated. The naval visits to Kronstadt and Toulon 
followed. The Franco-Russian treaty, that Bismarck had con- 
sistently striven to prevent, became a reality, though this dual 
alliance did not yet assume precisely the aspect of a threat 
to Germany. It appeared, like the Dreibundj to be of a de- 
fensive character, and could be regarded as a means for preserving 
the European balance of power. It was directed against England 
as well as against the Continental Powers. 

England betrayed the fact that in France and Russia she 
recognized her probable future antagonists, not alone on the 
occasion of the vast increase of her naval armament in 1888, which 
was based upon the ''two-power standard" and which ushered 
in a new epoch in modern naval history, but likewise during 
the period of the succeeding ten years. She welcomed, therefore, 
the lapsing of the close alliance between Germany and Russia, 
a development which she had striven in all ways to bring about ; 
she now sought to bring Germany's policy into line with British 
interests. Harmonious cooperation of the greatest naval power 
and the greatest military power for the preservation of peace 
was proclaimed as the program of the future. The so-called 
Zanzibar Treaty was entered into, whereby Germany surrendered 
important coast possessions and territorial claims in East Africa, 
in exchange for Heligoland, whose future maritime importance 
no Englishman at that time suspected (1890). 

England's idea in arranging her relations with Germany in 
this manner was to bind the latter country's hands in colonial 
matters. Relations, therefore, became increasingly strained as 
Germany in 1894 (in conjunction with France) successfully 
opposed a violation of the Congo Act by England, and later in 
connection with the events in South Africa from the time of 
the Jameson Raid to the annexation of the Boer Republics. 
The long accumulated displeasure at German competition, the 
jealousy caused by the thriving of our manufactures and trade, 
the hatred of the successful rival, found at this time astoundingly 
strong and undisguised expression in the English press; especially 
noteworthy was this in an article in the Saturday Review, 
which with a warped but ominous variation of Cato's warning, 
uttered the watchword: Germaniam esse delendam! 

This indiscreet revelation of England's true feelings was an 
important factor in causing the German people to give friendly 



48 MODERN GERMANY 

and intelligent support to the first great naval programme of 1898. 
At this time, however, England still regarded Russia, not Ger- 
many, as her most dangerous enemy. The agreement of 1899 
had laid the basis for a future understanding with France. But 
Russia, with its designs on the Persian Gulf, with its ambition 
to become the dominant Power in East Asia and in the Pacific 
Ocean, aroused the most serious apprehension in England. 
Especially was this so during the Boer War, which for years 
taxed the country's powers. Hence the endeavor of the British 
government to gain Germany, which had preserved absolute 
neutrality during this war, as an ally against Russia. It was 
at this time that Chamberlain uttered the rally cry for a Teu- 
tonic union, comprising England, America and Germany (1899). 
Germany, however, was far removed from unfriendly intentions 
against Russia, with which, as a matter of fact, it had just 
reestablished better relations. An alliance with England, under 
the conditions then existing, would have implied an abandonment 
of the development of the navy and of an independent position 
in world politics. An additional factor was the unwillingness 
of the parliamentary government of England to bind the country 
by definite treaties for definite eventualities. So these negotia- 
tions came to naught. The year 1900 witnessed the unanimous 
action against China of the World Powers, including the United 
States and Japan. But the Imperial Chancellor, von Biilow, 
did not allow himself to be swept by England beyond the provi- 
sions of the Yangtse agreement into opposition against Russia 
in the Manchurian question. This attitude of the German 
government finally convinced England that in no event would 
Germany permit herself to be used against Russia. The British 
government now took a most unusual step by forming. In 1902, 
an alliance with Japan, aimed primarily against Russia. This 
treaty from Its inception bore the germs of war, which broke out 
in 1904 and which resulted in freeing England for a long period 
from the fear of Russia's growing power. Japan had under- 
taken the role intended for Germany. The unfortunate out- 
come of this war, however, and the resulting revolution pre- 
pared Russia for becoming an ally of England just as the humilia- 
tion of Fashoda had done in the case of France. 

The period when Germany finally freed herself from the 
enticements of English diplomacy coincides, approximately, with 
the time when the results of the two naval programmes of 1898 
and 1900 began to be evident in the beginnings of a powerful 
sea fleet. Since that time the policy of England, protected by 
Japan against Russia, took a decidedly anti-German turn. King 



MODERN GERMANY 49 

Edward VII, who had ascended the throne shortly before, was the 
originator of the ''encircling policy" against Germany, which 
began with the entente cordiale with France in 1904 and was 
extended by Russia's admission to the group in 1907. The 
full development of this policy followed a few years later 
through the agreements arranged by Sir Edward Grey with 
the two governments in question and which transformed the 
entente into an actual war alliance against Germany. The 
development and manifestations of this ''encircling policy," the 
attempts at decreasing the political tension, the effects of the last 
Balkan Wars, the outbreak of the present great world war — 
all these will be treated in later chapters of this book, and are 
therefore not discussed here. It will be proper at this place only 
to add a few general remarks on the nature of the relations 
between the Powers in question and the aspects of the conflict 
of interests. This will be done in order to indicate the guiding 
principles of Germany's policy in the years immediately preceding 
the catastrophe. The question mainly concerns Russia and 
England. 

In the direct relations between Germany and Russia no 
points of serious friction existed; the aim of Germany's policy, 
especially since 1894, has unmistakably been to renew the 
former pleasant relations between the two neighboring states. 
In her attitude toward Russia during the bitter experience of 
the Japanese War and the resulting internal disturbances Ger- 
many was as friendly as is possible for a neutral power to be. 
Witness the generous utterance of Kaiser Wilhelm: "Russian 
sorrow is German sorrow." Russian publicists have recently 
brought the emphatic accusation against Germany that the latter 
country took advantage of Russia's necessity in 1904 to obtain 
more favorable conditions in the commercial treaty renewed at 
that time than were consonant with Russia's real interest. It is 
a fact that these conditions were more favorable for us than those 
of the treaty of 1894. But at that time Germany had found 
herself in an extremely unfavorable position, which Russia had 
utilized to the full ; and it was only right and proper that when 
this condition had changed, Germany should take thought for 
her own commercial interests to the best of her ability. But 
no unfriendly pressure of any kind was exercised by her. The 
complaints of the injustice done Russia by these treaties have, 
moreover, been greatly and deliberately exaggerated by Russian 
writers. This was done in order to prepare sentiment effectively 
for the negotiations for a renewal of the treaty in 191 7. In 
this the pressure which the "encircling policy" had for years 



50 MODERN GERMANY 

exerted upon Germany from all sides was to be used for the 
promotion of the commercial ambitions of the Russian govern- 
ment and Russian society. But the conflict of commercial inter- 
ests existing at this time was, despite the threatening speech 
indulged in by Russian writers, not of a nature to carr\^ with 
it the danger of war. Doubtless, a mutual attitude of fairness 
and restraint in the negotiations would have smoothed out 
any existing difficulties. German designs on Russian territory 
did not exist ; nor can it properly be assumed that before the war 
Russia had cast covetous eyes on the East Prussian provinces. 
The conflict of political Interests was limited, In the main, to 
the Balkan question and to the relation of Germany to Austria. 
Nor did the differences seem insurmountable if Russia and 
Austria but held to the convention of Miirzsteg of 1903, which 
had declared the principle of the status quo for the Balkan 
Peninsula — that Is to say, if Russia would temporarily restrain 
her desire for expansion and limit herself to a policy of Internal 
commercial, social and political reforms, In order to strengthen 
her position, which nobody was threatening. But as a conse- 
quence of the Franco-Russian alliance, shipwreck overtook the 
efforts of the German government to bring about a closer under- 
standing after the Japanese War, and thereby to lay a founda- 
tion for an understanding of the three empires, at w^hich Bismarck 
had aimed as the best guarantee for permanent peace. 

After the Algeciras Conference (1906) the French alliance 
exercised greater powers of attraction, and eventually brought 
Russia together with France into the agreement with England 
( 1907) . The German government having been unable to prevent 
this agreement, naturally drew from that fact the conclusion that 
it would be wise to maintain its close relations with Austria. This 
all the more because the union of Russia and England, the two 
former opponents In Oriental affairs, had emphasized and sharp- 
ened anew the differences between Russia and Austria, w^hlch 
had been only temporarily adjusted by the agreement of 
Miirzsteg. Russia, bound in East Asia by Japan, in Persia by 
England, turned anew with a changed front toward the Near 
East. And it appears that England, without explicitly with- 
drawing her opposition to the complete exclusion of Turkey 
from Europe and to Russian occupation of Constantinople and 
the Straits, nevertheless understood the art of awaking hopes 
and expectations in the breasts of Russian statesmen which ren- 
dered them useful tools for English designs against Germany. 
Had Russia limited herself to the demand that under certain 
restrictions passage through the Dardanelles be granted to her 



MODERN GERMANY 51 

ships of war, it is probable that neither Turkey nor Austria 
would have offered serious opposition. But Russia's desire 
went much further. She planned to extend her rule over Con- 
stantinople, the Straits, the Balkan countries, the Black Sea 
and Asia Minor, and to these plans the German-Austrian com- 
bination formed a serious obstacle. Repeated attempts were 
made at various times, by Russia in Berlin, by the English in 
Vienna, to bring about in one way or another a rupture of the 
close alliance of the two Central European Powers. All these 
efforts failed. It would be less in place to-day than ever to 
speculate whether Germany stands in greater need of Austria, 
or Austria of Germany, to maintain their position as World 
Powers — the important fact is that, in the European constellation 
of states as then existing, the two Powers were mutually inter- 
dependent and that the realization of this community of interests 
has manifested itself far beyond the actual terms of their written 
treaty. 

The effects of the Russian-British understanding in the Balkan 
question became more apparent after the meeting of Reval 
(1908), beginning with an increased agitation of the Greater 
Servian movement, which w^as directly aimed against the Aus- 
trian occupation of Bosnia, and indirectly against the integrity 
of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in general. The resulting 
tension became still more intense through the Young Turk 
Revolution, which gave a dangerous impetus to the nationalistic 
aims of the Balkan nations and of the Ottoman Empire, and 
increased the delicacy of Austria's position in Bosnia. Austria's 
decision to annex Bosnia was the result of this situation (Oct. 5, 
1908). Formally, it w^as a breach of the provisions of the Berlin 
Treaty, but it was dictated by an imperative, vital interest of 
the Dual Monarchy. Moreover, this act made no real change 
in conditions in the Balkan Peninsula, and all fears of more 
ambitious designs on Austria's part were rendered idle by the 
fact that at the same time Novi Bazar, in which Austria had 
treaty rights, was given back to Turkey. Nevertheless, as the 
result of England's activity, a storm of protest was heard on 
all sides against this one-sided action of Austria; and for Ger- 
many the fateful question arose: What position was she to take 
in the matter? Treaty obligations did not enter into considera- 
tion, only the political situation ; but as this was conceived by the 
German government there was no course but to support Austria 
unreservedly and emphatically in this act so unmistakably dic- 
tated by vital interests. Cold practical considerations w^ere the 
determining factor in this decision, not the romantic sentiment 



52 MODERN GERMANY 

of "nibelungen" fidelity. The Imperial Chancellor, Biilow, 
recalled at that time (March 9, 1909) in the Reichstag, Bis- 
marck's words: *'A state like Austria-Hungary, when abandoned 
by its ally, will become alienated and inclined to grasp the hand 
of the enemy of its faithless friend." (Speech of February 6, 
1888.) To be sure, as a member of the entente, Austria would 
gradually have sunk from her former position of power; but 
Germany likewise would have found herself in a future inter- 
national crisis in a position of dangerous isolation. 

The immediate and decisive support which Austria received 
from Germany was an important factor in quieting the attacks 
of the Powers against the Dual Monarchy and in preserving 
peace, but, under cover, the clash of interests continued. The 
Greater Serbian agitation, encouraged by Russia, continued 
despite the agreement of 1909, and was still further strengthened 
by the final outcome of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. The 
danger which this involved for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy 
became more and more manifest; it was, therefore, a matter of 
course that Germany should continue to stand firmly and de- 
cisively on Austria's side in the resulting conflicts. 

Naturally, Turkey was threatened even more by Russia's plans 
of expansion; but this consideration played no part in the out- 
break of the present war, not becoming a factor until later 
on. The German instructors in the Turkish army were just 
as little an indication of a control of Turkey by Germany as 
the English instructors in the navy were an indication of such 
a control on the part of England. The only difference is that 
the German military commission, with the earnestness and zeal 
characteristic of German officers, took a real and active interest 
in the strengthening and military education of the Moslems. 
Our commercial interests in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia 
justify to-day without doubt a keener participation in Balkan 
affairs than at the time of Bismarck, but they were not a decisive 
factor in the outbreak of the war. We as little desired to make 
the Mesopotamian affair a cause for war as the Moroccan. With 
the moderation and restraint which characterize our international 
policy, we had come to an understanding with England and 
Russia on the question of the Bagdad Railway. The construc- 
tion put upon these facts by an American author is as ridiculous 
as it is arbitrary and unfounded. He argues thus: 'ToUowing 
Bulgaria's understanding with Austria, only the conquest of 
Serbia was needed to bring about the realization of the Levantine 
Empire of the Pan-Germanists — hence the Austro-Serbian con- 
flict and the war." It is astounding that such figments of the 



MODERN GERMANY 53 

imagination can find a place in serious American magazines. Ger- 
many's policy in regard to Russia may be thus summarized : We 
are determined to oppose every efFort by Russia and her agents 
aimed at the destruction or degradation of Austria, even at the 
risk of war. It Is permissible in this connection to recall another 
remark of Bismarck: "The preservation of the Austro- 
Hungarian monarchy, as a strong, independent Power, is for Ger- 
many a requisite of the European balance of power, for the 
accomplishment of which, If necessary, the peace of the country 
may be sacrificed with good conscience." 

The German Empire is an obstacle in the path of the British 
efforts to attain world-rule In the same manner as Austria is 
an obstacle in the path of Russian Pan-Slavism. For almost 
twenty years the successful competition of German industry in 
the commerce of the world has aroused the jealousy, the envy 
and the hatred of British business men and of the government 
which they control. To be sure, the competition in no wise 
endangered the growth of England's export trade and appro- 
priated for Germany only a part of the riches created by the 
increase in international commerce; but German export trade 
was increasing more rapidly than England's and this rapid up- 
ward tendency, which marked the entire economic activity of 
the German people, was considered a source of danger to the 
preservation of England's commercial supremacy. 

An additional consideration was the growth of our fleet to 
the size of a respectable sea power; In actual number of ships, 
it is true, it was scarcely half that of the British fleet, but by its 
absolute size it nevertheless awakened respect. It was due to 
this fact that the British Admiralty drew together in home waters 
the chief units of its fighting forces, which had hitherto been scat- 
tered over the Seven Seas, and even left the protection of the 
Mediterranean in great part in the hands of the allied French 
fleet. There was no suspicion that our naval preparations were 
of an aggressive character; sensible English people have never 
expected an attack of the German fleet on England; but Eng- 
land did not intend to permit any strong sea power whatsoever 
to exist which. In certain contingencies, she might have to take 
into account. Her aim was to maintain undiminished the im- 
mense advantage she possessed over every other fleet in the 
world. Politicians who gave thought to the conditions necessary 
to maintaining England's naval supremacy were alarmed by 
the tendency to grow^th shown not alone by the German fleet 
but likewise by the trade and commerce of this Continental 
rival. For the greater the absolute strength of the German 



54 MODERN GERMANY 

fleet, the more difficult it became for England to maintain 
permanently the proportion of superiority over her rival which 
she then still possessed. What would the result be if Germany 
should raise the number of her dreadnoughts to sixty? How 
would England then be in a position to maintain twice that 
number? Whence would come the men and money for this 
purpose? From the article of Archibald Hurd in the Fort- 
nightly Review of October, 191 2, or the report of the British 
Admiralty on Canada for the same year, the conclusion is easily 
reached that these apprehensions were calculated to lead to a 
decision to check the further development of the German sea- 
power by a preventive war. Even the modest basis of our world 
policy and of our defensive maritime preparations seemed intoler- 
able to Englishmen, because, with intuitive correctness, they 
realized that Germany's economic strength and naval power 
might one day, without war, through gradual, uninterrupted 
development, challenge England's world supremacy. That, in 
fact, was the aim of Germany's policy; we desired to develop 
slowly in peaceful competition with England, until one day 
the older World Power would recognize Germany as possessing 
equal rights in determining the politics of the world. This 
development England sought to preclude by the war, follow^ing 
the failure of her efforts to induce Germany to limit her naval 
armament without corresponding political concessions and to 
accept a position incompatible with political independence. 

The aim of these endeavors was, of course, to perpetuate the 
great superiority which England at that time possessed in naval 
strength and to place this superiority upon a basis of interna- 
tional law. The principle of British rule, it was intended, 
should in this manner gain treaty recognition for all time. Ger- 
many was to be forced, although she had to reckon not only 
with the English but also with the French and Russian fleets, 
to limit her naval strength to suit the interests and convenience 
of the nation which rules the seas. In order that England might 
be absolutely safeguarded in her naval supremacy, and relieved 
from undue exertions in maintaining her superiority, Germany 
was expected to renounce the policy of providing as generously 
for her own safety at sea as political considerations required and 
her internal strength justified. The method underlying this 
naive request would, if applied to Continental conditions, justify 
Germany in demanding of France and Russia a limitation of their 
military strength to a point where it would seem innocuous to 
Germany. What would England say to such a request? There 
is in that country evidently quite another standard for tlie rela- 



MODERN GERMANY 55 

tions of the Continental Powers among themselves and for their 
relation to England. England is far from granting to the Con- 
tinental Powers a position of equality in international questions. 
France and Russia may submit to such a relationship, if they 
consider it compatible with their dignity and independence. 
Germany demands a position of equality with England, and re- 
fuses to recognize in principle and for all time her dominance of 
the seas. This was the principal cause which drove England 
into the war against Germany. 



CHAPTER II 
THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN KULTUR 

PROFESSOR ERNST TROELTSCH, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 

BERLIN 

THE Homeric heroes, according to legend, were wont to go 
into battle hurling imprecations at their foes, and it would 
seem that fighters always have experienced the desire to stigmatize 
their opponents as morally inferior. A change came with the 
knights of the Middle Ages, when the consciousness of repre- 
senting a privileged class and the desire to illustrate Christian 
mansuetude, even in battle, gave birth to practices exhibiting 
a certain esteem and courtesy. The rules of warfare and the code 
of honor of that time have remained operative in the maxims 
of our modern armies, and above all in the standards of the mod- 
ern officer; but the great mobilized masses of to-day, and espe- 
cially the nations themselves, counting millions of souls, once 
more experience the emotions of Homeric heroes and accompany 
the battle of their armies with primitive and violent race- 
hatred. 

This seems to be a psychological law and applies, with tem- 
peramental differences, to all the belligerents. But that which 
we are experiencing to-day is something that transcends the 
sphere of emotions. It is a new weapon which is wielded by 
the modern press. It is in the nature of a crusade against 
Germany, of a ''Kulturkrieg,'' which takes advantage of existing 
predispositions or adverse sentiments in order to create and 
propagate to the greatest possible extent a decided and uncon- 
querable antipathy. This vituperative literature strives to justify 
the war as the carrying out, so to speak, of a verdict of interna- 
tional proscription. ^ 

This Kultur war is primarily the work of England, in whose 

^ See the London Times, December 22, 19 14, statement of Professor Sayce: "The 
Germans are still what they were fifteen centuries ago, the barbarians who 
raided our ancestors and destroyed the civilization of the Roman Empire. For 
a thousand years the blight of German conquest hung oyer Western Europe, 
until at last the conquerors perished in internecine conflict or were absorbed 
into the older populations, and the Dark Ages came to an end. 

"We must trust that they will not return with a new avalanche of Teutonic 
barbarism, but that the Germans may resume their old vocation as the intel- 
lectual 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' for Western Europe. Germany 
has no ancient culture to fall back upon, and what that means may be best 
understood from the contrast between German savagery in the present war 
and the chivalry of the civilized Japanese in their war with Russia." 

56 



MODERN GERMANY 57 

political intrigues against Germany it has long been clearly 
perceptible. The inciting of the whole world against Germany 
and the attempt to starve her out would appear indefensible 
unless it were shown that the destruction of Germany is really in 
the interest of humanity and that the moral inferiority of the 
Germans demands it. A colossal campaign of suggestion is there- 
fore undertaken in order to justify and uphold this manner of 
warfare. Expressions of just appreciation, once so general, are 
now suppressed, and from Capetown to Edinburgh, from Rome 
to Bordeaux, the censorship does its brutal work. 

From a purely political standpoint such a policy is cleverly 
calculated. The unscrupulous determination to make use of 
every weapon, combined with the art of rendering this policy 
morally popular, are old traits of Britain's political skill, and 
the idea is as clever as is its execution. The latter may be 
divided into two closely connected and yet different processes. 
The first of these consists in influencing the daily press and 
incidental literature, in which the most grotesque and crude 
statements find a place, and the reader is made to shudder by 
tales of Huns, barbarians, child-murderers and cannibals. The 
hoi polloi demand such coarse pabulum, which is rendered more 
palatable by pictures and films, made to order in case of neces- 
sity. The other phase of the undertaking is left to scholars and 
celebrated authors, who in more dignified language and with 
scientific evidence, exhaustively picture the inferior or at any 
rate the dangerous qualities of the German mind, at least in 
its regrettable modern development. These products of their 
pens are distributed in countless copies, and furnish the catch- 
words and theories which are the weapons of the daily press 
when they feel that, in connection with tales of horror, they 
must offer their readers something more positive. In this en- 
deavor English publicists are, of course, generously supported by 
their French colleagues — indeed, the latter frequently provide 
their brethren across the Channel with the most telling points 
and most damaging charges, either revived or manufactured on 
the spur of the moment. Russian writers naturally lack such 
far-reaching influence.^ 

1 See Germany and Europe, by J. W. Allen, London, 19 14. ''The existence in 
Europe of a great state specialized for military purposes and directed by people 
dominated by such views — this is the immediate cause of the war" (p. 56). . . . 
"These deficiencies account for the old stupidity which marks almost all Ger- 
man work. The German mind is at once powerful and dull" (p. 46). Mr. 
Allen instances, as proof of their mentality, the works of Treitschke,_ Nietzsche 
and Bernhardi, and the pan-German publicists; but he knows, and indeed ex- 
pressly states, that these writers do not agree, and do not dominate German 
thought. He remarks further that the great groups, such as the Catholics, 
the Social Democrats and the Liberals, do not countenance the publications of 
the small pan-German group; but he calls on them to bear witness to German 



58 



MODERN GERMANY 



The former of these two phases of the Kultur war must be 
regarded from the psychologic, or rather, from the psychopatho- 
logic standpoint, and falls under the chapter of "Truth and 
Falsehood." The other, respectable portion of the anti-German 
literary output is of a different nature. In this group we find 
discussions of German character written from varied stand- 
points — some more conservative, some more radical — but all 
tending to present the war under the aspect of a Kultur war 
and to disguise the physical struggle as a moral and spiritual one. 
Despite this, how^ever, they present earnest and exhaustive 
studies of things German. Analysis frequently takes the place 
of polemics. For it is here a question of the spirit of German 
Kultur, which is presented either directly as the cause of the 
war, or as something inimical that must be fought, but which, 
by force of its inherent weight, often compels to purely scientific 

mentality and Kultur. Sometimes, however, he retracts his statements: "This 
mental condition seems to have amounted to what may roughly be described 
as a will to war, and may be regarded as the real cause of the war. But 
this mental state was not, ot course, a simple thing, all of a piece. It might 
even be argued that it did not really exist at all" (p. 30) ; and later he says, 
"Germany has meant the war, partly unconsciously, these twenty years" 
(p. 58). ' Finally the conclusion of his argument suggests the moderate terms 
of peace offered to Germany because of her value to Europe, the terms of 
peace including the condition that Free Trade be established throughout Europe 
and that everywhere — except in the British Empire — the various nationalities 
are to be permitted to determine their own political future. 

See also Germany and England, by the late Professor J. A. Cramb, Lon- 
don, 19 14. It is an honest, chivalrous and thoughtful work, but it is of course 
one-sided, and in one important point it is strangely in error. His book was 
written before the war, but it has had a large circulation. Professor Cramb 
pleads for the establishment of conscription; and he describes the threatening 
German danger. It is not German inhumanity that he considers the danger; 
it is the great political and intellectual development of the modern German 
Empire, driven by fate towards the hope of world-dominion, and thus into 
an inevitable struggle with England — an England determined to maintain her 
universal power. He bases his arguments chiefly on the works of Treitschke, 
and interprets England politics in the light of Treitschke's ideas. The final 
motive of Germany as well as of England, according to Professor Cramb, is 
not material, but spiritual, world-dominion; it is Germany's purpose to destroy 
Christianity, and to set in its place a German religion of worldly ideals, of 
the power of will, of heroism, the ideal of which is Napoleon, the prophet of 
which is Nietzsche. He holds that modern German development means the 
annihilation of exotic Christianity and creation of a new national religion 
which derives from Odin and the old Teutonic heroes; that the Germans, with 
their ideas of world-dominion, are experimenting at the same time with a 
new universal religion: "Corsica, in a word, has conquered Galilee" (p. 133). 
The English spirit, on the contrary, holds similar ideals of heroism, a religion 
of freedom, with reverence as well as fearlessness in its attitude toward the 
Riddle of the Universe. Because of these differences. Professor Cramb fore- 
sees an inevitable struggle between these rivals: "And one can imagine the 
ancient mighty deity of all the Teutonic kindred, looking serenely down upon 
that conflict, upon his favorite children, the English and the Germans, locked 
in a death-struggle, smiling upon the heroism of the children of Odin, the 
War-God!" (p. 152). 

See also The IVar and Democracy, by R. W. Seton-Watson, J. Dover Wilson, 
Alfred Zimmern and Arthur Greenwood, London, 19 14: Germany and the Ger- 
man Emperor, by G. H. Perris, London, 1914 (Fourth Edition); and Britain's 
Case against Germany, by Ramsay Muir, Manchester, 19 14. The last publica- 
tion discusses the variation between the old Germany and the new Prussian 
Germany, and upholds England's claim for world-dominion because she stands 
for the maintenance of the present world order, which the German principle 
of force aims to destroy. 



MODERN GERMANY 59 

or historfco-phllosophfcal discussion. Much misunderstanding 
and caricature are mixed with all this, as is also much that 
shows distinct bias. But in the main we meet here the 
scientific method, which was developed b)^ Germans precisely 
for such purposes and which is now turned by our enemies 
against us. Alongside of this is our own war literature, which 
is already of considerable volume. It shows us as we see our- 
selves. It is on the whole drawn with German honesty, and 
may be studied with profit by friend and foe, though of course 
the picture is only a rapid sketch of what is seen by the flash- 
light illumination of the war. But this is all that can be ex- 
pected, as on both sides the cultural contrasts of Europe are 
revealed by such momentary flashes, now that the hazy concep- 
tion of the ''respectable European" has practically been elimi- 
nated by the conflict. 

Let us endeavor, then, as calmly as may be in the face of 
the perils surrounding us, and w ith reference to the war literature 
that has come into existence, to characterize these great con- 
trasts and the position occupied by German civilization within 
this framework. We may then draw our conclusions without 
having to descend into the degrading arena of war polemics, 
with its increasingly disgusting abuse. 

So-called European Kultur, or, more properly expressed, the 
Kultur of the white Christian races, is not, as a matter of 
fact, so uniform as appearances would indicate, or as each 
fraction assumes it to be when it naively identifies its own 
particular Kultur with that of Europe. Likewise, the view 
that modern science had produced a uniform type of Kultur, 
consonant to the demands of reason, is as erroneous as is the 
view that Christianity implies and guarantees a homogeneous 
Kultur. The dispute is by no means a product of this war. 
England and France have long carried on the Kultur war by 
means of the press, lectures and festivals. England, in addi- 
tion, has done this through Christian missions in order to prepare 
against the day of political reckoning, or merely to emphasize 
the existence of a moral contrast. 

The various civilized states differ even in the material bases 
of their existence. The two Americas are independent, unas- 
sailable colonial states, self-sufficing commercially, destined in 
the future to undergo the social developments through which 
Europe has already passed. The British Isles are the centre of 
a world empire comparable only to the old Roman Empire; as 
in the latter, the citizens of the home state have grown into a 
proud master caste, versed in all the arts of ruling the most 



6o MODERN GERMANY 

heterogeneous territories and nations. The states of the Euro- 
pean Continent are military states, whose populations continue 
to outgrow their natural boundaries and who consequently come 
into serious conflict with each other, not only on the Continent 
itself, but also beyond its borders, over the division of the colonial 
territory which they require. These conflicts are of ancient 
date, and in the course of more than a thousand years the out- 
come has varied, so that to-day the purely political causes of 
disagreement are complicated by questions of honor and national 
traditions. Finally, the Russian Empire belongs to the type of 
bureaucratic predatory states which, like ancient Assyria, have 
no natural boundaries, and devote their excess of vitality to 
territorial conquests, instead of to inner development. 

These multifarious conditions cause great differences among 
the various states as regards their Kultur. But there are, in 
addition, differences of feeling, of thought, of the entire character 
resulting from the racial individuality of the various na- 
tionalities. They spring in part from the peculiar historical 
development of the chief individual groups, but are not to be 
explained entirely in this manner. There is in each case a 
peculiar mixture of elemental tendencies and historical destiny, 
of social-political and moral-intellectual development, acting and 
reacting upon each other, yet each with its own individual cause 
of being. It is clear from this that one can comprehend no single 
one of these types of Kultur without considering it in its 
entirety, as resulting from the intermingling of its various ele- 
ments and tendencies; especially must it be studied under the 
mutually interdependent phases of its external and internal life, 
of its material and spiritual properties, of the historical fortune 
it has met with and its inner qualities of character. The result 
is, therefore, that one must not seek the Kultur of a nation only 
in its science and art, its religion and morality, its culture and 
schooling, as the English, with their penchant for simplifying 
everything, are especially prone to do; rather must it be sought 
in the manifestations of the nation's life as a whole, in the more 
or less uniform national spirit created and revealed by the 
mutual interplay of these manifestations. It is, therefore, quite 
futile to quote statistics of renowned poets, scholars, artists, in- 
ventions and machines, as unfriendly second-rate newspapers are 
so fond of doing, taking as their standard only the accidental 
celebrity of the press or the encyclopaedia. This is one of the 
childish things which will automatically disappear with the war. 
The system of treating certain authors selected at random as 
typical of the German spirit is equally futile. We need do 



MODERN GERMANY 6i 

no more than mention the ridiculous trinity Treitschke-Nietzsche- 
Bernhardi, which to many controversialists is holier than the 
Christian trinity, but which in the better class of writings even 
among our enemies is recognized and condemned as an arbitrary 
and stupid selection.^ 

Nothing is to be gained by such crude methods. The real 
question is to grasp, in the broadest manner possible, the mani- 
fold and paradoxical manifestations of the life of a nation and, 
viewing them from a single or from as few central standpoints 
as possible, to fathom and understand them as a uniform whole. 
These central points, as our modern historical and historico- 
philosophical teaching shows, are primarily to be found In the 
political and social development of a nation, which determines 
its spirit. If not exclusively, at least in the main. ^ 

We can understand England if w^e keep in mind her Insular 
character, her national union under the Tudors, her absolutely 
unique position as regards the church, her Puritan Revolution 
and the contemporary turning to trade and manufacture, her 
fortunate position during the great European conflicts, which en- 
abled her to appropriate a fifth of the globe and transformed 
her Into an extra-European Power, dependent only upon herself. 
From this point of vantage one grasps the significance of the 
middle class, which is the pillar of English trade, with Its com- 
bination of strong law-abiding religiousness and keen business 

1 See Germany and Europe, by J. W. Allen, p, 4 et seq. He refutes the state- 
ments of the authors of Tlie War and Democracy (p. 350 et seq.) that the 
philosophy of force is common to all nations: "What is true and what is more 
serious, is that men like Harnack, Eucken and Wilamowitz, who should re- 
pudiate all intellectual kinship with Machiavelli and Nietzsche — men who are 
leaders of European thought — publicly support and encourage the policy and 
standpoint of a Government which, according to British ideas, has acted with 
criminal wickedness." 

2 It is perhaps well to pause here to say that the term Kultur is not only 
peculiar to German scientific language, but particularly to German thought and 
feeling. It is ceaselessly mocked at by the second-rate press as "Kultur with 
a K." It conforms to German History and manner of thought, in which tb; 
unity of the nation has been brought about by a spiritual development that has 
become one with her politico-social being. At the same time, Kultur harks 
back to Lutherism and the national church, in which the state and highest 
intellectual interest have become completely one. The Anglo-Saxon demo- 
cratic language speaks only of civilization, by which is meant the natural 
right of the individual, and through it the control of the state, the freedom 
of religion and the church, the recognition of the private character of personal 
belief and conviction, and the influence of public opinion on government and 
private life. See The War and Democracy, Chap. IX, p. 348 et seq. In France, 
too, the ideas of state, society, philosophy and aestheticism are closely con- 
nected. But they do not call this Kultur as the Germans do, but civilisation, 
progres, humanite, in order to express the logically necessary and rational 
character; implied in the German Kultur, however, there is something roman- 
tically, individualistically irrational, the idea of self-education and the improve- 
ment of the individual and the nation. For an English view of German Kultur, 
see Viscount Haldane's address, "Germany and Great Britain," delivered at 
Oxford at the time of the Agadir crisis; and note that he says the mutual study 
of the national mind of the two countries is indispensable, and note also that 
he calls attention to the fact that education (Bildung), which is general in 
Germany, in England leads to the establishment of class distinctions. 



62 MODERN GERMANY 

sense, its leanings toward the Free Church and toward an indi- 
vidualism that resents governmental tutelage and that expresses 
itself through control of the government, through individual 
independence, and above all through public opinion. Again, from 
this point of view, may be understood the development of that 
class of pioneers and conquerors who seized, organized and ex- 
ploited the colonies and who called into being that firm, masterful 
Englishman who regards the world as belonging to him, and looks 
upon himself and his customs and habits as the only possible ones 
anywhere. The national armies and universal duty to bear arms, 
as seen on the Continent, are inconceivable in such a colonial em- 
pire. Its activity is divided between business and voluntary 
military' and pioneer service, that shifts from point to point 
throughout the world. Above this middle class stands a 
monarchy and aristocracy, who are treated with conservative re- 
spect by the English democracy, owing to the latter's character, 
which chiefly aims at independence; nevertheless, owing to the 
pronounced commercial and industrial interests of monarchy and 
aristocracy, they do not form a social type as different from the 
rest of the population as that of the Prussian landed aristocracy. 
Further, above this middle class Is a social stratum of cultivated 
individuals, who, by virtue of their wealth and the opportunities 
thus oltered to them, may be said to belong to the noblest and 
most cultured specimens of intellectuallsm. 

But this class is much smaller than the corresponding class in 
Germany, and much less the result of universal popular education. 
That, on the other hand, beneath the "Hebrew Philistine middle 
classes," as Matthew Arnold calls them, there exists a substratum 
of the most abject poverty and helpless misery, has been shown 
plainly enough by English sociological work, the Salvation Army, 
and the most recent British social legislation. These were the 
conditions from which arose what Cramb, with natural emphasis 
on all that is great and striking in them, characterizes as the 
general tendencies of English imperialism during the last cen- 
tury and a half : "To give all men within its bounds an English 
mind; to give all who come within its sway the power to look 
at the things of man's life, at the past, at the future, from the 
standpoint of an Englishman ; to diffuse within its bounds that 
high tolerance in religion which has marked this empire from its 
foundation ; that reverence yet boldness before the mysteriousness 
of life and death characteristic of our great poets and our great 
thinkers; that love of free institutions, that pursuit of an ever- 
higher justice and a larger freedom which, rightly or wrongly, 
we associate with the temper and character of our race wher- 



MODERN GERMANY 63 

ever it is dominant and secure."^ The Conservative is recog- 
nizable in these words; nevertheless, in his ideal he includ* lib- 
eral English civilization as a world principle. The differences 
are, in fact, not very great from a world-political point of view: 
some Englishmen regard world dominion as the execution of a 
bold, imperialistic conception of power, others as safeguarding the 
moral world system of freedom against chaos. England's world 
dominance is to some the promotion of the masculine spirit of 
rule; to others it appears a right and duty imposed by God; but 
to both it seems a matter of course. 

The foundations of French Kultur were laid much further 
in the past. It is the prototype of national culture in Europe, 
gradually evolved through the consolidating influences of kings, 
court, administration, Gallicanism, and centralization of intellect 
in Paris. Thoroughly aristocratic, it was determined in the 
paths of its modern spiritual development by the acceptance of 
the Renaissance and the Counter Reformation. The aristocratic 
culture of this classic period was then passed on to the middle 
classes, which secularized and rationalized it, separated it from 
church and monarch, and placed it upon the foundation of a 
purely scientific conception of state and society. Basing their 
claims on this theory of the state, the middle classes took the 
power into their own hands and set up a rule of the people which 
they declared to be demanded by reason, human progress, freedom 
and social equity. This is the ideal of the bourgeois republic, 
erected upon the foundation of clear and relentless science, con- 
stantly calculating anew, in ingenious constitutional concepts, the 
proper share of the will of the individual in the power of the 
state, conceiving itself as the expression of reason (otherwise 
expressed, of individual rationalism), and hence as the principle 
of humanity, progress and anti-clericalism. The new republic 
connects itself to the glorious old political aspirations of the 
French military state by means of its propaganda for democracy, 
science and humanity, at one moment w^th the material weapons 
that liberate nations, at another with the magic of an elegant and 
lucid literature of suggestion. The intellectual element, however, 
of this democratic humanity consists au fond even to-day in the old 
aristocratic ideal of the esprit classique, in the cult of form and 
lucidity, in elegant ease and mathematical keenness, in the alterna- 
tion of scepticism and dogmatism — all of this inspired by that 
specifically French quality of imagination and feeling, the charm 
of which is felt in every line of French literature. By this means 

"^Germany and England, Cramb, p. 139 et seq. 



64 MODERN GERMANY 

French genius has succeeded in presenting itself to that portion 
of the world which is not under the sway of English civilization, 
as the standard of humanity, democracy and progress, producing 
at the same time the impression of a firm, established, but never- 
theless impressionable and artistic protean power. Yet the 
French peasantry and small capitalists continue to be ruled by 
the bourgeoisiej although under democratic forms, much in the 
same manner as at the time of the anciem regime and the Na- 
poleonic prefects. 

Freedom and equality are postulates of individual reason, on 
which society is built up, rational and lucid. But this indi- 
vidual reason is really only the spirit and taste of the old 
aristocracy, leveled to the plane of the bourgeoisie. The 
French Republic is a democracy in the form of its constitution 
and parliament, a democracy of high-sounding phrases, but it is 
not a real democracy of feeling, spirit and Kultur. The efforts 
of Socialism to create such a democracy are always wrecked by 
the omnipotence of the bourgeoisie, or else they end in violent 
temperamental outbreaks. He who has no share in the bour- 
geois mentality does not count, and is thrust back into the arms 
of clericalism, the enemy of all culture. The breach with the 
national religion and the national past, and the resulting adop- 
tion of science as the creator of the new, progressive and uni- 
versally valid order of society, is the most characteristic trait of 
the French mind, which, through all these breaks with the past, 
has maintained only the artistic spirit of the Renaissance. That 
enables France to act as leader to all nations which have experi- 
enced or desire a similar breach and it creates a feeling of affinity 
with all Romance peoples who are equally under the influence 
of the Renaissance. The world-wide influence of suggestion of 
the French is to be understood in this manner; truly, it is one 
of the most important results of European development. It can, 
however, scarcely be ascribed to hate or prejudice, if we Ger- 
mans believe that we recognize, not the strength of progress, but 
the aging of a great civilization, in this disturbed spirit, that has 
broken with the national religion and that is therefore so en- 
tirely rationalistic. This is likewise the opinion of many French- 
men, in view of the fact that all attempts at innovation and re- 
juvenation merely lead back into clericalism. Whoever recalls 
the brilliant essays of Melchior de Vogue in the Revue des deux 
Mondes of former years is reminded of strange, haunting au- 
tumn moods; whoever has read the social novels, le Mannequin 
d" Osier or VAnneau d'Amethiste, by the modern Voltaire, now 



MODERN GERMANY 65 

so ferocious,^ knows that the inevitable, logical consequence of 
such pure rationalism — namely, scepticism — is already manifest- 
ing itself in France in a high degree. For the moment, to be 
sure, a violent nationalism and the religion of revenge for the 
Franco-Prussian War has arisen as a "new idealism" to check 
this tendency, and has decked itself with all the splendor of the 
French claims to culture inherited from the eighteenth century. 
But in the long run this is likely to prove a futile and unpro- 
ductive idea. 

In respect to our third great enemy, there can be up to the 
present no question of a pronounced contrast of kindred civiliza- 
tions. It is true that the highly gifted masses of Russia hold 
within themselves possibilities and probabilities of an important 
new and essentially Russian Kultur. Were such a civilization 
really to materialize, it would undoubtedly be the most religious 
in Europe, and would result in an entirely new type, which 
would combine the specific orthodox religiousness with the pe- 
culiarities of an agricultural people still free from West- 
European capitalism and rationalism. Every one familiar with 
Dostoyevsky, Soloviev, and Tolstoi will look forward to such 
future possibilities with great expectation — if, indeed, we may re- 
gard them as possibilities. But the unorthodox West-Slavic ele- 
ments, which are under European cultural influences, would not 
be a factor, since they lack all prerequisites for participation in 
the manifestations of a specifically Russian spirit. Pan-Slavism is 
not a Kultur conception but a political weapon and a means of 
agitation. But that with which we are concerned at present is 
precisely not Russian Kultur in any spiritual sense. It is rather 
Czarism, with its traditional policy of force and conquest, which is 
meant to divert attention from the inner questions of Russian 
civilization to external politics. When Russian liberals and 
revolutionists seek to gain profit for Russian liberalism through 
an alliance with the Western Powers, and at the same time to 
indulge their hatred against reactionary Prussia, formerly the 
ally of Nicholas I, this has nothing to do with the conception of 
independent Russian Kultur; nor, on the other hand, has it any- 
thing to do with such a conception when the feelings of the ortho- 
dox mass are aroused against the impious Catholic and Protestant 
West and directed toward the conquest of Constantinople. The 
inclusion of Russia in this Kultur war against the German spirit 
is, therefore, meaningless, hypocritical bombast, which is not 
without its difficulties for the liberals in England and France. 

1 This refers to Anatole France and his anti-German attitude since the war.— 

Translator's note. 



66 MODERN GERMANY 

The cooperation of Russia is of purel)^ military and political 
importance. From the point of view of Kultur, the victory of 
autocratic Russia, with her Peter and Paul prison, her system 
of Siberian exile, her pogroms and her pseudo-constitutionalism, 
would mean nothing else than the advancement of the most vio- 
lent and senseless reaction. There is no need, therefore, to con- 
sider what Russian civilization will be in the future. 

The pictures that we have before us, in contrast with our own, 
are those of the English and French civilizations, whose influ- 
ence, in each case, extends far beyond the boundaries of the coun- 
try in question. The English spirit is dominant in North Amer- 
ica, despite that country's manifold peculiarities; while the 
French spirit controls anti-clerical Italy and the Romance coun- 
tries in general. Only by utterly disregarding the deep-lying 
differences in the Anglo-Saxon and the Latin conceptions of 
democracy and of the strong esthetic and temperamental differ- 
ences between the Anglo-Saxon and Romance peoples, can one 
conceive of Western civilization as identical with the democratic 
ideal of freedom, progress and humanity; only then can one, 
with a wealth of illuminating demagogic rhetoric and with all 
the ardor of the sincere doctrinaire, contrast it with the German 
class-state and the German philosophy of force. Connected with 
this, as a rule, is the doctrine of nationalities, looking to the 
emancipation of all those groups that consider themselves to be 
separate nationalities, and that would fain set themselves up as 
independent democratic states, by means of a plebiscite and under 
international guarantee. It is easy to picture the horoscope 
which, from this standpoint, the opponents of Germany and Aus- 
tria cast for those countries: disintegration into small democra- 
cies, with a minimum of military equipment, under the control 
of the liberal Great Powers. England herself would, of course, 
remain unchanged by the operation of this principle, since, as w^e 
are constantly assured, she consists only of willingly incorporated 
nationalities and is now, or is in process of becoming, a m.odel 
commonwealth of democratic, self-governing units, similar to 
that of North America. This democratic rhetoric furnishes the 
main basis of the attacks against Germany. Judged by this stand- 
ard, German-Prussian imperialism is indeed a thing to be con- 
demned in the interest of humanity and the future of the human 
race. Nor is there anywhere the least hesitancy shown in so 
doing. Material is thereby furnished for the press campaign, 
while at the same time the moral ideal is proclaimed with which 
the most heterogeneous elements make a war of extermination 
against Germany seem justifiable to themselves and others, in 



MODERN GERxMANY 67 

order to avoid admitting that the whole situation is merely 
the exploitation of the Russian desire for war for the benefit of 
France's dream of revenge and England's longing for commercial 
world supremacy. 

The real nature and tendency of German Kultur is not to be 
learned from such international rhetorical phrases or from super- 
ficial moralizing, but only from an analysis of Germany's devel- 
opment and of the German spirit. 

The decisive factor in this connection is to be found in the fact 
that the German Empire is a very recently created state, with 
complex and msecure boundaries, situated in the middle of Eur- 
ope, and unwelcome to all the previous Great Powers, for w^hom 
this politically free space in their midst formed the natural bat- 
tlefield and the natural source of territorial compensation. One 
needs only to recall the dismay which so humane a statesman as 
Gladstone experienced at the disturbance of the then existing 
political balance through the birth of the German Empire, and 
simultaneously through the formation of the Italian Kingdom, 
the latter event being rendered possible only by the former. 
This disturbance, and its continual augmentation by the eco- 
nomic and political growth of Central Europe, is the true reason 
for all the dislike and antagonism. In the youthfulness of this 
late-comer and trouble-brewer in the European system of states 
is to be found, moreover, the reason for its lack of finish, its 
sanguine vitality, its passionate self-consciousness, and the mass 
of still unsolved administrative problems. In the minds of out- 
siders this may be a ground for criticism, in our own it indicates 
merely the strivmg for an ever-growing unity and increasing sta- 
bility of the Empire, as well as the hope of a prosperous and 
great future. These are hopes that befit a vigorous adolescence, 
but which, under the relentless pressure of reality, will doubtless 
adjust themselves to the outside world. They indicate no more 
and no less than does the boundless optimism of the Americans — 
namely, the vitality and self-confidence of a j^outhful state. 

But the decisive factor in determining the spirit of German 
Kultur is the manner in which the German state was founded 
and the peculiar compound of plastic forces which moulded the 
nation. The Thirty Years' War left in its train chaos, religious 
disunion, poverty and a motley of small states. Austria, whose 
attention was concentrated on the Orient, could not undertake 
the reconstruction of the German Empire — her interests, in fact, 
lay in the perpetuation of the prevailing state of chaos. The 
memories of a former German Empire had faded, and seemed 
like those of a foreign world. But the vitality of the nation was 



68 MODERN GERMANY 

not extinct: it crystallized gradually around the new military 
power, the Prussia of Frederick the Great, which, through a 
series of well-known events extending over two hundred years, 
finally became the backbone of a new, if narrower, empire. That 
this was the only road open for reuniting the nation into a state 
every child in Germany knows to-day. The prerequisite for the 
development of Prussia into the German Empire was the devel- 
opment of a spiritually united and homogeneous German nation, 
which justified its demand for a firm state-edifice. This has been 
the work of German literature, poetry, philosophy and science, that 
since the eighteenth century have disseminated a new spirit of 
unity throughout Germany, torn as it was by religious differences 
and sunk into philistinism. The result was Wilhelm von Hum- 
boldt's great school and university reform, which has been copied 
in all the German states and which has enabled the spirit of 
German Kultur to become the unifying principle and the bind- 
ing force. The great educated middle class adopted the cause 
of Liberalism, which took upon itself in the remarkably peace- 
ful Revolution of 1848 the establishment of German union. 
In this effort it was forced to turn to Prussia to obtain the 
necessary military support, though at that time in vain. In the 
year 1870 Liberalism in all non-Austrian states finally suc- 
ceeded, with the aid of Prussia, in the formation of the Empire; 
to-day, in spite of all frictions, it has become incorporated in 
the politico-military edifice. Since the recuperation of Ger- 
man economic life and the founding of the Customs Union a 
new creative factor has been added. This is the combined in- 
dustrial activity of the whole nation; as a result of the founda- 
tion of the Empire, this industrial development began to bring 
forth all the latent energies of the people, and in the entre- 
preneur and working classes produced a third important element 
of the body-politic. Not without friction has this element hith- 
erto adjusted itself to the other two; nevertheless, it is bound 
to them by innumerable ties, resting as it does mainly upon the 
basis of discipline and order and upon the achievements of me- 
chanical art and science, of school and education. It was this 
third factor that made possible the tremendous growth in popu- 
lation, which since 1870 has increased by twenty-four million, 
the feeding of whom is the chief problem of the Empire to-day. 
In the interplay, friction and adjustment of these three forces 
is represented the German Empire of to-day. Here, and not in 
the alleged antithesis between un-German, power-seeking Prus- 
sia and the other, idealistic but politically weak states, lie the 
problems and contending factors of the new Empire; in Prussia 



MODERN GERMANY 69 

herself these are not less real than in the other parts of the 
Empire. The only difficulties that arise from Prussianism to- 
day are those resulting from the peculiar social structure of the 
class of great land-owners in Prussia, and especially from their 
intimate relationship with the Prussian administration. The 
military organization, the energy and system of this administra- 
tion, its spirit of discipline and responsibility have been willingly 
adopted by the whole country, which competes with the Prus- 
sians along these lines. For the nation is convinced that no in- 
dependent German civilization is possible without the protec- 
tion of a great powerful state, and that the sustenance of our 
millions is not feasible without a firmly united Empire, capable 
of a strong commercial and economic policy. 

Finally, one must not forget the great substratum of the 
peasantry and lower middle class, from which large groups with 
clearly realized aims are continually making their way upward. 
In these classes are stored the nerve power, the natural instincts, 
the elementary spiritual forces, which reach self-realization only 
with the level of self-conscious culture. The tremendous im- 
portance of this fount of national strength and the close con- 
nection of essential characteristics of the nation with this popular 
stratum and its peculiarities of mind and sentiment, so difficult 
of explanation, is made instantly clear at a time of war, like 
the present, when its importance becomes decisive. 

Like all great nations, Germany is rich in contrasts and com- 
plexities; as compared to its two great opponents, it is much 
further from a state of final development. In times of peace, 
therefore, it presents an aspect capable of widely divergent inter- 
pretations; but it is the result of great fateful moments like the 
present to bring about what otherwise years could not accom- 
plish — not alone the union of the diiferent parts and gro.ups, 
which in face of the deadly danger naturally think only of the 
preservation of the state — but above all the revelation of the 
hidden or obscured unity of spirit. Inward coherence reveals 
itself and spiritual unity flashes forth.^ 

1 The theory of the Prussianization of Germany is not accepted by the 
authors of The War and Democracy. They recognize that Germany was, at 
the outbreak of the war, and is still, an inner spiritual whole. Thus, on page 
120, it is said that the German war literature shows: "First, a great con- 
solidation of the German national unity, and secondly, a tendency ... to hark 
back ... to the wars of Liberation. . . . No one can read recent articles by 
the leaders of German thought without feeling that the Germans are still, 
before all things, and incurably, the people of poets and philosophers, and that, 
by a tragic irony, it is the best and most characteristic qualities of the race 
■which are sustaining, and will continue to sustain it, in the conflict in which 
its dreams have involved it." Also (p. 230) : "Here we have to learn from 
Germany, for German statesmen, strangely enough, have taken an immense 
trouble to make their policy a democratic one. The whole Germ.an nation is 
behind them, because for years and years they have taught the nation through the 



70 MODERN GERMANY 

The picture as it presents itself may be sketched in the fol- 
lowing outlines: 

The Germans are preeminently a monarchic people. To this 
they are bound not alone by ancient inherited sentiments of 
fealty, loyalty and trust (which to-day manifest themselves 
chiefly in relation to the person of the Kaiser as the upholder 
and symbol of German unity), but even more by national neces- 
sity. Only under monarchical leadership can the work of unity 
and development of a nation encompassed by danger be accom- 
plished. That has always been the case and is still so to-day. 
All European nations have achieved their unity by means of 
monarchy. The exceptional case of the United States proves 
nothing to the contrary, since in this instance the question was 
one of development without the presence of neighboring states. 
The French Republic is only a translation into republican 
form of that which the Bourbon and Napoleonic monarchies 
had created, and it has often enough suffered from friction 
between the Army, desirous of monarchic leadership, and the 
elements of democracy. Unity and coherence and a cor- 
porate military force demand a consistent and independent 
leadership which cannot be shaken; and this can be attained 
only in a monarchy, to whatever degree dependent upon the 
popular will and the free support of the people. Moreover, 
united Germany shows the most pronounced diversity in 
her social structure, embracing all classes from the old Prussian 
landed nobility down to the factory worker and peasant. It is 
in a period of transition from an agrarian to an industrial state, 
and is in need, therefore, in an especial degree, of a leadership 
unfettered by social distinctions, which has nothing to gain for 
itself and which in its own interest must be as just to all as 
lies within its power. No parliamentary majority can fulfil 
these demands. Great as may be the advantages of a parlia- 
mentary form of government for the discovery and training of 
political talent, as well as for the political education of a people 
in general, it is a menace to the unity of the military and politi- 
cal leadership of a youthful state. Hence the desire for parlia- 
mentary rule is not widespread in Germany, quite apart from 
the legal and historical difficulties of such a form of government 
in a confederation of states. 

No plutocracy, no committee of "intellectuals," no syndicate 

schools, the universities, the press, their own reading of history and their 
own idea of what true civilization is. . , . The real strength and danger of 
Germany is not what her statesmen and soldiers do, but what Germans them- 
selves believe. We are fighting not an army but a false idea." It is quite 
true that the unity of spirit in Germany is the work of the nation itself within 
the last twenty years. The outbreak of the war did not create, it revealed it. 



/ 



MODERN GERMANY 71 

of workmen's unions could provide us with what we need. 
That can be given only by a monarchy, and for that reason — 
whether through sentiment or understanding — we are monarchi- 
cally inclined. And it accords with a strong monarchy, such 
as we require, that its hand should be felt everywhere, both in 
great and little things. Personal freedom and human dignity 
do not suffer thereby in the least. While public servants are 
placed in a safer and more independent position, owing to the 
rights guaranteed to them by the laws, than in democracies, the 
average citizen experiences absolutely no repression through the 
monarchy. It is, of course, natural that a monarchic ruler, with 
his plenitude of power, should exercise great influence; but this 
is the case with every form of government, even with parlia- 
mentary majorities. We, at any rate, consider ourselves in 
many respects freer and more independent than the citizens of 
the great democracies. 

Closely connected with this is the military character of the 
German state and people. It is rooted in the old Teutonic 
warlike character which no esthetic cult, no puritanism and no 
commercial philosophy has succeeded in breaking, and which is 
a matter of course to our peasants. Even more, however, is it 
due to our geographical and political position, which can be 
secured against our neighbors only by superior strength. For 
this reason the last century has been conducive in the highest 
degree to the development of this military character. It has 
injected the conception of honor and the esprit de corps of the 
officers of Frederick the Great into Scharnhorst's Army of the 
Nation, and has so intimately united the Prussian ability for 
organization and rule with the ethical idealism of German edu- 
cation that they have thoroughly coalesced. The result of this 
is the remarkable efficiency of the professional officer and of the 
popular army. In the last analysis, national unity rests upon the 
army in the same manner as does the monarchy. All the ideal 
forces of education, science and technical training have been 
absorbed into the organism of the army; conversely, the mili- 
tary system furnishes the model and the requisite strength for 
the remarkable organization which prevails throughout the Ger- 
man nation and in which initiative of the individual and disci- 
pline of the w^hole are successfully united. All this is imposed 
upon us by fate, which has placed us in the centre of Europe; 
of this necessity we have made a virtue, which, despite unde- 
niable difficulties and frictions, has stamped the whole na- 
tional character with masculine clearness and lucidity. But the 
most important consequence of this universal bearing of arms is 



72 MODERN GERMANY 

the fact that an effective war can be waged only with the real 
and enthusiastic approval of the people; it must thus always be 
a war of defence. There can be no thought of world domina- 
tion with a popular army nor with a fleet which, based on 
conscription, can be used only for the protection of the country 
and of its trade and industry. The bitterness against German 
militarism — the hardships of which we alone have to bear — is 
really based only on the fact that the German army is so difficult 
to defeat, and that those who would like to dislodge Germany 
from her place, or prevent her from rising into prominence, find 
themselves forced to imitate this institution, which is psychologi- 
cally much less adapted to many other nations.^ 

The school organization parallels that of the army, the public 
school corresponds to the popular army. The latter as well as 
the former was called into being during the first great rise of 
the coming German state in opposition to Napoleon. When 
Fichte, while the country was groaning under the Napoleonic 
yoke, considered the ways and means of resurrecting the Ger- 
man state, he advised the infusion of German culture into the 
mass of the people, through the creation of national primary 
schools along the lines laid down by Pestalozzi, which were 
to educate the children, according to well-established methods, 
to mental independence, moral self-control and intellectual self- 
development. This program was actually adopted by the dif- 
ferent German states, and developed during the last century 
into a comprehensive school system of elementary, secondary and 
university education. This has become the real formative fac- 
tor of the German spirit. There is in this school system a 

1 See Germany and the German Emperor, by G. H. Perris, London, 1914. A 
characteristic expression of the average English opinion. The question, How 
can such a superior nation come under the sway of a military despotism, and 
virility, originality, liberty, and individualism be so completely lost ? is answered 
by an analysis of the whole of German history. After the Reformation, Ger- 
many was so drained of all vital energy that she could express herself only in 
romantic verses and abstruse metaphysics. Thus completely weakened, she 
succumbed to Bismarck's despotism. At the same time the modern economic 
revolution, while it deprived her of the remainder of her originality, on the 
other hand certainly supplied the necessary means for unity. It is Germany's 
tragedy, therefore, to have reached no sane democratic and progressive unity, 
but to be disintegrated again by Prussian brutality and its consequences. The 
contrasting picture of England is interesting and instructive: "If England 
became the mother of Parliaments, the exponent of evolution in political and 
social life, as well as in science and philosophy, it is ultimately not because 
oi any innate superiority of the British nature, but because her insular posi- 
tion has, since 1745, protected her from internal warfare, and for a much 
longer period has set her full in the current of modern forces, so that feudalism 
and clericalism withered early, and no speculation could get far away from 
the bracing winds of practical interest" (p. 115). 

See War and Democracy. The German outlook on life is called a "confused 
and patchwork philosophy" (p. 108), and it is explained by attempting to show 
that it originated in her long and debilitating political misery. Prussianized 
Germany, it declares, is sick, and, because it is undemocratic, it furnishes a 
case of morbid nationality-development. 



MODERN GERMANY 73 

Democratic and State-Socialistic element such as Fichte in- 
tended. On the other hand, it is closely connected with the 
achievements of the army and of German industry and techni- 
cal science, which have become famous throughout the world for 
the quality of their results and for their scientifically enlight- 
ened methods. 

This system also naturally involves certain dangers — conven- 
tionalizing to type, a pedagogic spirit and, as it were, a casting 
of minds in the administrative mould. Our system is most un- 
popular with the English, who prefer a vastly looser school or- 
ganization which makes for firmness of character and good fellow- 
ship rather than for education and general intellectual develop- 
ment. But the dangers referred to are neutralized by careful 
individualizing, by fostering the Kantian spirit of independence 
and self-government, and by the teaching of ancient classics for 
purposes of moral character-building. This is particularly the case 
in a great number of secondary schools, whereas the dangers are 
met in the universities by the spirit of free and pure science, that 
serves no utilitarian purposes. The English, on the other hand, 
prefer material utility and routine to our university education, 
leaving free, pure science to private scholars or holders of fel- 
lowships. Their secondary schools reflect class and social dis- 
tinctions much more than ours, while their free national schools 
are under a complicated administration of the church, the gov- 
ernment or the local bodies. It is extremely difficult to determine 
the greater or lesser advantage of the two systems. They corre- 
spond to the general character of each nation, and considering 
our character and our tasks, we have every reason to be thank- 
ful for our system. We are certain that our present accom- 
plishments and successes would not have been possible but for it, 
and we are confident of being able to overcome all its dangers 
by our alm.ost excessive spirit of individualism, originality and 
personal freedom. A spontaneous movement to this end has 
already begun to manifest itself among our present-day youth.^ 

The touch of State Socialism w^hich the army and the school 
are thus shown to exhibit is even more pronounced and compre- 
hensive in the general system of German administration. This 
system is the outgrowth of the patriarchal state of the seven- 
teenth century, and also of the enlightened "police state," which, 

1 See Universities and National Life, by Viscount Haldane, London, 1912 
(Second Edition), the chapter on "German Organization," p. 77 et seq., which 
discusses the German school system in relation to England. 

See also The War and Democracy, pp. 356-363, on the English dislike of the 
German educational system: "We have hardly yet begun in England to realize 
the possibilities of educational development along the lines of the British ideal, 
both as regards young people and adults" (p, 361). 



74 MODERN GERMANY 

by its thorough-going work, rescued the German people 
from the economic desolation left in the wake of the Thirty 
Years' War and the Napoleonic conflicts. But this administra- 
tive system has passed through new phases and has acquired 
new characteristics since the great period of Stein ; it has de- 
veloped from a patriarchal bureaucracy into a rational and far- 
seeing guardian of all the interests of the State and the people. 
It has joined hands with the great system of self-government in 
the cities and districts, with the various forms of insurance, and 
finally with the supervising and advisory parliaments, thus de- 
veloping an enormous activity the effects of which are seen In 
the prosperity and security of present-day Germany. Unfet- 
tered work and free competition of industry and agriculture 
would never have accomplished this unaided, as they have failed 
to accomplish it, as a matter of fact, in England and America. 
In this connection, we must above all refer to the great work 
of social Insurance, which is gradually being copied by the whole 
world, and also to the housing, land and labor legislation of our 
cities — in which there are no Ill-famed slums and which, with 
the general Increase of population, are on the high road to a 
marvellous prosperity. Nor must we forget the rational land 
policy, the encouragements to prosperity, and the protection of 
homesteads In the country. It Is true that these things have 
their dark side. Criticism Is heard of the predominance and 
number of the official class, of bureaucratic "enforcement of 
felicity," exaggerated respect, for position and title, the habit of 
depending upon the police for help and a certain tendency to 
groveling subordination. Englishmen, who In this respect pre- 
fer freedom from state intervention, are generally averse to this 
form of administration and are accustomed to speak contemptu- 
ously of the character which it has Imparted to the Germans. 
But these are dangers which we ourselves strive to counteract 
within the system, not In opposition to It. He who knows our 
administration from Its Inner working, not merely from the 
outside, and especially he who has made a study of the great 
system of municipal self-government, with Its bold experiments 
in far-reaching social legislation, will have no fears of bureau- 
cratic ossification as a final result. He will, on the contrary, 
see in It the growth of an established vigorous State-Socialism, 
which Is the inevitable development of modern society, and 
which even England has been compelled to inaugurate In her 
latest legislation. Our own love of freedom and the character 
of our great administrators guarantee that flexibility and life 



MODERN GERMANY 75 

will be preserved In the system, which has stood the test so 
brilliantly in the present war and which has yet many great 
problems to solve in the future. 

Only on the foundations here described was the development 
of German economic life possible; it synchronized in its growth 
with the development of our political unity and strength. The 
Germans, to be sure, are by nature an extremely diligent people, 
trained to careful and conscientious toil since the days of the 
boroughs of the late Middle Ages, and inured to hard work and 
thrift by the misery and poverty of the period of petty states. 
They are still to-day more industrious than the English, who 
are accustomed to growing rich with less labor and who con- 
sider this as their proper privilege. But only since the birth of 
the new state have the Germans successfully entered the cur- 
rent of the modern economic movement and raised themselves 
to the plane of their present extraordinary economic achieve- 
ments, under careful state guidance and with the spur of capi- 
talism and mechanical art. This primarily has increased the 
population, and this increase was again an incitement to more 
extensive labor. The result has been gradually to change us 
from a purely continental and preponderantly agrarian state 
into an empire in which industry and agriculture are combined 
and whose interests extend far beyond the seas. Great inter- 
nal difficulties are inherent in this dual tendency, but at the 
same time there are great advantages of an economic and psy- 
chological nature, as we are realizing most keenly at the present 
moment. German agriculture feeds the nation in time of w^ar, 
the German peasantry furnishes the best soldiers, and the large 
land-holder, accustomed to command, supplies the officer corps 
with the major part of its members. We are not a nation of 
rentiers, like the French, not a rural military and bureaucratic 
state bent on conquest, like the Russians, not a purely industrial 
and commercial nation, like the English, whose fleet is the bul- 
wark of their luxury and who provide for their younger sons 
by giving them posts in the colonies. We are still a nation 
working at high tension, that must employ all its arts of or- 
ganization, of order and calculation, as well as its whole political 
strength and unity to feed its increasing millions. To this very 
fact the war was chiefly due, since our industry and increase in 
population gave birth to our maritime policy, resulting in clashes 
with England, the exclusive ruler of the seas. To these circum- 
stances, far more than to German ideas and theories, are we also 
indebted for our great unpopularity. Our middle-class popula- 
tion, in pursuit of a livelihood. Is forced out into the world to 



76 MODERN GERMANY 

take places abroad as clerks, barbers, mechanics, teachers, superin- 
tendents and foremen, and they are naturally regarded as unwel- 
come competitors. A still more important factor is that our 
industry is compelled to concentrate itself chiefly on finished high- 
class products, not necessities, and that these products are not 
welcomed like those of dealers in raw stuffs and partly made-up 
goods, but must often struggle for a market against native finished 
goods. In addition, our business methods are frequently unwel- 
come to the established mercantile intercourse of older commercial 
countries. This is the result, to be sure, not of German character, 
but of Germany's commercial position ; but it is easy to generalize 
from such a basis and to stir up sentiment against the German 
spirit, as is being systematically done at present. 

All the things here mentioned — monarchy, army, school, ad- 
ministration and economy — rest upon an extraordinary instinct 
for order, combined with stern discipline and an earnest sense 
of duty. With this we penetrate more into the inner being of 
the German. Whence comes this trait, whether from natural 
endowment or from historical training, it is difficult to say. 
Nor does it matter. It is enough that things are as they are. 
It is in this sense that our ruler designates himself as the ''First 
servant of the State," and that the great German thinker ex- 
claims: "Duty, thou sublime word!" — the same thinker whose 
chief merit it is to have established philosophy on clear and classi- 
fied logical principles. Order and duty, solidarity and disciphne 
are the watchwords of our officialdom, of associations and cor- 
porations, of large and small business concerns, of our labor 
unions, and of the great social insurance undertakings. Method 
and system are the principles of scientific work and the technical 
arts, of education and social legislation. Even free artistic tem- 
perament and imagination do not move only in the sphere of in- 
spiration and mood, but seek, precisely in the case of our greatest 
men, to take their place in the general psychic development, in the 
cosmic conception and in the scheme of moral achievement. No 
examples need be mentioned, for this is the characteristic 
trait of the German which strikes strangers first of all. 
Many regard it with unfriendly eyes. Englishmen are fond 
of designating it as pedantic and doctrinaire. A Russian 
newspaper says: "The German has but one aim throughout 
his whole life. To be German, therefore, is identical with in- 
finite boredom." An Italian recently expressed the opinion that 
in Germany method is so highly developed that it renders genius 
superfluous. It is difficult to argue about a matter in which the 
decision rests on purely subjective standards, and in regard to 



MODERN GERMANY 77 

which It is true that, in our case, as in others, virtues have their 
drawbacks. At all events, there is no plethora of geniuses in 
other countries, and we may well be satisfied with so universal 
and widespread a substitute. 

But the dangers in this connection are after all not so great. 
For as one-sided development inevitably calls forth counter- 
balancing qualities in the human soul, so this sense of order 
finds its balance in extremely gentle and tender traits of heart 
and mind, in family instinct and love of home — the most beau- 
tiful expression of which is the German Christmas festival. It 
is further counteracted by the tender depth and primitive sin- 
cerity of feeling as expressed in our folk-songs, and by the stern 
sense of justice and self-assertive tenacity as shown in the ethics 
of our peasantry. Under the surface of the metropolitan jour- 
nalistic writings this is the genuine German character, which 
finds its way through a hundred channels, even into the highest 
classes, and which is now manifesting itself on all sides in our 
national army and touching our hearts with song and comrade- 
ship. Naturally, these elemental popular traits are as a rule 
completely lost upon the foreigner; just as we, in the case of 
other nations, can only divine these undercurrents by means of 
their anecdotal literature. At all events this is the point of 
contact with the Englishman, who is otherwise so different from 
us in spirit, but who feels also the need of a similar counter- 
balance to his commercial and utilitarian sense. But we limit 
this world of sentiment less to home and family ; we let it extend 
into every phase of life and cosmic conception; it finds expres- 
sion in our art and poetry, our social attitude and our judgment 
of our fellowmen. This fact is revealed by those poets whom 
one may characterize not as our greatest, but as the most essen- 
tially German: Jean Paul, Adalbert Stifter, Wilhelm Raabe, 
Willibald Alexis, Fritz Reuter, and above all Jeremias Gott- 
helf, who is not characteristic of Switzerland alone. 

Comparing them with Dickens and George Eliot, or Zola, 
we gain at least a dim conception of the difference in national 
spirit. But even where German poetry and character-delinea- 
tion rise to the heights of universal humanity and spiritual great- 
ness, we still meet this basic element, operating on the whole 
man with the force of a certain childlike heartfelt directness, as 
demonstrated by Goethe, Bach or Beethoven. Nay, this differ- 
ence extends even into the field of religion. Luther, who domi- 
nates German Protestantism, is distinguished by his childlike, 
popular traits and primitive strength of feeling from the sober, 
logically precise, and morally correct Calvin, whose spirit still 



78 MODERN GERMANY 

lives in Calvinism and non-conformity, although much external- 
ized, formalized and deteriorated along utilitarian lines. The 
keen observer would herein likewise discover the chief difference 
between German and French or Italian Catholicism. 

But as a matter of fact this entire antithesis in the sense of 
order and sentiment does not exist to such a pronounced degree 
as is apparently the case when viewed from without. For these 
two tendencies have a common source from which they flow and 
in which their inner unity is to be sought — namely, the German 
metaphysical and religious spirit. Our sense of order is not 
founded on its usefulness for material and social ends, but ema- 
nates, together with the sense of duty, from an ideal concep- 
tion of the spirit which is the rule and law of human life and of 
the universe. Nor is this feeling identical with a sentimentality 
that clothes, covers and seeks to compensate the asperities of 
life. It is rather the child of an elemental cosmic conception 
which realizes that this feeling is basic in the universe. The 
German is by nature a metaphysician who ponders and strives, 
from the spiritual inwardness of the universe, to grasp the inner 
meaning of the world and of things, of man and destiny. It 
will always be idle to explain the origin and development of this 
predominant, though by no means universal, characteristic. It 
remains the final German life secret, much discussed among 
the Germans themselves, the cause of sacrifice and suffering, the 
motive power of wonderful achievements — the problem of an 
ever-new compromise with practical life and its realistic demands. 

It is seen above all in the significance of religious life, as 
revealed by German history. The life of the burghers of the 
late Middle Ages was the first complete realization of Chris- 
tianity within the limits possible for an active people. From 
this class came the Reformation and the division of the Church, 
which has decided the fate of modern Europe, disrupted the 
unified German state, and lastingly bound up the general life 
of the single states with their religious organizations. At the 
period of national spiritual renascence of the eighteenth century, 
the great problem of life was the reconciliation of the modern 
spirit with Christianity, the creation of a scientific, critical theol- 
ogy, the adaptation of the Christian idea to a religiously deep- 
ened conception of humanity. This problem has remained until 
to-day the chief point of German interest. But at the same 
time the old traditional churches have displayed vital activity, 
and they are regarded by many intellectuals as the natural 
means of maintaining a moral idealism among the people. This 
has resulted, it is true, in very confused conditions. To remove 



MODERN GERMANY 79 

this confusion, whether in the manner of French anti-clerical 
legislation or in that of the Anglo-Saxon freedom of conscience 
and disestablishment of the churches, encounters difficulties, not 
alone in historical, political and legal conditions, but likewise in 
the depths of the German spirit itself, to which the Puritanic 
separation of politico-social institutions and purely individual 
culture is foreign. We regard state and spirit as belonging to- 
gether, and an old inherited instinct makes us avoid a separa- 
tion in the interest of both, despite the difficulties created by 
the modern spiritual cleavage. We suffer the confusion of this 
situation rather than resign ourselves to the Anglo-Saxon divi- 
sion of politico-social civilization and private individual spiritual 
training. In such a separation, experience teaches, the latter 
suffers grievously. The whole system in England presumes the 
general domination of an inviolable orthodox}', while on the 
other hand the French bourgeoisie has made anti-clerical enlight- 
enment a state question. This point shows with particular clear- 
ness the fundamental dissimilarities of the nations. 

A similar metaphysical tendency, though naturally less closely 
connected with the state, holds sway in German art. For that 
very reason, its real centre is music, since in it is voiced, in a 
manner most appealing to us, all that is unutterable and inex- 
pressible in the German character, simplicity and heroism, 
mirth and melancholy, faith and doubt, empirical knowledge 
and intuition. From Bach, Gluck and Handel down to the 
present day there is an unbroken series of the sublimest crea- 
tions. Through its music the essence of the German spirit is 
usually most easily revealed to foreigners, as is shown in Romain 
Rolland's great novel, ''Jean Christophe," to choose but one 
illustration. It is true that this metaphysically inspired, impul- 
sive and stirring art, is in sharp contrast with the artistic con- 
ception of the Latin races, with their sense of clearness, form, 
grace and transparency, which is an inheritance from the Re- 
naissance. Herein the great national contrasts are clearly 
revealed, contrasts which simply cannot be overcome and eradi- 
cated, and in the expression of which each people must live out 
its ow^n life. For this reason German music cannot be torn 
from its organic connection with the entire national life, from 
national religious faith and war-like heroism, from national self- 
consciousness and the hopes bound up therewith. How closely 
all these things are connected may be seen in the "Meister- 
singer," that most German creation of a master who in other 
respects may be said to be modern rather than purely German. 
Precisely for this reason, the protest of RoUand against German 



8o MODERN GERMANY 

Kultur and the severance of modern realistic Germany from 
old idealistic Germany proceeds from a false basis. For our 
enemies such a separation may doubtless be highly desirable, for 
us it lies neither in the realm of the desirable nor of the pos- 
sible. 

It is much more difficult to apply the same line of thought to 
German plastic art. For in this field, in Germany as elsewhere, 
influences are many and varied. Moreover, our situation is 
here very complicated. The great German tradition of the 
Middle Ages was interrupted, and in the period of desolation 
it was foreign art and literature that helped us find ourselves 
again. Especially in the plastic arts are the various influences 
highly involved; it is impossible, not alone owing to the limita- 
tions of space, to draw here one clearly defined line of specifi- 
cally German development. But that which is not possible 
from the point of view of the history of art, may, nevertheless, 
be indicated from the point of view of the history of civiliza- 
tion. Despite the German's yearning for the sunny south, the 
northern Gothic germ is in his blood, while the French have 
completely broken with the great France of the Middle Ages 
and turned sympathetically toward the Renaissance and the 
Counter-Reformation. The German's thought is always 
chiefly occupied with substance, expression, movement, not with 
line, form, symmetry and delicacy. This explains fundamental 
dissimilarities between the Germans and the Latin races, for 
the latter of whom, moreover, art stands in much closer con- 
nection with the immediate forms and instincts of life. 
This finds ample expression in the present Kultur war, and 
in the minds of many forms the basis for the charges 
of barbarism, just as the classical Frenchman saw only the 
untamed drunkard even in Shakespeare, the poet of the 
Renaissance, and as the Italian regarded, and probably still re- 
gards, northern Gothic art as barbaric art. This has been the 
source of a mass of international criticism, scattered throughout 
the world as commonplaces on the wings of elegant French 
journalism and eagerly accepted, especially by Anglo-Saxons, 
whose Puritanism and commercialism have deprived them of a 
definite artistic tradition. Further discussion on this point is 
without object. We Germans find the great symbols of our 
mode of artistic conception in Diirer, Holbein, Griinwald and 
Rembrandt; and we let the real artistic creative power of the 
present follow its own path, knowing that it cannot be fettered 
by theories and that it is certain to return to those old symbols. 

It is easier to characterize German philosophy in a uniform 



MODERN GERMANY 8i 

manner. It has, to be sure, naturally shared in all the move- 
ments of European thought; but in the main it is precisely this 
philosophy which is the expression and the cradle of the meta- 
physical German spirit, and its central position in German spir- 
itual life is of the greatest importance. The reader is already 
familiar with the main outlines, and a few words must suffice 
for this great subject. 

German philosophy was created by Leibnitz and Kant. Their 
spirit has acted on classical German literature and poetry, and 
in conjunction with these it laid the foundation of German 
idealism, which once more to-day, after many fluctuations, domi- 
nates German philosophy and has done more inwardly to form 
and strengthen the youth of Germany than anything else within 
the last twenty years. If in truth it is the task of modern 
philosophy, as distinguished from the ancient and medieval, to 
seize hold upon and philosophically digest and apply modern 
natural science and its all-permeating mechanical concept of 
nature, German idealism up to the present may be said to have 
set itself the task of combining with the mechanical concept of 
nature, the full appreciation of the moral, religious and artistic 
spirit, and the assertion of freedom with the mechanical princi- 
ple. In this effort, German idealism has hitherto undertaken 
its most abstract and elemental investigations, but never more 
ardently than at the present moment. By this means German 
philosophy has remained in closer touch with the religious life 
of the people than has the French scientific dogma of atheism. 
On the other hand, it has penetrated much deeper into the 
general spirit of religion than can be the case with the essentially 
practical and conventional religion of England and her not less 
practical and utilitarian philosophy. 

German philosophy is free, autonomous idealism. There can, 
in truth, be no question here of that so-called philosophy of 
force, nor of nationalism or chauvinism. The only question is 
that of the fundamental relation of nature and spirit, and within 
the bounds of spirit the question of the individual to the body 
politic. It is chiefly the spirit of Kant and Fichte which has 
inspired these investigations up to the present day. Their spirit, 
only calmer, more realistic and cosmopolitan, permeates the 
national uprising of 1914, as it permeated that of 181 3. For- 
eigners, it is true, are inclined to criticize this philosophy as 
abstruse metaphysics, or as semi-theology, and many contemptu- 
ous references to it are to be found in the literature of the war. 
But those who judge thus are in no case the leaders of thought. 
They are the average anti-clericals and the equally average Eng- 



82 MODERN GERMANY 

lish utilitarians and **matter-of-fact" men. The leaders of 
thought, even in those countries, have turned their efforts to-day 
tovi^ards a similar idealism, and are in many cases indebted (as 
for example, Bergson and Boutroux) to German philosophy. 
The basic difference is that in Germany philosophical idealism 
possesses a much stronger national tradition and has a much 
voider influence in educated circles, but in the main the European 
leaders of thought converge in a truly remarkable manner. 
There w as no need of going to v^ar for the sake of our divergent 
philosophies.^ 

Such a concentration on the spiritual elements of culture as a 
vv^hole, w^hich unmistakably characterizes the historical develop- 
ment of Germany since the Reformation, indicates a pronounced 
talent for scientific work in general. Thus, together with the 
increasing realistic tasks of the nation, we observe an increas- 
ing development of its powers in the field of empiric science. 
No mention is needed of what the nation has achieved in the 
line of natural science and mechanical art. It has in all branches 
fully attained to the science of the older and more advanced 
nations, and perhaps in some lines even surpassed them. But for 
purposes of our discussion, this Is unimportant. English scien- 
tists, who in their war fury will at best but credit their German 
colleagues with the discovery of the spectrum analysis as an Inde- 
pendent piece of research, may receive their answer from the 
German scientists, if these should think It worth their while. 

On the other hand, a word In regard to German historical 
science may not be out of place. At Its Inception it was strongly 
Inspired by philosophy, and embraces, in thoroughly cosmopolitan 
fashion, the development of languages, art, religion, politics, as 
well as the economics of the whole world open to our knowl- 
edge. In this effort It was emphatically supported by the in- 
vestigations of travelers and geographers. But among other 

1 See German Philosophy and the Present Crisis, by G. Dawes Hicks, 
Hihbert Journal, October, 1914, Vol. XIII, No. i. In this sober-minded article 
the writer claims that this entire system of philosophy has been superseded 
'by "Bismarckism." It is perhaps sufficient, in reply to this, to say that, 
despite our gratitude to the founder of the Empire, there has developed in 
Germany a reaction against "Bismarckism" as a system. The maxims and the 
deeds of a statesman who was called upon to overcome almost superhuman 
difficulties cannot be regarded as an ethical system for eternity. It is a 
strange fact that foreigners do not recognize German idealism — which they 
are always so ready to call "political immaturity" — when it treats political 
and social problems according to German history and not according to those 
French and English traditions which they accept almost as natural rights. 
It is impossible, of course, under our state and educational system, for German 
social philosophy to be what the English and French democratic systems de- 
mand; which proves that our social philosophy is idealistic. For further testi- 
mony on this point, see TJie War and Democracy, referred to in footnote, 
p. 69. German philosophy and the "potato-bread spirit," of which Mr. Lloyd- 
George speaks, of course, have as much in common as have English philosophy 
and miners' strikes, 



MODERN GERMANY 83 

numerous problems with which the science of the newly created 
and growing state found itself face to face was the particular 
problem of the state. Hegel, continuing the thought of an- 
tiquity as represented by Plato and Aristotle, had already recog- 
nized this as a quite peculiar problem, absolutely distinct and 
different from those of merely private morals and of social 
science. In Ranke's cosmopolitan investigations it was stated 
in its purely historical sense as the distinction between the in- 
carnation of political power and all other historical creations. 
The historical school of jurisprudence has effectually supported 
these apperceptions. Herein, it is true, German historical 
science, as emphatically as Plato had done in his day, opposed 
the democratic fiction that the state is an institution created by 
the individuals for their own security and happiness. This 
antithesis naturally became intensified in the days of the fierce 
struggles for national unity, during which the great historical 
investigators, von Sybel and von Treitschke, seemed to be 
developing into political publicists rather than historians. But 
^ anyone versed in such matters is aware that these political 
thinkers in no way intended to deny the existence of political 
ethics, but merely to distinguish them from the rules of private 
morality. 

It is precisely this distinction which English democrats, 
whether of Christian or anti-Christian stripe, fail to recognize. 
They measure all foreign states by their private moral rules, 
but leave the politically so advantageous immoralities of English 
politics to the responsibility of the Government. We are in 
this respect more honest, and penetrate further below the sur- 
face. The saying that "might makes right" has never been 
the motto of German thinkers, despite the fact that for them 
the conception of right and morality was more difficult and in- 
volved than for those who, in the manner of Puritanism, pro- 
claim a universal democratic natural right, which they reconcile 
with their own political aspirations by declaring their own state 
to be the guarantor and controller of natural rights throughout 
the world. 

German historical science, however, has by no means re- 
mained at the standpoint of the seventies. Without abandoning 
its conception of the nature of the state, it has again extended 
its view to include the entire cosmopolitan horizon, and has 
elevated purely political interests to the historico-cultural plane. 
It is, however, not possible at this point to enter further into 
this subject. It suffices to mention Mommsen, von Wilamowitz 



84 MODERN GERMANY 

and Eduard Meyer, or to recall the names of Harnack, Dllthey 
and Schmoller. 

To all this must be added German literature and poetry, as 
the most important revelation of the German spirit. It may 
seem surprising that they should be mentioned last in this con- 
nection. But that is due precisely to the universal function which 
they exercise among us. German life and feeling in the eight- 
eenth century had been forced back into a literary existence, and 
the entire vital energy and force of the nation was compressed 
into its literature. Literature, therefore, was the centre of all 
philosophical, scientific and cultural interests, and drew within 
its sphere social and finally state problems as well. Not with- 
out significance is it that Goethe, the typical representative of 
this literature, found the solution of his problem in universal, 
but at the same time thoroughly individual, self-culture. This de- 
termined the character of modern German literature. It ab- 
sorbed into itself the essence of German life, and in this way 
operated like a philosophy. It formed, deepened and transfig- 
ured the life of the nation in all fields of activity. In this con- 
nection the classical and romantic schools were, in truth, not in 
such marked opposition; they were united in the ideal of self- 
culture, differing only in the means to be employed for its 
achievement. Indeed, in carrying out this thought and in im- 
planting it in the soul of the people, the romantic school was 
perhaps more efficacious even than Goethe. 

In the course of the nineteenth century, German literature, 
it is true, fell from the heights attained (of which further dis- 
cussion is superfluous), but with fresh energy, it is now recov- 
ering from this decline. The literary revolution of the eighties 
prepared the way for a deep inner change and revival, which, 
at present, we feel within us only as a shadowy desire and im- 
pulse, but which is surely an indication of vitality and unex- 
hausted power. This is, therefore, the place for a word about 
Nietzsche, whose name has been so misused in this Kultur war. 

Nietzsche is rather a poet than a thinker. German philosophy 
is concerned with him but slightly, German politics not at all. 
He preached against the triteness, shallowness and self-compla- 
cency of German culture of the eighties, deepened vastly the 
conception of personality, strengthened the longing for sincere 
living and originality, and thereby blazed the way for a new 
romantic movement; in its development this movement has 
become much more German than would have accorded with 
Nietzsche's Latin and Slavic sympathies. Even before the war, 
the morbid, irritable and egoistic quality of his teaching 



MODERN GERMANY 85 

was in process of elimination, and doubtless in the spiritual ele- 
vation resulting from the war it will be permanently overcome. 
But only trivial Pharisees and narrow-minded sectarians can 
deny the incentive to new aims and inner searchings that owe 
their origin to him. 

How deeply this spiritual and scientific interest is rooted in 
Germany is shown by the remarkably broad classes which are 
permeated by it. All officials, teachers and preachers have 
enjoyed this education. The centres of scientific work are 
remarkably numerous and well equipped. In this respect Ger- 
many is perhaps unique. But even more important is the fact 
that an army of publishers, associations, institutions and enter- 
prises uninterruptedly provides the people with this intellectual 
pabulum. Music and philosophy, science and education are con- 
tinually popularized. A kind of democratization of all educa- 
tion is under way which strives to render the very best and 
deepest universally accessible. He who is familiar with the 
systematic activity of the Kunstwart and of the Durerbund 
with their remarkably cheap dissemination of genuine art and 
serious thought, knows with what earnestness this work is 
carried on. A Dutch socialistic paper was not wrong in declar- 
ing recently that this was one of Germany's greatest services in 
the field of culture. 

This brings us to the last, most important and most disputed 
subject: the German conception of freedom. It combines the 
metaphysical religious spirit, which we have just characterized,, 
with the political needs of the youthful Empire — as described in 
the opening passages of this chapter — in a peculiar, and it must 
be admitted, often paradoxical manner. Hence, as all contro- 
versialists correctly divine, and some express with striking clarity, 
this conception is different from the French and from the Anglo- 
Saxon. 

The French idea of freedom rests upon the conception of the 
equality of all citizens in their contributions to the carrying out 
of the common will. Theoretical constitutional maxims which 
safeguard the egalite and liberie, and occasionally incite the im- 
agination and the passions of the people, are of supreme im- 
portance, although in practice they fail to exclude the dominance 
of plutocrats and lawyers. Of fraternite it is perhaps best not 
to speak at all; it is and remains, in the words of Count Cham- 
fort, somewhat like the fraternite of Cain and Abel. 

The English idea of freedom, on the contrary, is a compound 
of Puritanic ideas and of conceptions dating from the times of 
the old Saxon Estates. It represents personal responsibility and 



86 MODERN GERMANY 

self-government of the individual; his independence of the 
state, based on a natural right; the creation of the state by 
the individual. Without attaching great importance to consti- 
tutional theories it exercises practical control over the powers 
of the state; it guarantees freedom of religious opinion, liberty 
in matters of conviction, and independence of spiritual culture 
from state interference. It is the realization of the universally 
recognized dominating position of the English citizen, w^ho 
imposes upon inferior races the rules of life suitable to them, 
while reserving his own rules for his individual determination. 
The Englishman acts from his own free utilitarian convictions 
and in reliance on his personal inviolability. It is his creed that 
this freedom coincides with the welfare of the state, which he 
proves either in Puritanical fashion, by means of Providence, 
or rationalistically, by means of evolution — in any case, which- 
ever way he looks at it, he considers it a matter of course. 
For this reason he links the state and government to public 
opinion, which is the product of these free and clever egoistic 
units, and he sees therein the guarantee of reason, morals and 
freedom. 

Upon either of these two bases, great and mighty developments 
of political and social life are undoubtedly possible and have ac- 
tually been realized. But the German idea of freedom is funda- 
mentally different. Rising gradually from long centuries of 
inferiority and servitude, the German first experienced freedom 
in German education and the spiritual content of individuality. 
These ideals were permeated from the start and for all time 
by the old German longing for independence and defiant self- 
assertion, though these were for a long time denied political 
realization. German freedom came into being, according to 
Kant's conception of it, as the freedom of spontaneous recogni- 
tion of duty and right, and in the romantic conception of an 
infinite wealth of culture, individual, but in all cases mutually 
complementary. Up to the present it has, in the main, retained 
this character. In conjunction with this, the old tendency 
toward particularism has persevered, manifesting itself in pro- 
vincial, dialectic and dynastic peculiarities, and in the proverbial 
German love of dispute and discord. But this latter quality is 
to-day greatly moderated in its disruptive effects. It has been 
sublimated into individualism and distinctiveness, and has defi- 
nitely subordinated itself to the strong feeling of political soli- 
darity, which will no longer brook foreign domination and is 
determined to regulate its own life from within, in the true 
German spirit and manner. By these means we have sought in- 



MODERN GERMANY 87 

wardly and morally to overcome the worst obstacle to German 
freedom ; namely, the separation of classes and castes dating from 
the period anterior to 1848. That is even in our day the most 
difficult and peculiar task of German freedom. From this point, 
truly, it was and still remains a long way to actual political 
freedom. The English model of Parliament and the system 
of self-government have helped us greatly along this path ; likewise 
a great influx of French Democratic thought has permeated Ger- 
man party life and is still generative to-day. Our energies are 
directed, and must for a long time be devoted to the utilization 
and adaptation of these incentives in forms suitable to our nation. 
Nothing demonstrates more clearly than this that we are still a 
young and unfinished state. Our policy regarding the various 
nationalities embodied in the German Empire has also much to 
learn along these lines. 

The democratization inevitably resulting from the popular 
army, the public school and the emancipation of the working 
classes, will continue to develop in Germany and will find means 
to adjust itself to military and political exigencies. That is a 
result in Germany, as everyAvhere else, of the condition in which 
modern nations find themselves; our freedom will always be dif- 
ferent, however, from that of the Western nations. Parliaments 
are necessary, but in our eyes they are not the essence of free- 
dom. The right of suffrage and the cooperation of the people 
in the duties of government educate to political maturity; but 
not even this is the freedom which we mean. German freedom 
will never be purely political; it will always be bound up with 
the idealistic thought of duty and with the romantic thought of 
individuality. Even as a political conception it will bear the 
mark of its essentially intellectual and cultural origin, in the 
same manner as the Englishman's conception bears the mark of 
Puritanism and the Frenchman's that of revolution. Above all, 
we desire to gain and develop this freedom ourselves and not 
to receive it as a gift from foreigners — least of all as the result 
of defeat, as the literature of our enemies so often consoHngly 
holds out to us in prospect. Here lie our definite tasks for the 
future. The freedom of the nation must grow and develop to 
completion in a victorious Germany, and this freedom will be 
German freedom, not French, not English, and above all, not 
Russian freedom. 

If, now, from this point of vantage we gather together all 
the traits described into the entity which they represent in life, we 
shall, in the main, have correctly formulated the spirit of German 
civilization as contrasted with that of the civilization of our 



88 MODERN GERMANY 

enemies — allowing, of course, for errors. Nor do our enemies, 
for their part, picture it very differently, save that they accen- 
tuate other points than we and with an unfriendlier emphasis. 
It would be childish to try to distinguish between these distinctive 
factors by a dogmatic pronouncement. The great national 
civilizations all have their advantages and their drawbacks, and 
there is room enough in the world for all. Let us draw atten- 
tion to one result only of the German conception of freedom. 
It has not the nationalistic impulse of French liberty to force 
itself on all mankind as the scientifically sole possible form; nor 
like that of England, the pretended moral impulse to regard 
all civilization as dependent upon the supremacy of English in- 
stitutions. 

German freedom does not strive for world dominance^ neither 
material nor intellectual. It stands for the freedom of the 
various national entities who may not destroy each other s possi- 
bilities of development nor allow them to become conventional- 
ized in the name of any law, no matter of what nature. In 
this sense we believe that we are the people who are striving 
for the true and genuine progress of mankind, which does violence 
to none and brings freedom to all. 

The longer the war of weapons continues, the more unrelent- 
ing this Kultur war has become and the greater the skill of our 
enemies in transforming by lies or imagination violent national 
egoism into humanitarian principles. In this the Machiavellism 
of the Italians has excelled all previous performances. We, for 
our part, know that for us this war is not primarily a question 
of principles and ideas, but rather one of life and death, and 
that the war of diplomacy and cultural enmity has been threat- 
ening us ever since we have enjoyed an existence in a political 
sense. We are, in the first place, fighting for our life. But 
this political life of ours as a Great Power carries with it an 
aspiration that fills us with unshakable confidence — the belief 
that the various nationalities must be released from England's 
dominance in the political and moral ordering of the world and 
her tyrannical control of the seas. 



CHAPTER III 

GERMANY'S INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
POSITION 

PROFESSOR HERMANN SCHUMACHER, OF THE UNIVERSITY 

OF BONN 

AS was more explicitly shown in the preceding chapter, Ger- 
many lies at the centre of the most densely settled part 
of the globe, and is surrounded by a greater number of popu- 
lous, powerful, and ambitious neighbors than any other country. 
On all sides, especially on the eastern and western frontiers, 
the way lies open for peoples strange in race, civilization and 
speech to enter the country with the products of their hands 
and brains. Germany has thus been designed by nature as the 
highway, and at the same time the gathering-place of Europe. 
Great cultural advantages undoubtedly result from this situa- 
tion. Germany has never been able to live for herself, in jeal- 
ous exclusiveness. Outside stimuli have at all times acted upon 
her life. No other nation has developed a like interest and 
understanding for foreign modes of life, and none has so great 
cause to appreciate foreign achievements along lines of civiliza- 
tion. Upon this basis, aided by German strength and thorough- 
ness, there has grown up a many-sided and rich life of the 
spirit. Germany has become the glorious land of poets and 
thinkers. 

But as a result of her geographical position, she also became 
the battle-ground for the settlement of all the disputes of Europe. 
For not alone to travelers, w^ith foreign wares and foreign 
thoughts, but likewise to warriors, with weapons of death and 
firebrands in their hands, were her unprotected fields open. Upon 
these have been settled the greater part of European wars. Time 
and again has the nation experienced terrible visitations, been 
robbed of the fruits of its industry, and set back for generations 
in the development of its powers. Whereas England, her 
coasts safe from foreign foes, was enabled to lay aside her 
gains and savings in undisturbed security; and France, despite 
the many wars waged (mainly beyond her own borders) 
by her glory-seeking kings, found it possible to preserve the 
continuity of her commercial development, the wealth and cap- 
ital of the German nation were repeatedly destroyed. These dis- 
asters were felt the more keenly in view of the fact that our 

89 



90 MODERN GERMANY 

limited territory was not richly endowed by nature. With its 
sand dunes and hilly stretches, it is inferior in natural fertility, 
not only to France and England and Northern Italy, but like- 
wise to Hungary and Southern Russia. It possesses no rich 
meadows, like those of the broad coastal regions of Western 
Europe. It brings forth neither cotton nor silk, nor rice nor 
corn, and wheat only sparingly. It hides no gold within its 
bosom, and but little silver and copper. 

Three great and vital tasks are thus presented for solution 
to the German nation. Culturally, w^e must develop the ad- 
vantages of our position at the heart of Europe, by cultivating 
every opportunity for peaceful intercourse, by the adjustment of 
intellectual interests, and by the encouragement, without na- 
tional stultification, of understanding for all that is noble and 
capable of development in foreign life ; politically, we must offset 
the disadvantages of our situation by developing our strength 
^nd holding ourselves ready to repel from our borders even a 
numerically superior enemy; commercially, we must overcome 
the handicaps of our position and of our past, by multiplying the 
productive factor of our labor as compared to the factors of 
soil and capital. These are the three great tasks which fate 
has laid upon the German people before all other peoples. They 
have not chosen them deliberately, the tasks have been imposed 
upon them. So long as the nation continues, so long will it be 
forced to strive for their accomplishment. The more nearly it 
succeeds, the better will it serve, not alone itself, but likewise 
humanity in general, whose welfare, as Germany believes, can 
be advanced only upon a basis of a multiplicity of equal and joy- 
ously laboring nations, but which must wither under any crush- 
ing world supremacy. 

For the performance of the political task it is not sufficient 
to resort to energetic measures in the moment of danger. This 
may be done by nations for whom nature has provided a more 
or less satisfactory protection, like the United States, which occu- 
pies almost an entire continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific 
Ocean and has at no point an equally powerful neighbor; or 
like England, who, thanks to her insular position, has remained 
untouched by the international disturbances of the Continent. 
The danger of invasion has in recent years filled England's im- 
agination; in Germany, however, it has, at all times, through 
frequent recurrence, been a terrible reality. In the face of 
this constant danger of invasion, that permanent protection which 
nature has refused us must be artificially provided through or- 
ganization, in contrast to England and the United States. This is 



MODERN GERMANY 91 

the stern lesson which history, supported by geography, at every 
turn impresses upon us, with an emphasis that it employs toward 
no other people. 

To follow this teaching has not been easy for the German 
people, for originally its individuality ran counter to the political 
requirements of its position and history. Since the times of 
Cssar and Tacitus, much has been written by strangers regard- 
ing the individual German's love of liberty, and we have often 
been described by natives and foreigners as a nation rich in 
striking individualities. Individualism is deep-rooted in the Ger- 
man soul. The antithesis between the natural inclinations of the 
individual and the vital demands of the whole nation was for 
a long time our undoing. It was gradually overcome only 
through two forces. At first a strong governing will, as exem- 
plified in the Prussian Kings, was able to hold it in check only 
by imperious authority; it required the conscious determination 
of the people, developed in the relentless but indispensable school 
of bitter experience, finally to overcome it. These two forces 
were welded together through Bismarck's creative power, and 
the present war has convincingly shown their irresistible strength. 
The lasting protection which, to our undomg, we had lacked 
during our previous disunion, was given to us by the Prussian 
Kings in times of greatest stress when they imposed the universal 
duty of bearing arms. This they did, not in arbitrary despotism, 
but with a proper care of their people and as the strong and 
wise providers for our political needs. 

In doing this they have unconsciously greatly helped also 
to prepare the way for the solution of the third or economic 
problem. For since the days of Scharnhorst, we have been ac- 
customed to regard the duty of military service, not alone as a 
measure of protection, the necessity of which has now for all 
time been impressed upon each one of us, but at the same time 
as an indispensable form of training. Clear-sighted observers from 
all civilized lands have in recent years come to a realization of 
this fact. Military service, as the school of physical development, 
takes its place by the side of the public school, which provides 
the elements of mental culture for each individual; it has hitherto 
been a matter of regret to us that every single individual did 
not come under the beneficent influence of military discipline as 
wtU as under that of the public school. Compulsory education 
and the requirement of military service are the two solid pillars 
upon which rests the proud edifice of Germany's defensive power 
and her economic strength. That which we were forced to learn 
in bitter days in the army, in order to save ourselves from de- 



92 MODERN GERMANY 

structlon, has later borne rich fruit in the field of our economic 
life, at the start almost to our astonishment. The same 
qualities which render our soldiers unconquerable in war are re- 
sponsible for the superiority which the army of our workmen 
so often show in peace. They are the qualities which alone 
render every great organization efficient: the highest possible 
development of the individual combined with the most efficient 
cooperation of all. 

Individual power demands mental, physical and moral develop- 
ment. Mental efficiency is secured by our school system, which 
is more highly developed than elsewhere and which finds its broad 
homogeneous basis in our 61,557 public schools, and its many- 
sided completion in the war academy, twenty-two universities, 
eleven technical high-schools, six commercial high-schools, four 
agricultural, forestry and veterinary high-schools, three high- 
schools of mining, sixteen for plastic art and eleven for music. 
Physical training, as stated, is gained by means of military service, 
which develops self-command and adaptability, punctuality, order 
and cleanliness. To these in recent years has been added a new 
and unique educational element in our system of workmen's in- 
surance with its 22,838 offices, 114 trade associations and 31 in- 
surance offices. This system has not alone provided expert med- 
ical attendance in all cases of greater or lesser need for every 
working-man's family, and thereby greatly assisted in the pres- 
ervation and improvement of public health; it has developed far 
beyond this into a general social-political and social-hygienic 
training of the entire people, in the same manner as it has 
turned its attention from mere relief of poverty to its prevention. 
Thus in later life are developed the seeds of a healthy and 
economically sensible manner of living which for the great ma- 
jority were sown during the period of military training. Finally, 
moral efficiency, which naturally depends greatly on that of mind 
and body, has also been increased through military service for 
the mass of the people. For here, through the most severe 
training, that quality is acquired which transforms a man, as the 
result of voluntary and intelligent subordination, into a useful 
member of the great present-day organizations — namely, disci- 
pline, the modern sister of industry. A sense of duty, such as 
the tasks of war require, even to the sacrifice of one's life, cannot 
fail to suffice also for cooperation m the tasks of peace. But 
only he who can obey can learn properly to command. The 
army, therefore, educates for us not alone recruits, but also 
officers for the vast undertakings of our industrial life; and es- 
pecially does it furnish those efficient intermediate workers, equally 



MODERN GERMANY 93 

trained In obeying and commanding, who may be styled the 
under-officers of our great industries, and of whom no other 
nation can show the counterpart. 

Without discipline, even the most able leaders are unable to 
make many men effectually useful in one common pursuit. In 
such case, the force of their will is broken in endless disputes, 
and a conception is lost before It takes shape in action. On 
the other hand, a group of men accustomed to discipline are like 
plastic clay. They need only the shaping hand of the creative 
artist. Nothing so smoothes the way from conception to realiza- 
tion, and so widens thereby the empire of the human will, as this 
quality of intelligent subordination, which raises the disunited 
desires of many wills from the arena of paralyzing conflict Into 
the realm of powerful cooperative action. A nation accus- 
tomed to discipline, and that is likewise educated and energetic, 
is, therefore, by its very nature, a nation of organizers. The 
German people have proved themselves such in all branches of 
the army and in industrial life; in agriculture and manufacture, 
in trade and traflfic. In times of peace our military organization, 
which embraces the nation, and the equally Impressive organ- 
ization of our economic life, stood side by side and often quite 
without mutual understanding. No fact in the present war, 
which has entered into all spheres of popular life as no previous 
war, is more characteristic, on the German side, than that these 
two, in closest cooperation, have been welded together Into un- 
conquerable unity. Victory will be gained by us, not through 
a rigid, antiquated "militarism," but through a vigorous concep- 
tion of organization that holds promise for the future. Instead 
of being abandoned. It will be further strengthened into exem- 
plary power. 



The Idea of organization grew in the field of economic life 
out of the vital necessities of the people, in the same manner 
as this Idea in the military field was forced upon us through the 
exigency of our position and our past. 

Politically, we could hold the difficult position apportioned to 
us by fate only by not dividing our national strength, but by 
concentrating it, numerically increasing and carefully husbanding 
it. On the other hand, the strong union which we finally 
achieved through the founding of the Empire and by means of 
universal military service, proved a powerful impelling force to 
further growth. Immediately following the war of 1870 there 



94 MODERN GERMANY 

was a sudden remarkable increase in the birth rate, which be- 
came an important factor in our further development, in so far 
as this new generation, on reaching its full potentiality as a 
labor force, proved a powerful stimulant to our economic life 
when this began its marvellous rise around the year 1895. But 
aside from this temporary increase resulting from the war, Ger- 
many suffered in general under the decrease in the birth rate 
common to all Western Europe. If the number of inhabitants, 
despite this fact, increased more rapidly than those of other 
European civilized nations, this, as is well known, is not to be 
explained by an increase in the birth rate, but by a decrease 
in the death rate. In Germany the ''fight against death" was 
early taken up on all sides, with German scientific thorough- 
ness and system. The death rate constantly decreased from 
28.8 per thousand, which was the mark from 1871 to 1880, to 
16.4 in 1 91 2. Thus it was possible, despite the falling birth 
rate, to bring the yearly excess of births in 1874 up to 500,000; 
in 1887 to 600,000; and again in 1895 ^"d 1896 to register a 
further yearly increase of 100,000; in 1902 this excess reached 
900,000. This tremendous increase from 41,000,000 in 187 1 
to nearly 70,000,000 in 191 5, or 75 per cent in forty-five years, 
so raised the population of Germany that to-day it occupies 
among European nations a position second only to that of Rus- 
sia. France, which at the beginning of the 19th century held 
this position, stands to-day, with approximately 40,000,000, in 
fifth place. Great Britain, on the basis of her white inhab- 
itants — ^45,000,000 in Europe and approximately 20,000,000 in 
other countries — does not equal the German figure ; and although 
Russia, which in Europe alone is nine times the size of Ger- 
many, excels the latter notably in numbers, it is culturally so 
inferior in the mass of its people that it fails to equal us, not 
alone in its power of production, but even as a consumer. Hence, 
Germany enjoys the economic advantage over all European coun- 
tries of having the broadest basis of production and consumption. 
It is the greatest inland market in the world, with the exception 
of the United States. Compared to its inland market, its for- 
eign market is of relatively less importance than is the case in 
any other European country. We have learned for the first time 
during the war the strength that results from this condition. 
This valuable knowledge will not again be lost, but will bear 
fruit for us in many years of peace. 

The constant striking increase of our population has been 
primarily of importance in subjecting German economic life to 
the driving force of incessantly mounting demand, as is the 



r MODERN GERMANY 



95 



case elsewhere only In the United States. Food, clothing and 
shelter, and above all a chance to work, had to be provided for 
this increasing mass. Thus enterprise and industry are kept 
alive in the whole nation, new organizing tasks of the most im- 
portant kind are uninterruptedly unfolding, and all efforts to 
reduce the increasing volume of work, through the introduction 
of improved methods, find rich reward. Under the pressure of 
these natural conditions, resulting from healthy German energy, 
a scientific spirit and organizing instinct have developed in all 
branches of our economic life. 

Slowly but steadily, this has become apparent in the field of 
agriculture, which at the time of the founding of the Empire 
was the most important of all the great branches of our 
economic activity. Forty-five years ago Germany might still be 
described as an agricultural country. She was able to satisfy 
not only her own domestic demand for food, but also exported 
her superfluous products to England. The latter country, since 
gaining a position of world dominance as the result of the long 
Napoleonic wars among the Continental Powers, had sacrificed 
its agriculture more and more to trade and manufacture, in re- 
liance upon its fleet. German agriculture had, to be sure, dur- 
ing the first half of the nineteenth century, improved considerably 
in its scientific and technical methods; but even under the strong 
influence of Albrecht Thaer, the first successful founder of a 
higher agricultural school, this advance had consisted mainly in 
introducing here and there better methods, as the result of 
experience, in place of those handed down from previous gener- 
ations. 

Had German agriculture continued to be carried on in this 
empirical manner, it would not have proved equal in any notable 
degree to the task of providing for the great increase in popu- 
lation. The German nation would in that case have found 
themselves in an embarrassing dilemma. It would have been 
forced either to feed its increasing numbers with foreign prod- 
ucts, and thereby place itself in the position of growing de- 
pendence on foreign countries (the dangers of which course the 
present war has forever impressed upon us), or it would have 
had to send abroad these consumers of food who threatened its 
safety, and would thereby have decreased not only its produc- 
tive power but also its defensive strength. These two discour- 
aging alternatives increased as practical possibilities at this mo- 
ment owing to the fact that, coincident with Germany's striking 
growth in population, an historically important development oc- 
curred through the beginning of competition in the sale of grain 



96 MODERN GERMANY 

from overseas in our markets. Previously transport of large 
masses of goods had been limited to small distances, hence within 
European boundaries; but precisely at this time the great mod- 
ern improvements in communication made possible the importa- 
tion of such staple foods as grain, from all parts of the earth. 
Simultaneously the great newly opened-up grain territory in the 
Western part of the United States invited emigrants in large 
numbers, as no other foreign country had ever done. This 
double danger became apparent soonest and most emphatically 
in England. In that country, subjected as it was to its full 
influence, the number of wage-earners engaged in agriculture 
and forestry, which in all great European countries fluctuates 
to-day between 35 and 69 per cent, fell to 11.9 per cent in 
the entire United Kingdom, and in England and Wales even 
to 8.5 per cent; at the same time the importation of grain for 
bread rose to fully three-quarters of the public demand. In 
Germany also this double danger became threateningly apparent. 
Importation of those products of the cheap and fertile American 
soil, requiring little labor and capital, was felt most disturb- 
ingly by German agriculture from 1875 on, while at the same 
time the stream of emigrants, mostly agricultural workers, con- 
tinued to swell, till in 1881 it reached 220,902. Had this de- 
velopment been allowed to continue uninterruptedly in Germany 
as in Great Britam, then, on the one hand, our agricultural pop- 
ulation would have suffered a diminution of three-quarters of 
its numbers, resulting in a probably fatal loss of our defensive 
strength ; on the other hand, our demand for imported grain for 
bread would have increased eight-fold over the present-day fig- 
ure, and thereby a starvation of Germany would have become 
for us the unavoidable danger which to-day our enemies vainly 
strive to make it. 

Bismarck took steps to meet this danger. With correct 
appreciation of the vital needs of the German people, in 1879, 
he introduced duty on grain. By this means, he saved our agri- 
culture from being driven to methods of extensive production; 
on the contrary, by guarding its market he gained for it that 
security which was needed for its further intensive development. 
Under the protection of our tariff, the spirit of science and 
organization was able to enter upon its astounding path of 
victory. 

Agriculture, which hitherto had been the victim of conserva- 
tive routine, was guided into paths of science and progress, as 
is well known, by Justus Liebig, the founder of the science of 
plant physiology and agricultural chemistry. He undertook the 



MODERN GERMANY 97 

most extensive investigations regarding the nutritive needs of 
plants and the nutritive value of the soil. Our present-day 
knowledge of fertilizers is based upon these experiments. Up to 
that time, however, England had excelled in many ways in inten- 
sive agricultural production. 

The science of artificial fertilization was at this time de- 
veloped in Germany and it has been practically applied in ever- 
rising degree. It was found that that which the soil needed 
could be produced outside the agricultural sphere. Thanks 
to this valuable discovery, one connecting link after the 
other was forged between agriculture and the manufacturing in- 
dustries. It was only now that the vast treasures became useful 
with which Germany is provided, in striking contrast to all other 
countries of the world. She possesses deposits of a salt which in 
foreign countries is hardly known even by name — namely, Kali. 
In close connection with our agriculture, our industry of Kali 
mining has increased ten-fold in the last twenty-five years, its 
production rising to 10,000,000 tons in round figures, so that 
to-day we export a considerable amount of this important fer- 
tilizer — for example, in 191 3 63,600,000 marks' worth. Even 
more important fertilizers are produced by the great manufac- 
turing industries. From the previously worthless and troublesome 
slag of our railway industry, in which the so-called Thomas 
method is supreme in Germany, we extract as a result of German 
discoveries the fertilizer rich in phosphoric acid of the so- 
called Thomas "meal," of which to-day 10,000,000 tons in round 
figures are used yearly. Our coke industry provides us, finally, 
with the third chemical ingredient which the soil needs for 
plant growth, and this the most important, namely, nitrogen ; this 
is due to our having learned to extract ammonia, among other 
valuable ingredients, from the previously deleterious coke gases; 
but important as this new by-product of our coke furnaces has 
become for us — and in the last six years its worth has nearly 
doubled — nevertheless it does not satisfy the needs of our agri- 
culture. In order to secure in sufficient quantity the nitrogen 
from which plants build up their albumen cells, we have become 
one of the greatest importers of Chili saltpeter. Almost 
half of all Chili saltpeter which reached Europe was used by 
us. This was a line in which our agriculture was dependent 
upon foreign countries. Even in times of peace we had 
felt this painfully. The war has already revealed itself to the 
Germans in many lines, not only as a destroyer but also as 
a creator, but it will doubtless remain the proudest achievement 
among many of our industries that, in the midst of the most 



98 MODERN GERMANY 

bitter struggle which a nation has perhaps ever had to undergo^ 
we have created a great new industry exclusively by scientific 
means. The new nitrogen industry, which the war has magically 
called into being, provides us not alone with that of which we 
had been deprived, as a result of the interruption of our import 
trade, but it provides us with better and more material. It 
holds out great possibilities of development likewise for times 
of peace. At all events, one cause of depending upon foreign 
countries has been removed for all time. And it may be ex- 
pected that that which has been achieved with regard to nitrogen 
on such a vast scale, and with such astounding swiftness, will 
be more or less possible also in other cases, where the inter- 
ruption of our imports calls into activity similar forces, which 
remain dormant in times of peace. 

The feeding of domestic animals has been put upon a similar 
basis as the nourishing of plants by scientific means, by which not 
alone agriculture but also manufacture was so vitally influ- 
enced. The science of feeding was developed, with constantly 
increasing care, from all points of view at the same time as 
the science of fertilization, and the possibility was thus opened 
up of widening the narrow circle of ancient and approved ar- 
ticles of food by means of new ones furnished by trade and 
industry. It was natural that at first we should take the 
easiest course and import with little trouble all that we lacked 
and desired. Therefore, in times of peace, trade in fodder 
was by far the most important. The war has forced us in 
great part to abandon this simple method, and has given us at 
the same time the strength to produce for ourselves that which 
hitherto foreign countries gladly and cheaply provided. In the 
beginning this was accomplished with greater difficulties and 
more serious expense, but in the long run it will necessarily prove 
to be a step forward. 

The scientific theory of the nourishing of plants and animals 
was supplemented by scientific advance in their breeding. Plant 
and animal rearing was first practiced outside of Germany, es- 
pecially in Scotland; but also in this line it was reserved for 
Germany to unite practice and science in an inseparable union. 
The first great success was achieved in the cultivation of that 
species of beets from which the German chemists Marggraf and 
Achard discovered the way to obtain sugar, upon the basis of 
which discovery a firm, hitherto unknown industry grew up to 
take the place of the West Indian cane sugar, of which Europe 
had been deprived by Napoleon's Continental System. Through 
nursing, the sugar producing qualities of the beet were so in- 



MODERN GERMANY 99 

creased that the average weight of beets necessary to produce 
a kilogram of raw sugar was decreased from about 26 pounds 
in 1870-71 to 13 pounds in 1910-11, and at the same time the 
average return in sugar from each hektare of land was raised 
from 42 cwt., at the beginning of the seventies, to 104 cwt., in 
the year 1910-11. Beet sugar thus not only set an example 
for agriculture of great and immediate value and of strong in- 
citing power, but at the same time this industry, originally due 
to war, gained such strength that since 1875 it has made us 
quite independent of imported sugar; by rapid strides it ad- 
vanced to the point of being our leading export industry, and in 
1898 exceeded in the value of its products all others upon our 
export list. Germany owes to plant-rearing her standing as the 
leading country in the supply of sugar. 

The German beet, however, is merely the most striking ex- 
ample of a great movement, which with increasing strength 
has seized upon Germany's whole agricultural activity. In every 
line of agriculture improvements in the methods of manuring, 
nursing and soil preparation, based on scientific research, have 
increased the returns in an ever greater degree. In the twenty- 
five years from 1885-1910, during which our population increased 
30 per cent, our grain crop rose from 18,200,000 to 25,800,000 
tons, and our potato crop from 29,700,000 to 45,900,000 tons, 
an increase of 45 and 55 per cent respectively. As in the pro- 
duction of beets, so likewise in the production of potatoes, Ger- 
many leads the world. In 191 3 Germany produced 54,000,000 
tons on 3,400,000 hektares of land, while Russia, Germany's 
closest competitor, produced a crop of only 3,600,000 tons, al- 
though she had 4,600,000 hektares of land under cultivation. 

In the production of wheat, oats and barley, Germany oc- 
cupies, it is true, third position; but in this connection she is 
inferior only to the United States and European Russia, which 
are, respectively, fifteen and nine times as large. In contrast 
to this. Great Britain and Ireland occupy thirteenth position in 
the production of wheat, seventh in that of oats, and fifth in that 
of barley and potatoes. Although France is more favorably 
placed according to statistical returns, occupying fourth position 
in wheat and third position in potato production, there is never- 
theless a surprising difference in her comparative production on a 
like extent of land. To the hektare she produces 27.6 cwt. 
of wheat, compared to Germany's 51.2; of rye 20.6 compared 
to Germany's 38.2; and of potatoes 192.2 against Germany's 
309.2 cwt. 

What is true of agriculture is also true of cattle raising. 



loo MODERN GERMANY 

Save in the breeding of horses — in which Germany Is excelled 
in Europe only by Russia, not quite equalled by Austria-Hungary 
and followed by France and Great Britain only at considerable 
distance — advance Is not to be reckoned primarily by the num- 
bers of animals. Limited territory sets fixed limitations in this 
field. It is in cattle breeding a question rather of carrying out 
to its fullest extent the economic principle of accomplishing the 
most with the least expenditure; and this is shown by the fact 
that, on one hand, we have greatly Increased the weight of the 
individual animal in the case of cattle and hogs, and, on 
the other, we have strikingly hastened growth to the period of 
slaughter. The success of these extremely important efforts in 
the line of meat production cannot, of course, be expressed In 
statistics. But even disregarding such considerations, Germany's 
position among the nations of Europe as a breeder of animals Is 
most favorable. In the breeding of hogs, which furnished nour- 
ishment for two-thirds of her people, Germany is far In the 
van. Russia, France and Great Britain and Ireland together 
did not possess in 191 3 as many head of these animals as we 
still possessed on December i, 1914 (25,333,772). In cattle rais- 
ing, Germany, with 20,000,000 head, is, to be sure, excelled by 
Russia, with 37,100,000 head; but this great numerical difference 
Is without doubt in the main balanced by superior quality. Cer- 
tainly, Russia has nothing to show equal to our 11,000,000 
remarkable milch cows. 

After Germany, in order come Austria-Hungary, with 16,- 
500,000 head of cattle, France, with 14,700,000, England, Ire- 
land and Wales with 10,600,000; for Scotland no figures are 
obtainable. The fact that In the most extensive branch of ani- 
mal raising, namely sheep raising, Germany has deliberately re- 
mained behind Russia, Great Britain and France — perhaps too 
far in the rear — does not vitiate the advantage which she enjoys in 
the other two lines of animal breeding. It remains true that by 
closely united science and practice we have created In our animal 
possessions a source of wealth such as no other people has 
achieved. In case of necessity we can consume these, and In 
times of peace by means of the acquired methods we can re- 
produce this wealth. Nevertheless, the war has shown us, more 
emphatically than books and speeches were able to do In peace- 
ful times, that there Is still room for much improvement in this 
field of our economic life, perhaps precisely because our advances 
have been so rapid. Tasks which are not only remunerative, but 
also necessary, were suddenly by the war brought to the atten- 
tion of the whole nation with convincing clearness. Here again 



MODERN GERMANY loi 

the present enforced conditions will be more than a mere episode, 
they will prove the source of new developments rich in promise 
for the future. Like agriculture, cattle raising after the war 
will be placed upon a firmer foundation than ever. He who has 
been forced to learn to do without an imported article returns 
to its use reluctantly. 



II 

In the same manner as in agriculture, so likewise in the field 
of industry has Germany, in a short space of time, undergone 
changes greater than previously in unnumbered centuries, thereby 
rising from a modest position to a height hitherto occupied by 
no other great country. 

Germany, it is true, in the sixteenth century led all other 
nations in the industrial arts. But it was brought down from, 
this proud position through the Thirty Years' War and the re- 
sulting political schism. Even after this there remained some- 
thing of the former renown of South German cities, such as 
Niirnberg and Augsburg; and many products of German in- 
dustry, as the steel ware of Solingen and Remscheid, still enjoy 
their ancient reputation far beyond the borders of Germany. 
But in general Germany was ill adapted for the new system of 
mass production. She lacked a great national market, the neces- 
sary capital and enterprise. Not until 1834 were the number- 
less local markets hitherto protected by tariff walls brought to- 
gether by the German Customs' Union into one general market, 
commensurate in its power of absorption with modern mass 
production. But aside from the union attained in customs' mat- 
ters, the unfortunate political division was painfully apparent. 
Thus, up to the year 1877 not less than twenty-nine different 
patent laws were passed in the German Empire. To gain pro- 
tection in all the individual German states was too complicated 
and costly, and that of a single state was insufficient for produc- 
tion on a large scale. Even in Prussia in 1871 only thirty-six 
patents had been granted. It was natural that, under such con- 
ditions, Germans with promising inventions should turn to Eng- 
land, which in 1852 had issued a liberal and uniform patent law\ 
A patent secured in that country opened up, not only the valuable 
market of Europe, but likewise colonial markets — indeed, those 
of the whole world. Numerous valuable products of German 
inventive genius were therefore patented in England, and many 
who were conscious of ability in industrial pursuits emigrated 



I02 MODERN GERMANY 

thither. Thus German technical ability served only to strengthen 
England's position of supremacy. The island kingdom had al- 
ready through its own strength accomplished much in the line 
of modern industrial development, thanks to the fact that its 
position enabled it quietly and uninterruptedly to devote its 
powers to commerce, while the Continental states were engaged, 
for its benefit, in destroying each other in ever-recurring wars. 
With the invention of the steam-engine, but before all with the 
long series of new industrial machines, notably in the textile 
and iron industries, England had won her first great victories in 
modern technical fields. Here the means were at hand of 
cheaply obtaining the most important raw materials in large 
quantities, partly from the rich native soil, partly from the 
colonies. In England the factory system was first developed, 
consciously, ruthless against the workmen, not shrinking from 
absolute cruelty. On the other hand, foreign inventions and 
foreign workers of all kinds had here their meeting-place. 
Before America became the great land of immigration, this dis- 
tinction belonged to England, not, however, for immigrants from 
the lowest class, but for those from the highest. England became 
the "workshop of the world," not exclusively through her own 
strength, but as the meeting-place of much of the industrial 
ability of the whole world ; as such, she not only exported her 
wares to other lands, but served them also as the great model 
workshop. Especially Germany passed through these two stages 
of dependence. In the first place, she served as a market for 
English goods, and up to the year 1879 scarcely any other great 
commercial territory welcomed them so freely. But when she 
began to develop her own modern industry, she found herself 
in many ways dependent on foreign countries, politically and 
economically united — not only on England, but likewise on 
France, and even Belgium. She then became a large importer 
from these countries of machines, half-finished articles, foremen 
and entrepreneurs. 

The superiority of England — the result of political conditions 
in the past — demanded of Germany a great display of energy, if 
the latter country wished to win for itself a position of inde- 
pendence and respect, commercially, as it had succeeded in doing 
politically through the war of 1870-71. Considerations founded 
upon natural conditions, and hence of permanent nature, were 
added to this historical and hence temporary circumstance. First 
of all, the island position of England gave her an extraordinary 
advantage in regard to transportation of goods. Germany, at 
the centre of the Continent, is in much higher degree dependent 



MODERN GERMANY 103 

upon the more expensive form of transport by land. She had 
to find some means of compensating this high cost of transporta- 
tion if she intended to become a competitor in the markets of 
the world. This was especially true in regard to the iron in- 
dustry, for which nature, kindly disposed, had deposited coal and 
iron ores in juxtaposition in England, and in the immediate neigh- 
borhood of the sea; while in Germany, as in the United States, 
they are widely separated. Such a counterbalance for the nat- 
ural advantages of geographical position was to be found only 
in tirelessly perfecting production by all the methods of science 
and organization. In many industrial branches recognition in 
the markets of the world was possible only through success in 
gaining and retaining technical and commercial leadership. But 
even in those lines where transportation does not play so decisive 
a role, as in the ''heavy" iron industry, England's insular posi- 
tion gives her advantages. Thus, for instance, especially on the 
west coast, the air is heavily charged with moisture from the sea, 
a circumstance which so facilitates the spinning of cotton-wool 
that for a long time it seemed impossible to equal the fineness of 
Lancashire yarn. 

All these considerations, taken together, resulted in awaking 
a stronger and more versatile scientific spirit and organizing in- 
stinct in German industry than was the case in any other na- 
tion. That w^hich had originally been withheld and made per- 
manently difficult, owing to unfavorable historical development 
and geographical conditions, it was necessary to attain through 
superlatively efficient training and concentration of power. Here» 
as in agriculture, only the most efficient work was satisfactory. 

The first prerequisite for obtaining this highly efficient kind 
of work was to diminish the pressure of English competition. 
For it is by no means true that all kinds of competition act as 
an incentive and intensifier of one's powers. This ail-too gen- 
eral doctrine, formed to favor the stronger, was perhaps still 
true in the days of Adam Smith, when capitalistic industry was 
in its infancy. We know to-day that competition may be so 
strong that enterprise is paralyzed, not incited, by it. In such 
a case it is necessary to reduce the pressure to such an extent that 
the stimulating effect of the competition may make itself felt. 
It was in precisely such a situation that many German indus- 
tries found themselves when the new German Empire came 
into being. Bismarck recognized the gravity of the situation 
and, in 1879, caused the introduction of a moderate pro- 
tective tariff on manufactured articles and grain. Several pur- 
poses were served thereby: struggling German industries were 



I04 MODERN GERMANY 

protected from ruinous competition with foreign-made articles; 
the home market was secured for home products; the increase 
in price of many foreign-made articles stimulated German in- 
genuity and enterprise; with financial conditions thus rendered 
easier, leisure was gained to invent, test and perfect improve- 
ments in all departments of production. 

At this period, moreover, occurred another event of great por- 
tent. Up to this time Germany had profited little by the in- 
vention of Benjamin Bessemer, whereby pig iron was transformed 
into steel in about twenty minutes. By the methods in vogue 
before Bessemer, this operation required about one and one-half 
days and the saving in time by the new method caused a reduc- 
tion in price of approximately 40 per cent. Bessemer's inven- 
tion was the result of experiments with British ores, which are 
free from phosphorus. German iron ore contains a great deal 
of phosphorus, and hence Bessemer's invention had been of prac- 
tically no value to the Empire's mineral interests. England, on 
the other hand, had greatly strengthened her industrial supremacy 
by the Bessemer process. German iron manufacturers were 
forced either to import Bessemer steel or the ores reducible by 
the Bessemer process. Some new method was needed that would 
apply to phosphorous ores as the Bessemer process applied to non- 
phosphorous ores. Germany possessed rich deposits of iron ore 
in Lorraine; the pressing problem was to find a way to treat 
them. This way was found, oddly enough, in 1878 by an English 
engineer named Thomas. British supremacy was menaced, al- 
though this was not realized at the time. In fact, so sure were 
the British that Bessemer steel would never be rivaled that the 
Thomas method was not only not adopted, but was decried. 
Not so in Germany, however. Scientists, engineers, mine-owners 
and manufacturers united to develop the new invention to the 
technical and commercial perfection necessary. These efforts 
were so successful that Germany became not only England's 
commercial rival in iron products, but a leader in the development 
of the iron industry. 

The scientific enterprise which carried the Thomas process to 
commercial perfection found ample opportunities in the various 
branches of the complex process of turning ore and coal into iron 
and steel. Experiments tending to the utilization of the gases 
produced by the manufacture of coke led to the discovery and de- 
velopment of that many-sided secondary industry — the produc- 
tion of coal tar, benzol, and ammonia for securing nitrogen, as 
previously described. Benzol and coal tar are the basis of our 
great peace trade in dyes, and in war they have been of ines- 



MODERN GERMANY 105 

timable value in the production of munitions and as a substitute 
for benzine. 

With this spirit of scientific enterprise was closely united the 
spirit of thorough organization. In all other European coun- 
tries, and especially in England, ore and coal mines, coke ovens 
and blast furnaces, steel works and rolling mills were all sep- 
arate and distinct enterprises. In Germany these various 
branches of the iron industry were at an early period organized 
and combined into immense concerns, with the result that great 
savings were made in the cost of production and transport. In- 
deed, the system of organization was carried beyond the proc- 
esses of production into that of marketing, so that the great 
series of operations from the first handling of the raw product 
to its final delivery into the hands of the ultimate consumer were 
united in one vast and systematized undertaking. In so far as 
possible, commercial chance and accident were eliminated. 

Scientific enterprise and thorough organization naturally 
brought about a great increase in productivity and acted as the 
equivalent of the natural advantages which England enjoyed, 
natural advantages that tended to prevent development along 
scientific lines. The steel industry was the first to show marked 
signs of growth, since in this line particularly, owing to the 
Thomas invention, German methods first developed. In the 
twenty years from 1890 to 19 10, the steel business grew ap- 
proximately seven times as rapidly as England's in point of 
production. We equaled England in 1893, and to-day we pro- 
duce almost three times as much steel as our former superior 
rival. In pig iron progress was not so rapid, since the Thomas 
invention, and its development was not so soon used in this field ; 
our output did not equal England's until 1903. But in the 
period since then we have gained so rapidly that our present 
output is nearly double that of our rival. In 191 2, Germany 
produced 17,600,000 tons. Great Britain and Ireland 9,000,000 
tons. Germany at last united politically and devoting herself 
to previously neglected fields, by untiring and skilfully directed 
labor has won back what she possessed before the Thirty Years' 
War — European supremacy in the entire field of the iron in-^ 
dustry. 

The importance of this cannot be overestimated. Within re- 
cent years a universal change has taken place in the industrial 
activities of mankind. Up to the end of the nineteenth cen- 
tury, the utilization of vegetable and animal raw material was 
the basis of industrial life. No country possessed a modern in- 
dustry on a large scale which could be compared in point of 



io6 MODERN GERMANY 

strength and firmness of organization with the cotton industry of 
Lancashire. In fact, the Lancashire cotton industry was the 
standard of modern industrial ideas. With the development of 
cheap and quick transportation facilities, however, the basis of 
industrial life changed and the utilization of mineral raw ma- 
terials assumed first importance. In the United States, owing to 
a railroad system whose total mileage exceeds that of all Europe, 
the Iron industry gained first place; In England, with her su- 
premacy in trans-Atlantic shipping, especially after the change 
from wooden to iron and steel ships, the Iron Industry assumed at 
least a temporary supremacy to cotton, which had been the In- 
dustrial mainstay for centuries. This change, characteristic of 
our day and generation, took place earlier and more markedly 
In Germany, although even to-day the German demand for rails 
is not a third of that of the United States, and her shipbuilding 
not a fourth of that of England. Yet, despite these facts, the 
iron industry in Germany ranks first In point of importance, and 
although it does not stand with that of the United States, it 
exceeds that of England. 

Great Britain is still preeminent In cotton manufacturing: the 
number of her spindles (55,971,501) exceeds that of the fol- 
lowing three countries combined — the United States (3i,5i9r 
766), Germany (11,404,944), and Russia (9,111,835). Her 
supremacy In iron has been lost to the two countries which, less 
burdened with the traditions of a glorious Industrial past, were 
able to devote their entire strength to tasks of the present. The 
importance of this In present-day economics cannot be magni- 
fied. Cotton manufacture is simply the transformation of raw 
material into cloth; iron manufacture embraces many and varied 
products. So long as Germany was backward In the iron in- 
dustry, these other fields were closed to her; but as soon as her 
iron and steel equalled the foreign in quality and price, indus- 
trial opportunities gave the skilled German workman ample 
employment. 

From 1900 to 1907, cotton products, ranging in value from 
219,000,000 marks to 432,000,000 marks, occupied first place in 
the German export list, with the exception of the year 1902. But 
from 1908 on, first place has been preempted by the export of 
machines. In 1880, the total value of machines exported was 
only 42,000,000 marks. In 1890, 67,500,000 marks, but by 1907 
it had reached the sum of 387,000,000 marks, as against an im- 
port value of 83,000,000 marks. These figures were still, how- 
ever, far behind those of England: her exports were valued at 
627,000,000 marks and her imports at only 67,000,000 marks. 



MODERN GERMANY 107 

Five years later, the tally was different. In 191 2, Germany ex- 
ported 630,300,000 marks' worth of machines and England 631,- 
600,000 marks' worth, while British imports were greater than 
Germany's. The year follow^ing, in 19 13, the value of the ex- 
ports of German machines was 680,300,000 marks. It may 
safely be assumed that the domestic sale of machines is greater 
in Germany than in Great Britain and Ireland, and, taking this 
into account, there seems no reason to doubt that in 19 13 Ger- 
many held first place in Europe in the machine industry, the 
position which she had reached ten years before in the pig iron 
industry and twenty years before in the steel industry. 

Since 1908, moreover, iron ware has held second place on 
the German export list. The term embraces a multitude of ar- 
ticles. The export value of these products in 19 13 was 652,000,- 
000 marks. Various forms of iron products are not included 
in this list, such as iron bars, sheet iron, iron pipes, iron wire, 
iron rails, pig iron and loop iron, which represent an export 
value of 672,000,000 marks. 

In third place in the export list, since 191 2, comes pit coalo Its 
value in 19 13 was 516,000,000 marks (coke amounting to 147,- 
000,000 marks), only 300,000,000 marks below the British fig- 
ures. The closely related iron and coal industries make up a 
full quarter of the whole German export trade, amounting to 
more than 2,700,000,000 marks annually. No other branch of 
industry in any other country has conquered for itself such a 
position in the markets of the world. This has been won with- 
out force or favor from the government, purely on the face value 
of the goods themselves, and although it may be altered tempo- 
rarily by forcible measures, in the long run it can be lost only 
by superior efficiency of competitors. 

This may be taken as a general rule in regard to German 
industries, applying to many others with even greater force. Al- 
though in many instances the amount of the output is not suffi- 
cient to figure largely, yet the methods of production and market- 
ing are classic examples of the lines along which German industry 
is developing. Take as an example the German chemical in- 
dustry. Engaged in this are 195 stock companies, employing 
300,000 workers and producing in peace times goods valued at 
1,750,000,000 marks, and in war great quantities of both de- 
structive and curative agents. The success of this thoroughly 
modern industry was not based on any special source of raw 
materials but altogether on methods and labor. Success has not 
been due to lucky discoveries, to a few secret formulas: it springs 
absolutely from systematic efforts to achieve definite goals. This 



io8 MODERN GERMANY 

organized scientific labor, for example in the case of one factory 
alone, led to the application for 798 patents in 191 1, or more 
than two per day; this factory was the Elberfeld Dye Works, 
which employ regularly four hundred scientifically trained chem- 
ists. The energy for such constant achievement cannot be called 
forth by the arbitrary exercise of power, no matter how ruthless, 
nor by imitation, no matter how close; it can be achieved only 
through long, patient and intelligently planned labor. And any 
interference or cessation of progress means retrogression in this 
field of labor, which is more closely related to scientific investiga- 
tion than others. 

It is not due to accident, therefore, but to the quality of the 
workers and their product, that the German dye industry, which 
is characteristic of the Empire's technical skill, is its most typical 
€xport industry. It produces four-fifths of the world's demands 
in dye stuffs, and its experienced workers and methods will con- 
tinue to develop new fields not only for the benefit of Germany 
but for that of the world. As regards the value of its exports, 
the chemical industry, to be sure, ranks less than that of the 
machine and iron industry; but when the import figures are 
considered, it holds third place in foreign trade. 

Even more favorable is the ratio of export to import in a 
fourth industry, that of electricity and its allied trades. The ex- 
port value is less, but that is due in part to the fact that in this 
trade more branch factories have been established in foreign 
countries than in the chemical industry. All four of these In- 
dustries — the manufacture of machines. Iron, chemicals and elec- 
trical products — form a group representing in their processes 
typical modern Industry, turning out products of exceptional 
quality and conducted upon the most advanced lines of modern 
big business. In all these chief branches of our export industry, 
remarkable personalities are in active control, assisted by large 
staffs of young workers who have been expertly trained in techni- 
cal and commercial schools for their particular line of work. 
In these Industries there Is an unusually high proportion of 
educated officials as compared with mere hands, of skilled labor 
as compared with unskilled. 

To the adequate training of the worklngman, Germany has 
devoted unceasing care for more than a century. In addition to 
universal compulsory school attendance up to a certain age and 
universal compulsory military service, the state has added a sys- 
tem of thorough vocational training for all branches of indus- 
trial activity. Nor Is purely cultural education for the worker 
neglected. In the so-called "extension schools," every oppor- 



MODERN GERMANY 109 

tunlty is given the pupil, and ft is made his duty, to carry on his 
studies begun in the lower grade schools and to apply them to 
whatever line of work he is following. Although attendance 
is not compulsory, custom is rapidly making it so. At the end 
of 1912, in Prussia alone, 19,371 teachers made up the staffs of 
2,235 industrial and 392 commercial extension schools; many 
of these teachers were practical workers. Other federal states 
have advanced even further than Prussia in the development of 
this branch of education. 

Even more noteworthy is the progress made in social legisla- 
tion. The same geographical circumstances that have driven 
Germany to rigid economy in handling her natural treasures and 
raw material have forced her also to constant care for her 
most valuable possession — human energy. Step by step, work- 
men's insurance and protective legislation for workmen have been 
developed, until to-day they are the greatest organizations deal- 
ing with ''human economics" in the world. At the beginning of 
the war, for instance, 25,000,000 persons were insured in the so- 
called Workmen's Insurance against accident, 18,000,000 against 
sickness, 16,000,000 against disability and old age; in 191 3 the 
combined insurance organizations, with a capital of 3,057,000,- 
000 marks, paid out for relief the sum of 840,000,000 marks, or 
at the rate of 2,250,000 marks daily. 

The rapid development of our industrial enterprises, calling 
as it did for the expenditure of all our strength, brought with 
it the danger of imperiling national health. England suffered In 
this respect during the early years of the nineteenth century. Our 
social legislation, which seeks to prevent injuries and to relieve 
them If they do occur, has been the chief means of protecting us 
from a like disaster. It is due to this legislation that we possess in 
our urban industrial workers soldiers equally efficient as those 
of our rural levies. They have shown themselves not only phys- 
ically capable of meeting the inclemency of the weather and 
hardships and deprivations of all kinds, but more than that, 
they have withstood that "mass test of the national nerves,'* 
which is one of the effects of the war. In times of peace, when 
controversies as to the suitability of certain measures tended to 
narrow and obscure the view, it w^ould have been impossible to 
foresee how fully the demands of war have justified this social 
legislation, to which Bismarck gave the original impetus. The 
President of the Imperial Insurance Bureau has said: 

"The battle of Koniggratz, it is well known, was won by the 
German schoolmaster. Now it is the German schoolmaster and 
the system of social legislation that win the victories." 



no MODERN GERMANY 

All Germans will heartil)^ agree to this. 

Encouraged by the numerous insurance organizations in which 
he is given a share in administration and jurisdiction, the work- 
man himself has taken a hand in his own education. He has 
been compelled, in a short period, to pass through a develop- 
ment which in England was spread over many years. Although 
this did not lead to the violent conflicts which occurred in Eng- 
land, naturally Germany did not escape friction and disturb- 
ance. Here, too, economic insight defeated political blindness 
only after a long struggle. In 1891 our labor unions numbered 
in round figures only 350,000 members, while in the previous year 
in the Reichstag elections the Social Democrats polled 1,500,000 
votes. In 191 2 the economic and political organizations of the 
German workmen were in close agreement in numbers. In the 
Reichstag elections there were 4,500,000 Social Democratic votes, 
and the labor unions of all kinds numbered 3,750,000 members. 
In 1 89 1 our system of unions stood far behind the older Eng- 
lish system. It did not show a quarter of the English strength. 
In 1906 it equalled the English figures, and in 191 2 it ex- 
ceeded them in membership by nearly a million workmen, and 
in yearly contributions by about 20,000,000 marks. The organ- 
ization of the German workmen is to-day by far the most pow- 
erful of its kind in the w^hole world. 

Up to recently nearly the whole German working class seemed 
to be separated from the rest of the German people by an im- 
passable chasm. In vain in times of peace was a means sought 
for bridging this breach. The war accomplished the miracle, be- 
cause it was clearly recognized by the whole nation, and by every 
individual worker, as an unjust war of aggression and as such was 
indignantly resented. Our Social Democratic body of workers, 
which had previously opposed our military system and had been 
inclined to a pacifist policy, would have continued its opposition 
if a single doubt had existed of the justice of the German cause. 
Again, for the second time, the German people had reason to 
thank their enemies for an inspiring outburst of unity. In the 
gathering of princes in Versailles, on the iSth of January, 1871, 
the German Empire was created, to the accompaniment of the 
thunder of cannon on French soil; again on the 4th of August, 
1914, in the east as well as in the west, the terrible voices of can- 
non were heard, as the representatives of the whole people in 
the German Reichstag united in a holy war enthusiasm. In 
1870 a portion of the representatives abstained from voting for 
the war credit. In the present war an amount such as the world 
has never seen was unanimously approved. In spite of many- 



MODERN GERMANY in 

sided jealousy and enmity, the German people have maintained 
their outward political unity in fourty-four years of peace. In 
the future, when the unavoidable strife of parties again breaks 
forth, we shall in spite of all attacks know how to maintain the 
finally acquired union of national thought and feeling. That 
will remain as an especially valuable gain from the terrible 
struggle. 

Ill 

The financial development of German industry — a subject too 
complex to admit of analysis here — demanded capital, Germany 
was still a poor country at the time of the founding of the Em- 
pire. Even the basis for the development of capital, a uniform, 
regulated, sound monetary system, did not yet exist. The political 
disunion was apparent in the fact that nearly every one of the 
German states had its own coinage, and as a natural result of 
the wide-spread poverty, the old silver standard still existed 
everyw^here, outside of little Bremen. As England, the ruler of 
the commerce of the world, had attained the gold standard in 
l8i6, through a series of fortunate events, active participation 
by Germany in international trade was rendered extremely diffi- 
cult. For the same reason, the development of her internal 
economic life was delayed. The war of 1870-71 brought the 
solution. In political union was found the hitherto lacking con- 
stitutional basis for a statesmanlike reform of the German mone- 
tary system, while at the same time the French war indemnity 
provided the means necessary to the adoption of the gold standard 
hitherto enjoyed by England alone. It was not yet practicable, 
however, to establish a complete gold standard. As long as the 
gold supply of the world was limited, geographically, to western 
North America and Australia, and, technically, to the old-fash- 
ioned placer or washing method, there was not enough available 
metal to meet demands. It was the time of the "universal pulling 
at the golden blanket" and the high tide of international bi- 
metallistic endeavors. 

In 1879, when Germany's gold stock was less than 1,500,000,- 
000 marks, we were forced to retain, in conjunction with the 
new gold coins, the old silver "thalers," which were legal tender 
up to any amount. The great increase in gold production, due 
to the process of mining employed in the Transvaal, made the 
adoption of an exclusive gold standard possible in Germany. 
In 1906, according to the statistics of the American Director of 
Mints, Germany ranked second among the states of Europe, with 



112 MODERN GERMANY 

a gold stock of 3,853,000,000 marks, standing, it is true, 484,000,- 
000 marks behind France, but exceeding Russia by 263,000,000 
marks and England by 1,505,000,000 marks. Upon this firm 
basis, Germany was enabled, in 1907, to complete her monetary 
reform by the withdrawal of the *'thalers" from circulation. 

Therewith bills on Berlin acquired the same gold value as 
bills on London, which had up to this time been without com- 
petition in the control of international payments. In Germany 
we were at last able to take measures to achieve independence of 
England in this field. By means of our London and trans-oceanic 
branch banks, we succeeded in this effort in districts which had 
remained behind in their development and which did not yet pos- 
sess their own firm banking system. In competition with the 
thirty-two English Colonial Banks, which possess two thousand 
branches throughout the British Empire, we have accomplished 
hardly anything, nor, in fact, have we sought to do so. Indeed, 
England was able to retain on the whole her rich inheritance 
in this field so undiminished that before the war London could 
still describe itself as the center of international exchange. This 
position it owed to the carefully cultivated reputation of unlim- 
ited capacity and unquestionable honesty. Will it be able to 
maintain this reputation after the war, or will the wealthy 
United States succeed in gaining it for itself, and so assume the 
leadership in the international money market? Perhaps in this 
field, also, the relationship of equality of the leading commercial 
powers, for which Germany is striving, will be established, so 
that every species of supremacy will be swept aside and each na- 
tion given the opportunity to demonstrate its ability to the full 
extent of its capacity. 

Not only the fact that the monetary reform was carried out 
became of importance for Germany's position in international 
commerce, but also the manner in w^hich the gold standard was 
introduced. The gold stock of a country may be centralized or 
decentralized. It is centralized when it lies in the vaults of 
the banks, especially of the central note bank, decentralized when 
it circulates freely. All centralization means economy. The 
more the whole cash reserve is brought together, the more profita- 
bly can it be utilized. Such a concentration also brings about a 
certain saving of interest. For these reasons the British have, to 
a very large extent, centralized their gold reserve. This system, 
first developed in England, is regarded by many as a model, and 
steps along this line have been taken in France and Russia. 
One fact has been insufKciently considered. The organization 
of the monetary system must be adapted, more than any other 



MODERN GERMANY 113 

organization, not alone to normal conditions but to crises. In 
cases of abnormal demand, which are scarcely to be foreseen, it 
becomes necessary to be able to lay hands on cash in unusual 
quantities. This may be obtained from domestic or foreign 
sources. Only he who controls the gold market can depend on 
foreign countries. 

It is one of England's chief advantages in international com- 
merce that, as the earliest and up to 1872 the sole gold-standard 
country, she became the gold market of the world. This posi- 
tion she was enabled to maintain, even after the appearance of 
competing purchasers of gold in consequence of the adoption of 
the gold standard by other nations, owing to the fact that she 
controlled politically and commercially two of the greatest gold 
producing countries — South Africa and Australia. England be- 
lieved, therefore — relying on her monopoly of the commerce in 
gold — that she might confidently assume the risk which attaches to 
her monetary system. In proportion as her commerce in gold 
decreased or was threatened, this risk was sure to become per- 
ceptible. Hence the Bank of England was compelled in this war 
to increase its gold holdings by other means. Therefore it incor- 
porated into its stock the Indian reserve currency, the gold in 
hand of the Egyptian National Bank, and probably also the gold 
reserve of the National Bank of Belgium, which was transferred 
to England, as well as the gold treasure of the Argentine Conver- 
sion Fund. Moreover, it accumulated gold in South Africa and 
Australia through sequestration of the mine output of those 
countries, as well as in Canada from the debts of American finan- 
cial circles due to England. This money was not brought across 
the ocean, it is true, on account of the high rate of insurance, but 
it is counted as part of the Bank of England's cash. Further, 
the Bank of England exacted a certain amount of gold security 
for advances made to the Allies of Great Britain. This measure 
was applied, in the first instance, to Russia. Apparently 8,000,- 
000 pounds sterling w^re transferred from Petrograd to London 
at a very early date. But France likewise was allowed a credit 
of 1,500,000,000 francs only against a cash security of 500,- 
000,000 francs in gold. 

By these unusual means the Bank of England succeeded 
in raising the gold cover for its notes and its other 
liabilities falling due without notice. At the end of August, 
19 1 4, the gold cover had been as low as 18 per cent. On 
December 2, 191 5, it had risen to 28.7 per cent, but was still 
9.8 per cent below what it was on July 23, 19 14. Conditions 
were worse in France, where the gold cover within the same 



114 MODERN GERMANY 

period fell from 51.5 per cent (July 30, 19 14) to 28.5 per cent 
(December 2, 1915), and in Russia, where it decreased from 
57.6 per cent (July 29, 1914) to 26.4 per cent (October 29, 
1915). In regard to the Imperial Bank of Russia, it is even 
doubtful whether it does not book the gold transferred to Lon- 
don among its assets. Otherwise it is difficult to understand why 
the item "gold abroad," showing 35,600,000 rubles on October 
29, 191 5, should have risen to 228,500,000 rubles on November 
29, 1915, while the gold stock of the Bank, given at 1,600,000- 
000 rubles on November 29, 191 5, is approximately the same as 
it was on October 29, 1915, and on July 29, 1914. At any 
rate, in contrast to the general deterioration of the gold hold- 
ings of our enemies, the Imperial Bank of Germany has an im- 
provement to show. The gold cover for all its obligations due 
without notice — not only banknotes but deposits likewise — in- 
creased from 30.1 per cent on July 31, 19 14, to 32.1 per cent 
on November 30, 19 15. 

While the central note bank of England is dependent upon help 
from outside, the German Imperial Bank rests entirely upon its 
own strength. For Germany from the start refused to assume 
this dangerous risk, for the sake of the saving of interest, that 
results from a thorough centralization of the cash reserve. The 
Empire, in the gold which is in circulation, possesses a strong 
internal reserve capable of meeting the demands even of the 
greatest crisis, because gold circulates more freely in Germany 
than in England, France and Russia; the combined amount of 
gold in circulation and gold stock in banks in Germany exceeds 
that of England. This explains how the German Imperial Bank, 
in the throes of the greatest war which any country has ever had 
to sustain, has been able, week by week, to augment its gold 
stock, so that after sixteen months of war it had increased by 
1,182,000,000 marks, or 98 per cent (November 30, 1915: 2,- 
435,000,000 marks), as compared with the time of the outbreak 
of the war (July 31, 1914: 1,253,000,000 marks), and that it 
excelled the gold stock of the Bank of England of even date 
(December 2, 191 5: 51,100,000 pounds sterhng) by 1,400,000,- 
000 marks, or 134 per cent. It is true that at first France, 
and finally England also, by her proclamation of July 8, 1915? 
have done all in their power to imitate Germany's methods, much 
derided at the start, of withdrawing the gold reserves from cir- 
culation ; but since both countries possess only small reserves 
of that kind, their success was very modest. The Bank of Eng- 
land up to the end of October, 191 5, shows an increase of its 
gold holdings of only 13,800,000 pounds sterling, not a quarter 



MODERN GERMANY 115 

of that of the Imperial Bank of Germany, while the Bank of 
France's gold stock rose only by 736,000,000 francs — that is to 
say, by half of that of the Reichsbank. This strong and steady 
increase of Germany's gold stock, which remains inexplicable for 
all whose knowledge is confined to the British financial system, 
while astonishing In itself, is yet all the more remarkable for the 
fact that this flow of gold into the coffers of the Central Bank 
from channels of uncontrolled circulation Is taking place with- 
out application of any measures of compulsion. The sole Im- 
pulse Is to be sought In the universal patriotism of the people. 
As a fight carried on with "silver bullets," the war Is in Germany 
a national war. 

The credit of a country Is built upon the gold stock of its 
banks. In the present war, in Germany the gold stock Is en- 
joying larger internal accretions and suffering smaller deletions 
than In England, France and Russia. The most Important task 
of the gold stock Is to adapt circulation to rapidly changing de- 
mand, by keeping It elastic. In Germany this has been achieved 
in absolute perfection by bringing the supply of currency into 
immediate causal connection with the demand for the circulating 
medium, bank notes being Issued on the basis of trade bills, the 
amount of which rises and falls with the degree of economic 
activity. The greater the amount of bills signed and discounted 
for the payment of goods purchased, the greater becomes the 
amount of bank notes in circulation ; and this again diminishes 
to the degree that these discounted bills are redeemed. A per- 
fect adjustment to the demand for money is thus automatically 
brought about, and the Imperial Bank has to provide only the 
necessary metal cover. In Germany this Is fixed by law as at 
least one-third of the face value of the total issue of notes, where- 
as in England, France and Russia corresponding rules are lack- 
ing. The elasticity achieved through this method of providing 
cover for the bills of exchange does not exist in those countries, 
or only to an imperfect degree. In France this elasticity is 
menaced by the fact that bank notes may be Issued, not only 
for discount transactions but likewise for loans against commer- 
cial collateral. It Is quite absent in England, where the bank- 
note system, for historical reasons, Instead of being In organic 
union with the economic life, has been brought into outward 
inflexible connection with the financial administration of the state, 
and where, furthermore, the amount of bank notes issued with- 
out metal cover is limited. This fundamental defect in her 
financial system, although at times extremely inconvenient, Eng- 
land was able to endure as long as her commerce In gold suffered 



Ii6 MODERN GERMANY 

no interference. By means of this she was able, through the 
great elasticity in the gold stock, to make up for the lack of 
elasticity in her bank-note system. But in case the commerce 
in gold is in any way impeded, the results of this fundamental 
defect in the system can be temporarily alleviated only by all 
the unusual measures for the maintenance of the gold stock 
already described. 

In Germany, on the other hand, we have been able to maintain, 
in time of war, the elasticity which distinguishes our bank-note 
system in time of peace. Slight changes were necessary to this 
end. In the first place, in war time, the place of the individual 
as buyer and as employer of labor is largely taken by the state, 
which thus determines to a great extent the amount of payments. 
Hence, if it is desired in war time, as was the case in time of 
peace, to make the amount of currency conform to the demand 
for money, it is necessary to bring the bank-note system into 
organic union, not only with the nation's economic activity, 
but with that of the state, also. This w^as achieved by making 
the bills of exchange and promissory notes issued by the Govern- 
ment discountable through the Imperial Bank, if payable within 
three months ; they w^ere thereby given the same standing as cover 
for bank notes which private bills of exchange enjoy. By means 
of this simple logical adjustment to war conditions, the Imperial 
Bank attained the same automatic elasticity for the unusual de- 
mands of war that distinguishes it under normal conditions. 

Supplementary measures also were necessary. Since the Im- 
perial German Bank, in order to maintain its metal cover on a 
high level, is not permitted, as is the Bank of France, to use the 
funds gained from the issue of bank notes for loans against com- 
mercial collateral as well as against bills of exchange, it en- 
deavored to limit as much as possible the amount, and especially 
the length of time, of such loans. For these purposes only the 
capital of the bank and the deposits may be used. In times of 
war, however, credit demands show a general increase. Espe- 
cially was this true on the present occasion; for, following the 
lead of the Paris Exchange, the Vienna and Brussels Exchanges 
were closed on July 27, 1914, the London Exchange on July 
30, and the Berlin and New York Exchanges on August i. 
A relief for the resulting extraordinary difficulty in the sale of 
bonds and stocks had to be provided by making loans upon them 
legal, and this without obstructing the Imperial Bank in the 
fulfilment of its great principal task. Accordingly, as early as 
August 4, 19 14, after the Prussian example tested in earlier 
wars, loan banks were established, authorized to grant loans to 



MODERN GERMANY 117 

the total of 3,000,000,000 marks against judiciously appraised 
securities, as well as with unlimited personal liability on the 
part of the borrower. 

For this purpose these institutions issue "loan bank notes" 
in amounts as low as one mark, whereby a corresponding change 
in the denomination of bank notes is avoided. These loan 
bank notes, for w^hich, in addition to the double security above 
mentioned, the Empire assumes liability, must be accepted at 
full face value by all authorities of the Empire and of the 
federal states. That the public showed no reluctance in tak- 
ing up this new currency was in accordance with the experience 
of former wars. It is, however, one of the surprises of the 
present war that advantage was taken of this new credit 
system only to a degree which seems slight for a nation of 
nearly seventy million people. The maximum amount of the 
loan bank notes in 1914 was 1,317,000,000 marks (December 
31, 191 4) ; in the first half-year of 191 5 it rose to 1,574,000,000 
marks (April 15, 1915), while on November 30, 191 5, the total 
issue stood at 1,631,000,000 marks, of which 889,000,000 marks 
were in circulation. It is subject to constant fluctuations. If 
the increase, incidental to the war loan issues, must be consid- 
ered surprisingly small, the decrease wont to follow them must 
be called surprisingly rapid. Advances taken in connection with 
the three big war loans, which in all amount to 25,500,000,000 
marks, on October 30, 191 5, stood at no more than 1,054,000,- 
000 marks, or approximately 4%. What is more significant in 
regard to the economic strength of the German people, under- 
rated both at home and abroad, is the surprising fact that the 
demands made on the loan banks by subscribers were smaller on 
the occasion of each succeeding war loan. Up to the time when 
the first installments fell due, payments made by means of funds 
raised through the loan banks, as compared to the total pay- 
ments, were as follows: 

Total From Loan 

Total Amount First Payment Banks Funds % 
I war loan: 4,481,000,000 2,568,000,000 710,000,000 27.6 
II war loan: 9,103,000,000 6,085,000,000 521,000,000 8.6 
III war loan: 12,160,000,000 8,732,000,000 566,000,000 6.5 

England resorted to a measure similar to the German loan 
banks, but narrower in scope, in that it is confined to war loans, 
while it is much less stringent as regards the loan conditions. 
Loans are made to the full, instead of to a partial value of the 
security, for three years, instead of six months, and at a discount 



ii8 MODERN GERMANY 

of 1% under the legal discount rate, instead of at the rate of 
interest for loans on commercial collateral, which would be higher 
than the discount rate. When the second English war loan was 
to be raised (McKenna), conditions were made still lighter for 
subscribers, in that the former liberal conditions, relative to the 
loanable value of the security given, were replaced by quite ex- 
traordinary rights of exchanging new loan scrip for old govern- 
ment bonds. 

By organizing the loan business independently of the Reichs- 
bankj the note cover by bills of exchange — one of the pillars of our 
bank-note system — was maintained in its full strength. The other 
pillar, which consisted in the metal cover, has been very greatly 
strengthened through the notable accretion of gold from inland 
sources. But it was necessary, from the very beginning, to or- 
ganize this support so that all strains to which it could con- 
ceivably be subjected within the extreme limits of possibility 
might be successfully withstood. It was therefore determined 
that the loan bank notes should be reckoned as governmental 
obligations, as part of the cash in hand of the Imperial Bank. By 
this means the central German note-bank would be enabled, even 
in face of a diminishing gold reserve, to meet all demands the war 
might impose on the inland market. This extreme precautionary 
measure — the importance of which has entirely failed of compre- 
hension abroad — has, like so many others adopted for contin- 
gencies that eventually did not arise, not proved of any practical 
significance. The sound condition which our monetary system 
has preserved, even in war time, is shown precisely by the cir- 
cumstance that the German bank notes have more successfully 
maintained the ratio of gold cover necessary in times of peace 
than the bank notes of the Bank of England, despite all emer- 
gency measures, and more than those of the Bank of France or 
the Russian Imperial Bank, which have entirely discontinued 
their regular reports. In this manner Germany has given proof 
that her monetary system is, of its own strength, equal to the 
most severe demands, in war as well as in peace. Nor is this 
fact militated against by the precautionary measure taken by the 
German Imperial Bank, in consideration of the cessation of all 
influx of gold from abroad, for the checking of the export of 
gold ; this it permits only for certain definite purposes. The 
same thing has taken place in England, though not quite to the 
same extent nor in the same forms. England, too, has not been 
able to maintain the free exportation of gold. Thus there is no 
difference of principle, but only of degree. 

Very much the same considerations obtain with regard to 



MODERN GERMANY 119 

the exchange rates, if only for the reason that much more com- 
plicated channels for international payments had to be made 
use of. Germany's foreign exchange, soon after the war broke 
out, suffered a depression which was increased by deliberate mis- 
interpretation as well as by genuine misunderstanding, but which, 
broadly speaking, was soon checked. The English rate of ex- 
change was maintained as long as England's excess of imports 
was kept within bounds. Only when, in 191 5, this excess be- 
gan to assume inflated proportions, did the exchange begin to 
drop, and it has shown unmistakably an increased tendency to 
do so since the month of April. The difference existing in this 
respect between Germany and England — which is all the more 
important because the English themselves characterize the pound 
sterling as international currency, in contrast to the cur- 
rency of other countries — is connected with the question of 
trade balance. It is true that to-day Germany's trade balance is 
negative, but the excess of imports, owing to the restriction of 
German commerce, is moderate. England's trade balance has 
developed unfavorably to an incomparably greater degree. In 
the first ten months of 1915, the excess of England's imports 
from the United States alone over the exports was 396,600,000 
pounds sterling, as against 194,800,000 pounds sterling during 
the same period of the preceding year. In this connection, more- 
over, it must not be forgotten that the enormous purchases made 
for the account of the government are not included in these fig- 
ures. It is not unlikely that by the end of 191 5 the unfavorable 
balance of England's trade will amount to 8,000,000,000 pounds 
sterling. 

In England, as is not the case in Germany, there are no obsta- 
cles in the way of employing whatever means seem useful in sup- 
porting the value of currency, and all such means are b.eing lib- 
erally employed. Thus, many hundreds of millions of marks' 
w^orth of foreign securities were sold and — in addition to several 
smaller bank loans — the great Morgan loan of $500,000,000 
was placed on the market. But all means prove futile. 
The pound sterling, the presumed unassailability of which used 
to be the mainstay of England's hegemony in the world's trade, 
has dropped, as the mark did before, and it will continue to 
drop the longer the big British importation of war material, 
food-stuffs and raw material continues, the more hands are 
withdrawn from the British export industries, the more the ad- 
vances grow which England has to grant her allies (which Mr. 
McKenna, on September 21, 191 5, figured as amounting to 423,- 



I20 MODERN GERMANY 

000,000 pounds sterling) and, finally, the more the British cred- 
its in the United States diminish. 

The depreciation of the German rate of exchange, as likewise 
the cutting ofif of Germany from the world's commerce, will 
pass into history as an instructive war episode in Germany's eco- 
nomic life. Germany possesses sufficient strength to effect the 
transition from war to peace just as efficiently as, under much 
more difficult conditions, she performed the reverse process. As 
regards the depreciation of the English rate of exchange, with 
all its many concomitant phenomena, the longer the war lasts, 
the more it will grow into an event of world historic character, 
the importance of which will still be felt in the years following 
the war. 

Upon the described basis of our financial system, newly cre- 
ated with much care in time of peace and wisely strengthened in 
the present war, it was possible to build up an efficient private 
banking business. As the reconstructed German Empire was 
forced to content itself with an insufficient gold supply, so it 
was inadequately provided with capital with which to meet the 
great demands made upon it. It was forced, therefore, to have 
recourse to the countries of old established wealth. Economical 
methods and efficient organization were consequently especially 
necessary in the banking system. 

The five most prominent banks to-day, taken together, had at 
the time of the founding of the Empire a stock capital of only 
122,800,000 marks. By 1880 this had risen to 246,000,000 
marks; in 1895 to 413,000,000, and on January i, 1915, it had 
reached 1,020,000,000 marks, to which must be added 325,000,- 
000 reserve funds. These banks placed their capital at the 
disposal of the growing industry and trade. They expressly 
styled themselves ''Banks for Commerce and Industry," went 
in deliberately not only for the simple and safe operations of the 
money market, like the English joint-stock banks, but also for a 
share in the growth of Germany's economic life, and sought to 
develop the spirit of enterprise in all promising undertakings 
They considered it not only their right, but their duty, to enter 
into the more remunerative but likewise more risky stock invest- 
ment business. 

The close connection which naturally soon developed between 
banks and business in the young German Empire was not with- 
out drawbacks. The large banks, which showed marked prefer- 
ence for long-term investments subject to the fluctuations of 
the market, hesitated at the start to go into the short-term 
deposit business, which is the prominent feature of 



MODERN GERMANY 121 

English banking. As late as 1890 the great Berlin stock 
banks had only 100,000,000 marks in deposits. At about 
that period, however, the systematic fostering of this branch of 
business was undertaken, in order to help the great banks of 
Germany to attain their full strength. On January i, 1915, 
the four greatest Berlin banks showed deposits amounting to 
1,748,000,000 marks. In connection with this it should be re- 
membered that in Germany, contrary to the English custom, 
credits granted for commercial purposes, but not yet used, are 
not entered on the books as deposits. On the above date the 
nine leading Berlin banks combined had at their disposal a 
capital of funds and deposits amounting to 6,000,000,000 marks. 

But even this does not fully express the strength which they 
have attained. The great Berlin banks to-day no longer stand 
alone. As they continually engage in great speculative undertak- 
ings, it has always been their aim to diminish the risk con- 
nected with the expansion of that class of business with all the 
means at their disposal. The effort to reduce such risk has been 
in a large measure responsible for the fact that our young Ger- 
man banks have grown to such vast organizations. The first 
point to be remembered is that an increase of deposits does not 
imply, as in England, a reduction of the banks' own funds; on 
the contrary, this gives an impulse to an increase of the stock 
capital and reserve funds; for since the assets and liabilities 
cannot be balanced against each other, as is the case in Eng- 
land, where the banks persevere in the old-fashioned custom of 
confining their business to the stereotype short-term credits, in 
the German banking system the relation between the bank's own 
funds and the deposits is quite different. It is no mere coinci- 
dence that the Deutsche Bank, the Diskontogesellschaft, and the 
Dresdener Bank excel all other German banks in the develop- 
ment of their deposit business, and at the same time have far 
outstripped them in the increase of their capital stock and re- 
serve funds. 

In accumulating these great amounts a means has been sought 
and found of balancing the risks by investing the banks' funds 
among a great variety of interests, with the result that the debtors* 
solvency depends to a great extent on quite diverse economic 
circumstances, frequently of a mutually neutralizing effect. Pre- 
ponderant dependence on closely connected commercial interests 
— that is to say, dependence on the conditions of a single locality 
or on a single branch of commerce or industry — is everywhere 
carefully avoided. Geographically, as well as in regard to the 
lines of business pursued, the activity of the individual banks has 



122 ]VIODERN GERMANY 

been extended as completely as possible. Their investments in 
German enterprises are naturally heavy; their activity, how- 
ever, is not confined to the Empire's boundaries but extends to 
nearly every country on earth. 

This expansion has taken place mainly in the form of wide- 
spread aiftliations. There have been cases of consolidation of 
more or less importance; but there is a fundamental diiierence 
between the three great French consolidated banks, with more 
than lOOO branches throughout the provinces, and the compre- 
hensive organizations under the German banking system. Local 
peculiarities have been retained in a much higher degree. This 
has been the case especially where different banks have been 
united, not in a giant organization, but merely in details of finan- 
cial or personal control, without affecting their separate existence. 
The fact that the three greatest German banks in their yearly 
statement for 1914 showed not less than 318.000,000 marks 
permanently invested in other banks is an indication of the im- 
portance attained in German banking by this system of affilia- 
tions. It has been estimated that in the combined balance of 
all the German banks these three great institutions, together with 
the banks affiliated with them, hold no less than 60 per cent of 
the total. 

Mistaken foreign theories to the contrary, German banking 
has developed along these lines in a few years from small be- 
ginnings to a great and powerful position. There is no deaden- 
ing conventionality in its vast organization to cause needless 
interference with its efficient working, nor are there any worn- 
out traditions and governmental regulations standing in its way. 
On the contrary, the German banking system is free, in con- 
trast to that of France and England, to use its great powers to 
the fullest extent. All the fears born of tliis freedom have 
been proved by the experiences of the war to be entirely ground- 
less. Without this unrestricted freedom, the German banks 
could never have identified themselves with all branches of na- 
tional economic life, as they have done, and in which they have 
now attained a position of leadership. 

To begin with, they won for themselves a dominant position 
in the world of finance and capital. Compared with the power 
of the great banks with their widely distributed clientele, which 
in most cases is easily influenced, the German stock exchange has 
come to occupy a secondary position both in standing and in- 
fluence. In England the stock exchange is able to maintain its 
monopoly largely because of its activity in the floating of securi- 
ties. Not without justice has it been said that, while the great 



MODERxN GERMANY 123 

German banks make use of the stock exchange as a medium 
in promoting their new enterprises, in England it is the banks 
that are made use of by the promoters and speculators. That is 
v\hy the closing of the exchange was less keenly felt in Ger- 
many, especially as it proved easier in Berlin than in London 
and Paris to liquidate smoothly the transactions for the end of 
July. A reopening of the exchange ostensibly took place in the 
two latter countries, but under such drastic restrictions that a 
free market does not exist. Judging from the soundness and 
strength exhibited by our great banks in the war, which are 
of such paramount importance for the stock exchange, it may 
be confidently assumed that when the time comes for the reopen- 
ing of the Berlin exchange, happily freed from its old obligations, 
it will occupy a position among European exchanges not only as 
strong as before the war but even stronger, and that it will 
not fail to give proof of its innate sound condition. 

In the industrial field, also, the banks have gained a position 
of leadership. Without them, the rapid and striking develop- 
ment of our industrial production would not have been possible. 
Their concentrated financial strength guided our young and 
feeble industrial enterprises past the danger of being crushed 
out of existence by more highly developed and experienced com- 
petitors. Indeed, the banks have not only assisted individual un- 
dertakings in case of necessity or furnished them the means for 
extensions of their business — they have been mainly responsible 
for carrying the idea of comprehensive organization, which proved 
so effective in banking, into the entire sphere of industry. For 
wath its allied banks throughout all Germany, the individual 
great bank is no longer interested merely in a single undertaking 
in one branch of industry, but in several mutually competing 
undertakings. The evils which unrestricted competition in trade 
brings about are consequently felt also by the banks. Their aim, 
therefore, must be to diminish this harmful competition. Accord- 
ingly, they extend their interest in the particular undertaking 
to include all allied and mutually dependent undertakings, and 
thus become the leaders in the development of the ''cartel" sys- 
tem. They are extremely active in furthering the organization 
of our industries along cooperative lines by means of efficient 
associations.^ 

This development of our banking system, which, from dis- 
tinct private concerns, has brought forth a great body of insti- 
tutions pursuing national and cultural aims, completes the organ- 

1 A "cartel" is an agreement between industrial or commercial concerns pro- 
viding for joint action in their business policy, without otherwise destroying 
the independence of the members. — Telanslator's note. 



124 :\IODERX G£RMAx\Y 

ization of the internal forces of Germany's economic life. In 
this new setting;, the economic strength of the German people, 
which was iinalh- freed through the victorious war of 1870-71 
from the handicap of political disunion, has developed astounding 
vitality- in almost all fields. In a period of forty years strenuous 
work has thus retrieved that which had been neglected, Ger- 
many to-day is no longer a poor country. Careful estimates 
agree in showing that Germany now occupies the first position 
among European nations, not only in respect to the collective 
wealth of the people — amounting to about 310,000,000,000 
marks — but also in respect to her total yearly income, which 
represents 43,000,000,000 marks. This great change has not 
been recognized in other countries, because Germany, in con- 
trast to England and France, still continues to devote her im- 
mense savings primarily to the development of her own powers, 
and invests only a small portion of them in foreign loans. In 
the last five years, of the stock and bonds put on the market in 
England 18 per cent (38,000,000 out of 210.000,000 pounds), 
and in France 30 per cent (1.523,000,000 out of 4,914,000,000 
francs) were domestic securities;^ whereas in Germany no less 
than 85 per cent were so applied, while in 1912 only 255,000,000 
out of 2,425,000,000 marks were invested in foreign securities. 
It is on account of this sustained demand for capital within the 
country that Germany in time of peace, despite her large sav- 
ings, shows regularly a higher rate of interest in the money 
market than England and France, where industry does not con- 
tinually demand such great sums. It is only since the war that 
these conditions, which are so important for German foreign 
exchange, have begun to show signs of a readjustment. Ever 
since the month of December, 1914, when the Imperial Bank 
reduced the previous war discount rate from 6 per cent to 5 
per cent, the old established difference in the official rate of dis- 
count between Germany and England and France has disap- 
peared. And while formerly the price of the French 3 per cent 
loan was considerably higher, it is now below the price of the 
3 per cent German loan. 

The different method in the use of capital explains, further- 
more, why at the beginning of the war the German stock ex- 
change was in so much better condition than that of England, 
not to speak of France. The great economic crisis of the 
Balkan States, following in the wake of the Balkan wars (which 
were financed mainly by France) and the scarcely less severe 
crisis in Mexico, Brazil, Argentine and Canada, as well as the 
bursting of the Russian bubble, affected the money market of 



MODVAiS GKRMANY 125 

France most stronj^Iy, tliat of England in scarcely lesser decree, 
and tliat of Cjermany least of all. Germany had her capital 
undiminislied, t})erefore, for financing the war. It enabled us, 
shortly after the he^innin^ of the war, to raise a loan of a larger 
amount than the French war indemnity of 1871. 'i he subse- 
quent loans, which were twice and three times as large as the 
first, were, in part, also raised with the help of money saved 
in time of peace. But in the main their great success, which 
was a surprise to the Germans also, was due to other causes. 

Germany succeeded in making the transition from peace to 
war conditions witli unexpected ease and thoroughness. That is 
partly explained by the character of this war. Every German 
felt that it was a war of defense. Every one realized the dan- 
ger which menaced the whole, and was ready, as a part of this 
whole, to serve the nation and sacrifice himself for it. The 
moment that war had been declared, the interest of the individual 
subordinated itself to that of the state. There was no opposition 
between the state and economic interests. Everything which 
the latter had to offer was placed at the disposal of the state. 

Combined with these inner forces, which have never swayed 
a great nation in like degree and extent, external forces were 
at work creating, as if by magic, that many-sided structure of 
our new war economy. This we owed to England. For when 
the latter paralyzed our foreign trade immediately at the out- 
break of war, our economic organization of peace times to a 
very large extent became entirely useless. In many cases there 
was no choice between peace and war economy. Activity was 
only possible within the new war organization. The pressure 
of the enemy from the outside eliminated the necessity of pres- 
sure on the part of the government. Voluntary service per- 
formed what compulsion could never have accomplished to 
the same extent. 

In this way Germany was able to restore in striking manner 
in her body economic the circulation interrupted by her forcible 
exclusion from the world's commerce; while in normal times 
it pulsated throughout the whole earth, it is now limited to the 
narrow circle of national economic life. This narrowing of its 
course has resulted in accelerating the circulation. Everything 
which formerly served the countless and varied purposes of an 
export trade, amounting yearly to over 10,000,000,000 marks, 
was now enlisted in the service of the one great object of the 
country itself. Germany was no longer working for the whole 
world, but, even more devotedly and attentively than formerly, 
almost exclusively for her own needs. Thus, she accomplished 



126 MODERN GERMANY 

the great feat of freeing herself, in the main, from the old 
dependence on extensive imports and on easily exhaustible sup- 
plies, by founding her entire war economy on her own work. 
So completely has the economy of peace times been transformed 
into that of war that it is certain to-day that Germany is able 
to provide herself with adequate supplies for any length of 
time. It is true that this may not always be done as eco- 
nomically as formerly, that it is still necessary to be saving in 
many things, that numerous inconveniences must be borne by 
those who remain at home, but the times of anxious doubt are 
past. We are sure to-day that no matter how long the war 
lasts, Germany can keep it up with her own resources. The 
"isolated state" which hitherto existed only in theory has become 
a reality. 

Independence in production also means financial independence. 
Practically our entire financial strength remains in the country. 
It flows only from one hand to the other, above all in a broad 
and rapid stream from the state to the individual. As often as 
our money completes this course of inland circulation, just so 
often does it become available again for the state in the nature 
of loans. It is only a question of carefully selecting the time 
for a new loan and of preventing large parts of the stream, which 
essentially remains the same, from being withheld from the state 
by artificial means. If these precautions are taken, Germany's 
defeat cannot be caused by financial difKculties. 

If our financial troubles have been overcome, thanks to our 
"isolation," they oppress our enemies more and more from month 
to month, until to-day no state feels the financial burden of the 
war more than England. Our enemies lack the forces which 
in Germany produced a new and firmly knitted war economy. 

As far as England is concerned, from the very beginning 
a deep and serious war sentiment was lacking. It was believed 
that this was only a new, somewhat greater adventure on foreign 
soil, to be added to the list of numerous wars which England 
had waged all over the world in the course of the past few 
decades. At home the public felt itself safe. There the war 
was not regarded by all as of vital interest for the entire 
nation. On the contrary, the British drew the sword in the 
behef that they would suffer no more through the war than if 
they remained neutral, and they even endeavored to convince 
themselves that they were magnanimously entering the combat 
for Belgium and not for their own interests. Under such con- 
ditions it was not possible, even among the English people, in 
whom political instincts are probably more strongly and more 



MODERN GERMANY 127 

generally developed than in any other nation, for the interest 
of the state to take precedence over the interest of the indi- 
vidual. 

Even externally the war had but little effect at first. Trade 
with the enemy countries ceased, it is true, but otherwise all 
connections with the economy of the world remained the same 
and the seas were open for export and import. The economic 
organization of peace times was not brought to a standstill. On 
the contrary, now that important competitors had been put out 
of the way, it was a question of developing it as much as possible. 
Great advantages for the economy of the country from the war 
were expected by the people and by the government. Economic 
interests were not placed at the disposal of the state, but it was 
expected that they would be promoted by the state to a degree 
impossible in times of peace. But the matter turned out differ- 
ently than had been expected. Everywhere the demands of the 
war have been miscalculated, but nowhere so much as in Eng- 
land. More men and means were required than had been im- 
agined. This resulted in that great conflict between state and 
economy which is taking place in England to-day. It consists 
chiefly in the fact that a war organization which has not been 
voluntarily created by the nation is being forced upon it. It 
is only partly possible to conceal the coercive character of the 
measures that have to be taken. As a matter of fact, it cannot 
be doubted that the recruiting system is regarded as an un- 
welcome coercion, more so than the military service in those coun- 
tries which have for centuries been accustomed to the great idea 
of the protective and educational character of universal con- 
scription ; and as regards production, it is undeniable that the 
government of free England had to use compulsory measures in 
a manner such as has been witnessed in no other country. While 
in Germany all concerns, whether large or small, devoted them- 
selves voluntarily to the new tasks imposed by the war, many 
hundreds of factories in England had to be placed under gov- 
ernmental control in order to supply the urgent needs of the 
war. 

All of this is of added importance because England, whose 
productive power in many fields \yas not able even in time of 
peace to accomplish as much as Germany, has to provide not 
only for herself but also to a great extent for her allies. For 
France has been affected economically and financially through 
the war perhaps even more heavily than in a military sense. 
Her territory occupied by Germany contains her most highly 
developed industry, that of mining and iron, which might have 



128 MODERN GERMANY 

been best able to compensate for the prostration of her manu- 
facture of fancy goods. Of the French output of coal 68.8 per 
cent, of coke 78.3 per cent, of iron ore 90 per cent, of pig iron 
85.7 per cent, of steel 76 per cent is produced in the eight prov- 
inces of which our victorious troops have been in possession 
for over a year. Thus France is paralyzed in her industrial 
productive strength. She is in need of foreign supplies to a far 
greater degree than in time of peace. The circulation of forces 
in her economic body has been most severely disturbed. She 
is suffering constantly from heavy, depleting loss of blood. 

Similar conditions prevail in Russia. Just as England is an 
industrial and commercial state, standing in need of the products 
of foreign agriculture to a degree hitherto true of no other peo- 
ple, so Russia represents the greatest agricultural country w^hich 
the w^orld has ever seen. With the agricultural products of her 
vast territory, she pays for all the industrial products which her 
uneducated population is as yet unable to produce in sufficient 
quantity and quality. With these products she must, above all, 
meet the interest on the greatest foreign debt which any state 
has ever contracted. Russia to-day, cut off from the world, is 
unable to dispose of the great staple products of her soil. Con- 
sequently she is not only deprived of the strength to which 
was lately due, as a result of abundant crops, the satisfactory 
condition of her finance and the unmistakable improvement of 
her economic life, but she has also suffered so fundamental a 
disturbance in the circulation of her economic forces that all 
hope of cure must seem futile. Since only a strong, healthy, 
industrial state, such as Russia cannot yet claim to be, is in a 
position to conduct a modern war by its own strength, the need 
for foreign supplies felt by the Russian state and by Russian 
national economy must increase with every month of the war. 
Germany alone has proved equal to the task of cutting herself 
free, without impairment of vitality, from the world's economic 
life, with which she was so thoroughly intertwined, and of placing 
herself upon her own feet. Germany alone has been able satis- 
factorily to finance the war with her loans to the amount of 
25,500,000,000 marks. Only Germany is able, from every 
point of view, successfully to play the role of the "isolated state." 
From this fact, which was a surprise e/en to the nation itself, 
Germany may still have to draw important deductions. 

IV 

The general systematic development of domestic economic 
strength in the field of agricultural and industrial production, 



MODERN GERMANY 129 

as well as in that of money and credit, was bound to make its 
effect felt beyond the boundaries of Germany. For the great 
quantities of foodstuffs and raw material which, in times of peace, 
Germany imported from all parts of the world for her con- 
tinually growing population, had to be paid for. This could 
be done only with the products of German labor and with 
services rendered to other countries in the field of transport or 
in money and investments — that is to say, only by activity in 
those spheres of economic life in which England considered her- 
self entitled to a monopoly of the whole world. We have 
already dealt with money and capital transactions. We must now 
turn to the question of transport and commerce. 

Conditions in the field of transportation do not favor Ger- 
many. The country is blessed with a number of noble rivers, 
but while England is washed by the sea on all, and France 
on three sides, Germany has access to the great international 
highway only in the North, whither all her rivers, with the 
exception of the Danube, flow. Sea-traffic is therefore not only 
of slight importance to inland trade, but it does not play in the 
field of foreign commerce the same part as in England and 
France or the United States. But her central Continental posi- 
tion and the w^ealth of her neighbors are an advantage to Ger- 
many. She has a great Continental trade, in addition to her sea- 
borne trade. Of the 21,000,000,000 marks which represent her 
commercial transactions for 191 3, approximately 8,000,000,000 
worth was transported by land. When the sea trade is checked, 
land trade may be increased; herein lie possibilities of adjustment 
and development unknown before the war. Because of this 
land branch of her foreign trade, which has suddenly experi- 
enced an abnormal increase, Germany must organize her inland 
transportation as efficiently as possible. The same is true of that 
part of her trade which is carried on by sea; for since out 
maritime transport is confined to the short line of our North 
Sea coast, most of our import and export goods have to make 
long interior journeys. 

Up to the time that Germany determined to adopt a pro- 
tective tariff for the sake of her industries, the nations did not 
fully realize the importance of this transport question. Bis- 
marck, who carried the tariff idea to rapid victory, also accom- 
plished the nationalization of the Prussian railroads. All classes 
in Germany to-day regard this as his greatest and most beneficial 
achievement along economic lines. Many separate and poorly 
organized enterprises were brought together under one manage- 
ment, an operation which represented the first great economic 



I30 MODERN GERMANY 

consolidation and which even to-day remains the greatest that 
not only Germany but perhaps the world has ever seen. It 
offered countless possibilities of economy, and it has proved to 
be the most brilliant stroke of business that Prussia or any other 
modern state has ever done. At the same time, this nationaliza- 
tion also exercised a strong influence on our industry. In the 
first place, it had a wholesome effect on industrial competition 
by limiting it to the field of prices and cost of production, and 
by preventing it from encroaching on the field of freight rates. 
In the second place, by introducing uniformity in the gauge 
and rolling stock, it created facilities hitherto unknown in the 
transportation of bulk articles; this has vastly strengthened out 
industry in its development into big concerns and has rendered 
possible the present high degree of standardization of our products. 

As the German railway system is to-day the greatest in Europe, 
and only surpassed by that of the United States, so is the 
Prusso-Hessian railway combine the greatest single undertaking 
in the world. This is not the most important feature in German 
inland communication. As long as the German railways were in 
private hands, the development of the artificial as well as of the 
natural waterways was carried on only half-heartedly ; with gov- 
ernment ownership, hundreds of millions of marks have been ex- 
pended in creating a highly developed and closely interconnected 
system of waterways, surpassed in efficiency by no other. It is 
characteristic of German methods that recently efforts have be- 
gun to be directed towards taking the railways and waterways 
out of the field of unregulated competition and bringing them 
into a powerful union, to the end of a reduction of freight rates. 

Our shipping trade is based upon this system of interior com- 
munication, which on all frontiers extends far into the neigh- 
boring states. Proofs of our old maritime ability, as in the 
days of the Hanseatic League, have never been lacking, but the 
prohibitive features of Cromwell's Navigation Act, which with 
ruthless deliberation established England's position in mari- 
time trade, pressed heavily upon German shipping. Not 
until the revolt of the United States from England did the 
Act suffer a modification important for the Hansa cities, and 
not until 1849 was it repealed. Then, for the first time, sea- 
traffic with the coasts of the various continents was legally open 
to the Germans. But German shipping still suffered from the 
fact that it lacked a national flag, and consequently protection 
and dignity. This state of affairs was changed by the founda- 
tion of the German Empire. Not alone was the path of de- 



MODERN GERMANY 131 

velopment now open, but a strong national mainstay had been 
created. 

On this new basis German shipping gained its first great 
success in the emigration traffic. When the preponderance of 
emigration shifted from England to the Continent, the ancient 
advantages and disadvantages of the geographical position of the 
various countries underwent a complete reversal. England's in- 
sular position prevented her from finding an adequate substitute 
for the failure of her own emigrants, w^hile the German Hansa 
cities of the North Sea took deliberate advantage of their Con- 
tinental situation. Through its emigrant trade to the United 
States Bremen gained a leading position. With Hamburg, it 
succeeded, when the stream of emigrants thinned in Germany, 
in making up for the loss and even in increasing the original 
traffic by an influx from other countries. Through the merits 
of their organization, the two cities were able to retain their posi- 
tion as the greatest emigrant ports in the world, even when the 
growth of German commerce transformed the country from a 
land of emigration into one with an excess of immigration. It 
was in this field of emigrant traffic that Germany first suc- 
ceeded in securing maritime independence of England. It was 
more difficult to achieve this in the field of passenger traffic, for 
on account of her Colonial possessions and her position in inter- 
national trade, England has more cabin passengers requiring 
transportation than any other country. It was possible to gain 
a place equal to England's only by attracting a portion of the 
non-English traffic through offering the best possible accommo- 
dation. Germany succeeded in this on several of the chief ocean 
routes, as was most clearly shown perhaps in the attraction ex- 
ercised by her ships in the international tourist traffic. Thanks 
to her successes in both fields of passenger traffic, Germany has 
been enabled to gain a leading position on certain portions of 
the seas in the technically highest developed maritime branch, 
viz: the liner traffic, which is distinguished by speed and regu- 
larity of service. In the North Atlantic field Germany was 
able to win the blue ribbon, which England succeeded in re- 
capturing only by granting, contrary to German custom, a high 
government subsidy to the Cunard Line for its two vessels, the 
Mauretania and the Lusitania. 

Germany realized, however, that in order to conquer and to 
maintain in all departments of shipping a place next to England's, 
she would have to increase her competitive power to the highest 
possible degree by organizing the shipping business along the 
most rational lines. This was achieved by developing the liner 



132 MODERN GERMANY 

traffic, which was limited to fixed routes with definite ports and 
hence greatly subject to the risks of trade fluctuations, into a 
widely ramified system, in which one line helps the other. By 
this system a greater freedom of movement, and hence a greater 
degree of insusceptibility to natural and artificial crises, is gained, 
together with a far-reaching invulnerability against the effects of 
competition. In shipping as in banking, the chief impulse to 
iurther development lay in the desire to effect a counter-balance 
against local risks, and the novelty and limit placed to that de- 
velopment helped to make success possible. For while in England, 
with her older traditions, the growth of the shipping business was 
scattered, owing to her wealth in harbors and capital, German 
shipping is concentrated in two neighboring North Sea harbors, 
on whose small population it was originally, and is even to-day, 
to a great extent dependent for capital. In this field, too, Ger- 
many has achieved deliberate concentration of her strength to 
a much greater extent than England. Foreign countries can 
show no counterpart to the Hamburg-American and North Ger- 
man Lloyd Lines, with their many-sided and systematic organi- 
zation. Other countries have not developed their shipping lines 
into great coordinated systems to the same degree as Germany 
has. Nevertheless, England still enjoys a notable superiority in 
the shipping field. In tonnage of ships, she exceeds Germany 
five-fold. Wherever the dominion of the great liners ceases, and 
the task is one of carrying the great volumes of agricultural 
staple goods, which are only transported for a short period of 
the year and in extremely varying quantities, England still enjoys 
her former predominance. In the so-called trampship business, 
the most international branch of all, England continues to hold 
sway, as in scarcely any other line. 

This supremacy in the trampship business is of great im- 
portance to the ship building industry. With the change from 
wooden to iron and steel ships, the attention of builders was 
turned from lumber producing countries to those rich in iron. 
At the same time the business grew from the narrow plane of 
the small undertakings of artisans to the large scale of capitalistic 
enterprise. The system of large production, which England first 
developed, owing to the invention of the Bessemer process in the 
iron industry, was extended almost immediately into all branches 
in which iron figured largely. Since the sixties England became 
the ship-builder of the world. Even more strikingly than for 
the world's carrying trade, do her figures for ship building (65 
per cent for the period 1901 to 1910) surpass those of Germany 
(9.5 per cent) for the same period. This great superiority is 



MODERN GERMANY 133 

due, in part, to the international reputation which England has 
acquired as the possessor of the greatest navy. She was consid- 
ered the builder of the best ships. Under the influence of the 
development of our war fleet, on the one hand, and of our pas- 
senger liners, on the other, Germany has in a short space of time 
established her independence in this field of high-class construc- 
tion. Her great passenger steamers stand in the first rank, 
and her warships are inferior to those of England only in num- 
bers, not in quality. The second mainstay of England's ship- 
building is the English tramp-steamer. In contrast to passen- 
ger and war ships, the trampship is a wholesale article. Just as 
up to within a few years our machine industry was limited al- 
most entirely to individual products, so our ship-building trade 
has neglected cheap construction en masse. Energy has been 
concentrated upon the production of expensive and constantly im- 
proving individual ships. But just as our machine industry in 
recent years passed, as we have seen, through an important stage of 
standardization and then became the greatest German export 
industry, it is one of the great questions of German economic life 
whether we shall succeed in carrying the idea of production en 
masse, which is a controlling conception of to-day, into the field 
of our ship-building. Here, as in so many branches of industry, 
by placing production upon a practical and rational plane, we 
should retrieve lost opportunity and recover the flourishing state 
of the old Hansa period. 

Shipping, which can be maintained on the highest plane of 
development only when supported by eflScient ship-building, is the 
pace-maker for foreign trade. Although in relation to economic 
life in its entirety foreign trade does not play in Germany by 
any means the part it plays in England, or in France, never- 
theless its statistics reflect strikingly the general development. 
The table for international trade stands thus in millions of 
marks : 

Germany. England. France. 

1890 8,195 15,300 8,337 

1900 11,088 17,899 9,208 

1907 17,011 23,741 12,104 

1913 22,530 28,644 14,814 (1912) 

Although in 1890 England was so far in the van that, in a 
sense, she was removed from competition, Germany has gained 
considerably on England, while France has remained far behind 
both countries. The result of this development is that Ger- 
many, like the United States, increased her share of international 



134 MODERN GERMANY 

trade in the period from 1 890-1912 from 11 per cent to 12.9 
per cent, while in the same period England's share has fallen 
from 20.2 per cent to 16.6 per cent and France's from 11 per 
cent to 9 per cent. Despite this, these two countries have 
maintained their previous superiority to the extent that foreign 
trade in 191 3 in England represented 596 marks to each indi- 
vidual of the population, in France (1912) it represented 370 
marks, but in Germany only 322 marks. But the chief com- 
petitors facing each other are England and Germany. It is with 
them chiefly that we propose to deal hereafter. 

More important than the total figures are the differences in 
single lines. In import trade, in which England is still far 
ahead of Germany, raw material and foodstuffs hold first place 
in both countries. In 191 3, they formed 72.1 per cent of all 
German imports; in addition, there were 11.7 per cent of half- 
finished goods, which, like raw material, are subjected to a 
process of further manufacture, while only 13.7 per cent were 
finished goods. The first twenty items on the import list are 
raw materials, among which stand, far in the lead, cotton (607,- 
000,000 marks), wheat (417,000,000 marks), wool (412,000,- 
000 marks), barley (390,000,000 marks), copper (335,000,000 
marks), skins (321,000,000 marks). 

The twenty-first and twenty-second positions are held by agri- 
cultural products, such as butter and oil-cake, with a total value 
of 237,000,000 marks, and the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth 
by cotton and woolen yarn, both half-finished products, with 
a total value of 224,000,000 marks. There follows again a 
series of raw materials, until the first finished article of manu- 
facture is reached with machines, to the value of 80,000,000 
marks, in thirty-third place. On account of this relative unim- 
portance of manufactured imports, the two countries of tem- 
perate climate which have the most extended territory, the 
United States and Russia, compete for first position on the 
German import list. England has maintained third position 
against Austro-Hungarian competition. No independent coun- 
try takes from England so many goods as Germany; not even 
her own colonies take so much, with the exception of India. But 
even among England's exports to Germany, raw material and 
half-finished products play an important part. The first five 
positions are held by coal, herrings, and three different kinds of 
yarn. In 191 2 the value of finished goods was only 246,000,000 
marks, out of 842,000,000 marks for the whole import list. 

Of quite a different character is the German export trade, 
which in 191 3 reached the 10,000,000,000 mark, and which is 



MODERN GERMANY 135 

only 622,000,000 marks behind that of England, and 101,000,000 
marks behind that of the United States. In this list in 1913, fin- 
ished goods held the lead, with 63.3 per cent, to which was added 
1 1.3 per cent of semi-manufactured goods. All parts of the 
earth share in these exports, which consist mainly in industrial 
products. In the van stand those countries which possess great 
purchasing power, as the result of a high state of development 
or of a numerous population. England stands far in the lead. 
In 19 1 3 her imports from Germany, amounting to 1,438,000,000 
marks, far exceeded her exports thither, amounting to 876,000,000 
marks. But the great difference in the total figures of Ger- 
many's trade with England is chiefly explained by the fact that 
England was able to maintain her old commission trade by serv- 
ing her colonies with European products, and it is counterbal- 
anced in great part by the fact that the British colonies, con- 
trary to the motherland, show a greater export trade to Ger- 
many than an import trade from that country. The former 
advanced 560,000,000 marks during the ten years from 1900 to 
191 1, the latter only 140,000,000 marks. England is followed 
by Austria-Hungary (1,104,000,000 marks), Russia (880,000,- 
000 marks) and France (790,000,000 marks). Fifth position 
in Germany's export trade is held by a non-European country, 
the United States, with imports of 713,000,000 marks, as against 
exports of 1,711,000,000 marks. Germany imports more goods 
from the United States than any other country. Next rank 
again five European countries. It is obvious that the European 
countries are the most important for German export trade. In 
her export trade, too, Germany shows herself to be a European 
Continental state. All the sea coasts of the world may be 
reached with little trouble by water; in the case of transporta- 
tion by land, that one of the rivals often enjoys an advantage 
who can avoid the trans-shipping of his goods. By the geograph- 
ical position of Germany, which in this point proves an ad- 
vantage rather than the reverse, the fact may doubtless be ex- 
plained that German export trade has gained on that of Eng- 
land in Europe. For the period from 1890-19 11 it has been 
shown that in every European state, except Portugal, imports 
from Germany increased more rapidly than those from Eng- 
land. Germany is still surpassed by England in the outer circle 
of European countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, and 
Turkey, as well as France, but she is in advance of Britain in 
the other European states, although only slightly so in the inner 
circle comprising Sweden, Norway, Italy, Bulgaria, and Bel- 
gium. This advantage is marked in all her neighboring states 



136 MODERN GERMANY 

not yet cited, as well as in Russia and Serbia. Beyond the bor- 
ders of Europe, however, the picture is quite different. In the 
countries beyond the seas, Albion has maintained the penetrat- 
ing strength of her trade. England's exports show almost 
everywhere a greater increase in the years from 1890 to 191 1 
than Germany's; only Mexico, San Domingo, and Guatemala, 
in addition to the German colonies, are exceptions. 

The German export trade, which is thus distributed over 
the different countries according to a kind of natural law, is 
made up of an extraordinary variety of goods, and consists mainly 
of finished products. Aside from pit coal, coke, grain and kali, 
it shows no such bulk articles as the import trade. For her 
machines and iron-ware, which occupy the leading position, in- 
clude innumerable separate classes. This versatility may be con- 
sidered a German peculiarity. England has among her expprts 
bulk articles also. These are the products of her textile in- 
dustry, which at the time of the founding of the German Em- 
pire formed fully one-half- of the English export list, and still 
to-day make up nearly two-fifths of it. Since the Germans did 
not appear until late in the markets of the world, and lacked 
such great staple articles, they were forced to interest themselves 
in that medley of goods which the English — at first contemptu- 
ously, then enviously — styled ''German articles," ''German nick- 
nacks," or "muck and truck trade." This multifariousness vests 
the German export trade with that adaptability which distin- 
guishes it and which has made the German overseas merchant 
the experienced, resourceful and energetic man whom every one 
fears as a competitor. The trade in the great staple articles 
known as Manchester goods is, on the contrary, carried on along 
smooth, well-beaten tracks, in which there is slight opportunity 
for gaining new experience. It represents, furthermore, that 
branch of modern factory industry which may be most easily 
taken up in new industrial countries. Here again original ad- 
vantages have been transformed into disadvantages and vice 
versa. This is not due in any way to improper competition, but 
is the natural result of progressive development. 

England has had to suffer under the pressure of this develop- 
ment resulting from natural conditions, not alone in neutral 
markets but even in her own. English imports from Ger- 
many in 19 1 2 were 69 per cent finished articles, while the 
German imports from England showed only 29 per cent of such 
goods. At the start it was believed in England that these in- 
dustrial imports were the result of an inferior competition based 
on starvation wages and contemptible practices. They desired 



MODERN GERMANY 137 

to protect their own well-developed, high-quality industry against 
the undesirable intruder. As a consequence, there was passed 
the British Trade Marks Act of August 23, 1887, which re- 
quired the country of origin to be stamped on all imported 
goods. The stamp "made in Germany," it was intended, should 
become a mark of inferiority for all German goods. As a matter 
of fact, it has become a testimonial to German ability. It 
showed the world, to its surprise, that German goods were no 
longer by any means "cheap and nasty," as they were still called 
at the Philadelphia Centennial Exhibition in 1876, and it served 
as an unintentional English advertisement of German industry. 

When it w^as seen that a mistake had been made, there was 
a shift from the attack on foreign "truck" to an attack on for- 
eign products of quality. The Patent Act of 1907 increased for 
a foreigner the difficulties in securing a patent. Any patent may 
be cancelled if the greater part of the goods are manufactured 
abroad. In this way, protection for many German inventions 
is prevented, or else German patent-holders are forced to sur- 
render the rights to Englishmen or to build factories in England. 
But this weapon also turns against those who have forged it. 
For the patent law injures the English intermediate trade by 
forcing the foreigner to ask himself whether a particular product 
is intended for use in England, or only for passage through that 
country. 

At the same time an effort was made to protect the monopoly 
in high-class English manufactures by organizing a campaign of 
vilification against German products. The entire English press 
throughout the world was impressed into this contemptible serv- 
ice. The limit, which it would be difficult to surpass in times 
of peace, was reached by Eastern Engineering, a monthly maga- 
zine founded in 191 2 by the British Engineers Association for 
China. 

This campaign is still going on, in war time, only with height- 
ened wantonness. The campaign of defamation is assuming the 
gigantic proportions of the modern war en masse. The restric- 
tions placed on patents are developing into patent-robbery, at 
least temporarily; the efforts toward tariff protection, started 
by Chamberlain, are finding their realization in the prohibition 
against "trading with the enemy," which applies not only to 
entering Into future obligations, but to carrying out those already 
assumed. The competition in the shipping trade in times of 
peace, for which the British state granted subsidies of hitherto 
unheard-of amounts, is now becoming piracy; England had long 



138 MODERN GERMANY 

prepared for this by stubbornly blocking all progress in inter- 
national law regarding naval warfare. 

But war is "the continuation of politics, only with other 
means." It was reserved for England, whose policy was al- 
ways strongly influenced by economic considerations, to carry 
the war spirit into all branches of economic life, with a coarse 
brutality such as mankind has not yet seen. What had long been 
regarded as a universally accepted attainment of civilization in 
regard to warfare is trodden under foot by England, without 
regard to the future, and her opponents thereby find themselves 
forced to measures of retaliation. The rules which were gal- 
lantly observed forty-five years ago in the war between Germany 
and France are throw^n to the winds by England, who brutalizes 
and embitters warfare. The war is systematically extended to 
the peaceful civil population, and private property is seized, not 
alone at sea but even on land. 

Complaints had long been heard over the "inevitable Ger- 
man." Now the hour had struck to get rid of the diligent rival. 
Immediately with the outbreak of hostilities, all male German 
and Austro-Hungarian citizens between the ages of seventeen 
and fifty-five were cooped up both in England and her colonies 
in concentration camps, first invented by the English in the 
South African War. Regard for public opinion seems to have 
led to certain modifications in the motherland, but the policy of 
force was allowed full rein in the Crown Colonies, which are 
under the Colonial Secretary, not under Parhament — this, not- 
withstanding the fact that in this case the fear of spies could 
not be offered as an excuse, and the common interest of the 
whites suggested caution. In Hongkong the Germans were even 
imprisoned in Chinese prisons, despite the protest of the British 
Governor, who replied to the order by resigning his position. 

Together with the elimination of these dangerous individuals, 
began the destruction of that which they had created by cease- 
less work. Wherever the Germans were most successful the 
English proceeded to enforce liquidation of their affairs. The 
spirit which ruled this procedure is indicated clearly in The Alien 
Enemies' (Winding Up) Ordinance, which was promulgated on 
December 7, 19 14, in the Straits Settlements and in Further 
India. It decrees not alone that enemy firms — even those stock 
companies entered according to British law whose shareholders 
are at least two-thirds foreigners^ — are to be forcibly liquidated, 
at the cost of a commission of 2^/^ per cent; but, following liqui- 
dation, all books, letters and vouchers, accounts and documents, 
together even with the statement of the liquidator, may be de- 



MODERN GERMANY 139 

stroyed. The president of the Bremen Chamber of Commerce 
expressed the feelings of the whole German nation when he char- 
acterized this measure, taken in the name of the King of Eng- 
land, as ''the worst warping of justice that has occurred since 
the existence of civilization"; he adds that the British state has 
thereby illustrated "the downfall of all governmental order." 

The English, however, look to time for the principal gain 
in their economic life. This viewpoint finds expression, with' 
classical brevity, in The London Times of December 11, 1914, 
in the following words: 

"From a British manufacturer's point of view, the longer the 
war continues the better for British industries. We may feel 
the pinch at present, but years hence we shall get the benefit. 
Every German firm in British Colonies, which has been eating 
into the very vitals of the British manufacturer and operatives, 
will be ruined. If we had had a larger military force to rush 
into the field and subdue Germany at the start, the effects would 
not have been so far-reaching." 

It was in the same spirit that Sir Edward Grey, on August 
3, 1914, in justification of the British declaration of war, made 
the following statement, the cold-blooded calculation of which 
aroused the indignation of the German people, fighting for its 
most sacred possessions: 

"For us, with a powerful fleet which we believe able to 
protect our commerce and to protect our shores and to protect 
our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little 
more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside." 

One cannot expect from the mouth of a diplomat the cynical 
frankness which characterized the British Admiral Monk, when 
he gave utterance to the famous words: 

"What matters this or that reason? What we w^ant is more 
of the trade which the Dutch now have." 

In The United Service Institution for 1909, in the prize essay 
of a British naval officer on England's wars, the writer sums up 
the results of his investigation in the following equally frank 
soldierly declaration : 

"We give all sorts of reasons for w^ar, but at the bottom 
of them all is commerce." 

In expectation of the war now raging. The Saturday 
Review made, as early as 1897, this statement, which has often 
been repeated in milder form by British newspapers in all parts 
of the world: 

"If Germany were extinguished to-morrow, the day after 
to-morrow there is not an Englishman in the world who would 



I40 MODERN GERMANY 

not be richer. Nations have fought for years over a city or a 
right of succession; must they not fight for 250,000,000 pounds 
of yearly commerce?" 

If not the whole truth, still a great degree of truth is con- 
tained in this statement of an American newspaper: 

''This war was not made in Germany, but 'made in Germany' 
is the cause of it." 

Events, however, have already disappointed the great hopes, 
and especially the business calculations, of Sir Edward Grey. 
Englishmen will learn that there are higher forces in national 
life than cold-blooded desire for gain. As the development of 
German commercial strength in production and trade was not 
the result of frivolity and arbitrariness, or even of hostility to 
the English — an attitude foreign to our people, with few ex- 
ceptions — but springs of necessity from natural forces which can- 
not be eliminated, in like manner war cannot bring victory to 
backwardness over progress. It can destroy the careful but anti- 
quated work of previous generations, but not the forces of prog- 
ress, rich in promise for the future, which created this work. The 
longing of the German people is only to gain a freer field for the 
exercise of the powers given to them by God, for their own 
benefit as well as for the benefit of mankind. As surely as 
Napoleonic plans of world-conquest are foreign to the soul 
of the nation, just so surely will that longing remain alive in 
it while the earth bears German men. For this reason the 
war appears to the German people as a war of freedom. It is 
aimed against Russia's Pan-Slavic plans of conquest on the 
European-Asiatic Continent, and against England's rule of the 
sea. It aims at a balance of power, not alone on the European 
Continent to the advantage of a clever outsider, but likewise 
upon the ocean. In this fight for the equality of the nations, 
Germany feels herself to be the protagonist of civilized mankind. 
And thanks to her scientific training and strength of organiza- 
tion, she will win mankind's gratitude, as soon as the mists of 
defamation have cleared away and freedom has been achieved for 
^he judgment of the nations. 



CHAPTER IV 
GERMANY'S COLONIAL POLICY 

DR. WILLIAM SOLF, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE 
COLONIES 

THIS article is no apology, no excuse for our having colonies, 
and no explanation why we have them. Germany has 
colonies because she wished to, and had to have them. We 
know that we have obtained all of our colonies in a legal manner 
and have not stolen them, and we are responsible to ourselves 
and to no foreign power for the existence of our colonial posses- 
sions. If I have determined to prepare a contribution for the 
purposes of the present book dealing with Germany's colonial 
policy, it is done with the well-considered intention of showing, 
by means of an analysis of the spirit of our colonial administra- 
tion, how far Germany's colonial policy is from being "mili- 
taristic," in the sense In which that adjective is used by our ene- 
mies. 

Our enemies are not clear in regard to the fundamental fact 
that that which is called "militarism" stands in close Interrela- 
tionship w^ith the geographical, economic and general political 
foundations on which a modern state develops. They ignore the 
fact that in every modern centralized state, which from the inter- 
play of Its geographical, commercial and political factors is im- 
pelled to form a standing army, the spirit of militarism exists 
and everywhere takes on the same or similar forms of activity. 

Although in the birth of German militarism in Prussia, the 
same factors were originally active as in other countries with 
standing armies, nevertheless certain special factors of local geo- 
graphical and national-ethical nature gave it a particular stamp. 
The principal element in this differentiation was that of bitter 
necessity — the position of small and poor Prussia, surrounded by 
mighty and rich neighbors, w^ho obstructed and rendered diffi- 
cult, as much as possible, her rise and existence. The dira 
necessitasj or "holy necessity," made the concentration of all 
powers imperative, and left no chance for a costly policy of 
force and prestige. Necessity drove the Prussian rulers to a 
stronger centralization of their state, to the creation of a bu- 
reaucracy w^hich treated the inadequate supplies of the public 
treasury with the care accorded to the "Arc of the Covenant." 

141 



142 MODERN GERMANY 

Necessity has been the great teacher and disciplinarian of the 
Prussian state, on the throne, In the army, among the employees 
of the Civil Service, and In all ranks of the people; It created 
that laconic, reserved, but wiry and persevering Prussian type. 

The Prussian state Is Indeed like the woolen shirt, which irri- 
tates but furnishes warmth; It was forced to assume rough and 
harsh characteristics, created by bitter necessity. In constant 
pitiless discipline and fulfillment of duty, the people and their 
princes became great; the state remained long deprived of all 
that makes life rich, joyous and beautiful. The peculiar marks 
of militarism which gave Prussia her Individuality remain with 
her to-day, for the reason that the prerequisites for the existence 
of Germany as a state are more and more found to be the same 
as those which were once the deciding factors for Prussia. 

While other countries, as the result of a more fortunate geo- 
graphical position, were able more easily to regulate their gov- 
ernmental, military and economic needs and Institutions, ''holy 
necessity" — the present time proves this once again — remained 
the indispensable teacher and long familiar disciplinarian for 
Prussia, lying as she does at the centre of Europe, protected 
for long distances by no natural boundaries and surrounded by 
jealous enemies. ^'Tou jours en vedette'' may serve as a motto, 
not alone for Prussia but also for the whole German Empire, 
which has only of recent years approached a condition of af- 
fluence. The whole German nation is to-day filled with the 
same spirit which first rendered Prussia great and unconquer- 
able. 

The tactics of our enemies In accusing us of militarism are as 
unjust as they are foolish. They misunderstand entirely the 
peculiar bases of our young empire. Were Germany free to 
act and move in the same manner as other states have long been 
able to do — most of which have for centuries enjoyed political 
and territorial union — she would perhaps have rid herself of 
many characteristics which have been the result of her develop- 
ment during a period of great stress. 

We see that In ''New Germany." We thought in our col- 
onies to gain the freedom of development denied us In the 
Fatherland. In her colonies Germany did not reckon with 
foreign foes, did not contemplate the conquest of her possessions 
by European Powers. Trusting In the solidarity of interests of 
the white race, and supported by the provisions and spirit of 
the Congo Act, the military protection of our colonies was 
slight, and Intended principally for the preservation of peace 
and order among the natives, and for the suppression of the 



MODERN GERMANY 143 

slave-trade. Such were the legally limited tasks of our defence 
and police troops. In all the colonies of Africa and in the South 
Seas the German government introduced at many points dif- 
ferent and freer rules in the field of administration and military 
control, as well as in economic life, in trade and traffic, in rail- 
road management, in agriculture, etc., than was possible at 
home. In none of our colonies is there a military administra- 
tion. Were militarism the idol of Germans, and did Germans 
really possess the war-like characteristics and piratical instincts 
attributed to them, our colonies would inevitably furnish proof 
of the fact, and a welcome arena would be seen in them for this 
supposed soldierly brutality and love of fighting. The fact that 
this is not so, that we have introduced a civil and peaceful form 
of government and have not transplanted the restraints and 
limitations historically necessary for Germany into these new 
fields of our administrative activity — that, taken all in all, we 
have developed a freer spirit in them — this appears truly re- 
markable. It shows the real spirit of the German nature and 
policy as it manifests itself when free from foreign enemies, from 
belligerent neighbors and ''holy necessity," and as it would 
everywhere and universally manifest itself were this possible. 

The history of the conception of colonial aspirations in Ger- 
many and of its slow, gradual development shows that no am- 
bitious impulse for great deeds, no prompting of a sudden whim 
or passing ill-humor, no desire for an increase of power prompted 
the German government to enter upon the thorny path of an 
active colonial policy. Formerly this was freely acknowledged, 
even in the camp of our present enemies, who are now actively 
engaged in taking possession of our colonies. Prince Bismarck 
was finally brought to abandon his views against the acquisition 
of distant colonies by the bitter experiences which Germans suf- 
fered at the hands of the "impartial" and ''just" British colonial 
administration in the Fiji Islands, in their ten-year struggle for 
lawfully acquired land titles and monetary claims. For a 
long time it was his sincere desire to be guided in all ques- 
tions of maritime and commercial importance by the assump- 
tion of the identity of German and British interests. But the 
effect of the annexation of the Fiji Islands by England in the 
year 1874 upon the trade and plantation undertakings of Ger- 
mans settled there showed Bismarck clearly that England was 
ready to go hand in hand with Germany in the introduction 
of freedom in trade and commerce only so far as she herself 
was able to gain by this partnership. These experiences were 
the main factor in forcing Bismarck to the conviction that Ger- 



144 MODERN GERMANY 

man interests overseas were in need of a more thorough protec- 
tion than could be expected from England, friendly, it is true, 
but selfish and under certain circumstances given to acting ruth- 
lessly against foreign interests. With other colonial powers we 
had had even worse experiences. 

Long enough had the arbiter of the destiny of the young 
German Empire postponed Germany's entrance into the ranks 
of the colonial powers, for fear of the dissipation of its energies 
so urgently needed for internal strengthening. Had the spirit 
of German trade and enterprise in foreign colonies enjoyed 
protection and equal opportunity, had the expectation been justi- 
fied that the colonial territories as yet unappropriated would 
remain open to international commerce, German policy would 
perhaps never have taken this step. Its ultimate necessity 
was the result of bitter experiences. The care and responsi- 
bility for the future of the German nation, rapidly growing in 
numbers and in economic power, forced the government to place 
under the protection of the German flag a portion of the still 
unappropriated lands in Africa and in the South Seas. As these 
were territories whose position had hitherto not seemed desir- 
able to the older colonial powers, it might have been expected 
that the recognition of the German occupation would have met 
with recognition by the other powers without friction. For 
Germany was most careful, in this connection, to avoid encroach- 
ment on existing rights or interests. 

The reverse was the case. Innumerable obstacles were placed 
in the way of Germany's claims to new land. Step by step we 
were forced to contend with the jealousy and malevolence of 
neighboring colonial powers. Attempts were made by every 
means to block German colonial plans and to diminish the Ger- 
man colonial territory. The other colonial powers had orig- 
inally confined themselves to occupation of the unclaimed coastal 
districts of the African Continent, but after the birth of the con- 
ception of the colonial "hinterland" there began keen competition 
in the expansion of colonial possessions from the coast into the 
interior of Africa. France especially sought at this point to cur- 
tail our West African colonies, by despatching numerous military 
missions and by the manufacture of legal claims. In the years 
1898 and 1899, French colonial agents in Dahomey, basing their 
claims on a wrong longitudinal calculation, occupied a stretch of 
land of two thousand square kilometers, to the injury of the neigh- 
boring Togo Land. Negotiations covering sixteen years, fre- 
quently most delicate but always conducted on the German side 
with the greatest patience and long-sufFering, were necessary with 



MODERN GERMANY 145 

the French government, as well as new and expensive boundary 
expeditions, in order to convince the latter government of the 
incorrect work of its former commissioners and to uphold the 
German treaty rights at this boundary. 

So difficult was it made for Germany to come to a definite 
understanding with her colonial neighbors regarding her boun- 
daries that even to-day, after a complete generation, the boun- 
dary lines of the German protectorate have not yet everywhere 
been finally regulated and settled. Mountains of documents 
have been written and oceans of ink spilled in this connection. 
The French colonial administration has at all times shown itself 
notably lacking in the spirit of conciliation and broad-minded- 
ness in questions of boundary regulation. 

The responsible leaders of Germany's policy have missed no 
opportunity to emphasize how much they valued the preserva- 
tion of pleasant relations with their colonial neighbors, espe- 
cially with England, and that these pleasant relations should 
not be disturbed by differences in colonial matters. In the 
report concerning the motives for the German-English under- 
standing of July I, 1890 (the so-called Zanzibar Agreement), 
these words occur: "The thought is not to be entertained of 
being forced into a rupture with England on account of a colo- 
nial dispute. It is not to be doubted that our colonial posses- 
sions are materially too unimportant to balance the disadvan- 
tages of a war which would deeply affect the prosperity of both 
parties. Not alone is actual warfare to be avoided, but alienation 
of the nations, embittering of feeling in wide circles and diplo- 
matic feuds on account of these possessions can not be counte- 
nanced. We desire urgently to maintain in the future our former 
cordial relations with England." 

On December 11, 1894, the Imperial Chancellor, Prince 
Hohenlohe, explained to the Reichstag the guiding motives of 
Germany's colonial policy. They were, he said, partly of an 
economic, partly of a national, and partly of an ideal and re- 
ligious nature, the latter in respect to the campaign against the 
disgraceful slave-trade and the support of the missions. He 
closed with the warning that, with due regard for all foreign 
rights, the maintenance of our colonial possessions was demanded 
by our national honor and was an outward sign of our national 
prestige which we would stand ready to defend. 

On February 13, 1896, Herr von Marschall, Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs, said in the Reichstag: 

"It is not the German fashion to seek quarrels or to cause 
trouble or to attack others' rights. We are always ready, and 



146 MODERN GERMANY 

have given proof of it to England, to respect the rights and In- 
terests of others. We are most w^illing on this basis to stand In 
close relationship w^ith all nations. But this Is on the assump- 
tion that our consideration of others Is founded upon a full 
measure of reciprocity." 

On December 14, 1895, the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Bil- 
low^, declared that by * world policy" he understood simply "that 
In the field of commerce, Industry and shipping we demand the 
same consideration as all other countries, and that w^e intend to 
stand upon a footing of equality vulth the vv^hole w^orld." Again, 
on November 14, 1906, he said that It v^^as his aim so to conduct 
a w^Ise, w^ell-considered and deliberately moderate world policy 
that the safety of the German people might not be endangered 
and the future of the nation not compromised. 

But on no occasion have the true aims and the unselfishness 
of the German colonial policy been shown in a clearer light 
than In our attitude toward the colonial plans of King Leo- 
pold II of Belgium. Prince Bismarck, from the start, did every- 
thing in his power to further them. His bridal present to the 
young Congo State was Catanga, rich In copper and to-day 
the pearl of the Belgian colonial possessions. Two German ex- 
plorers at that time had just proclaimed Its economic Impor- 
tance. To secure a large free trade zone In Central Africa 
appeared to Bismarck almost as desirable as the acquisition of 
colonies of our own. But how little the Belgian King acted in 
accordance with the spirit and aims of the Congo Act of the year 
1885! What bitter struggles and material sacrifices Belgium 
was compelled to make in order to recover from the selfish mo- 
nopolistic policy of Leopold's period in the Belgian Congo! 

With justice the geographer, Dr. Supan, declared that no 
colonial policy had ever been so inspired by the spirit of peace 
and respect for the rights of others as the German. 

Even Gladstone saw himself compelled in the British Parlia- 
ment, In 1885, In view of the moderate attitude of the German 
government, to Invoke the blessing of heaven upon Germany's 
colonial aspirations, and to welcome her as England's friend 
and colleague for the blessing of mankind, and to declare: 

*'I welcome her entrance Into this field of action and shall 
be delighted for her to become our associate In spreading light 
and civilization In poorly civilized territories. In this work she 
will encounter our most heartfelt and best wishes and every 
encouragement which lies In our power." 

Many misunderstandings would perhaps have been avoided 
had the planless division of Africa in the 8o's of the last cen- 



MODERN GERMANY 147 

tury, dictated by various outw^ard circumstances, been more 
organically regulated by mutual understanding and considera- 
tion of the interested states. Proposals were frequently made 
looking to a consolidation and re-grouping, especially of the 
German and English colonial possessions in Africa, and aiming 
at a simphfication of their administration. Unfortunately these 
efforts were made at a time when in the colonies in question, 
through private and governmental activity, so many interests 
of various kinds had been created that a peaceful territorial 
adjustment or exchange could not but seem impracticable, even 
with the best intentions. The right moment for the regula- 
tion of European possessions in Africa on a natural basis had 
been irrevocably neglected. 

One might, however, have expected that with the outbreak 
of the present war the interested Powers would have remem- 
bered Article 11 of the Congo Act of February 26, 1885. 
This article binds the parties to the Congo Act, in case one 
of the Powers exercising rights of sovereignty in the Congo 
Basin should be involved in a war, to lend their good offices, 
in order that, at the request of the state in question, the dis- 
puted territory be placed during the war under the rule of 
neutrality. This wise and humane provision had been in- 
cluded in the Congo Act at the special initiative of the United 
States of America. One of that country's delegates, Mr. Kasson, 
had, in an exhaustive and convincing exposition, shown what 
terrible atrocities had resulted from involving the Indian tribes 
in the military complications of the European states which 
possessed colonies in North America in the eighteenth century. 
The repetition of such unfortunate happenings should, he 
said, be avoided in the Congo Basin. Efforts should be made 
to prevent, in case of war, the arousing of the passions of the 
Central African tribes, already by nature inclined to pillage 
and plunder, so that the work of incipient civilization and the 
entire success of the missionaries might not be destroyed at one 
blow. 

On the German side, immediately following the outbreak of 
hostilities, the necessary steps were taken to bring about, 
through the intervention of the United States, the neutralization 
of that part of the Cameroons belonging to the Congo Basin, 
covered by the convention, as well as of German East Africa. 
A similar effort was made also by Belgium, as shown by the 
Belgian Gray Book; France was at the start inclined to agree 
to the proposition; later, however, under the influence of Eng- 
land, who openly declared it necessary to injure Germany 



148 MODERN GERMANY 

at all possible points, she rejected the proposal, in union with 
Great Britain. As the reason for the rejection, it was declared 
that Germany was the one who had started the opening of 
hostilities in Africa. 

According to all available reports, however, it stands estab- 
lished that in East Africa, as well as in the Cameroons, hos- 
tilities were begun by the Allies. Particularly in the Cameroon 
portion of the Congo Basin, the German stations at the begin- 
ning of the crisis were cut off from all news from Europe, 
and in many cases were surprised by the enemy forces. But 
even in the event that later searching investigation should prove 
that in individual cases these conflicts had been precipitated 
by subordinate German representatives, unfamiliar with the 
Congo Act, there would still have been time according to the 
wording of Article 1 1 , had there been the proper desire, to inter- 
vene and disregard an isolated incident. 

Germany fulfilled her duty by working for the peace of 
Africa, despite the fact that the only information which reached 
her was of attacks by English ships in German East Africa. As 
is shown by the Belgian Gray Book, with almost cynical frank- 
ness, England and France did not themselves take their officially 
offered grounds of refusal very seriously. These were nothing 
more than masks for their true intentions of violence. 

The opening of hostilities on Colonial soil reawakened all 
those instincts and inclinations which it has been the earnest 
endeavor during recent years to restrain among the natives by 
peaceful training, and gradually to eliminate altogether. This 
cannot fail to undermine seriously faith in Europeans as the 
representatives and imparters of "civiHzation." All previous 
achievements in the opening up of Africa and the elevation of 
its population have been wiped out at one blow. The un- 
counted millions expended by Christian missionary work in 
Central Africa have been spent in vain. The action of the 
English and French toward the German civil population in 
the protectorates, contrary to international law and all colonial 
tradition, has thoroughly undermined the position of the white 
race. 

Upon England and France, then, rests the full responsibility 
in the judgment of history for the disastrous violation of the 
Congo Act, which, but a short while ago, would have been 
considered unthinkable. 

The general administration of the German colonies has fre- 
quently been characterized by foreign critics as military and 
bureaucratic. This criticism is unfounded. A military admin- 



MODERN GERMANY 149 

istratlon exists nowhere in the German protectorates; civil 
administration has been introduced everywhere in such a way 
that the troops are subject to the governor, and the latter again 
to the Colonial Secretary, as the representative of the Imperial 
Chancellor in the field of Colonial Administration. This is 
not universally the case in foreign countries; a great part of 
the troops in the French colonies, including the Foreign Legion, 
is directly responsible to the war ministry at Paris, which in 
West Africa has even introduced universal conscription. One 
might here more justly speak of militarism than in regard to 
our system, since under our administration in Togo Land and 
the South Seas there are no colonial troops at all, and but few 
in the other colonies. 

The charge of bureaucracy, which has also frequently been 
made in Germany, has been answered by a report (191 3) 
regarding the administration of the European colonial states. 
Extensive investigations have shown that the number of officials 
in the German colonies was by no means excessive, that they 
were even fewer than in most of the colonies of other countries. 
A comparison of the budget appropriations for the officials of 
tropical colonies demonstrates that the German protectorates in 
Africa have lower expenses for the administrative staff than most 
of the neighboring English, French, Belgian and Portuguese col- 
onies. Equally incorrect is the statement that bureaucracy in 
the German colonial administration excludes the people from 
a share in it. In no other colonial state in the world is, for 
instance, the home administration of the colonies subject to 
so extensive control through Parliament, as in Germany. But 
likewise, in the colonies themselves, the people's representatives 
organized in the governmental council have not less influence 
than in the tropical colonies of like development of other colonial 
powers. This is true to an even higher degree of the representa- 
tive body in our only settlement colony, South West Africa. 
With the progress of the financial independence of the colonies 
from the mother country, self-government will increase in scope. 
This principle has repeatedly been announced by the central ad- 
ministration. 

Like the general administration, the financial management 
in the German colonies is thoroughly liberal. The greatest 
publicity, the most punctilious accounting and the strictest con- 
trol on the part of the financial authorities of the Empire and 
of Parliament prevent all exploitation and inhuman tendencies 
in the financial administration of the colonies. 

There is in our colonies no special taxation of foreigners, 



150 MODERN GERMANY 

no deviation from the principle of equality and justice. Only 
in the case of the missions are certain privileges granted. 

One of the principal sources of Income is from the customs 
duties, w^hich are laid in the main upon articles of luxury or 
such other goods that can be dispensed with or that may be 
replaced — seldom or never on those needed for the increase of 
production, such as machines, utensils, etc. Owing to the fact 
that revenue is chiefly based on the customs, it is possible in 
the German colonies to keep those taxes low by means of which, 
in other colonies, the raising of the revenue is shifted entirely, 
or in great part, on to the shoulders of the natives. While, of 
course, fully realizing the educational value of the tax for the 
natives, the German government believes that it should be 
increased gradually, according to the natives' understanding 
of the nature of taxation and with consideration for their eco- 
nomic strength. 

The financial administration of the German colonies has also 
refrained from imposing taxes on articles of consumption, in 
addition to the import duties, a system which has been developed 
in the colonies of countries in which discriminations In the im- 
port tariff in favor of the motherland cause a shortage in the 
customs revenue. Such consumption taxes have mostly the pur- 
pose of placing the burdens of the colonial administration upon 
the natives. 

These principles which, after some years of hesitation and 
uncertainty, are at present universally applied throughout the 
German colonies, have had the pleasing result that the native 
population gradually has developed not only peaceful coopera- 
tion but absolute confidence in the administration, while the 
economic situation and state of civilization have advanced every- 
where in the most favorable manner. The financial sacrifices 
which were necessary for a considerable time were not made 
in vain, and the liberal and lenient methods applied in the* 
financial administration have been so far from preventing a 
favorable economic development that to-day Togo Land and 
Samoa are able to meet all their expenses, while the three great 
African colonies meet all those of the civil administration, only 
New Guinea receiving a subsidy for general administrative 
purposes. 

The economic colonial policy of Germany is filled with the 
same spirit of humanity and inspired with the same liberal 
ideas that distinguish the other branches of her colonial policy, 
especially that In regard to social matters, which stand in such 
close connection with those of an economic nature. Wher- 



MODERN GERMANY 151 

ever the contrary is asserted abroad, there is an absence of 
facts to serve as proof. It is true that occasionally some German 
writer or politician is cited to testify to the correctness of 
such false statements. For example, Meynier, the French 
writer on colonial subjects, refers to a German colonial poli- 
tician entirely unknown in Germany, *'Carl Otto," who is said 
to advocate economic exploitation of the colonies, without re- 
gard for the natives. On the strength of the authority quoted 
by Meynier, the respected French colonial magazine, La 
Depeche Coloniale, believes itself justified in writing: "Uon 
appliqua sans Jiiesure la politique de la colonisation a la maniere 
forte/' Thus simply by substituting the word 'Ton' for 
"Otto," the German Government is held up as the representa- 
tive of principles in its colonial policy which are not only illiberal, 
but actually detestable. 

Every chapter of this book shows how little the German 
colonial policy is inclined, in its care for the welfare of the 
natives, to the principles of colonization a la maniere forte, 
and how determined it is in its resistance to all contrary de- 
sires. This policy ''a la maniere forte'' has been entirely absent 
from Germany's general economic policy of colonial adminis- 
tration, although in this field opposing desires and interests 
were not lacking. These measures, based on force, belong 
to the arsenal of the old Mercantilism, which has recently re- 
appeared under the name of the New Mercantilism. Their 
aim is to exploit the colonies exclusively from the standpoint 
of their financial usefulness to the motherland, with disregard 
of the welfare of the colonies themselves, and with the greatest 
possible exclusion of other countries from remunerative under- 
takings in them. Such a policy tends to the most ruthless ex- 
ploiting of the natural resources and of the strength of the 
natives, by means of monopolies, differential tariffs toward 
foreign countries, and bounties for the motherland. Although 
these measures are no longer employed in the same brutal 
manner as in the palmy days of Mercantilism, nevertheless 
colonization a la maniere forte is being tentatively put forth 
by this Neo-Mercantilism in the field of international eco- 
nomics. Germany has not followed this current in her colonial 
economic policy, although nearly all the colonial Powers mani- 
fest an inclination to readjust their economic policy from this 
point of view. Germany has remained consistently faithful in 
her protectorates to the principles of free trade and the open 
door, of international competition on an equal footing and of 
industrial freedom of trade and residence. Likewise, monopo- 



152 MODERN GERMANY 

lies and concessions tending to check economic development 
have been recently refused by the German colonial administra- 
tion, which, indeed, has sought to set aside those already 
existing. 

Germany is the only colonial state, except Holland, that 
has not favored her ow^n trade either in the tarifif lav^s of the 
motherland or in those of her colonies. France has assimilated 
Algeria and a portion of her colonies from the point of view of 
customs. She regards them almost completely as within her tariff 
boundaries, w^hich fact gives French commerce the advantage over 
that of other nations trading w^ith these colonies. In regard to 
her other colonies France has introduced preferential tariffs favor- 
ing the motherland, and reciprocally the colonies, which amount 
to as much as 85 per cent of the normal duties. In Tunis, 
likewise, France has favored her own trade in important lines, 
such as grain, by admitting them free of duty when carried 
in French bottoms. Portugal has introduced discriminating 
customs rates up to 90 per cent of the regular tariff in favor of- 
her own colonial shipping. Spain has acted similarly. England 
also enjoys tariff advantages as high as 33 per cent of the normal 
rate in her self-governing colonies. She has in this manner 
secured for British industry a market which, without this 
preference, she would not have been able to maintain to the 
same degree. Likewise, the United States has to a large extent 
assimilated its colonies in customs matters. Belgium has, it is 
true, no preferential tariff, but by means of her extensive system 
of concessions she has practically precluded the competition of 
other states and secured a monopoly in the trade w^ith her own 
colonies. 

Further measures for the benefit of the motherland in its 
relation to the colonies are shipping subsidies without correspond- 
ing return, rebates of charges made to national trade (as in 
the Suez Canal) as well as export duties on goods not intended 
for the motherland. In the French colonies the export duties 
are entirely or partially remitted for goods bound for France. 
In Further India the export trade with France is quite free 
from duty; in other colonies it is reduced 50 per cent. If the 
goods are from the plantations of Frenchmen they are wholly 
or in part relieved of export duty. Cocoa pays in St. Thome an 
export duty of eighteen reis per kilo when exported in Portu- 
guese ships, but sixty rets per kilo when shipped in foreign bot- 
toms and bound for foreign ports. 

German economic policy practices none of these measures 
in favor of Germany's own colonial trade. The few export 



MODERN GERMANY 153 

duties on the products of the German colonies are entirely of 
a fiscal or protective character, and not for the purpose of 
discriminating to the advantage of the motherland. This almost 
unique adoption of the principles of free trade in the German 
colonies has occasionally resulted in hardships vv^hich have 
been publicly aired in Germany. It is sufficient to mention 
the fact that important classes of products from the German 
colonies do not find a market in Germany, although they are 
badly needed there and have therefore to be imported from 
other countries. Thus, in the absence of any preferential regu- 
lations, the following articles do not go to Germany, but to 
foreign countries : Diamonds, principally to Antwerp ; South 
West African copper to the United States and Belgium; East 
African skins and hemp to North America. While France 
exports the products of her West African colonies almost en- 
tirely for use in French factories, most of the cocoa and palm 
oil from the Cameroons is sold in England. The principal 
export article of our South Sea colonies, copra, is carried in 
great part to Marseilles and other non-German ports. We, on 
the contrary, buy these raw materials in large quantities from 
other countries, especially from foreign colonies, thereby de- 
veloping their export trade. The result of this is that our 
import trade with these colonies stands at a disadvantage com- 
pared with our export trade, and that we furnish excellent 
markets for the industries of foreign colonial states. The 
Manchester Guardian justly remarked in regard to this liberal 
trade policy of ours: 

"Germany, in mounting degree, receives the products of 
our English factories indirectly, by our disposing of them in 
India and other colonies, which obtain the money for them by 
the export of raw materials to Germany." 

Germany's international economic policy stands consistently 
on the principle of "Live and Let Live," and everywhere main- 
tains the open door for foreign commerce and shipping in her 
spheres of interests and colonies, in the hope that German trade 
and shipping will be treated in equally liberal manner. There 
was from the start no room for a narrow-minded colonial policy 
in connection with such broad and generous principles. There 
would seem to be more reason to reproach Germany's colonial 
policy with the opposite fault, when it is borne in mind that 
only since 1893 have the German colonies enjoyed the right 
of the most favored nation in the German customs territory; 
and when the praise is remembered which the French colonial 
politician, Renty, gives to our colonial trade policy: 



154 MODERN GERMANY 

"The German colonies in Africa are surrounded by trade 
rivals, who will profit by the former's inactivity in order to 
gain the market for themselves and to develop a predominant 
influence under the protection of the German flag." 

In one field only has the German colonial trade policy 
sought to make use of measures of colonization a la maniere 
forte, not, however, in order to promote German trade and 
injure that of other countries, but, at the sacrifice of important 
commercial and financial interests, to advance humanitarian 
aims and common international interests in the African Con- 
tinent. The German government is a leader in the movement, 
by means of international measures, of exclusive and prohibitive 
duties, to impede and if possible to prevent entirely the im- 
portation of brandy, as well as of weapons and ammunition 
into the African Colonies of the European states, according 
to the declaration of Brussels relative to the Congo Act. It 
is only owing to the opposition of other European colonial 
states that this object has not been entirely accomplished. Some 
of the states would not support the Idea of an international 
agreement to put an end to the smuggling of weapons and 
ammunition, so beneficial for their trade, and to the not less 
lucrative trade in brandy, so deleterious to the natives of Africa. 
Although exposed to the danger of smuggling from neighbor- 
ing colonies, the German government took steps against the 
trade in weapons and brandy in its African colonies by Introduc- 
ing measures which are more radical than anything that other 
colonial states were willing to adopt. For instance, the Im- 
portation of brandy for the use of natives is absolutely forbidden 
in German East Africa and German Southwest Africa and 
Samoa. In the Cameroons Its use has been greatly restricted 
by an especially high duty, prohibition zones and other meas- 
ures of control; In Togo Land, the Importation of brandy was 
materially reduced, despite financial loss to this protectorate, 
whose revenues are small. 

In the same manner as freedom of trade Is absolutely un- 
restricted in Germany's colonial policy, save as afifected by the 
above-mentioned humanitarian measures, so is commercial free- 
dom the rule In connection with a liberal industrial policy. 
While in the colonies of other countries there is frequently a 
ruthless effort to prevent Industries and trades from being 
developed which flourish in the motherland, there are no such 
measures in the German colonies; even for foreigners there is 
absolute freedom of trade and residence. In German East 
Africa several thousand East Indians, who are British sub- 



MODERN GERMANY 155 

jects, find themselves freer to practice their trades undisturbed 
than even in several British colonies, as, for example. South 
Africa. On the other hand, no industries are artificially en- 
couraged by means of premiums and other kinds of favors, as 
in Australia and Canada, w^ith the aim of crushing out inter- 
national trade. The German colonial trade policy makes use of 
such measures as little as it does of colonial protective tariffs. 

The attitude of the German government in regard to the 
investment of foreign capital in the colonies corresponds to this 
liberal policy in regard to trade and industry. No obstacle 
is placed in the way of foreign capital. Of course, in cases 
v^here capital is found to be entering upon a course contrary to 
the general interest, as was the case with some large chartered 
companies, the endeavor is made by the same measures as are 
employed in like case against German capital — viz., by agree- 
ment or by redemption of their rights — to obviate the evil. As 
a result of these liberal conditions, the investment of foreign 
capital in the German colonies has considerably increased. Of 
the 506,000,000 marks represented by the capital of various 
companies which is at present invested in German colonies, not 
less than 89,000,000 belong to foreigners. The German gov- 
ernment is careful to assure itself that the invested capital and 
the undertakings founded thereon in the protectorates are as 
sound as possible. A ''Permanent Trade Commission of the 
Colonial Administration" acts in an advisory capacity to the 
colonial authorities in questions which regard capital and its 
influence. 

Likewise in the field of money, banks, and credit, thoroughly 
liberal tendencies are the rule. The use of money is introduced 
everywhere in the protectorates in place of barter, and wages 
are paid in cash instead of in kind. In agreement with this, 
we find markets encouraged in the German colonies with the 
aim of facilitating for the natives advantageous sales of their 
products. In the field of credit, also, the German colonial ad- 
ministration has been successful in advancing ideas of social 
protection for the natives, by prohibiting the giving of credit 
by merchants for tropical products, the so-called trust system, 
that is so harmful to the native element. Further steps along 
this line have been taken by the creation of savings banks through 
the local authorities and post offices, or in connection with the 
existing trade banks. 

From all this it is plain that the general economic policy 
of Germany in her colonies is in no way a colonization a la 
maniere forte, but that it is rather a colonization decidedly 



156 MODERN GERMANY 

a la maniere douce; for it Is free from mercantilism, which 
is militarism in the field of political economy. Despite the 
rejection of all severe measures calculated to injure other na- 
tions for the benefit of German interests, it is able to show such 
brilliant successes that it finds its justification in itself and sees 
no cause to depart from its well-tested principles. Especially 
during the last ten years this policy has produced such rapid 
economic progress in the German colonies as is seen in but 
few colonies of other countries. Capital, which was at first 
shy, has shown an increasing confidence In the economic de- 
velopment of the German colonies, so that to-day more than half 
a billion marks is represented by the companies operating there. 
Twenty years ago less than 62,000,000 marks of private capital 
were invested in the German colonies. If capital during this 
period has Increased tenfold, the extent of the foreign trade of 
the German colonies has grown twice this amount In the same 
time. These brilliant economic successes have been achieved 
under a thoroughly liberal colonial trade policy, thanks to the 
efficiency of the merchants, planters and other entrepreneurs 
active in the colonies, who are mostly Germans, supported 
as they are by a liberal and far-sighted administration, with 
an understanding of economic questions. 

In matters of jurisdiction In the colonies there exists a dif- 
ference between the whites and the natives, but no one who 
knows the principles underlying the treatment of the natives 
will for a moment doubt that this difference owes its origin to 
fatherly care for the natives, and finds its justification therein, 
and that this legal differentiation Is not planned to bring about 
a privileged position for the whites as a master race. In regard 
to these guiding principles, I expressed myself exhaustively two 
years ago, before the Reichstag, and I should like to repeat here 
what I then said: 

"The natives are our proteges, and the German government 
has, therefore, the duty to regard their lawful interests as its 
own. For we do not wish to annihilate the natives, we wish to 
preserve them. This is a duty of common decency which we 
undertook with the raising of the German flag In our African 
colonies and In the South Seas. The exercise of this duty is 
also a matter of wisdom; for by this means alone can we secure 
the possibility of a reasonable economic policy and thereby the 
basis for German national activity. 

"I shall not repeat the phrase of the 'master nation' and the 
'serving race.' I am of the opinion, however, that the white 
man stands In relation to the natives as the guardian to the 



MODERN GERMANY 157 

ward, as the grown person to the child. If, for example, the 
native is granted unrestricted control of his land, he will dis- 
pose of it in a short time, waste the money received for it and 
fall into poverty. If the government, in addition, permits the 
free use of alcohol, moral deterioration is added to poverty; the 
natives degenerate and disappear. Of course, to colonize in 
this fashion is possible, and it is the desire of many so to do. 
For what else is the aim and the hope of the great horde of 
colonists who regard natives chiefly as a handicap to the develop- 
ment of their own interests? To what other goal do all the 
efforts lead which are sought to be justified by phrases like the 
'struggle for existence' and the 'survival of the fittest'? That 
colonization simply implies the economic exploitation of the 
colonies is just as false as that the duty of our home adminis- 
tration is limited to efforts looking to the improvement of trade, 
industry and agriculture. Besides the natural wish of the 
ruling nation to reap advantages from its colonies, we must not 
forget that the colonies are the home of people to whom we 
have promised our protection, for whom we must take thought. 
Other duties are born of this one, equally great for the colo- 
nizer. The peoples with whom our colonization activity brings 
us in touch stand upon a lower level of civilization, occupy a 
much inferior standpoint than we civilized whites — in some cases 
they are very far beneath us. Not alone the legal obligation 
which belongs to us as protectors, but our position as a civilized 
state forces us, with the obvious arguments of a civilized cosmic 
conception, to aid these peoples, and to try to provide better 
living conditions for them than they, with their limited intel- 
ligence and capacity, have been able to provide for themselves. 

''To colonize is to 'missionize' — to missionize in the noble 
sense of educating to Kultur. In the same manner as the cor- 
rect appreciation of the spiritual essence of his own nation is 
one of the most important duties of a statesman, likewise the 
colonizer must unceasingly strive to study and to fathom the 
thoughts and feelings of the natives, and must regulate his 
methods accordingly. His tasks are many and multifarious. 
The natives are ignorant — they must be instructed. They are 
lazy — they must learn to work. They are afflicted with all kinds 
of diseases — they must be cured. They are savage, cruel and 
superstitious — they must be tamed and enlightened. All in all, 
they are big children who need training and guiding. 

"These principles have nothing in common with the stand- 
point of a master class which is so violently attacked by the 
Social Democrats. Nor can they be characterized as a weak 



158 MODERN GERMANY 

policy of cuddling the natives. These principles are pre- 
eminently practicable; by means of them alone can one solve 
the chief problem of every colonial system, the problem of 
rendering native labor useful, and of releasing the energy stored 
up as rudis indigestaque moles in the lower peoples for the aims 
and broad field of activity of our higher intelligence. 

"I come now to a difficult point, and I beg you not to mis- 
understand me — I believe, indeed, that I cannot be misunder- 
stood in this connection. How are the natives to be educated 
to this work of civilization — are they to be persuaded to work 
(I do not use the word 'forced' in order to avoid misunderstand- 
ing), or what means are to be employed? That depends upon 
the character of the different peoples, on their moral level, and 
the degree of their education. This problem must be solved 
differently in every protectorate. It cannot be accomplished 
from this end by means of general principles. Each governor 
must study the question in his territory and act accordingly. 
But for the planter, as well as for the merchant, there is in 
the colonies but one single policy — that of the preservation of 
the natives, the utilization of their work for the planters, a 
multiplication of their needs and therewith the increasing of 
their purchasing power to the advantage of our trade. 

"The division of work between the natives and the whites 
must be such that the native places the work of his hands at 
the service of the white man's intelligence. The policy of feed- 
ing on the lower races, of extermination and destruction, is 
antiquated and immoral, likewise unwise — one does not kill the 
hen that lays the eggs. Treat the native with justice. This 
may not preclude severity and harshness where they are neces- 
sary. But grant him conditions of life consonant with his 
wishes, and raise him gradually. For periods of fifty and one 
hundred years make but slight difference in the development 
of peoples. In this manner the economic development of the 
colonies will vigorously progress — by means of the natives and 
with them, not despite the natives and against them." 

These principles governing the policy to be followed with 
the natives are not newly announced and introduced by me, 
but since the beginning of our colonial activity they have been 
practiced with absolute conviction by every one of my prede- 
cessors in office. In the interest of the natives, as the postulate of 
harmonizing in an equitable manner the traditions of the primi- 
tive peoples, the protection of whom we have undertaken, with 
the conceptions of Germans as representatives of European cul- 
ture and civilization, the creation of a separate legal position 



MODERN GERMANY 159 

for the natives was a prerequisite. While, in the main, for the 
whites the law of the motherland holds, the tribal customs of 
the natives were on principle not disturbed, in so far as this did 
not offend against the most elemental rules of common sense 
and morality. This consideration was our duty as human be- 
ings. The colonies are the home of the natives. The white 
man is more or less a guest. There are millions of negroes to 
a few whites. The natives have a right to see their view of 
life and law respected. German law can demand from them 
only secondary recognition. Where tribal customs offer no 
solution, German legal principles may be applied. And this 
actually occurs, only on the basis of custom, it is true, not by 
force of express legislation. The introduction of German law 
as a whole had to be withheld for reasons of legislative policy. 
Germany herself had had occasion to learn, when in the sixteenth 
century the foreign Roman law was forced upon her, that how- 
ever excellent a law system may be, it is not calculated to satisfy a 
nation and awaken confidence if it has not grown out of the life 
of the people itself. A system of law so developed in all lines as 
the German can be grasped and made use of only by a correspond- 
ingly developed intellect. The native of the German colonies is 
absolutely without this mental maturity. He would be incapable 
of making beneficial use of the rights which the German law 
would give him, and he would be unable to fulfill the duties 
which it would place upon him. It is only necessary to think 
of the oath upon which German procedure is based. The 
native has not yet learned to make clear, trustworthy observa- 
tions and to repeat them simply and unadorned before the court. 
His unbridled imagination causes him to see visions which have 
little to do with reality. The taking of an oath would place 
him in danger of legal prosecution. Were we, however, to 
release him from responsibility, on the ground that he lacked 
mental training and the required perception, the oath would 
sink to a mere empty formula and lose all its value as a proof 
— the very purpose for which it is taken. It would then be bet- 
ter to suppress the taking of all oaths. 

The retention of the tribal laws can be nothing more than a 
transition in a progressive development. The association with 
the whites constantly creates new complications which require 
legal settlement. As a matter of fact, numerous breaches have 
already been made in the tribal system, and it is the undeviating 
aim of the government to maintain the natives' law on a level 
with improving economic and cultural conditions. 

All members of tribes indigenous to the protectorate, as well 



i6o MODERN GERMANY 

as hybrid tribes, come under the head of "natives." In addi- 
tion, members of outside negro tribes are reckoned in this cate- 
gory. Those belonging to other races than the white who pos- 
sess German citizenship, or who, as citizens of other civilized 
states, stand on a footing of equality with our own, either accord- 
ing to treaty right or by custom, are subject to the laws of the 
whites. 

The German Empire represents the protective power in the 
colonies, which is nothing less than full sovereign power. It is 
exercised by the German Emperor in the name of the Reichstag. 
By virtue of sovereignty, the Empire and the Emperor possess 
legislative power, which the Empire exercises in the form of 
laws and the Emperor in the form of ordinances. To a limited 
degree, the right of issuing ordinances is vested also in the 
Imperial Chancellor and the governors. The Empire makes 
law primarily for the whites; the regulating of the native law 
lies within the provinces of the Emperor, the Imperial Chan- 
cellor and the governors. A greater mobility is called for in 
this latter field than is possible with the legal machinery of the 
Empire. Since the Empire regulates the budget of the protec- 
torates, it possesses a far-reaching influence on the administra- 
tion, together with the possibility of supervision of legislative 
measures, most of which are issued in the form of laws. 

For the whites and that part of the native population on a 
like footing, the German civil, criminal and bankruptcy laws, 
as well as the German rules of procedure, are in general in 
efFect, by virtue of the law concerning the protectorates. This 
is true, likewise, of the regulations touching matters of volun- 
tary jurisdiction. Provisions of Prussian law have supple- 
mentary force. It was necessary for the courts to be organized 
on a basis of simplicity corresponding to the existing primitive 
conditions. Only two grades of courts were created: district 
and upper courts. The district judge has individual jurisdiction 
in questions which in Germany are under the jurisdiction of 
the judges of local courts. In other matters the district court 
sits with three members in some cases, with five in others, on the 
bench. The larger number acts in cases of crime or serious 
misdemeanor. The upper court consists of the chief justice and 
four assessors or associates. The district judges and the chief 
justice must be qualified to hold the office of a judge in one of 
the federal states, and they are authorized to exercise their 
judicial functions by the Imperial Chancellor. In the exercise 
of these functions they are independent and subject only to the 
law. The assessors are chosen from the ranks of those subject 



MODERN GERMANY i6i 

to the jurisdiction of the court {Gerichtseingesessenen) . The 
right of appeal {Revision) is still lacking. Its introduction is 
contemplated through the establishment of an Imperial colonial 
court. The state's attorney takes part in criminal cases only 
at the main proceeding in the first instance, in connection with 
the prayer for legal remedy, and in cases before the higher court. 
Lawyers and notaries have a similar position as in Germany. 

The law for the natives, as already explained, is based on 
the tribal law. The resulting difference in comparison with 
the law governing the whites is limited to the question of ma- 
terial rights and the manner of procedure in the presentation 
of claims; it does not extend to the personal standing before the 
law. The native has different, but not inferior rights. Life, 
health, freedom and property are secured to him to the same 
extent as to the white man. To him also the government lends 
its strength in obtaining his rights. There are, it is true, in 
East Africa, Togo Land and the Cameroons remnants of so- 
called house-slavery. But this is without influence on the 
personal legal standing of those subject to it. The house-slave 
is considered by the judge as legally competent, and enjoys full 
legal protection. The government has taken steps to prevent 
such conditions arising in future and an early termination of 
those still existing is aimed at. 

For the protection of the natives againt the exploitation of 
their inexperience, detailed regulations have been issued in regard 
to the making and to the nature of credit and surety under- 
takings and of contracts for work. Credit and surety under- 
takings must have in some cases official approval, while in others 
reduction to writing suffices. Especial attention has been given 
to labor contracts. It was important, among other things, to 
prevent conditions similar to slavery from arising, as well as to 
obviate alienation of the worker from his home connections. 
Labor contracts may not exceed a certain length of time. The 
hours of daily work are fixed. The rate of wages is regulated. 
Wages must be paid in cash and may not be curtailed. In addi- 
tion, the employer has numerous duties regarding the social 
welfare of the workers. He must provide healthy living quar- 
ters, proper care, sufficient food, nursing in the event of sick- 
ness, medicine, bandages and, if necessary, medical attendance. 
In the case of a sufficient number of workers, specially ar- 
ranged sick-quarters and a complete apothecary shop must be 
kept ready. Disregard of these duties entitles the worker to 
break the contract without losing his right to wages, or the con- 
tract violated by the employer may be voided by the authorities. 



i62 MODERN GERM.\NY 

In connection with the regulation and de^•elopment of real 
estate rights, it was the constant aim of the eovernment to main- 
tain the natives in possession of land sufficient for them and 
their descendants to be permanently protected against eco- 
nomic ruin. They were either confirmed in their original hold- 
ings or received as much land as tliey needed for their liveli- 
hood. Disposing of this property to whites, as well as its en- 
cumbrance, has been either absolutely forbidden or made con- 
tingent on the approval of the governor. It was intended that 
the natives be protected against exploitation by foreign greed. 
These protective provisions are still in force, despite the fact 
that, owing to continued development, nati\"e real estate law 
has appreciably approximated to that of the whites. 

The real estate book {Grujidhuch) forms the nucleus of 
German real estate law. In it the holdings of land are fixed 
officially as to size and location, as well as the conditions of 
ownership and encumbrances. In the real estate book, which 
may be inspected by any one, reliable information is given in 
regard to the actual and legal conditions of any piece of ground, 
and the necessary data are offered for the conclusion of a real 
estate transaction. Especially does it promote the extremely 
important branch of credit on real estate, by giving trust^vorthy 
information on the points important for this purpose. This 
institution has been introduced into the colonies and arrange- 
ments have been made for the natives to avail themselves of it, in 
so far as it does not threaten them with disadvantages. Land 
entered in the real estate book may be acquired by the natives 
without limit. The governor, however, decides as to the entering 
of their holdings in the book, in the interest of the natives them- 
selves; for the legal and economic conditions resulting from this 
entering presuppose, for their profitable use, a higher degree of 
understanding than the native on the average possesses. 

Family and inheritance laws of the natives have been least 
influenced by Gexman legal ideas. Marriage and its legal re- 
sults are so deeply rooted in the spiritual life of a people, how- 
ever low it may stand in the scale, that it is impossible to at- 
tempt to adapt them to our higher conceptions until the neces- 
san* moral basis has been created. The spread of Christian 
principles through instruction and exemplary conduct prepares 
the way for leading the natives to the propex goal. The gov- 
ernment is constantly endeavoring to bring about by all mild 
means a moral elevation of the people's character, in order to 
give to the wife and mother her proper position in the family. 

The material law of inheritance of the natives has hitherto 



MODERN GERMANY 163 

proved unamenable to legal regulation, in the same way as 
has the law of the family. In German East Africa, how- 
ever, where Indians and Arabians live in conditions of com- 
fort, a beginning has been made toward official regulation of 
estates. The heirs, in the case of an inheritance, may entrust Its 
administration and distribution to the local authorities. Similar 
possibilities have been created among the inhabitants of Samoa, 
among whom, as a result of deaths, disputes as to title and 
land play an important part. 

A radical change has taken place under German rule in the 
field of criminal law. The decisions of responsible authorities 
resting upon established principles of penal law took the place 
of the frequently arbitrary caprice of tyrannical chieftains. 
Such principles were seldom found in the native laws, which 
showed scarcely the first beginnings of an enlightened system of 
penal laws. They could be abstracted only from the German 
statutes. German penal law thus furnished the provisions ac- 
cording to which the natives are made responsible for criminal 
offenses. There could, however, be no thought of proceeding 
sweepingly by introducing the German criminal code as a whole. 
With its sharply defined legal conceptions and definitions of 
criminal acts, it would have remained incomprehensible to the 
natives. On the other hand, it was necessary to leave a certain 
amount of freedom to the judge, in order that he might give 
to the customs and conceptions of the natives the proper influence 
in weighing the question of guilt. Thus far no exhaustive enu- 
meration of punishable acts has been made In any of our protec- 
torates. It Is, however, a matter of course that punishment 
is dealt out for such crimes as result from superstition or from, 
the cultural conceptions of the natives, as, for example, the giving 
of poison, blood-revenge, etc. 

The considerations which operate against an enumeration of 
punishable acts are not operative as regards the fixing of the 
different kinds of punishment. There are, therefore, general 
rules respecting them. Admissible punishments in the African 
colonies are castigation, fines, imprisonment with enforced labor, 
imprisonment in chains and the death penalty. In the South 
Seas castigation and imprisonment in chains are not permissible, 
but in their place enforced labor without Imprisonment has been 
substituted. Where castigation is permitted, it was already cus- 
tomary before the establishment of German rule. It Is still 
Indispensable as an educational measure, since the natives them- 
selves consider It necessary for their own protection and demand 
its application. It cannot be applied In the case of women or 



i64 MODERN GERMANY 

elder persons; natives of higher education or of a better social 
position are, on principle, to be exempted from its operation. 
The right of castigation may be exercised only upon approval 
by the governor. The punishment is applied under the super- 
vision of a physician. The death penalty rests on the ultimate 
decision of the governor. 

Jurisdiction over the natives rests, on principle, in the hand 
of the local administration, as represented by the Bezirksamt- 
mann (sub-governor) and the heads of the stations. The 
reasons urged against the separation of the judicial and ad- 
ministrative functions are convincing. The administrative of- 
ficial is in uninterrupted touch w^ith the natives; he is in the 
best position to discover their ideas of right and he enjoys 
their confidence. His dignity w^ould suffer if he did not have 
the power to punish and to decide disputes. Natives are ad- 
mitted to the proceedings as far as possible as advisors and 
experts. In this manner they help to spread a knowledge of the 
law and themselves become familiar with the legal conceptions 
of the whites. This tends to strengthen confidence in the legal 
verdicts. Native customs serve as a model for the conduct of 
the proceeding; the hearing is oral and public. The natives 
are not sworn, but a deliberately false statement is punishable. 
Measures for securing a confession which are not permissible 
according to native custom may not be employed. 

While in German East Africa and South West Africa the 
law is administered only by whites, in the Cameroons, Togo 
Land and in the South Seas, part of the jurisdiction has been 
left in the hands of the natives or entrusted to them. The gov- 
ernment, however, has retained control and the right of re- 
vising the decision. In the Cameroons for certain native tribes 
and territories, local chiefs are active as single judges, and 
native courts of arbitration serve as collegiate courts. Their 
jurisdiction is limited according to the amount at issue and the 
seriousness of the ofiFense. They have no jurisdiction in cases 
of murder and manslaughter. The courts of arbitration serve 
furthermore as courts of appeal in cases heard before the na- 
tive chiefs. All cases can in the last instance be submitted to 
the governor for decision. Furthermore, provision has been 
made for a revision in cases where large sums of money are in 
dispute or severe punishment is involved. The decision in these 
circumstances rests with the governor or the chief justice. 
Execution is limited to such property which the debtor can dis- 
pense with without endangering his economic position. Tribal 
possessions may be taken in no case. The proceedings take 



MODERN GERMANY 165 

place without the presence of a state's attorney. Criminal 
prosecution is left to the decision of the court. There is thus 
no legal obligation in the matter. The accused is at liberty at 
any stage of the proceeding to secure counsel. 

From the history of the development of our military strength 
in the protectorates, it is clear that the acquisition of colonies 
by Germany was carried on by peaceful means and that her en- 
trance into the ranks of colonial Powers was not prompted by 
conquistador instincts. When Germany entered upon the acqui- 
sition of colonial possessions, those in authority conceived of 
their development as purely mercantile and under mercantile 
forms, as great trade and plantation undertakings. It was not 
considered advisable or w^ise to employ military force for these 
chartered companies. The Empire provided protection for them 
as regards the outside world; internal safety was left to their 
own police-soldier forces. 

This system did not prove adequate. The companies, in 
their attempts peacefully to open up the country, encountered 
the opposition of native potentates, or came into conflict, as in 
the Central African districts, with tribes that had long car- 
ried on trade there and whose ruthless exploitation and slave- 
trade could not be quietly endured. 

The companies were likewise powerless, through lack of the 
necessary force, to put a stop to the incessant fighting of the 
native tribes among themselves. The possibility of their exer- 
cising influence toward a healthy development of their spheres of 
interest continued to decrease. The various concerns soon found 
themselves at the end of their financial resources. The Empire 
stepped in, and by means of the power at its disposal succeeded 
in establishing an orderly state of affairs. 

The experience was thus again repeated, which has been 
that of all colonizing Powers, that the opening up and develop- 
ing of territories occupied by peoples of inferior civilization is 
impossible without the protection of military force. 

As a result of this observation, police and defence troops 
were established in the possessions of the companies, which 
were taken over as protectorates by the Imperial Government. 
The express purpose of these troops was, as stated in the be- 
ginning, the maintenance of peace and order in the protectorates 
and the suppression of the slave-trade. Nei<-her at the beginning 
nor in the course of later development was there any thought, 
in connection with the organization of a military force in our 
colonies, of guarding the territories under our protection against 
states belonging to the civilized community of international 



i66 MODERN GERMANY 

law. While in Southwest Africa, our sole colony suitable for 
settlement purposes, the defence troops are made up of white 
officers, petty officers and men taken from the home army as 
volunteers, in the tropical colonies only the first two classes are 
white, the rank and file being negroes serving for pay. 

The strength of the various defence troops was regulated ac- 
cording to the power of the natives in the colonies in question. 
From small beginnings their numbers increased automatically 
with the progressive opening up of the colonies; nevertheless, 
they remained within moderate limits, save for temporarily 
necessary increases. In recent years there has been rather a 
reduction than an increase of these troops in the various 
colonies. 

The fighting unit generally is a company. Divided into such 
units, and widely scattered, the defence troops are distributed 
over the colony. That which the individual troop lacks in 
numerical strength must be made up for by its intrinsic worth, 
which is the result of adequate training and instruction. The 
soldiers who have come from the home army furnish the quali- 
ties necessary for this purpose, but the European instructors 
have also succeeded, by tact and discretion, in raising the negro 
troops to the highest possible standard of discipline and military 
efficiency. It is a proof of the sound condition of the whole 
organization that up to this time none of the negro troops have 
failed in any case. Their reliability stood the test in brilliant 
fashion in recent occurrences. 

Not alone, however, in the purely military field, but espe- 
cially in the non-military field have the defence troops accom- 
plished great things. From the beginning of our colonial ad- 
ministration up to the most recent time, officers and petty- 
officers of these troops have worked hand in hand with the civil 
authorities in the peaceful labor of general administration. The 
results achieved in this connection furnished the basis on which 
the civil administration could proceed with its extensive measures 
as soon as a district was pacified. 

In the work of establishing stations and district offices the 
troops were of the greatest assistance. Officers, petty-officers 
and men have never failed, by strenuous work together with tire- 
less interest and practical common sense, to accomplish their 
prescribed work, despite a frequent lack of training in the 
technique of civil administration. The individual tasks were 
by no means slight and required political skill and a grasp of 
the affairs of the natives. Supported in general by only a 
slight military force, these men, transplanted into absolutely 



MODERN GERMANY 167 

unfamiliar territory, had, first of all, to gain a firm footing in 
order, by gradually extending their influence into broader spheres, 
to accustom the inhabitants to their new masters and to the 
new order of affairs. 

Closely connected with the general activity of the adminis- 
tration are the technical and cultural tasks performed by the 
troops in the various districts. Most of the stations are entirely 
the work of the troops, who succeeded in creating not alone 
practical, but likewise architecturally pleasing buildings for the 
administration, surrounded by hospitals, w^lls, storehouses, mar- 
kets and slaughter houses, and where the means were available, 
tasteful gardens and all kinds of useful institutions serving 
cultural aims. 

Special attention was paid to the development of roads. Most 
of them were laid out by the troops and provided with bridges, 
dams, tunnels, culverts, etc. Worthy of mention are also the 
attempts made in raising domestic animals. The efforts met with 
excellent success, for example In Southwest Africa in the line 
of horse-breeding. The achievements of the troops in the field 
of administration and the cultural improvement of the colonies 
deserve all the more acknowledgment because in most cases the 
means for these purposes were very limited. 

In addition to the manifold claims upon them in military 
and administrative fields, a large number of officers of the troop 
and of the medical staff find time for scientific activity and have 
published in pamphlets and current scientific works the knowl- 
edge of land and people which they have gained in the colonial 
service. Others, through extensive work In the field of cartog- 
raphy, have gathered extensive material important for the open- 
ing up of the colonies. Special attention must be called to the 
service which the officers of the medical staff of the troops have 
rendered, not alone in the exercise of their medical profession 
with the troops, but also In scientific study of tropical sickness 
and animal epidemics, as well as in the line of tropical hygiene. 

We thus see that in all branches of colonizing work the 
troops have developed a multifarious and strenuous activity. 
Though with the continuing development of the colonies they 
will have to place In other hands one or the other of the 
branches of their successful activity in the field of general ad- 
ministration to which they have become devoted — thus finally 
limiting themselves entirely to their military duties — neverthe- 
less the satisfaction and the credit belong to the troops for 
having laid the foundation for the political, cultural and eco- 
nomic development of the colonies. 



i68 MODERN GERMANY 

Now that the war has extended even to the colonies, the 
defence troops find themselves face to face with tasks which 
they were never intended to perform. Their use for purposes 
of defence against an enemy from abroad had not been con- 
templated. Such a contingency seemed excluded, since, as al- 
ready mentioned, the protectorates had been neutralized by the 
Congo Act in case of war-like developments among the signatory 
Powers in Europe. 

It remained for the enemies of Germany to break that agree- 
ment and to carry the war into the colonies. But despite the 
employment of numerically much superior forces, they have 
not yet been successful in obtaining any decisive success. The 
defence-troops have proved w^orthy of their traditions also in 
meeting this absolutely new task.^ 

1 This chapter was written in the early part of the year I9IS.^Translator's 

NOTS. 



CHAPTER V 

THE GERMAN MILITARY SYSTEM 

COMPARED WITH THE FRENCH, ENGLISH, AND 

RUSSIAN SYSTEMS 

PROFESSOR HANS DELBRUCK, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
BERLIN 

THE Prussian army, which forms the backbone of the 
Imperial German army, goes back to the reconstruction 
of the old Prussian army, which, shattered by Napoleon in 
1806, had gone to pieces. In order to free Prussia from the 
French yoke, General Scharnhorst conceived the idea of sum- 
moning to arms the entire population capable of bearing them. 
In 1 81 3, this plan was put into operation. Only through this 
tremendous effort of Prussia, in conjunction with all the other 
Powers, was it possible to put an end to the menace of Napoleon's 
universal dominion. Napoleon's power was already so great 
that his mediate and immediate subjects amounted to seventy 
million; his opponents, taken all together, were scarcely more 
numerous. No one of them, therefore, could be spared for 
victory, neither England, nor Prussia, nor Austria; and Prussia, 
which did not yet number five millions, was forced to intro- 
duce universal military duty and carry it to complete adoption. 
This universal duty of bearing arms proved such a brilliant 
success in the Wars of Liberation that it was retained in times 
of peace, although it was not alone a heavy burden for the 
Prussian people but was fraught with difficulties in execution. 

The standing army still showed great resemblance to the 
armies of the eighteenth century, as the English army still does 
to-day. A large proportion of the soldiers served twenty years, 
and even longer. As a result, there was in this army but little 
room for the recruits who were called by universal conscription, 
especially as these w^re to be retained with the colors for a 
period of three years. The great mass of the recruits, very 
superficially trained or not at all, were incorporated into the 
Landwehr. This Prussian Landwehr thus bore a great sim- 
ilarity to the British militia, and its military usefulness was 
slight. Only gradually, in the course of the nineteenth cen- 
tury, was this evil overcome. On the one hand, the class of 
soldiers serving for a long number of years dwindled, as the 

169 



170 MODERN GERMANY 

favorable development of economic life and Industry brought 
about better wages than the slender pay in the army. To-day 
it is considered sufficient to retain merely that number of soldiers 
after a long period of service adequate to satisfy the need for non- 
commissioned officers. On the other hand, after long hesita- 
tion, the time of service w^as reduced from three years to two 
years — with the exception of the cavalry and the mounted field 
artillery. This reduction, in 1893, aroused great apprehension 
in officers' circles and among many patriots. It was thought 
that the military spirit would suffer, and that the army would 
really be no army at all, but merely a Volkswehr, or militia, 
since only the first-year class would be under arms at the 
moment when the elder class was released and the new re- 
cruits were not yet trained. But subsequent success proved 
that the fears were groundless. Through continued and great 
efforts, and through the most careful use of the time, the two- 
year period of service has been made to furnish excellent mili- 
tary material. 

The organization is now very simple. The duty of military 
service extends from the twentieth to the forty-fifth year. The 
two youngest classes form the standing army. The next 
classes are made use of in the event of war, approximately to 
double the strength of the regiments, to form reserve regiments, 
and to create Ersatz or compensating battalions with Ersatz 
reserves. Landwehr regiments are formed from the elder Land- 
wehr soldiers, and finally from the last classes up to the forty- 
fifth year are formed the Landsturm, or last reserve regiments, 
who are used principally for barracks service and as guards for 
prisoners, but who In this war have frequently fought at the 
front. Recourse is had only in the last event to the youngest 
class from the seventeenth to the twentieth year. 

When Minister of War Boyen, the disciple and follower of 
Scharnhorst, organized the new army of peace in the autumn 
of 1 8 14, he established the principle that the standing army 
should contain about ten thousand men for every million of 
the population. This represented at that time, as Prussia num- 
bered ten million in population, something over icx),ooo men, 
or I per cent of the total number. This percentage has varied 
but little during the last century. When no fresh contingents 
were formed for some time It would occasionally sink slightly 
below that level; and when for the purpose of absorbing the 
excess of young men, new regiments were authorized, usually 
as the result of parliamentary struggles, the ratio would increase 
by a fraction over i per cent. In the summer of the year 



MODERN GERMANY 171 

1914 it stood at I.I 17 per cent for the army, and 1.27 per 
cent for the army and navy together, not counting the officers. 
The natural aim, however, of such a policy — to have all service- 
able young men pass through the training school of the army — 
has never been realized, not even at the outbreak of the present 
vv^ar. Although in the year 19 13 the standing army was in- 
creased by 63,000 recruits, there still remained 30,000 thor- 
oughly serviceable young men, and not less than approximately 
200,000 with slight physical disabilities {Ersatz reserve and 
Landsturm with weapons), who might have been called to the 
colors and who are now, with the progress of the war, gradually 
being drafted into the army. The reforms undertaken in the 
army during the last century had, on the whole, for their pur- 
pose not so much to increase the numbers in the army in propor- 
tion to the population as through reduction of the term of 
service to reduce the individual burden connected with this 
militaristic system, and to make room for the training of a 
greater fraction of the nation. But we have never carried the 
universal duty of military service to its final conclusion. 

Of the greatest importance, from the political as well as the 
military standpoint, is the institution of the One-Year Volun- 
teers {Einjdhrig-Freiwillige). The name "volunteer" is no 
longer applicable. It originated at the time when the army 
was not yet large enough to accommodate all eligible men, and 
when lots were drawn among the superfluous. In order to 
enjoy the privilege of one-year service, a recruit had to relinquish 
the right of drawing lots, and to this extent the service was vol- 
untary. To be eligible to serve as a one-year volunteer a young 
man has to provide his outfit, and receiving no pay, to support 
himself. Likewise, proof must be given of a superior education, 
by means of school testimonials or on the basis of a rather severe 
examination. The one-year voluntary service, then, is in no sense 
a privilege of wealth, but rather a privilege of education, for, 
whereas the examination may never be remitted, assistance is 
given to young men of superior education who lack the means 
for supporting themselves throughout the entire year. 

The one-year service, which was introduced by Minister of 
War von Boyen in 1814, together with the duty of general 
military service, has two striking advantages. In the first place, 
military service for only one year interrupts but slightly the 
general training of our young men. On the contrary, it is 
regarded by many as a great advantage that young men, whether 
merchants, students or farmers, interrupt once in their life their 
civil employment and become familiar with an entirely new 



172 MODERN GERMANY 

world. In the second place, these one-year volunteers provide 
the indispensable material for replenishing the body of officers. 
After one year of service has rendered a sifting possible, the 
superiors select those suitable for the position of officers, who 
are then called to the colors twice for a period of eight weeks, 
thoroughly trained, and commissioned as officers. In the event 
of mobilization, these reserve and Landwehr officers are inter- 
mingled with the regular officers in such a manner that a great 
number of reserve officers are drawn into the line regiments, 
while regular officers are assigned to the reserve and Landwehr 
regiments, especially in positions of command. Acquaintance 
with German officers' corps in time of war shows that a large 
proportion of them are judges, state's attorneys, teachers, pro- 
fessors, artists, writers, farmers, merchants, engineers and officials 
of all kinds. 

The French army is different from the German in three 
important points. In order to maintain a strength approxi- 
mately equal to that of Germany, in view of the difference in 
population (thirty-nine and one-half million as against sixty- 
eight million), the levy is much stricter than with us. In 
France the duty of universal military service is not merely a 
theory, but a reality. The army, therefore, does not, as in 
Germany, form i per cent but i^ per cent of the population. 
Further, the system of one-year voluntary service is lacking. 
An attempt was made in 1872, it is true, to introduce it, but as 
time passed it became more and more apparent that the French 
administration was too unreliable in its application. The one- 
year service became the privilege of wealth and Influence. All 
of the representatives in parliament were active in procuring 
this advantage for the sons of their constituents, and the ex- 
amination became a mere farce. Accordingly, in 1906 the 
system was abandoned. This was bearable as long as the time 
of active service In the French army was only two years, as In 
the German. But with the return to a period of three years 
(August 13, 1913), a condition was created that In the long 
run could result In nothing less than the choking of higher 
education in France. From a military point of view, the gain 
was a corps of reserve officers of admirable qualifications. But 
it Is self-evident that a student or an engineer who is forced 
to Interrupt his course for a period of three years, and not for 
two as In Germany, and to immerse himself In a military exist- 
ence, Is able to resume his former studies only In exceptional 
cases. In respect to the French military organization, it may 
be truthfully said that militarism has become a power Inimical 



MODERN GERMANY 173 

to civilization. Finally, the French army is distinguished from 
the German through the make-up of the corps of officers. In 
Germany, officers are chosen exclusively from among young men 
of higher education and members of educated families. Only in 
time of war are non-commissioned officers who have distinguished 
themselves by unusual bravery promoted to the rank of commis- 
sioned officers. In France, non-commissioned officers may rise 
to the rank of captain. This is not the place to discuss the 
relative advantages of the tw^o systems. Politically, the obser- 
vation may be permitted that these old captains were the chief 
supporters of ''Bonapartism," of the rule of the sword, under 
Napoleon I as well as under Napoleon III. 

The Russian army resembles superficially the French most 
closely. It also is based on the universal duty of bearing arms 
and on the three-year service — indeed, for a large proportion 
of the army, as the cavalry, mounted artillery, engineer troops 
and the five army corps in Asia, this extends to four years. In 
191 3 this period of service was increased by a further half-year, 
through the provision that the eldest class of soldiers may not 
be released until the recruits have completed their training. 
It may be said, then, that there is in the Russian army an 
average period of service of four years. This is without refer- 
ence to the Cossacks, who are a permanent and but poorly dis- 
ciplined body. But even greater is the distinction which re- 
sults from the difference in wealth and education of the French 
and Russian peoples. While in France all young men who are 
at all serviceable actually serve, in Russia, despite the immense 
size of the army, many of them remain exempt, so that universal 
service exists in theory but not in practice. Russia possesses 
neither the wealth nor the human material for a corresponding 
body of officers. The great mass of the Russians — approximately 
eighty per cent — are peasants, who in almost all cases can 
neither read nor write. The broad middle class, which in France 
as in Germany furnishes the corps of reserve officers, exists in 
Russia in but slight degree. Indeed, there is even such a lack 
of individuals fit to become non-commissioned officers that the 
companies have only half as many as in Germany. Russia is 
thus not in a position to form the reserve and Landwehr bodies 
which serve to increase the French and German armies to 
such a great extent in case of mobilization. Reserve divisions 
are formed, it is true, but in the main the veteran reservists are 
used simply to fill out and replace the cadres of the standing 
army. On the other hand, the mass of the Russian people is 
so great that the Russian army on a peace footing is larger than 



174 MODERN GERMANY 

the German, Austrian and Italian armies reckoned together. 
In 191 1, on a peace footing, Germany had 615,000 men under 
arms, Austria-Hungary 395,00O, Italy 243,500, or a total of 
1,253,500, while Russia had 1,380,000. 

In foreign countries the effort has been made to spread the 
view that the mad race in the increase of the armaments of 
European countries was caused by the constant growth of the 
German army. This is true only to the extent that, following 
our victories in 1866 and 1870, all the other states increased 
their armaments. But how slight the growth of the German 
army has been during the last twenty years is seen from the 
following table: 

Called to the colors in Recruits ^ 

1894 283,200 

1898 267,900 

1904 262,600 

1905 282,100 

1906 270,400 

1910 285,400 

191 1 292,200 

191 2 308,000 

Not until the year 19 13 did the number of recruits rise to 
382,900 (one-year volunteers, etc., included). This notable 
increase, like the lesser increases of the three previous years, 
was caused by the extremely threatening attitude of Russia 
on our borders, in connection with the disturbances in the 
Balkans. In 191 3, simultaneously with an increase of our army 
by 63,000 recruits, the Russian contingent of recruits was in- 
creased by 130,000, and since at the same time the period of 
service was lengthened by a half-year, the army's peace footing 
rose from 1,380,000 to 1,850,000, or by 470,000. The German 
army at this time numbered in round figures 790,000, including 
the officers (30,000) ; and, by a further increase of the con- 
tingent of recruits in the autumn of 191 4 to 661,175 privates, 
the entire army (including officers, non-commissioned officers, 
volunteers, etc.) would have stood approximately at 830,000 
men. 

Let us now contemplate, from the point of view of "militar- 
ism," the three armies which we have compared. Various 
meanings may be attached to this word. First, we may under- 

1 Including the navy, one-year volunteers, public-school teachers, etc. 



MODERN GERMANY 175 

stand the absorption of the nation's strength to a degree that 
seriously hinders its cultural development. This is most strik- 
ingly the case in France. The combining of the absolutely 
universal obligation to bear arms v^^ith the three-year period 
of service proved a condition intolerable in the long run for 
a civilized nation. A few months previous to the outbreak of 
the war, a French visitor who called upon me could not restrain 
himself from expressing his absolute despair at this French 
law. As a result of it, French civilization, he declared, would 
be destroyed. Not without justice, therefore, was the suspicion 
rife at the time the law went into effect that it indicated the 
early coming of war. It was impossible to conceive of it as 
a permanent condition ; it could be regarded only as a. disguised 
and round-about form of mobilization. To deny or to doubt 
this is to concede all the more unreservedly that France had, in 
fact, fallen into a militarism inimical to civilization. 

Conditions were not otherwise in Russia. Although In that 
country the three or four-year period of service affects only a 
small proportion of the people — and those mostly peasants at 
that, who are on such a low level that it is a matter of in- 
difference whether they wear the uniform of the Emperor a 
shorter or longer time — nevertheless, it is all the more un- 
fortunate for the mass of the nation that the army and navy 
absorb so large a part of the annual revenue of the state that 
nothing is left for a public school system. It may be true that 
the ruling classes and the Church in Russia do not desire a 
public school, because they fear that an enlightened peasantry, 
able to read, might disrupt Church and State; but even if this 
design and the sinister motive prompting it does not exist, 
the means to the end would be lacking. A universal public 
school is an extremely expensive institution. Russia, however, 
Is too poor to maintain at the same time an Immense army, a 
great fleet and a good general system of education. Here 
again we find a kind of militarism which one must designate 
as an enemy of culture. 

The German military system Is so little Inimical to culture 
that it has not alone not prevented us from maintaining together 
with it a model system of education from the public school 
up to the universities, but we have also been able to carry out 
great social reforms, as a result of which in Germany there is 
practically no longer a proletariat class. 

The military spirit in the three armies which we have ex- 
amined is chiefly represented in their corps of officers and in the 
education which they impart to the youth of the land. If it Is 



176 MODERN GERMANY 

justifiable to call this education 'militarism," it is nevertheless 
clear that the reproach which that word carries again applies 
to Germany least of all. 

Here is the declaration which was signed by more than four 
thousand German teachers of the higher schools: 

"We teachers in Germany's universities and advanced schools are 
servants of science and conduct the work of peace. But it fills us with 
indignation that the enemies of Germany, with England in the van, 
seek to draw a distinction, ostensibly in our favor, between the spirit 
of German science and what they call Prussian militarism. In the Ger- 
man army there is the same spirit as in the German people, for the two 
are one, and we also are part of it. Our army also cultivates science 
and owes its achievements to this fact in no slight degree. The service 
in the army renders the youth of the land capable for all works of 
peace, science among them. For it educates them to a self-denying 
sense of duty, and gives to them the self-confidence and sense of honor 
of the truly free man, who willingly subordinates himself to the state. 
This spirit lives not alone in Prussia, but it is the same in all the states 
of the German Empire. It is the same in war and in peace. Our army 
is now engaged in war for Germany's freedom, and therewith for all 
the possessions of peace and morality, not alone in Germany. Our 
belief is that the whole culture of Europe is dependent on the victory 
which German 'militarism' will achieve — manly discipline, fidelity and 
the spirit of sacrifice of the united German people." 

He knows the German army of to-day but superficially who 
judges it by the outward uniformity and the severe, often 
harsh form of drill by which it is created. The aims and 
achievements of true military training are thus characterized by 
a leading military authority (Deutelmoser) : 

"An army fit for war is not a great machine in which, if it is prop- 
erly constructed throughout, the motive power proceeds from one point 
and by automatic compulsion sets the most distant wheels in operation. 
Each element of which an army is composed is an individual being, has 
its own world of thoughts and feelings, with an individual will, which 
may just as easily express itself against the operation of the whole as in 
agreement with it. Herein lies the principal difficulty in the leading of 
great masses. If the highest plane of agreement is to be reached, it is 
needful that the many thousands act together, not under mechanical 
compulsion, but as independently thinking and willing units. Formerly 
this was quite different from today, since the close-rank formations of 
the past left but slight latitude for the individual. King Frederick's 
Grenadiers fought shoulder to shoulder, closely knit in serried ranks. 
Each one supported the other, and the command of the leaders regulated 
the gunfire or the fight with the bare weapon quite as mechanically as 
did the orders on parade. The battle formation of present-day infantry 
fighting, on the contrary, is that of the deployed firing line. The deadli- 
ness and quick fire of modern weapons means sure annihilation to mass 
formations, such as the close ranks of the linear tactics. They demand 
that the fighting troop be split into its smallest elements, the individual 
riflemen. And the carrying power of these weapons necessitates further 
that this separation take place while at a great distance from the enemy. 
Thus the individual, at the very moment when brought face to face 



MODERN GERMANY 177 

with the immediate danger of death, is deprived of the influence of the 
word of command. He must, furthermore, seek cover in the landscape 
in order to offer the smallest possible target to the enemy. As a result, 
he disappears from the supervising eye of the leader more than might 
be desired, and he is in a high degree left to himself. The danger is 
herewith created that the expediency and uniformity of the action be 
lost, and that the 'will to victory' give way to the consciousness of the 
continuing presence of death, calculated to undermine the morale. There 
is but one counter-measure for this: so to develop in each man in time 
of peace the independent power of decision that he knows how to act 
correctly without constant direction, and above all to train him to hon- 
orable feelings and strength of will which under the stress of necessity 
and danger by their own force overcome the instinct of self-preserva- 
tion." 

Can one blame us Germans that we value highly, from a 
purely pedagogical standpoint, quite aside from its military 
worth, such a training, which aims at subordination, obedience 
and fulfillment of duty, as well as at free and independent deci- 
sion, but never at despotic oppression; and that we wish the 
entire youth of the country, as far as possible, to enjoy ft? 
That is all that Germany has done. It is true that from time 
to time we have increased our army and created new units, but 
only in correspondence to the increase in the number of young 
men. The reproach of competing in military preparation, there- 
fore, is directed really against the German mothers, who have 
taken care that Germany since 1870 has increased from forty 
to sixty-eight millions, while France has remained stationary 
at about thirty-nine to forty millions, owing to a lack of the 
maternal instinct among Frenchwomen. 

The British army stands, as a purely mercenary institution, 
in fundamental contrast to the German, French and Russian 
armies, which are all three more or less national armies. The 
Englishmen hates the compulsion which the universal duty of 
bearing arms implies, as well as the military spirit with which 
the entire people become filled, as the result of passing through 
military training. From this feeling, therefore, has proceeded 
the reproach of "militarism" which is directed against Ger- 
many, especially Prussia, since this institution was first created 
in the latter country and has been only imitated by the others. 
Is a mercenary army, how^ever, in every connection less mili- 
tary than a national army? I read recently in an English news- 
paper (the London Morning Post) that the essence of mili- 
tarism lies in the misuse of military power for ambitious aims. 
The English nation, thanks to its mercenary army and its tre- 
mendous fleet, has brought into subjection more than 350 million 
people, nearly a quarter of all the inhabitants of the earth, and 



178 MODERN GERMANY 

it exercises supremacy over all the seas of the world. This 
would never have been possible with a national army. 

General Ian Hamilton demonstrates in his book "Compulsory 
Service" (1911), that precisely for this reason England must 
not introduce universal military service, since the recruiting 
for the colonial army, which upholds England's world su- 
premacy, would thereby suffer too great a restriction, and since 
a popular army is not adaptable for this work. Lord Esher, 
the friend of King Edward VII, expresses the same opinion 
in a pamphlet, "The Maritime and Military Position of the 
British Isles." 

"The British people," he says, "are war-like and aggressive; 
they have for centuries been constantly fighting, and, indeed, 
until quite recently it has been difficult to find any single year 
in which the British Empire has not been at war in some part 
of the world." 

One should, therefore, he says, speak not of "Imperial De- 
fence" but of "Imperial Offence." A popular army is not 
suited to such work. As a matter of fact, all states which have 
created great colonial empires have always made use of specially 
hired troops for this purpose, with the exception of Russia, and 
recently Italy in the Tripoli campaign. But the Russian army, 
as a result of the low state of culture, the limited levy and the 
long period of service. Is nearer to the nature of a mercenary 
army than that of Germany and France. English militarism is, 
therefore, much more adaptable for a misuse of power than is 
Continental militarism; and It is only necessary to read in "The 
History of Our Own Times," by Justin McCarthy, the story 
of the suppression of the Indian Mutiny, in order to see what 
spirit the Colonial army produces in Its officers. The entire race 
of the descendants of the great King Baber, twenty-four princes, 
were exterminated. Lieut. Hodson murdered three princes with 
his own hands, on detecting them among the prisoners; and 
McCarthy declares that public opinion in England, as a whole, 
recognized Hodson's deed as patriotic and worthy of praise. A 
mercenary army. It Is true, has also its sense of military honor, 
and is, therefore, not without idealism; but this idealism is quite 
different from that which Inspires the German army and, we are 
glad to add, the French army as well. For that which we style 
a universal duty to bear arms, the English have no other expres- 
sion than "compulsory service." It will not be long before they 
have learned otherwise on this point. In quite the same manner 
as with us, tens of thousands of young men in England, especially 
of the upper classes, have voluntarily entered the army, not for the? 



MODERN GERMANY 179 

sake of the "king's shilling," but in order to stand shoulder to 
shoulder with Tommy Atkins in the defence of their country, or 
more accurately, to uphold England's world supremacy. Even 
at the moment when they summon the whole world to battle 
against Prussian militarism, they themselves are already in the 
midst of it. 

The German army is the most thoroughly trained and most 
powerful war instrument of all the armies of the world, but at 
the same time the one which is the least available for a mere 
policy of ambition and thirst for power. It is true that it is 
bound in unconditional fealty and obedience to its Emperor, 
but the Emperor himself dare claim this obedience only as the 
representative of the nation's interest as a whole, or as he him- 
self expressed it on the occasion of his coronation, as "The First 
Servant of the State." In other words, our army is strong only 
on the political defensive, as when it is a question of defending 
the existence and the honor of the Empire against foreign aggres- 
sion. If in foreign countries the German spirit of aggression 
is often spoken of, and to this end German military writers are 
quoted, it must be made clear that by this is meant a strategical 
and tactical offensive, the spirit of which, It is true, is properly 
cultivated in our army. But to a political offensive, to the delib- 
erate starting of a war like the present, for the sake of conquest or 
for world supremacy, our people would never lend themselves; 
and of what value would be all the technical skill and discipline 
in this army without the spirit which results from free and full 
agreement, and which is none other than the spirit of the entire 
nation? Not more than 15 per cent of the army now in the 
field was in uniform on the day before the mobilization; the 
other 85 per cent are citizens and peasants, workers and students, 
the great proportion heads of families. Would such men 
be ready, for the sake of mere plans of ambition, to let them- 
selves be led to death? 

But the objection to this is made in foreign countries that 
the real ruling class in Germany is the officer caste. In the 
first place, our officer class is not a caste. Under Frederick the 
Great it possessed something of this character; to-day entrance 
into this body is open to every qualified young man of educa- 
tion and breeding. War Minister von Roon spoke of that class 
on one occasion when writing to Emperor William I as: "That 
part of Your Majesty's subjects who bear Your Majesty's weap- 
ons." This class, upon whose efficiency and educational activity 
our national freedom in great part depends, enjoys among us the 
greatest consideration, but it is far removed from ruling the 



i8o MODERN GERMANY 

state. The English officer-corps, shortly before the outbreak 
of the war, was on the point of mutiny and had already refused 
obedience to the civil government, because the parliamentary 
policy in Ireland displeased it. The French officer corps has 
obeyed the civil government since 1871, but, as is well known, 
with inward revolt. They had to submit to the leaders of the 
parliamentary groups, of the political slate-makers and dema- 
gogues, not because they were victims of the superstition that 
the Chambers represented the will of the French people (the 
French themselves speak with the greatest contempt of this rul- 
ing body), but because they had been defeated at Sedan. Every 
one in France is aware that had the French army been success- 
ful in defeating Germany, it would have marked the end of 
parliamentary lawyer-rule, and the army would have seized the 
powers of government, as under the Bonapartes. In Germany 
it is not the army which rules, but the Emperor, with the Federal 
Council and the Reichstag. To be sure, the Emperor feels 
himself to be the supreme commander and head of the army, 
and he will always have respect for its feelings, but he will 
consider in equal degree the feelings of his people, because he 
knows he is able thoroughly to fulfill his duties as ruler and to 
exercise, to its full extent, his royal right, only if the army and 
people are united under his leadership. Neither will the officer- 
corps ever mutiny as in England — not even if the Emperor, for 
political reasons, acts against its desires — nor can the victorious 
army oppress civil freedom, as in France, because the army is 
the Emperor's, who is bound by the Reichstag and the Consti- 
tution. If there have ever occurred disputes between officers 
and civilians, it was only in regard to questions of local and 
slight importance, which were exaggerated abroad in an un- 
friendly fashion. How superficial these differences were has 
been strikingly brought to our realization by this war. 

From whatever point of view one contemplates the constitu- 
tion of the armies of the four states which we have considered, 
it is clear that the reproach of "militarism" applies least of all 
to Germany; unless it be for the fact that this country first of 
all enunciated the principle that every citizen is a born defender 
of the Fatherland, and consistently carried it through, the other 
states falling into line later. With this principle, however, Prus- 
sia first saved Europe from the universal domination of Napoleon 
and then from that of the Czar. 

Even if we may claim that Germany (Prussia) for the last 
one hundred years has kept, with slight variations, her army in 
the same ratio to her population (i per cent), we are neverthe- 



MODERN GERMANY 



i8i 



less forced to admit, and we do it gladly, that in one respect 
we have greatly increased our armament. 

In order not to be excluded from international politics, in 
order not to be forced to be an idle spectator when the other 
Great Powers divided Africa and Asia among themselves, in 
order finally to protect her constantly growing maritime trade, 
Germany has gradually, since 1888, developed her fleet and 
thereby aroused England's deepest jealousy. But in this con- 
nection, also, quite false data are circulated abroad regarding 
us. In order to prove how the Germans were hastening the 
growth of their navy, the English have always compared the 
number of ships which were laid down; but this gives quite a 
false impression, as England needs only two, Germany three 
j^ears for the building of a great battleship. A correct com- 
parison is afforded by the following table, which groups together 
the battleships and the big armored cruisers. 

BIG BATTLESHIPS READY 



England 


Germany 


Englaito 


Germany 


1907 

1. Dreadnought 

2. Indomitable 

3. Inflexible 

4. Invincible 


None 


21. 
22. 

23- 

24. 

Ik 

27. 


I9I2 

King George V. 

Centurion 

AJax 

Audacious 

Australia 

New Zealand 

Queen Mary 


1912 

10. Oldenburg 

11. Kaiser 

12. Friedrich der 

Grosse 

13. Goeben 


1908 


None 




5. Temeraire 

6. Bellerophon 

7. Superb 


28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
•32. 


1913 

Iron Duke 
Marlborough 
Emperor of India 
Benbow 
Tiger 


1913 
14. Kaiserin 


1909 

8. St. Vincent 

9. Collingwood 


1909 

1. Nassau 

2. Westfalen 


15. Prinzregent Lmt» 

pold 

16. Konig Albert 

17. Seydlitz 


10. Vanguard 


33- 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 


1914 

Queen Elizabeth 

Warspite 
Barham 
Valiant 
Malaya 


1914 


1910 

11. Neptune 

12, Indefatigable 


1910 

3. Rheinland 

4. Posen 

5. V. d. Tann 


18. Markgraf 

19. Grosser Kurfiirst 

20. Konig 

21. Derfflinger 


1911 

13. Colossus 

14. Hercules 

15. Orion 

16. Conqueror 

17. Monarch 

18. Thunderer 

19. Lion 

20. Princess Royal 


1911 

6. Ostfriesland 

7. Helgoland 

8. Thiiringen 

9. Moltke 


Is. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 


191S 

Resolution 

Revenge 

Ramillies 

Royal-Oak 

Royal-Sovereigni 


191S 

22. Kronprinz 

23. Liitzow 



To this must be added: 43. Agincourt; 44- Erin; 45. Canada. 43 and 44 were built for 
Turkey, 45 for Chili; these were subsequently seized and added to the British fleet 



i82 MODERN GERMANY 

In the year 19 15 England had thus from 42 to 45, Germany 23 
great battleships ready; since 1910 the ratio has changed but 
slightly; and if a certain competition in this line has existed 
between England and Germany, it was begun by the former, 
not by the latter. Germany, it is true, has taken the liberty 
of building a fleet, of entering upon the construction of modern 
dreadnoughts, but only as following England's lead. 

The charge is thus disposed of that Germany created her fleet 
in order some day to attack England with it. For more than 150 
years the English nation has lived in the constant fear of a 
foreign invasion. At one time it was the Spaniards, generally 
the French, occasionally the Russians, and now it is the Ger- 
mans who disturb the peaceful sleep of the English citizen. To 
what purpose, however, does Germany build a fleet, if not to 
attack England with it? England, it is true, needs a fleet to 
protect and maintain her world empire, such as history and the 
bravery of her ancestors have bestowed on her ; the German fleet, 
however, is not in keeping with the meagreness of the German 
colonies; it is a strong battle fleet; it would be a pure luxury if 
it were not intended for an attack on England. 

The error in this reasoning lies in overlooking the value 
and importance of military preparation, even if not put to any 
actual use. Our naval experts have always claimed that a 
fleet, even in the face of a greatly stronger enemy, is of notable 
importance, because the latter, even with the prospect of com- 
plete victory, is sure to suffer severe losses himself, which will 
weaken his position in the world. This has been called the 
''principle of risk." If there were, perhaps, in Germany persons 
so fanciful as to dream of an immediate landing in England, 
in responsible circles there was a much soberer line of thought. 
It was desired, it is true, that the great battle fleet should be 
for something more than the mere protection of our own coasts, 
but this by no means implied a desire for an attack on those of 
England. What was desired lay between these two extremes. 
Our aim was to' be able to exercise, whether on England or 
on other Powers, a pressure sufficient to compel them to grant 
to Germany in world politics such a place in the sun as her power 
and her internal strength gave her the right to demand by the 
side of the others. New and extensive territory in Africa 
and Asia was continually being divided up among English, 
French, Russians, Americans and Japanese. Germany could 
not permit herself, and did not intend, to be permanently ex- 
cluded from this. Had Germany built no fleet she would not 
have been able to prevent the dismemberment of Turkey. Eng- 



MODERN GERMANY 183 

land, no doubt, found it extremely unpleasant that the main 
part of her fleet was held permanently in the North Sea through 
the growth of Germany's navy. But it is a long step from this 
to an attack, and England would have removed the drawbacks 
of the situation without great trouble by an honest understand- 
ing with Germany. Undoubtedly, there was in England a party 
which loyally strove for such a peaceful understanding, and the 
Emperor and Chancellor, supported by universal public opinion, 
met this movement willingly half-way and without any arriere 
pensee. If, nevertheless, the opposition party in England finally 
gained the ascendency, this was not due to the actual impossi- 
bility of a compromise, and in still less degree to any aggressive 
intentions on Germany's part; it was due solely to the fact that 
the aggressive policy of Pan-Slavism in the Balkan Peninsula, 
which finally resulted in the murder of the Archducal Heir 
Apparent, brought about a general crisis in Europe and gave the 
English war-party the upper hand. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF GERMAN 
INSTITUTIONS 

PROFESSOR GUSTAV VON SCHMOLLER, OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 

THE charge has been brought against Germany and Prussia 
that they lack the spirit of free institutions, that they are 
ruled by a harsh militarism inimical to culture. He who speaks 
thus may perhaps have in mind Herbert Spencer's thoroughly 
mistaken conception of the two separate modern types of state: 
the old reactionary type of the military state, and 'the advanced 
liberal type of the industrial state. Or the present-day glorifica- 
tion of democracy may hark back to the constitution of Attica, 
to the days when the great statesmen of Athens from Solon and 
Kleisthenes to Pericles created the democratic constitution by 
which the demos, or people, were supposed to rule. Spencer's 
conception is as mistaken as is the comparison of our great states 
with tiny Attica. This state had, at all events in the period of 
its democratic glory, a thorough military form; and to-day the 
United States of America maintains a small army only because 
it has no powerful neighbors. It would support a large standing 
army, says Professor Sloane of Columbia University, if it had 
three such dangerous neighbors as Germany has (Preussische 
Jahrbilcher, Vol. 158, p. 466). We admire Attica, which at 
the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War counted 250,000 inhabi- 
tants, not so much on account of the rule of the demos, as for 
the fact that it saved western civilization from suffocation by 
Persia. It saved this civilization because it was able to unite 
its infantry division of hoplites, who were drawn from the 
burghers and peasants, with its aristocratic cavalry squadrons, 
and to build a war fleet capable of opposing the Persians. The 
true greatness, however, of this incomparable democratic state 
is to be seen in the fact that, three hundred years before Christ, it 
^ followed its great aristocratic leaders, and that these leaders, while 
not emancipating the slaves and half-free classes, educated the 
mass of the ordinary citizens to a devotion to their public duties 
that has scarcely been equalled since. The superiority of Athens 
lay not in the rule of its demos, but in the obedience of its people 

184 



MODERN GERMANY 185 

down to the Peloponneslan War to their aristocratic leaders, 
and in the fact that these leaders created in the people a strong 
public spirit and educated them to devote themselves to the ideals 
of the state. 

There have been, no doubt, barbaric and semi-barbaric peoples 
of warlike nature who, as a consequence of a rough nomadic life, 
possessed a military, more or less despotic constitution preclud- 
ing free political institutions, like the Arabians under Mahomet, 
or like many of the German tribes and states during and after 
the wanderings of the peoples. But a military constitution and 
lack of poh'tical freedom are by no means historically inseparable, 
nor does one by any means alwa3^s follow the other. 

If we exclude the older types of states organized on a military 
basis (which cannot really be compared with the present-day 
states), the best explanation for the causes of the development 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of military states, lead- 
ing to certain limitations of civil freedom, is given by the great 
Oxford professor, Seeley. He says: "The amount of free- 
dom that may reasonably exist in a state is in indirect propor- 
tion to the military-political pressure exerted by foreign states 
against its boundaries." 

Germany was driven to universal military service by the un- 
precedented pressure of the French wars and of the Napoleonic 
domination from 1792 to 1 81 3. The development of the German 
fleet and the army increases from 1890 to the present day are 
traceable to the English encircling policy {Einkreisungspolitik) , 
and to the increased pressure of Russia and France against Ger- 
many. Had England, who, during the period from 1792 to 
1 81 4, destroyed the fleets of the other nations and conquered 
most of their colonies, been content with the position of power 
which she enjoyed from 181 5 to 1850; had she continued to the 
present day the peaceful policy pursued from 1846 to 1870, 
when she granted independence to her most important colonies 
and limited her naval programme — in such event, we Germans 
would probably have built no fleet nor made such increases in 
our army as we have made. But since Disraeli's day she has 
followed a new policy of conquest. During the period from 
1800 to 1900 she annexed between seven and eight million 
square kilometers of land and one hundred millions of people, 
and increased her fleet enormously. England has again become 
such as Kant described her in the eighteenth century: most 
greedy for conquest and the most warlike state in Europe. It 
is no wonder that the other states have been forced to imitate 
her in a degree. But has England by this fact become less free.. 



i86 MODERN GERMANY 

less democratic? Certainly not. Just as untrue is it that Prus- 
sia and Germany, because during the last two centuries they 
assumed a military character, have become a country without 
freedom, without a constitutional form of government. Ger- 
many is different, it is true, in essential points, from France, 
England and the United States. She does not have parliamentary 
government — that is to say, control of the highest administra- 
tive positions by the parliamentary majority. But the freedom 
of the citizen is protected against arbitrary encroachment on the 
part of the state authorities as well, if not better, than else- 
where. 

But what is understood by this political freedom in which 
we are said to be lacking? Principally two things: i. A cer- 
tain Influence of the people on the government, on legislation 
and on the leading principles of interior and foreign policy; 2. 
a secure guarantee of the freedom of action of the citizens in 
questions of faith and religion, in family life, in expressions of 
opinion, in literature and in the press, in private economic af- 
fairs, in the formation of societies, in public gatherings, etc. It 
is necessary that every civilized state should to-day exercise 
influence in such matters by certain legislative measures. But 
it must do this with tact and discretion, applying the laws im- 
partially; the courts and the administration should act in a 
strictly legal manner. 

In determining the powers of the Government, as well as in the 
circumscription of the sphere of individual freedom as against the 
powers of the state and arbitrary actions of the Government, 
one thing above all must be avoided: class rule and class abuse. 
Or rather, since this is never entirely feasible, class abuse must 
be limited by law as much as possible. And since for the last 
two hundred or three hundred years all civilized states have 
seen entirely new class systems develop, with the most pro- 
nounced tendencies toward class abuse and class dominance, the 
vital question of the new interior development of the state is in 
many cases the following: Where, under what forms and in- 
stitutions of government, and with what laws has the nearest 
approach been made to preventing the degradation of the lower 
classes and to limiting the abuses of the ruling classes? It can- 
not be questioned that, although royal despotism in ancient 
times and in the Middle Ages in many cases manifested and 
directly promoted pronounced class abuse, nevertheless the later 
enlightened despotism as well as the military and bureaucratic 
state of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have limited this 
notably. Just as certain is it that, although the development of 



MODERN GERMANY 187 

the democratic idea in the constitutions led to the expectation of 
the ehmination of class abuses — indeed, it held this out as a 
promise — nevertheless, while not unavoidable nor common to 
all states, in many of them the increase of democratization 
brought with it an increase of these abuses. This was the result 
chiefly of the moral and political level which the upper classes 
had reached before gaining greater rights and greater influence; 
and of the moral and mental development of the lower classes, 
who fought against the upper in the free state for political 
rights, but even more for possessions and income. 

The greater the political freedom is in any given state from 
the dual point of view of influence exercised by the people on 
the Government and the protection of the individual rights of 
freedom, the more emphatically can it be affirmed that these 
two factors have a beneficent effect proportionate to the degree 
of morality and of political and individual virtues attained to 
by the upper and lower classes. Premature granting of politi- 
cal freedom leads ofttimes to the downfall of the nation, or at 
least to bitter and long-continued inner strife. Extensive politi- 
cal freedom is held to be more easily realized with success in 
small states, especially those protected against the outside world, 
like Switzerland, than in large states, among well-balanced na- 
tions than among hot-blooded races. Such freedom, it is 
claimed, operates much more often in a beneficial manner in 
times of quiet development than in times of great social changes, 
of technical advances and of outward and inward struggles. 

But let us come to the point. Let us try to grasp the spirit 
of German institutions as it developed from 1650 to 181 5, and 
as it was rounded out from 1815 to 1915. It first took form 
in the secondary states, which were mostly ruled by the patri- 
cian classes ot the cities and the rural nobility. These states 
gained a firm governing power through gifted families, through 
the union of several territories and through the political strug- 
gles and wars of the period; from semi- or entirely aristocratic 
republics they became military and bureaucratic states. There 
arose here the best type of that which has been styled enlightened 
despotism. Representatives of this were the Prussian Princes 
from 1640 to 1786, IVIaria Theresa, Joseph II, and certain 
Saxon, Brunswick, Hessian, Bavarian and Wiirttemberg princes. 
In England the same type of state had been discredited by the 
Stuarts of the seventeenth century, while Cromwell's dictator- 
ship had approximated to it temporarily. In the Netherlands 
the princes of the House of Orange had been too weak, as 



i88 MODERN GERMANY 

'Opposed to the capitalistic city aristocracy, to reach their goal. 
In France love of display and conquest, religious intolerance, 
royal extravagance and vanity undermined enlightened despo- 
tism. In the England of a later period a foreign dynasty, w^ith 
mostly incompetent princes, was able to accomplish nothing from 
1714 to 1815 and w^as crowded aside by a great and capable 
aristocracy. The latter succeeded in establishing England's trade 
supremacy, but at the price of outrageous enrichment and domi- 
nation of the upper classes, and of degradation of the workers, 
which caused the country to stand on the brink of a social revo- 
lution practically from 1790 to 1850. This was prevented from 
coming to a head only by the severest of discriminating laws, by 
military force and cannons. 

What, now, did the German bureaucratic and military state 
in Prussia and in Austria and in the German secondary states 
achieve from 1640 to 1840? What did it indicate? Of what 
did it consist? What were its aims? How is the spirit of the 
resulting institutions to be expressed In a few words? 

This German bureaucratic and military state suppressed or 
checked feudal class rule and made it possible for the ruling 
princes to create efficient executive state organs at the centre and 
at the periphery. It put an end to the economic struggles between 
the city and the country. There was thus created a strong mon- 
archic power of a type which became an example for the whole 
world. It brought together the best elements of the people of 
all classes in bureaucratic and military service to form a new 
leading class, a new civil service aristocracy that stands high 
above the feudal as well as the money and capitalistic aristocracy 
of other countries and times. In the main, it succeeded in pro- 
tecting and saving the peasant class from being overburdened or 
impoverished and from being robbed of its land by extortionate 
sales. It reformed the corrupt city and guild constitutions of 
the Middle Ages, and rendered the city inhabitants ready for 
sound self-administration and for freedom of trade and resi- 
dence, and it assisted the peasant class to gain free ownership 
of its land. It introduced religious tolerance and universal edu- 
cation. It created at first in the individual states, then in the 
Customs Union and the Empire, a free interior market and a 
national trade constitution. It advanced and emancipated science, 
through the codification of the law, through great reforms in 
the organization of the courts, and through the suppression of 
all Star Chamber justice it guaranteed In the years from 1746 
to 1840 personal individual freedom such as existed at that time 
in no other European state. Although at the same time the 



MODERN GERMANY 189 

military burdens, the weight of taxation and the governmental 
conduct of economic matters did at many points operate oppres- 
sively against the citizens; although England, through her par- 
liamentary constitution (the admiration and imitation of w^hich 
was preached by Montesquieu in the eighteenth century) was 
in certain respects much in advance of Germany — despite all 
this, there is room for a difference of opinion whether the Eng- 
land of the three Georges or the Prussia of Frederick the Great 
stood higher from a cultural point of view. Of none of the 
English kings or statesmen could an English poet have said w^hat 
Goethe said of Frederick: "He shone upon us from the north 
like the pole star, about which the whole world seemed to 
turn.'; 

It is true that the energetic development of the bureaucratic 
and military state had also its drawbacks: from 1780 to 1850 
it became somewhat petrified, and the change to constitutional 
life was not made easily or quickly. We shall later return to 
this point. But, on the other hand, its traditions prevented 
hurried, ill-considered constitutional experiments, and its vital 
institutions, adapted both to the nation and to the times, have 
laid the foundations for a free constitutional life. 

In order to prove thfs, let us first examine somewhat more 
closely the personal elements of the bureaucratic state and then 
its more important government reforms. Our first question is: 
Of what nature was the class of civil servants and officers who, 
in Germany, under the leadership of the prince, the "first servant 
of the state," from 1640 to 1840, secured governing powers — 
the class that from 1640 to 1820 ruled mainly alone, but from 
then on in cooperation with the estates and the constitutional 
representatives — and that in Germany to-day still possesses po- 
litical preponderance, as in no other state in the world? Imita- 
tion of it, it is true, has been attempted since the middle of the 
nineteenth century in many differently ruled states, for instance, 
in the American Civil Service reform and in the British service 
in India. 

Since the once healthy local system of self-government had 
degenerated into oligarchic class domination, and since the 
landed aristocracy and the city patricians more and more abused 
and exploited the peasants and small burghers, the better Ger- 
man princes felt increasing need of protecting the middle and 
lower classes through councilmen, judges and magistrates who 
stood outside of the old aristocratic and city cliques. For this 
purpose clergymen and court officials offered their services, but 
especially jurists who had studied in Bologna, Prague, Leipsic, 



I90 MODERN GERMANY 

and other new German universities, and had gained knowledge 
of Roman law and of the imperial prerogatives it prescribes; 
in other cases these officials were burghers or noblemen from 
neighboring states who had no connection with the home cliques. 
In this way the Hohenzollern of the fifteenth century ruled in 
the Mark Brandenburg by means of knights, priests and writers 
from their Frankish home state. Their successors in the six- 
teenth century depended, in the main, on the Saxon or Meissen 
jurists, like the two Chancellors Distelmeyer, and also on Saxon 
and Bohemian noblemen. When, under Joachim Friedrich 
(1598-1608), the estates complained of the many foreigners in 
office, th'e elector replied that they themselves were quite lacking 
in the necessary knowledge; and his minister, the Bohemian 
Count Schlick, added that with the exception of one or two 
persons, the elector had no faithful men among the Brandenburg 
nobility. 

In the seventeenth century there appear, by the side of and 
above the native Brandenburg civil servants, the powerful Prot- 
estant nobility of East Prussia (such as, above all, the Dohnas), 
and capable officials from Cleve-Mark, Magdeburg and West- 
phalia, whom the Great Elector gladly attracted to Berlin. An 
especially important foreign element for the Brandenburg-Prus- 
sian officers' and officials' class was furnished by the French 
Huguenot families, who had fled to Brandenburg-Prussia, and 
among whom were many learned men, jurists and officers. In 
the year 1688 there were, among 1,030 Brandenburg officers, 
not less than 300 Huguenots, and probably also many Dutch, 
Swedes and Danes. We shall refer again to the fact that in 
many provinces, as late as 1713 to 1740, the nobility would not 
enter the Brandenburg army. The daughters of Huguenots in- 
fluenced the official class by marriage with the nobility of all the 
provinces; in like manner the Princesses on the Brandenburg 
throne of the families of Orange and the Palatinate brought with 
them from the Netherlands and Heidelberg thoughts and men 
of Protestant and progressive stripe, thereby forming at the 
court itself a strong counterweight to the ruling squire class, or 
Junkerstand. From the time of Friedrich Wilhelm I, it became 
the custom to fill the higher provincial offices with a prepon- 
derant number of men from the other provinces, in order to 
create a royal local administration which stood above the selfish 
interests of the provinces and the nobility. Under Frederick 
the Great, and even more perhaps under Friedrich Wilhelm III, 
the great talents and characters from the whole of Germany 
thronged to the Prussian service. The great Minister of Jus- 



MODERN GERMANY 191 

tice, Carmer, was from the Palatinate and of Scottish, extrac- 
tion; the Minister of Mining and Commerce, Heinitz, was a 
Saxon; Baron von Stein was from the Rhine, Hardenberg 
and Scharnhorst were Hanoverians; Gneisenau came from Aus- 
tria, Niebuhr from Holstein. The great reforms from 1808 
to 1820 could scarcely have been carried through without this 
foreign contingent in Prussian officialdom. 

It is a simple physiological fact that through this blood and 
race mixture from 1680 to 1820 the production of remarkable 
talent, even of genius, in Prussian official circles was likely to 
be considerably increased. 

At all events, within this order of officials and officers from 
different provinces and classes there grew up a united spirit, 
with distinctive feelings and views; there came to exist a strong 
bond of union, a pronounced esprit de corps, in contrast to the 
classes and circles inimical to the king and the civil service, to- 
gether with an increasing devotion to the ruler, the government 
and the state. The officials all felt themselves to be an ecclesia 
militans, a reform party within the state, opposed to all manner 
of local, special and class interests. Sons of officials and of 
officers were encouraged to follow the career of their fathers. 
Frederick the Great w^as fond of saying that in this manner the 
sons grew up from their youth in an atmosphere of honor and 
with the welfare of the state at heart. Talented and striking 
characters from both high and low social strata were welded 
into a uniform official class. It was here possible — as once in 
the Roman Church — for the lowest day-laborer or peasant's son 
to rise. Ministers of such origin sat beside counts and princes 
from 1640 to 1850, although for certain positions nobles were 
preferred, or ordinary citizens were ennobled to fill them. One 
need only refer to the career of Rother, who advanced between 
the years 1806- 1848 from the rank of an army clerk to that of 
a minister of state. 

The sons and grandsons of the most selfish squires {Junker), 
the most bitter enemies of the monarchy, acquired quite different 
feelings in military and government service, and became imbued 
with the conception and interests of the state. The new associa- 
tions in which they found themselves and amid which they 
worked freed them from the old ties, and turned many of them 
into efficient cooperators in an anti-feudal policy for the benefit 
.of the peasants, trade and industry — a policy which tended to 
•strengthen the monarchy. They shared in the enlightened tend- 
encies of Frederick the Great, and in the political ideals of 
F'riedrich Wilhelm III and his advisers. 



192 MODERN GERMANY 

This sense of spiritual unity in the bureaucratic state was 
strengthened by the gradual development of an identical eco- 
nomic basis for all members of the official and officer class. 

Those occupying official positions in the old established states 
were landed proprietors and generally hereditary holders of the 
office, or they held yearly elective positions which, as wealthy 
aristocrats, were open to them only. With the increasing divi- 
sion of labor, both of these classes of officials proved insufficient, 
even harmful. In neither case was the office-holder's chief 
devotion given to his work, but to his material possessions and 
their increase, to family and class interests. With the growth 
of the power of money in the economic life and the increasing 
division of labor, appointment by the ruler of officials for life, 
living exclusively for their work, and receiving fixed remunera- 
tion and special training, became feasible and more and more 
frequent in the monarchic state. The Roman emperors were 
the first to develop such an official class, working for fixed sal- 
aries; the Church of Rome applied this form of the imperial 
administration to its priests, and the other states, with France in 
the lead, sought from the thirteenth century on to develop such 
an official class; from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century it 
gradually repressed the older official system. Burgundy and 
Austria imitated the French model, and the more important 
German territorial states followed suit. 

It was a new and difficult question to organize all the offices 
and bureaus, to find, educate and train suitable men, and to 
develop official careers; this effort could succeed only gropingly, 
and against great difficulties. The chief problem was to con- 
quer constantly arising abuses. It was a question of creating 
in that epoch of incipient money circulation a social mechanism 
of the most complicated kind ; even the most capable princes 
and governments succeeded in accomplishing this only through 
particularly favorable circumstances and by efforts continued 
through decades and centuries. 

German officialdom of the fifteenth to the seventeenth cen- 
tury had been, to a great extent, a body of rather doubtful men ; 
but in Prussia from 1670 to 1750 trustworthiness and efficiency 
had become the rule among them. Gneist speaks of the officials 
and generals who surrounded Frederick the Great as forming 
one of the most intellectual generations which Germany had 
ever produced. The old system of payment by perquisites or in 
kind from property administered by the officials themselves had 
to be superseded by a regular and reliable system of salaries in 
cash; the hunt for vacant fiefs and other similar privileges had 



MODERN GERMANY 193 

to be done away with and the right of appointment to be gath- 
ered into the hand of the sovereign. A clear civil service law, 
distinct official instructions and a strict government control had 
to be introduced, while allowing the officials far-reaching initia- 
tive in making proposals within the province of their office. 
The officials had to be made subject to just laws of disciplinary 
punishment and a gradually adapted system of examinations, 
admitting only the efficient and well-trained. A certain routine 
of promotion had to be established, and in consequence thereof a 
certain tradition as to the classes from which officials were to 
be taken. The result of all this was to create uniform stand- 
ards of duty and official probity throughout the entire official- 
dom. 

To be sure, there were dangers connected with this Institution 
of professional officials, such as development of cllquedom, of 
patronage by superiors and members of Parliament, and of a 
tendency to stagnant routine. Furthermore, with the guaran- 
teed income and comparative security from dismissal which the 
officials enjoyed, there was also the danger of their inclining too 
much to consulting their own convenience and developing a 
lack of initiative in their official activity. The official Is called 
upon to display the greatest degree of ardor and devotion for 
objects which do not concern his personal Interests. Personal 
ambition alone is not sufficient as an Impelling force; it must be 
supplemented by a strong sense of duty, high ethical and intel- 
lectual training, and a strong moral and political esprit de corps. 

The assured economic position, Income and pension, the rule 
adopted at an early period against taking part in stock transac- 
tions or engaging In business, had the beneficial effect of en- 
abling the official to devote himself entirely to his work and to 
the interests of the public, and of placing him above the social 
battles of the classes. 

"The essence of the state and of official position," says Ernst 
Meyer, "is the protection of the general welfare against the 
particular interests of the wealthy classes." 

It was the historical task of the bureaucratic state to create 
for this purpose an order w^hose collective intellectual and spir- 
itual qualities were devoted to the service of the state, who 
subordinated their personal interests as well as their prejudices 
to official duty. To be sure, that ideal was unconditionally 
attained only in the case of nobler natures, in connection with 
home education, school and university training. 

Prussian officialdom, however, approached thereto most 
closely in the eighteenth century, and again from 18 10 to 1 840. 



194 MODERN GERMANY 

Furthermore, in the constitutional period from 1850 on, the 
ethical and political qualities of the official class remained the 
intellectual and moral backbone of the state. Only in connec- 
tion with great events and great spiritual, political and moral 
movements, and under the guidance of great princes, generals 
and statesmen, was Prussia able to raise her officials to their 
high plane of efficiency, of integrity and cooperation. And in 
the other great territorial states the development had been simi- 
lar in the years from 1700 to 1850. But in 1786, as well as in 
the period from 1720 to 1850, the natural drawbacks of the 
bureaucratic state became evident. The officials had become a 
ruling class. The people rightfully demanded a greater share 
in the state and government. It was necessary that a constitu- 
tional epoch should rejuvenate the bureaucratic state, raise it 
again to a higher plane; competition with nobility and civilians 
demanded greater efforts of it. We can with confidence state 
that the political transformation which took place from 1840 to 
the present time has not destroyed the chief qualities of our 
just, intelligent, mentally and morally elevated official class» 

We shall now speak of the principal achievements of the Prus- 
sian bureaucratic aristocracy from 1640 down to our own time. 
They deserve careful consideration, if one wishes fairly to judge 
the drawbacks of the German bureaucratic and military state in 
the period to 1840 and if one desires duly to appreciate its effect 
on present-day conditions. These achievements consist in: i. 
The introduction and carrying out of universal education, the 
founding of the public school as well as of other institutions of 
learning. 2. The organization of the army and the adoption of 
the universal duty of bearing arms. 3. The judicial reforms. 
4. The reform of the system of self-government, beginning in 
this period, and its later development. 

In considering the inner structure of society in the European 
civilized states from the Carlovingian period down to the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, nothing is more important, next to 
the division of wealth, the feudal system and the beginnings of 
monetary development and government finances, than the fact 
that the thin upper stratum of the country and city aristocracy, 
under the guidance of priests and clergymen, had learned to read, 
write, reckon and keep books, while the mass of the people in 
city and country, owing to their lack of such knowledge, were 
condemned to social subordination, to dominance and exploita- 
tion at the hands of the aristocracy of the learned. The Ger- 
man Reformation had set up the requirement that the entire 



MODERN GERMANY 195 

<jrerman nation must learn to read the Bible unaided. That is 
the origin of modern public schools, the first message of good 
hope for the elevation of the lower and middle classes. The 
enlightenment of the eighteenth century next demanded the 
sharing of the people in this intellectual progress, and thus gave 
a strong impulse to the development of the schools. The better 
ruled German states, especially Prussia, underwent in the eight- 
eenth century and down to 1850 an important improvement in 
their school system, although the upper conservative classes 
feared that as a result the young men would become insubordi- 
nate and the girls dissolute. The development of the public 
school, however, was not completed in Germany and elsewhere, 
until the period from 1830 to 1850. At the same time the 
government school system, effecting a marked restriction of the 
religious and private schools, gained a general victory in Ger- 
many. Now^here else was universal education made a reality 
to such an extent as in the German bureaucratic states. The 
result was a uniform spreading of moral and cultural concep- 
tions, and an approach of the lower and middle classes to the 
upper without parallel anywhere else. In France, Guizot had 
created a more or less widespread school system in the period 
from 1830 to 1840; in England the state did not begin to con- 
cern itself with education until a generation ago. The moral 
and economic destitution of the lower classes in England from 
1750 to 1830 is one evidence of this fact. The generation at 
the helm to-day in Europe was born from 1850 to 1870. In 
the sixties, of children from six to fourteen years of age, only 
4 per cent were non-attendants at school in Prussia, while in 
France 20 per cent, in England 25 per cent and in Russia 90 
per cent came under this head. 

The greatest social reformers of all times have appreciated 
the political and social importance of the public school. Solon 
desired to open the schools of Attica to the great majority of the 
people; Robert Owen laid chief stress in social reform on schools 
for the children of workers; and the best English administra- 
tive officials of India demanded schools for that country, in 
order to combat the caste sj'stem from within. Extensive politi- 
cal rights and a democratic constitution, without a good public- 
school system, are a political paradox, if not, indeed, a madness 
or a crime. And, in addition to the public school, the people 
must have extension schools, and industrial and vocational 
schools. The higher system of education, the universities, the 
technical and commercial schools, can be built properly only 
upon this foundation. Especially in this line has no other nation 



196 MODERN GERMANY 

in the world made greater progress than Germany, from 1850 
down to the present. It may be stated without exaggeration 
that the advancement of talent in the lower classes, a certain 
freedom of vocational choice, the approach of all classes to each 
other and the bridging of the abyss separating the people from 
the aristocracy is rendered possible only through a broad and 
efficient system of educational institutions, from the lowest grade 
to the highest. The 110,000 non-commissioned officers in the 
present-day German army, who became soldiers with a common- 
school education, thanks to the instruction offered them as non- 
commissioned officers, enjoy the opportunity, as well as the right 
to enter, when 32 years of age, into the lower and middle posi- 
tions of the army, civil or municipal service. This service has 
from a third to a half-million excellent officials, of whom many 
before i860 passed on to higher careers, and whose sons and 
grandsons are still to-day in many cases advancing to the upper 
ranks of officialdom. 

Previous to 1834, when graduation from the Gymnasium was 
first introduced, and down to 1840 when it became more and 
more the requirement for admission to all higher official posi- 
tions, many of the numerous ex-non-commissioned officers ad- 
vanced from the middle positions to the higher service. This 
still occurs to-day in individual cases. It would have been bet- 
ter to retain in the main the principle of advancement which 
obtained from 1790 to 1850. 

Finally, on the subject of education let us make one more 
observation in regard to scientific freedom in our universities, 
since they have recently been frequently branded as unfree 
government institutions. The European universities grew up 
from the fourteenth century, in connection with the Church; 
their first great achievements were in Bologna, Paris, Prague 
and Leipsic, and then throughout Germany after the Reformation. 
Their guildlike character, however, led in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries to a narrow-minded system of cliques and 
nepotism. The free university administration degenerated in the 
same manner as the old free city constitutions. A striking new 
revival of the German universities begins with the great princely 
foundations; Halle and Gottingen in the eighteenth century, 
Berlin, Munich and Bonn at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century head the list. The older universities followed the mod- 
ern lead and were remodeled on similar lines. The right of 
the princes to appoint professors rejuvenated the universities. 
Government funds in greater and greater amounts were placed 
at their disposal. Appointment by the state does not preclude 



MODERN GERMANY 197 

the fact that savants proposed by the faculties are almost al- 
ways appointed. The absolutely free body of Privatdozenten, 
or free-lance lecturers, furnishes the necessary healthy competi- 
tion for the officially appointed professors. Each of the numer- 
ous federal states strives to attract the best men. He who is 
disciplined in Gottingen may receive a call to Berlin, as did the 
brothers Grimm. Freedom in lecturing, teaching and method, 
as well as in literary activity, is unlimited. The administration 
of the university by the faculty and the academic senate pre- 
serves the republican form, as contrasted with the American 
absolutism of university presidents and the influence of trustees, 
who, believers in a protective tariff, remove professors advo- 
cating free trade — a thing which could not happen in Germany. 
At all events, the German universities during the last sixty 
years have stood assuredly not under but above those of other 
civilized states. This has always been unconditionally admitted 
in Russia, North America, Japan and elsewhere. 

The European armies of the sixteenth and seventeenth cen- 
turies rested upon the system of the free enlistment of paid 
mercenaries from the home country and from abroad, these mer- 
cenaries being welded together into brotherhoods and companies 
by private military contractors (condottieri), mostly noble cap- 
tains w^ho had become rich, or by war commissioners who had 
received an enlistment patent from some prince. The traditions 
of the Swiss who hired themselves out in foreign lands, and the 
mercenary brotherhoods {Landsknechtsbruderschaften) which 
had been formed by Emperor Maximilian, originally controlled 
this development. William of Orange, Gustavus Adolphus, 
and the French kings and generals improved the organization 
and the methods of fighting, sought to transform these bodies 
partially into national troops, and paved the way for monarchic 
discipline. The regiments, which wTre formed only for the 
summer months, gradually became permanent. The Great Elec- 
tor was the first, in 1660, after the Northern War, not to re- 
lease his troops in Brandenburg-Prussia. From that time on 
there was a Brandenburg-Prussian army, which from 1660 to 
1786 was the first, as well as the best, in Europe. The Elector 
transformed the purely private enterprises of majors and cap- 
tains, who were only perfunctorily controlled by princely war 
commissioners, into bodies of troops whose officers he appointed. 
During the period from 1680 to 17 13 the army became a purely 
governmental undertaking of permanent nature, the officers 
changed from greedy money-makers into officials with the gov- 



198 MODERN GERMANY 

ernment's commission and under princely control. An increas- 
ing proportion of officers and men were already natives and sub- 
jects, or became such. The system of levies w^as used in con- 
junction wath that of free enlistment; communities and cities 
were called upon to furnish soldiers. The general canvassing 
of soldiers as the only method, especially in foreign countries, 
proved to be too dear, and often furnished useless rabble that 
constantly deserted. 

When Friedrich Wilhelm I, for the sake of h!s household, as 
he said, from 1714 to 1730 at times went too far in the hiring 
of foreign soldiers and thereby brought about unfavorable re- 
sults, recourse was had to the mixed system, which continued 
until 1808. A portion of the company consisted of enlisted 
foreigners, who served almost for life and who were encour- 
aged as much as possible to marry native women; during part 
of the year, for reasons of economy, they were given furloughs 
within the garrison for industrial work — the so-called Frei- 
wdchter. This part of the army could not be increased in time 
of war. The other part consisted of native peasant boys, who 
were apportioned to the regiments according to the so-called 
canton districts. They received training for one year, supple- 
mented by several periods of from one to two months, and 
remained for twenty years subject to call. They were the 
more numerous in time of war, as the foreigners were in time 
of peace. Although the so-called canton ordinance of 1773 
declared that ''all the inhabitants of the land are born to bear 
arms," the tiigher classes of society were not yet subject to this 
military duty, and the exceptions increased for economic reasons 
until 1806. A determined opposition against this duty of national 
military service was offered from 1733 on, not primarily by the 
peasants, who were proud to be enrolled and have a bunch of 
feathers in their hats, but by their overlords. The latter con- 
sidered it an infringement of their rights that the peasant was 
now more dependent on his regiment commander than on his 
overlord. The duty of military service was a great step toward 
the development of universal citizenship. The peasant had now 
a direct connection with his king, whom he had often seen, per- 
haps spoken with, and whose battles he had helped to win. 

A still more important fact was that, with the increase of the 
army (171 3, 38,000; 1740, 83,000; 1786, 200,000; 1806, 250,- 
000 men — the last two numbers equalling 2.3 per cent and 3.7 
per cent, respectively, of the population), the whole nobility were 
more and more drafted into the corps of officers. The poor lower 
nobility of Pomerania early entered military service in order to 



MODERN GERMANY 199 

increase their small incomes; the Brandenburgian nobles also 
readily joined the army. But it was quite otherwise from 1713 
to 1740 with the East Prussian aristocracy, who lived generally 
on their feudal incomes and whom Friedrich Wilhelm I had 
frequently to compel to send their fourteen- to eighteen-year-old 
sons to the cadet schools and regiments. The result as a whole, 
however, was that the entire nobility of the kingdom, by the 
year 1800, had become accustomed to seeing all of their sons 
officers or officials. That nobility, in 1700 still in great part 
feudal and anti-monarchic, was now a faithful and trustworthy 
monarchic party, to which fact was due their loyal devotion in 
the nineteenth century to the national cause. 

Under this system Prussia had a small army for peace, a large 
army for the field. The foreigners, lifelong professional sol- 
diers, formed the core and backbone about which the native 
peasants were grouped. A relentless discipline was needed to 
keep these utterly different elements together. In time of war 
there were usually no more foreigners to be had, but it was 
always easy to fill out the regiments by means of the numerous 
men liable for service in the cantons who had not yet been 
called. Although the whole Prussian military system had a 
certain harshness, nevertheless it appeared, even to Mirabeau- 
Mauvillon, despite its drawbacks and evils, to possess great 
advantages. It provided for the poor nobility, he said, and 
gave work and shelter to the idle proletariat ; as a result Prussia, 
despite her poverty, had a like birthrate with the most prosperous 
and fertile countries of Europe. 

On the other hand, unfriendly criticism of the Prussian mili- 
tary system increased from 1786 to 1806. The elder officials 
supported it unreservedly, but public opinion and the young 
generation of the most capable officers demanded more and more 
the abolition of the foreign levy, the formation of reserve or 
militia troops, or even indeed universal military service. 

The government down to 1806 was not energetic and bold 
enough for a great reform; the footless w^ar against France 
from 1792 to 1795, the ill-conceived divisions of Poland between 
1793 and 1795, which strengthened Prussia only outwardly, not 
inwardly, had been too costly to leave any money over for mili- 
tary reform. This came, however, from 1808 to 1820. Among 
the regulations introduced during this period were the univer- 
sal duty of bearing arms, the creation of a large Landwehr in 
connection with the regular army, a thorough reconstruction of 
the officers' corps, on the basis of equality of the ordinary citizen 
with the nobles. It was no slight task, even under the pressure of 



200 MODERN GERMANY 

war, for War Minister von Boyen, In the years 1814 to 181 5, 
to create a moderately large army of peace, with three years* 
service, besides the two classes of Landwehr reserves which 
were formed on the basis of universal conscription. This was 
an achievement of the great Idealistic and liberal statesmen and 
generals to which the vacillating King, Friedrich Wilhelm III, 
gave his approval only because Boyen cleverly represented It to 
him as merely the development of existing Institutions. The 
two Ministers, Altenstein and Dohna, had been, in 18 10, as 
were later the Berlin city representatives, against general mili- 
tary service, in the pretended interest of civilization. Scharn- 
horst conceived of a standing army of the Indigent and of a per- 
manent militia of the upper classes In connection with it. Gnei- 
senau attributed the relaxing and deteriorating of the nations 
and the dying out of a sense of public duty to the standing mer- 
cenary armies. Universal military duty, he said, mingles the 
upper and lower classes, does away with social prejudices, com- 
pels better education of the common people and rests upon a 
moral principle which sets the masses in movement and blends 
them together. Baron von Stein regarded the universal duty 
of bearing arms as the chief means of creating a sense of soli- 
darity, of combating the opposition of the various classes to each 
other and the tendency of the upper classes to unwarlike and 
eifeminate habits. 

Metternich, of course, regarded universal military duty as a 
mistake. Emperor Alexander feared the democratic character 
of this Institution so greatly that in Paris he expressed doubt 
whether It would not soon be necessary to send help to the King 
of Prussia against his own army. In Koblenz, Gneisenau, as 
commanding general, was suspected of being a demagogic gen- 
eral. The French made merry over the Prussian "child-army." 
General Biilow and many of the elder generals urgently de- 
manded the return to the old system. Only Adjutant-General 
von Witzleben held the King in 1819 firmly to the great re- 
form. 

The Prussian army law of September 3, 1814, is perhaps 
the most Important law of this epoch. It has been of funda- 
mental importance for the development of moral and political 
conceptions, at first In Prussia, then In Germany, during the 
w^hole period down to the present. It was a democratic law In 
the best sense of the word. Germany stands, as does no other 
state, upon universal education and the universal duty of bearing 
arms. With universal military duty the standing army became, 
above all else, a training-school for the whole nation. Its intro- 



MODERN GERMANY 201 

duction, says one of our great historians, was a bold stroke, with- 
out precedent, bringing to mind the energy of the antique concep- 
tion of the state. Universal military duty presupposes the agree- 
ment of people and government. It permits of no war of which 
the nation does not approve. With it no war of conquest is possi- 
ble, but only a defensive war, a war for the life and existence 
of the nation. 

The changes which, from 18 14 down to to-day, took place 
in the Prussian and German army constitutions need not be 
traced here. They did not change its basic character. How- 
ever heatedly the reform of the army was discussed from 1859 
to 1866, however strongly feudal the officers of the standing 
army temporarily seemed, while the Landwehr appeared to be the 
only popular part of the organization, nevertheless this basic 
idea remained: The standing army, with its professional offi- 
cers, is the backbone of our military strength and the school for 
the whole nation; but the greater part of the troops who take 
the field are citizens, not professional soldiers nor professional 
officers. We still have, as from 18 13 to 1815, as in 1830, 1848, 
1864 to 1870, a people's army, which is more truly popular 
than any other army in the world. It is not more beloved of 
our princes and nobility than of our citizens, peasants and 
workers. Every one who is familiar with our Social Democ- 
racy knows that even for the Social Democrat his period of 
service remains the most delightful memory. We have wit- 
nessed the manner in which the Social Democrats, without ex- 
ception, joyously responded to the summons. He who knows 
the relation of our officers to their men is aware that I have 
been justified in often making this declaration in lectures and in 
writing: "If our entrepreneurs and their agents stood toward 
their workers on the same footing as our officers toward the 
men under them, we should have no social question among 
us." 

All this chatter about an unsocial despotic German militarism, 
inimical to liberal civilization, is the talk of people who have, 
or desire to have, no knowledge of our internal conditions. 

We pass now from the reform of school and army to the 
judicial reform. Nothing is more important for the security of 
the individual freedom of modern man in the state of to-day 
than a high standard of public justice: Justitia fundamentum 
regnorum. No task was more difficult in the change from the 
state of the Middle Ages to the modern commonwealth, than 
the creation of an able, impartial body of judges, of an up-to-date 



202 MODERN GERMANY 

court organization, of efficient civil and criminal laws. Much 
of this was accomplished by the old Prussian state before 1800; 
and together with the other German states, Prussia made con- 
siderable progress from 1800 to 1870. Between that date and 
the present day Germany has achieved a model of uniform court 
organization and a uniform code of civil law, which unites the 
merits of the Code Civil and of the old Prussian state law 
{Landrecht) . 

It is no easy task to present concretely, in a few w^ords, the law 
reforms of a thousand years. But let us attempt it. 

The elder Germanic legal procedure provided for the conduct 
of cases by the community under the presidency of the count and 
of the magistrate, whose functions were merely formal; a 
strictly formal verbal process, without appeal, led to the deci- 
sion. As early as the time of Charlemagne the communities 
proved inefficient and the Emperor replaced them by sheriffs 
(Schoffen). This reform was not sufficient. The Schoffen 
court in the late Middle Ages had completely broken down. 
From the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries, in all European 
states, it was necessary to introduce a monarchic system of court 
organization, judges appointed by the ruler, and a scientific body 
of law. But the change from the old to the new was extremely 
difficult. To create a learned body of judges was no easy task, 
especially for the lower courts. Old and new institutions re- 
mained for hundreds of years, existing side by side, and mutually 
obstructing each other. The Roman Law gained the upper hand 
more and more from the fifteenth century on, not as a better, but 
as a written, learned system of a higher state of civilization. The 
legal procedure of the Roman Church, with its principles of 
equity, and that of the princes and their counsellors, which was 
fashioned after it, was preferred to the procedure of the old court 
organizations. At the same time there grew up the written pro- 
cedure with clerks of the court. Next, from the eighteenth cen- 
tury on, there appeared, as an important step forward, the col- 
legiate courts, like the Imperial Court and the higher princely 
courts. 

In the local courts everything remained unchanged; the func- 
tions of the sheriffs sank, in most places, to mere cooperation in 
the drawing up of legal documents. The judges had insufficient 
legal training, or none at all ; they became dependent on grasping 
clerks and cunning lawyers, as well as on the latter's go-betweens, 
the so-called procurators, who were the channel through which 
all corruption passed. Almost all the judges, especially those of 
the lower courts, were without regular pay and were supposed to 



MODERN GERMANY 203 

live from perquisites of the court. As Late as the sixteenth cen- 
tury, the courts sat only one to two weeks four times yearly, 
although the written procedure long since had demanded a con- 
tinuous official activity throughout the whole year. The civil 
law was entirely uncertain, the criminal barbaric; the procedure 
was everywhere conducted according to precedent and whim. 
Interference with justice by the princes and their commissioners 
was the order of the day ; the dragging out of the cases was pro- 
moted by the cupidity of the judges and lawyers, and the tedious- 
ness of the written procedure became unbearable. As there 
was confidence in no body of judges, in no city or manorial court, 
the sole hope of a just decision rested in sending the papers in 
the case to the law faculties, or to the few Schoffen courts that 
were still respected. Jurisdiction in Germany reached its lowest 
point about 1650. 

The attempts at reform in Brandenburg-Prussia from 1650 to 
1740 were numerous — but of little avail. Provincial upper 
courts were created ; in 1 7 1 7 criminal cases were taken from the 
local county courts, that is to say, from the overlords; in 1718, 
in East Prussia, the county law was reformed ; frequent attempts 
were made to revive the system of oral pleadings in the Berlin 
Upper Court {Kammergericht) . But it remained mere patch- 
work. The reformers were powerless against the advocates of 
the old dilly-dallying methods. There were no funds with which 
to pay competent judges. 

It was the great achievement of Frederick the Great and of his 
relentlessly energetic High Chancellor, Samuel Cocceji, that 
during the period from 1745 to 1755 an upright, learned body of 
judges was created, no longer dependent on perquisites, but with 
regular salaries, that the "procurators" were done away with and 
reduced to lawyers' clerks, that the body of judges and lawyers 
was thoroughly overhauled and placed under close surveillance, 
and that the payment of lawyers was deferred until the termina- 
tion of the cases. Through Cocceji justice became speedy in 
Prussia. Cocceji, says Ranke, founded the Prussian judiciary 
anew. From that period on, he adds, personal freedom was to a 
certain extent guaranteed. Star Chamber justice was done away 
with and jurisdiction confined to the regular courts admitting of 
two appeals. All judges stood now under the surveillance of the 
chief justice, all lower courts under that of the upper courts. 
The training of judges was strictly regulated by examination and 
by promotion through the preparatory grades of Auskultator 
and Kejerendar. The personnel and the organization of jus- 
^tice had now reached the plane to which the Prussian adminis- 



204 MODERN GERMANY 

trative system had already attained in the years from 1680 to 
1740. 

What Cocceji began was completed by two men, less ruthless 
than he, but standing even above him in point of moral nobility 
and intellectual endowment — the High Chancellor von Carmer 
and his Councillor Suarez (i 780-1 795). 

The reform of the civil procedure (April 26, 1781, and July 
6, 1793), the introduction of oral pleadings, the increase of the 
judges' power to unlimited freedom in establishing the material 
truth, and the limitation of lawyers' activity was designed to se- 
cure justice for the peasants and the people of the lower classes. 
This has been called the procedure by inquiry: The judge was 
bound ex officio to discover the truth. He was vested with a 
kind of tutelary, almost state-socialistic power, which was to 
counteract the untrustworthiness of the lawyers of that time and 
the helplessness of the litigants. The judges were intended to 
occupy, on a small scale, a position such as the all-powerful king 
occupied on a large scale, with his desire to understand and to 
help the lowly. The windmill owner of Sans-SoucI who is sup- 
posed to have Impelled the King to leave him In peace by saying: 
^7/ y a des juges a Berlin j" never spoke thus. But Carmer 's code 
of procedure, like the King's interference in behalf of the miller 
Arnold against his overlord. Count Schmettau, made the whole 
Prussian people believe that there was now one state in Europe 
in which the obscure man could secure justice against the great 
man. 

Attempts were made in all the greater German territories, 
from the sixteenth century on, to create a uniform whole out of 
the conglomeration of the adopted Roman Law, the German legal 
institutions, and the legislation subsequent to the year 1500. 
Friedrlch Wilhelm I attempted to do what Leibnitz had advised ; 
Cocceji also outlined a plan, but only Carmer possessed the cour- 
age to influence Frederick the Great to attempt the creation of 
a code comprehensible to the people. It was intended to make 
it so clear and complete that the disputes of the jurists should 
cease. The outline was printed during the period 1784 to 1788; 
and despite many attacks and criticisms It was put Into effect on 
June I, 1792. Its aim was not to create a new law but to codify 
and elucidate the existing law. 

This general common law {Allgemeines Landrecht) reflects 
the conditions of the half-feudal, half-absolute state, of the bu- 
reaucratic and military state. It was from the start subject to 
much discussion, but it was nevertheless recognized as an epoch- 
snaking advance by the greatest and most far-seeing men of the 



MODERN GERMANY 205 

age. It provided for the first time a uniform law for a state with 
radically different provinces. It created a fixed and purely Ger- 
man law nomenclature ; it was a compromise between Roman and 
German law. It vastly increased legal security. It helped more 
than anything else the transition from the "police state" to the 
legal state. It was the worthy predecessor of the French code 
civil and of the German general civil code {Biirgerliches Gesetz- 
buck) of our day. It became the foundation for the whole Ger- 
man legal life of the nineteenth century. 

The nineteenth century continued to build upon the founda- 
tions of the eighteenth century. The jurisdiction of the ma- 
norial courts in Prussia, which had long since been restricted, 
w^as in 1849 entirely abolished, although it was much superior 
to the jurisdiction of the English justices of the peace; Lord 
Brougham, as is well known, once remarked of the latter that 
it was worse and more partial even than the justice of a Turk- 
ish "cadi." Trial by jury was introduced. The great reforms 
in procedure and court constitution between 1 877-1 879 created 
in all Germany a uniform procedure, and attached laymen as 
assessors to the courts of the first instance. In short, Germany 
has to-day a system which, as regards the legal protection of 
the people and of individuals, is surpassed by that of no other 
nation; it has enjoyed this, in its main outlines and principles, 
for quite a number of generations. 

We come finally to the question of self-government. It is, 
in the proper form, the best training school for political free- 
dom; it can, however, develop along false lines into an instru- 
ment of class rule and of political corruption. We understand, 
in this connection, by self-government the administration of the 
municipalities and other communal units by the citizens them- 
selves, with more or less independence as regards the state 
authorities and officials. If this independence goes as far as it 
went at one time in the German Free Cities, or in the greater 
Territorial Cities from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century, as 
well as among the manorial lords, or in the county and district 
corporations, the resistance of the state to this independence 
and its abuses becomes necessary, as the German princes from 
1500 to 1800 found to be the case. Since in England a strong 
monarchy from the early Norman kings down to the Tudors kept 
the nobility and cities subordinate to the central power, the 
healthy self-government which grew up in the county, township 
and parish caused great admiration on the Continent, espe- 
cially in Germany, down to the time of Gneist,^ and sugges- 



2o6 MODERN GERMANY 

tlons were made for its imitation in Germany. But the advo- 
cates of such measures failed to see that the English self-gov- 
ernment in county and township had long since degenerated 
into class rule. 

In the state of to-day the central power and its organs must 
rule absolutely in the whole legislative field, in foreign and 
military affairs, and as regards justice. In the field of finance, 
police and internal administration the authorities of the munici- 
palities and other communal corporations may be entrusted with 
the carrying out of certain governmental affairs; others, espe- 
cially institutions of general utility of all kinds, may be left 
entirely or partially to them, ordinarily in such a manner that 
they choose their own bodies and appoint their own officials 
for these undertakings. Especially does the purely business ad- 
ministration of the municipalities belong to this category. 

Where the communal authorities are inspired by the proper 
feeling, this self-government, within its proper limits, is a 
higher form of political life. These locally chosen authorities 
stand nearer to concrete conditions, and bring a great sum of 
character and intelligence to bear on the public service which 
would otherwise be lost to it. Such a self-government edu- 
cate? the whole people politically, raises its sense of solidarity. 
But it must not be forgotten in this connection that the well-to- 
do classes are primarily the ones to enter this service of self- 
government, and that they are continually subjected to the 
temptation of misuse of power. An eminent teacher of German 
constitutional law said, therefore, not without justification: 
"Self-government is always more or less class rule." Only by 
taking this point of view, which enables one to contemplate as a 
whole the historic development of self-government and its dif- 
ferent possible results, is one able correctly to appreciate the 
various phases of its growth. 

From this point of view it is easy to understand why the 
German governmental authorities of the seventeenth and eight- 
eenth centuries were obliged, in the same manner as they found 
it necessary to eliminate the rule of the nobles in the heart of the 
state, to resist just as strongly the freedom of the German cities 
as that of the manorial rulers and of the county and district cor- 
porations of the rural nobility. The Prussian city administra- 
tion, as well as the rule of the rural nobility, had to be brought 
under governmental control during the seventeenth and eight- 
eenth centuries; the administration of the taxes and debts of the 
Estates proved too corrupt and had to be transferred to the 
state. It was found necessary to place the district and county 



MODERN GERMANY 207 

government under partial or entire state management, and the 
city administration had to be freed of its pronounced abuses. 

Let us examine somewhat more closely the transformation of 
urban and rural self-government in the eighteenth and nine- 
teenth centuries. The German Free and Territorial Cities 
were in the seventeenth century in a deplorable condition. The 
economic decadence from the end of the sixteenth century, the 
destruction due to the Thirty Years' War, the vast indebted- 
ness, the clinging to the ideal of local economic independence 
in the age of upgrowth of national states, the selfish exploita- 
tion of city rule by a small oligarchy — these are the characteris- 
tics of urban life of that period. The rising territorial state 
had to combat as anachronistic the independence of the cities in 
matters of economic policy. The cities in which the rulers of 
the great German states had their abodes, Berlin, Munich, and 
Dresden, began at this time to revive again, but all others were 
losing ground in proportion as they were independent. 

In the Brandenburg-Prussian cities, governmental interfer- 
ence was brought about primarily through the municipalities* 
inability to meet the interest on their debts, and through the 
complaints of their creditors. Princely commissions for inves- 
tigation were numerous from 1680 to 1750; they revealed not 
alone the hopeless condition of the city finances, but an abyss 
of the worst abuses of the governing clique as well. 

In the same period, through the creation of a standing army, 
the cities wxre given princely garrisons — barracks did not yet 
exist. Every citizen had soldiers permanently billeted upon 
him; the commandant of the city assumed position beside the 
aldermen and was forced frequently to interfere. He had to 
inform himself as regards the city administration, negotiate with 
the body of aldermen, and regulate various matters in conjunc- 
tion with them. He reported to the War Commissioner of the 
territory or to the Chief War Commissioner in Berlin. As the 
old direct city taxes proved unavailing, the Great Elector and 
his son introduced in their place the city excise tax (1664 to 
171 3)) which the aldermen generally opposed, but which the 
plain people desired. It w^as possible to collect this tax satis- 
factorily and justly only by changing it from a city to a princely 
tax. The commissioner, the so-called tax councillor of later 
times, who supervised the excise in six to fifteen neighboring 
cities, automatically became between 1680 and 1740 the royal 
comptroller for the whole city administration. Was his report 
too unfavorable, there would be appointed for the city in ques- 
tion, for one or two years, one of the above-mentioned investi- 



2o8 MODERN GERMANY 

gating commissions, which would result in a rearrangement of 
the whole constitution and administration of the city in the 
form of a so-called "city hall ordinance." 

The most important point, at the same time the preliminary 
for all material reform, was the regulation of the city indebted- 
ness. A greater part of the indebtedness was paid off from the 
royal treasury, the unduly high rate of interest was reduced, in 
some cases the means for payment of interest and refunding 
were gained from the excise tax. The suffrage for the city 
council and city courts and their powers were regulated anew. 
Everywhere the yearly changing city administration was done 
away with, and a magistratus perpetuus created; the super- 
fluous and dishonest aldermen and city officials were elimi- 
nated and replaced by better elements. Appointment to many 
offices by the head of the state remained customary, although 
the old right of election was usually not formally rescinded. 
The aldermen, who were, according to precedent, called in for 
auditing purposes but contemptuously treated — in case of dis- 
pute even beaten — gained an established position. The magis- 
tratus perpetuus, cut down to a smaller number of members, 
came under the strict surveillance of the tax commissioner 
{Steuerrat). 

This commissioner also, it is true, occasionally abused his 
power. But, on the whole, the tax commissioners in the eight- 
eenth century were among the most capable officials; through 
them the whole city administration once more became honest, 
economical and just. An entirely new and better police system 
was rendered possible. The greatest obstacle to such a system was 
eliminated. In almost every city of from five to forty thousand 
inhabitants and over, there were from two to five independent 
communities, existing side by side, and ten to twenty so-called 
princely, noble, and religious "franchises" (Freiheiten) , inde- 
pendent of all city authority. This condition was done away with 
by centralizing all executive powers in the hands of one city coun- 
cil and of the city commandant. The Prussian state obtained 
thus from 1680 to 1750 uniformly governed cities, an ideal 
which London did not realize until 1888 or 1889, for which 
reason the condition of its police and administration was often 
likened, even in England herself, to that of Constantinople. 

The Prussian state had thus from 1706 to 1808 achieved a 
city government thoroughly controlled by the central power, 
but absolutely honest and capable, and which was able to make 
proper use of the far-reaching communal freedom that Baron 
von Stein gave to it in the City Ordinance {Stddteordnung) of 



MODERN GERMANY 209 

1808. This law became the basis of Prussian and German inde- 
pendent self-government of modern times. It is, together with 
the law regarding general military service of 1814, politically the 
most important and beneficent German law of the nineteenth cen- 
tury. 

The Prussian City Ordinance of 1808 determined the later laws 
of 1 83 1 and 1853, and those of the new Prussian provinces, and 
up to a certain point also those of the rest of Germany. Its 
characteristic features were: i. That the collegiate magis- 
tracy governs the city. 2. That the representatives of the citi- 
zens, the aldermen, elect the members of the magistracy and 
also vote the budget and the taxes. 3. That numerous depu- 
tations or commissions formed from the magistracy, the alder- 
men, and qualified citizens administer the city's affairs in de- 
tail. In the magistracy there is a minority of paid members 
elected for from six to twelve years (burgomaster, syndic, cham- 
berlain, public works commissioners and superintendent of 
schools), together with a majority of honorary members elected 
from among the citizens and who usually give their whole time 
to the city's administration. The paid members receive a pen- 
sion in case of failure of re-election. The best elements of the 
professional state officials have placed themselves at the disposal 
of the cities for these positions. The aldermen naturally possess 
great influence, for the reason that they appropriate the funds for 
the administration of the city; but one reaches membership of 
the council as a rule only after having learned to fulfill serious 
duties by years of work in the mixed commissions, and in the 
various administrative branches. In this manner the boards 
of aldermen of the German cities have, on the whole, been 
kept from developing into city parliaments, in which only 
honor, influence and contracts are sought and in which the 
majority, by cunningly devised tax schemes, lays the minority 
under contribution, and individuals selfishly pursue their own 
interests. 

The German chief city burgomasters stand head and shoul- 
ders, as regards capacity and achievement, above the majority 
of their colleagues in other civilized states; the latter in part 
are capable only of presiding at banquets or of putting their 
name to what their secretaries have thought out, planned and 
submitted to them, like the Lord Mayor of London, or like 
the majority of the mayors of the French cities; those in the 
United States stand in many cases at the head of secret or open 
unions which plunder the cities, as has long been the case in 
New York. 



2IO MODERN GERMANY 

The German burgomasters often play a decisive part in the 
German parliaments; they rise to ministerial positions or be- 
come chief burgomasters after having been ministers, like the 
present chief burgomaster of Berlin, who is a retired Imperial 
minister. The German burgomasters have become the real 
educators of the German people in political thought and in the 
fulfillment of their duty toward the state. 

The German city constitution founded by Stein was justly 
taken as the model for the Prussian county ordinance {Kreisord- 
nung) and the constitution of the counties from 1872 on. Before 
this end was attained, however, the Prussian and German county 
constitutions had to pass through many crises and make many 
false starts. 

If in East Prussia the rural village communities remained 
too long merely an appanage of the feudal manor, nevertheless 
the development of the aristocratic County Estates {Kreis- 
stande), from the seventeenth century on, and their employ- 
ment for the military and tax purposes of the state from 1640 
to 1806, resulted in the county commissioner (Landrat), who 
had originally been chosen from among their members, becom- 
ing more and more a royal official, without ceasing to be a 
trusted confidant of those within the jurisdiction of the county. 
Hardenburg attempted to make him altogether a dependent 
professional official, but did not succeed in his attempt. The 
feudal reaction, under the guidance of the romantic Crown 
Prince, from 1820 to 1840, gained the upper hand in the con- 
duct of the state, without being able to suppress entirely the 
old Prussian liberal officialdom, which from 1806 to 1820 had 
saved and reformed the state. The provincial constitutions on 
the basis of the old Estates and the provincial county ordi- 
nances (1823 to 1848) were a baneful victory of the feudal 
reaction, but the controlling officials did not surrender to 
these bodies the right of taxation or other important func- 
tions. The victory of liberalism brought from 1848 to 1850 a 
one-sided liberal county and communal ordinance, which was 
again set aside in 1853. The reform of local self-government 
made no progress until 1872. But then, from 1872 to 1891, 
came one of the most sweeping reforms which the Prussian state 
ever experienced: the introduction of a healthy form of rural 
self-government, together with the reform of the administra- 
tive organization and the creation of the jurisdiction by admin- 
istrative law courts {Verwaltungsrechtsprechung) calculated to 
protect the rights of the individuals and the public. We will 
not enumerate the individual laws in question. A central posi- 



MODERN GERMANY 211 

tlon is held, as mentioned, by the new county constitution of 
1872, an imitation of the city ordinance. Its characteristic 
points are a justly divided representation of the great landed 
proprietors and the smaller holdings, and of the small cities 
belonging to the county system; a corresponding taxation of 
the counties voted by this representative body; and a reform of 
the office of county commissioner {Landrat) . The Landrat 
remains half state-official, half-trusted confidant of the county, 
but a county committee assists and controls him. The county 
authorities attend to government affairs, and the economic ques- 
tions of the county. The development of administrative juris- 
diction, the reform of the local governments and of the provin- 
cial authorities, finally the ordinance for rural communities 
{Landgemeindeordnung) of July 3, 1891, all conceived and car- 
ried out in the same spirit, complete the great reform. 

The spiritual fathers of this reform were the liberal his- 
torian of constitutional law, Rudolf Gneist, and the conserva- 
tive Minister of the Interior, Fritz von Eulenburg; moderate 
liberals and those conservatives friendly to great reforms had 
united for this work, towards which there was violent opposi- 
tion. Bismarck had come to realize more and more the neces- 
sity for such reform. It was a question of imposing strict 
duties of self-government upon the county aristocracy and the 
peasants, and of letting the lower classes share in these duties. 
By this means, that which had been done for the city inhabi- 
tants by the city ordinance of 1808, was now done for the open 
country. 

All classes dov n to the workers take part to-day in the city 
and county administration. The beneficial effects of this are 
seen to-day among the Social Democrats whose share in the 
system of self-government is praised by all unbiased leading 
officials, especially by the burgomasters. They are doing excel- 
lent service in this line, and they thereby become accustomed to 
fulfill serious official duties, like the middle and upper classes. 

In most of the other German states, reforms similar to those 
here described have begun to be undertaken. England, after 
long seeking in the dark, achieved modern laws of self-govern- 
ment comparable with those of Germany only through her two 
great Local Government Acts of August 13, 1888, and March 
15, 1894. In France, Napoleon did away with almost all self- 
government, and since 1870 not much has been done to change 
this. 

What Is left, then, of the reproach of our enemies and of 



212 MODERN GERMANY 

many of our lukewarm well-wishers among the neutrals, that 
Germany is to-day still a reactionary military and bureaucratic 
state, without political freedom, and that since Bismarck's days, 
instead of working for political and democratic advance, we 
have striven only for power and military strength, and finally 
that we proclaim the doctrine that might is greater than right 
and wish to destroy England's position of world supremacy and 
place ourselves in her stead by the power of arms? It is true 
that the German Empire was born amid the clangor of arms 
from 18(34 to 1870; it would not exist at all had it not been 
for the Prussian army and Bismarck's plans for practical politi- 
cal power. But would the United States have come into exist- 
ence without the Revolutionary War, without Washington, 
without France's military- aid, and would it continue to exist 
without the victory of the Northern States in the Civil War? 
Is it possible to conceive of France without her wars from 1490 
to 18 15? Did England's world power arise without maritime, 
commercial and colonial wars extending through centuries? 

It is certain that Prussia and Germany issued triumphant 
from the pitiful divisions of the German nation in the Holy 
Roman Empire only by means of the Brandenburg-Prussian 
military and bureaucratic state, which finally from 1866 to 
1870 brought about German unity. It was not victorious, how- 
ever, because of its military strength alone, but because at the 
same time it possessed a model interior administration and 
because its organization represented a political training and 
schooling of the highest order for Germany. 

Certain South German states, it is true, did not gain a con- 
stitutional form of government until the period from 1818 to 
1848 — Prussia, indeed, not until 1848 to 1850. It would per- 
haps have been better for Prussia had she entered upon the 
constitutional path as early as 1820 or 1830. But the earlier 
entrance upon this course would not materially have altered 
the fact that the monarchy, army and officials, even after the 
granting of the constitution, remained the chief controlling 
powers, which remain to the present day. Nor would an earlier 
adherence to such principles have altered the fact that Germany's 
geographic position, as it had done for centuries and is still doing 
to-day, invited her neighbors to invasion and conquest. Germany 
would have shared the fate of Poland, if the military and bureau- 
cratic state had not been victorious and survived, feudal control 
by the nobles being out of the question. If in 1830, 1848, or later, 
some, or even a majority of the German states had followed the 
course of the Swiss democracy, the spirit of the ''little canton" 



MODERN GERMANY 213 

would have become triumphant with us, as in Switzerland. We 
should assuredly not have become a united Empire. Nor should 
we, in compensation, have produced other poets like Goethe and 
Schiller, which, according to English jingoism, should be our 
only legitimate occupation. 

But if we did not have the official aristocracy of our con- 
scientious civil servants and of our incomparable body of offi- 
cers, we might have a ruling aristocracy of money and cap- 
ital, such as on the whole impose their will in England, France 
and in the United States. In that case, to be sure, we should 
have a somewhat more complete democratization of all 
our institutions. We are undoubtedly advancing toward 
changes along these lines — for example, toward a reform of the 
Prussian suffrage law. But we desire neither England's nor 
France's parliamentary system, nor party rule such as that in 
the United States, based in part upon purchased votes. Cer- 
tainly, many of our institutions are still a long w^ay from per- 
fection. But we, nevertheless, consider them better than those 
of the great western democratic countries — at all events more 
adapted to Germany's spirit and history. 

Undoubtedly, democracy is able to bring forth healthy con- 
ditions in small states. And the great states, likewise, to-day 
strive more earnestly than formerly to educate the mass of the 
people to self-rule and to a share in the government. But in 
doing this certain dangers are always run: the democratic form 
of government usually brings forth capitalistic class-rule, cor- 
ruption, buying of votes, and an uncertain, changeable foreign 
policy. At all events, the blessings of democratic reforms are 
to be gained only in those cases where a strong, self-reliant, 
central power is preserved, and where the populace, before gain- 
ing greater rights and influence, has been accustomed for a 
long time to important government duties. The degree of ad- 
missible democratic institutions is determined to-day more than 
ever, as Seeley teaches us, according to the security of the 
state's exterior position (such as Switzerland, but not Germany, 
enjoys), and according to the degree in which healthy, aristo- 
cratic strength is preserved, such as England possesses in her 
gentry, and Germany in her officialdom. 

The present-day German Empire presents a strange mixture 
of "great state" and "little state," of aristocratic forces and 
conditions in Prussia, of democratic in the west and south. 
These forces have learned to adapt themselves to each other, to 
understand each other, and to unite for the accomplishment of 
Igreat tasks. Prussia has developed from a territorial state> 



214 MODERN GERMANY 

which was almost a republic of nobles, to a constitutional state, 
after passing through the military stage; she has educated her 
aristocracy to the conception of public duty through service as 
officials and officers and through self-government. The royal 
power has reconciled itself with the democratic and constitu- 
tional tendencies, on the basis of the official state which it pre- 
eminently represents. The Imperial power has made social 
reform its motto, in conjunction with exterior protection, with- 
out in any wise destroying the spirit of industrial enterprise. 
The landed aristocracy and the aristocracy of wealth have 
clasped hands, and each of them finds honor and occupation in 
the army and in the administration. The means of reconcilia- 
tion with the lower classes is found in the universal duty of 
bearing arms. 

Our ministers and party leaders spring to-day almost more 
from the middle class than from the aristocracy, in part also 
from the lower classes. But almost all of these political lead- 
ers have been through the school of official service and of self- 
administration, so that they do not bring with them into their 
high positions the instincts of the money-maker or the van- 
ity of the position-seeker. Bismarck and the Eulenburgs, Ca- 
privi, Hohenlohe and Billow, Bethmann and Delbriick, Bot- 
ticher and Miquel, Bennigsen and Eugen Richter, as well as 
Schulze-Delitzsch, rose by passing through this school and that 
of self-government. In the middle-sized and small states purely 
official ministers are more common even than in Prussia. Nat- 
urally this type of character, which prevails on the ministerial 
benches and among the party leaders, has its drawbacks as 
well as its advantages. But where does one find a type of 
humanity, a ruling class, or an institution without the comple- 
mentary faults of its good qualities? 

The attacks which are made to-day in such violently exag- 
gerated fashion, especially in England and France, and even in 
the United States, against the manner in which Germany is 
governed, result chiefly from a lack of understanding of Ger- 
man conditions and from the difficulty of grasping them with 
English or French conceptions and prejudices, when viewed 
from the standpoint of fundamentally different governmental, 
administrative, legal and social conditions. In addition, in 
individuals, anger at the destruction of war, the influence of 
aroused national passion, personal experiences, the degree of 
politico-historical training, or the lack of it are factors which 
give birth to such fairy tales as the one that Germany was 
driven into the war by the teachings of a neurasthenic philos- 



MODERN GERMANY 215 

opher (Nietzsche), of a chauvinistic general (von BernhardI) 
and of a great historian who hated England (von Treitschke). 
These three wicked men, it is claimed, have for the last twenty 
to thirt}^ years hypnotized the whole of Germany, deceived her 
into believing that England was bound for destruction in any 
event, and that Germany must seize her inheritance. We shall 
not examine this stupid invention more closely; it is disproved 
in another part of this book. In closing, we shall say a few- 
words further in regard to the misleading statements of Pres- 
ident Emeritus Eliot, of Harvard University, in the New York 
Times. He is well known to many German scholars, who had 
certainly hoped to hear more veracious and more sensible things 
from him about Germany. 

We are not conversant with his earlier work as a natural 
scientist. As a director of the leading American university, his 
achievements have been great and exemplary. But as a politi- 
cal historian he is an absolute failure; he looks down upon 
Germany with arrogant superiority, because he sees that Ger- 
many has other institutions than his native country. 

He speaks somewhat in this manner : You Germans have, it is 
true, achieved something in literature, art, science and edu- 
cation, but if you do not renounce your autocratic government, 
your standing army with its universal military service, your 
secret treaties, your unyielding bureaucracy, your love of 
power, your aspirations for colonies, we free Americans can 
have no sympathy for you. 

Much — indeed, most of that which he blames us for — ap- 
plies to the majority of European and non-European states, and 
above all to France, Russia and England. But France appears 
to him sufficiently democratic to be pardoned for having founded 
by military means an immense colonial empire in the last forty 
years. He closes his eyes to Russia's brutal policy of force and 
conquest, because she was the originator of the Hague confer- 
ences! In regard to England, he does not seem to be quite 
aware through what measures of force her tremendous colonial 
empire came into existence, or how gigantic her conquests by 
force have been precisely in the period since 1870. But Eng- 
land, in compensation for this, does not have universal military 
duty, which, according to him, takes away freedom, restricts 
unfettered social movement, and costs even the well-to-do lib- 
erty, health, and under certain conditions life itself. All states 
to-day enter into secret treaties, even the United States, but 
Germany alone is made responsible for this. Germany is blamed 
by Eliot for having conquered and annexed Schleswig-Holstein 



2i6 MODERN GERMANY 

and Alsace-Lorraine, in 1864 and 1870, respectively; he for- 
gets to say that both were German countries, and that the latter 
had once been taken from us by force. Eliot complains bit- 
terly that there was no vote of the people taken in regard to 
these conquests. I should like to remind him of what his 
colleague, Sloane {Preussische Jahrbiicher, Vol. 158, p. 460), 
says in regard to the conquests of the United States: "We 
have gained neighboring territory through force, through war 
or occupation, and through purchase or exchange. In none of 
these cases have we inquired through a vote of the people as to 
the wishes of the inhabitants in the particular territory, nor have 
we approached the Hague tribunal for advice. We have always 
had the same excuse, namely, that it was required by our inter- 
ests." Professor Sloane possesses the historical and constitutional 
knowledge in which President Eliot is so sadly lacking. The 
latter declares that our relation to other states cannot improve 
until we have repudiated Bismarck's policies. Eliot would as- 
suredly consider us insane were we to demand of the Americans 
that they renounce the policy of Washington and of the great 
Federalists, who gave them a fatherland, in the same manner 
as Bismarck's policy gave us ours. 

Eliot takes the attitude of the child who expects roses from 
an apple-tree when he blames us for not sharing the political 
opinions of the present-day American, who stands for "human 
freedom and peace." We answer him that we do stand for these 
things, but we cannot strive for such goals at all times nor 
always under the conditions which appear proper to him and 
to some Americans who share his views. 

We have reached the end of our discussion. Its aim was 
to attempt an exposition of the spirit of our public life as this 
presents itself to the German writer on economics and consti- 
tutional law. Naturally, our view is in direct opposition to 
that taken of this spirit by our enemies, who in many cases are 
quite ignorant of Germany and her history. 

The judgment of our enemies will not be easily changed. 
But the truth in regard to the causes of the present war and 
the state of German conditions will, nevertheless, finally pre- 
vail — more, to be sure, through the logic of facts than through 
the efforts of German scholars. With time the world will 
learn the truth as to German militarism, German lack of free- 
dom and German barbarism. It will be recognized that Ger- 
mans know well how to appreciate the blessings of political 
freedom, but only when it is joined with a strong sense of feel- 



MODERN GERMANY 217 

ing for the state and for the fulfilment of political duty. The 
fact will be recognized that we suffer from fewer abuses of 
class power, because in addition to and above the aristocracy 
of wealth, we possess an unimpeachable official aristocracy and 
a strong monarchy and imperial power. Ir will be recognized 
that we appreciate the right of self-government for municipali- 
ties as highly as other nations, but that we are willing to grant 
these rights only to such as have been educated to them. It 
will be recognized that we are no warlike, aggressive nation, 
precisely on account of the universal duty of bearing arms, and 
that we are by far less greedy of conquests than the English, 
the Russians, the French and the Americans. It will be recog- 
nized that our imperialism demands only *'a place in the sun,'* 
while that of England aims at exclusive control of interna- 
tional trade. The world will come to realize that we protect 
the smaller states better than England, unless they conspire 
against us. We prevented France in 1830 from annexing Bel- 
gium, and in 1867 Napoleon from annexing Luxemburg. 

In contrast to the world-embracing plans of our enemies, we 
stand for the balance of power among all the great civilized 
states, for the system which the great Scipio family once de- 
sired to introduce in the Mediterranean, when selfish merchants 
of Rome forced the state into the course of international trade 
supremacy. Since that time, in every case, the momentarily 
greatest states have succumbed to the same temptation — first 
Spain, then Holland, then France, then England. To-day the 
United States faces a like danger. These tendencies toward 
world supremacy have always injured rather than benefited 
the states manifesting them. We Germans shall not succumb 
to this danger. We are, therefore, the nation capable of doing 
most for the advancement of international law and interna- 
tional arbitration. 



CHAPTER VII 
THE SPIRIT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY 

DR. HANS LUTHER, CITY COUNCILLOR OF BERLIN 

CO-OPERATION of the citizen in public affairs is a char- 
acteristic of the modern state. Strange to say, the opin- 
ion is encountered among foreigners, even among intelligent and 
usually well-informed foreigners, that such a citizenship scarcely 
exists in Germany, if, indeed, at all. This conception seems to 
result from the conviction that the democratic form of govern- 
ment is the only one that gives citizens the proper influence on 
the destinies of the state. This is a confusion between form 
and substance. The important question is the realization of 
the state as a corporate entity in which the individual lives in 
freedom and can assert himself. By what means this goal is to be 
reached is a question of form, which must be decided differently 
according to the historical and geographical conditions of the 
individual nations. The constitutional principles of the so- 
called democratic states, likewise, vary greatly among them- 
selves. It is only necessary, for example, to compare the United 
States with France. Furthermore, constitutional forms, like 
all things human, are subject to development. The German 
constitution will continue to progress without doubt in the 
line of an ever-increasing development of citizenship. 

If the present condition of citizenship within the German 
Empire is to be understood, one must consider not only the 
right of suffrage, as it exists in the Empire for the Reichstag, 
and in the component states of the Union, e. g., for the Prus- 
sian legislature, or Abgeordnetenhaus. The fact is of great 
importance that citizens whose appointment depends on election 
cooperate to a marked degree in ordinary administration — that 
is to say, not alone in connection with legislation, which is 
reserved for the legislative bodies. Such elected members, for 
example, are found in Prussia in the County Councils 
{Kreisausschilsse) and District Councils (Bezirksausschiisse). 
These authorities are called upon to decide in regard to a 
variety of important administrative questions; in addition, they 
constitute Administrative Courts {Verwaltungsgerichte). Fur- 

218 



MODERN GERMANY 219 

ther, the laity is well represented also in the other courts. Thus, 
the more serious crimes are tried by the Schwurgericht^ in which 
the jurors decide questions of fact as well as of guilt. Less 
serious offenses are decided before a court consisting of a pro- 
fessional judge, who presides, and two laymen, who are called 
Schoffen. Laymen are active, likewise, in civil cases, in so far 
as they deal with affairs of trade and industry or with condi- 
tions relating to commercial employers and employees; in all of 
these courts the presiding officer alone is a professional judge, 
while the associates, who are in the majority, are laymen. The 
associates in the industrial and mercantile courts ( Gewerbegericht, 
Kaufmannsgericht) are chosen directly from the members of the 
business in question, primarily according to the principle of pro- 
portional election. 

All these rights of the citizens concern the state in a narrower 
sense. No one, however, will be able to judge or even to under- 
stand the German state organism who sees nothing on the one 
hand but the state, and on the other the individual. Public life 
is built up in numerous intermediate steps passing over the family, 
over the community, the profession, race connections and many 
other unifying conditions until a comprehensive whole is reached. 
This comprehensive whole alone is the state in the narrow sense. 
If, now, it is the duty of the state organism to adapt itself to the 
actual conditions of the nation's life, it must in its various activi- 
ties do justice to all of these intermediate phenomena. The 
resulting organisms of a vastly manifold nature are, however, 
not an exclusive peculiarity of the German Empire. England 
has a great number of such organisms intervening between the 
individual and the state in the narrow sense, and which in their 
collectivity represent the sum total of public life {Staatsleben), 
These intermediate organisms exist, of course, also in France and 
other countries, although less developed. Hence, if one wishes to 
gauge the importance of the individual in public life, the ques- 
tion must not be: What influence has the individual upon the 
affairs of the state in the narrow sense? It must be framed 
thus: To what degree does the individual play a part in the 
general expression of public life? Having thus correctly ex- 
pressed our question, we are faced by an abundance of rights, 
but likewise duties, of the individual citizen in the public life 
of Germany. In no other country are the intermediate organ- , 
isms between the state and the individual endowed with so 
many rights and so much actual influence on public life as in 
the German Empire. 

The legal point of departure for these intermediate organ- 



220 MODERN GERMANY 

isms is the conception of self-government, or municipal home- 
rule. Considered purely from the juridical point of view, the 
corporations for the exercise of self-government are legal per- 
sonages of the public law, who are not subordinate to the state 
as its appointees, but stand side by side with the state with a 
certain degree of independence. By means of such a legal for- 
mula, however, one cannot grasp the fundamental nature of 
these typically German forms of expression of public life. The 
whole of German history reveals a strong impulse of the people 
toward self-government, in the broadest sense of the word. 
This tendency has at times proved most dangerous in the his- 
tory of the German people. In the old German Empire the 
tendency of the individual to regard rather the particular ob- 
ject close at hand than a more distant general goal was a de- 
structive element, which was overcome only gradually along the 
course of development leading through the strong "territorial 
state.'* To-day, however, self-government is no longer a disturb- 
ing factor. For the mighty German Empire of the present has 
given to the German people that state and national consciousness 
which almost all the other nations of the world have possessed 
for a long time, and which they, therefore, begrudged us Ger- 
mans. On this basis, self-government is a source of strength, 
since it directs the attention of the individual not alone to those 
affairs of public life which are removed from his immediate per- 
ception, but also to those matters directly under his eye and hence 
subject to his judgment. A German body politic without a 
system of self-government is unthinkable. 

In the modern development of self-government, the cities, or 
municipalities {Stadtgemeinden) y can claim for themselves the 
right of priority. They are followed by the rural communi- 
ties {Landgemeinden), Organizations of a higher kind in 
Prussia are the counties {Landkreise) , which embrace the 
smaller cities and the rural communities, and the provincial 
units (Provinzialverbdnde) , which are formed from the greater 
cities and the counties. Provinces and counties are called com- 
munal unions {Kommunalverbdnde) , in contrast to the single 
communities (Gemeinde). Besides these communal corpora- 
tions, with extensive functions, there are still a large number 
of special organs of self-government, namely, such bodies as 
are called upon to fulfill one or more definitely specified duties. 
These bodies have in many cases come down from olden times, 
especially as local associations for common interests (Interes- 
senvereinigungen) . These cooperative bodies are most highly 
developed in regard to water rights; an example are the numer- 



MODERN GERMANY 221 

ous dike-associations. Modern vocational representation Is of 
more widespread importance: the chambers of agriculture, the 
chambers of commerce, the chambers of trade and industry; 
undoubtedly also we shall soon have labor chambers or cham- 
bers of workmen. All of these chambers, each of which Is 
limited to a definite territory, have public legal authority to 
protect the vocational interests which they represent. In the 
case of disputes as to the extent of their authority, they can 
appeal to the decision of the Administrative Courts. The Gov- 
ernment does not exercise any influence on the appointment of 
the chief officers of these bodies for self-government. The 
members of the trades or callings represented in these cham- 
bers work in perfect freedom through their many organs. Fur- 
ther, these bodies are not restricted in their freedom of combi- 
nation. In this way associations have arisen whose influence 
on our entire public life has been very perceptible: the Council 
of Agriculture {Landwirtschaftsrat) from the chambers of ag- 
riculture, the Diet of Commerce {Handelstag) from the cham- 
bers of commerce, the Diet of Trade and Industry from the 
chambers of trade and industry. Legislation has recognized 
these free associations in various ways; for example, the Council 
of Agriculture, as well as the Diet of Commerce, were given 
seats in the Imperial Distribution Board {Reichsverteilunffs- 
stelle), whose important task is the distribution of the grain 
and flour on hand to the various communities. 

The German Diet of Cities {Stddtetag) is also represented 
in the Imperial Distribution Board. It is a union of the Ger- 
man cities sprung from their own initiative. This association 
is all the more important because it is in the city organizations 
that the idea of self-government is most highly developed. The 
tasks of the cities are more comprehensive than those of any 
other self-governing body, including the other communal cor- 
porations. The counties and the rural communities have, only 
when considered as entities, approximately identical tasks. The 
activity of the provinces is more or less confined to definite 
lines, such as highways, care of the insane, of the blind and of 
the deaf and dumb, and supplementary charities. The cities, on 
the contrary, can each claim in their particular territory the 
same universality of aims as the state. To be sure, they are 
excluded from a number of fields of public activity, naturally 
from that of foreign affairs. For the rest, the cities determine 
alone what tasks lie in their province simply by assuming them. 
Their decision is influenced by the state only to the degree that 
certain tasks are assigned to the cities by law. On the other 



222 MODERN GERMANY 

hand, there is no legal requirement for the cities to secure the 
state's approval before extending the field of their activity. Ac- 
tual development has forced them, in many fields, to the fore- 
front of progress. A few statistics will prove the truth of this 
statement in a general way. In the period from 1895 to 1908 
the budgets of Prussian cities of 25,000 inhabitants and over 
increased more than threefold. At present the total cost of 
running the German communities is not less than that of the 
Empire itself. The debts of the municipalities — in the main 
contracted for profitable purposes — are notably higher than the 
Imperial Government debt before the outbreak of the war. 

The constitutional form of the German cities is republican — 
if, indeed, one can properly apply to self-governing bodies this 
conception adapted to the state as a whole. Chief importance, 
in this connection, attaches to allowing individual citizens the 
greatest possible participation in affairs. It may with confi- 
dence be asserted that the acts of the self-governing bodies are 
acts of the citizens. To be sure, chief place in the city adminis- 
tration is held by a burgomaster, generally styled "Chief Bur- 
gomaster," who is always a professional official, and nearly al- 
ways a lawyer (jurist). His constitutional influence, however, 
is clearly circumscribed. He is not appointed by the central 
government (as in Holland), but is chosen by the other officials 
of the city, and requires only the approval of the state govern- 
ment. The overwhelming majority of Germans agree that this 
practice of filling the chief city positions with professional offi- 
cials is one of the greatest safeguards for the relative independ- 
ence of the cities from the state as a whole. Professional su- 
periority of the central state officials, constantly in touch with 
public affairs, by which the layman is so likely to be unduly in- 
fluenced, carries no weight with a Chief Burgomaster; for he, 
too, has professional experience, generally of an entire lifetime, 
to draw upon. The danger, moreover, that the Chief Burgo- 
master, since he himself is an official by profession, might secretly 
feel himself more in sympathy with the government officials than 
with the inhabitants of the city, is obviated in the first place by 
the fact that the other city officials elect him — generally for twelve 
years. Further, the preeminence of his position depends precisely 
upon the independence of the city administration from the state. 
Hence the professional Chief Burgomasters, as well as the assist- 
ant burgomasters, city councillors, deputies, etc., are in the prac- 
tice of our public life determined supporters of the idea of self- 
government. 

The position of these professional city officials within the 



MODERN GERMANY 223 

self-government organism is quite different in the various Ger- 
man states, nay, even within the various sections of the indi- 
vidual states. In this connection the individual "city ordi- 
nances" are determining. Efforts to create a uniform system 
in place of the existing variety are sporadic, and, except where 
special abuses have developed, are generally regarded as inad- 
missible interference with justifiable local peculiarities. This 
is a further proof that German constitutional life has not been 
built up according to some system or other thought out with 
pen and paper. Therefore, it finds no favor with those persons 
who believe in the beneficent power of only one formula. Ger- 
man constitutional life has developed organically and is, there- 
fore, multiform and variegated, like a mountain group which 
does not lack uniformity in its basic outlines and inner harmony. 
We have thus in the city administration in some places the bi- 
cameral, and in others the uni-cameral system. In the case of 
the uni-cameral system, there is only one determinative body, 
namely, that of the city aldermen — municipal representation 
after the model of popular representation in the state; their pre- 
siding officer is the Chief Burgomaster. In the case of the 
bicameral system, there exists, beside the body of aldermen, a 
"magistracy," with co-determinative functions. In this system 
one of the aldermen is elected from their midst as chairman at 
their meetings, whereas the Chief Burgomaster presides in the 
"magistracy," but has only an equal vote with all the other 
members. The underlying principle, however, of all the mu- 
nicipal systems is the same, namely, that the aldermen are 
elected by the citizens. Electoral franchise varies in the dif- 
ferent city statutes; in some we find three classes of voters, in 
others universal equality of direct suffrage, et cetera. The 
method is predominant of electing only a third of the repre- 
sentative body at a time, so that a certain amount of consistency 
is preserved in the administration. Widespread, but recently 
much opposed, is the so-called houseowners' privilege, whereby 
half of the aldermen must be houseowners. In all cases the 
aldermen are elected directly by the inhabitants of the city. 
The Chief Burgomaster, on the contrary, and the other prin- 
cipal city officials, and especially the members of the "magis- 
tracy" (where such exists), are elected in some cases by the 
aldermen, in others in the same manner as these themselves, 
by the citizens. The "magistracy" is not made up exclusively 
of professional officials, but at least half of its members are 
citizens who serve in an honorary capacity. This variety of 
suffrage rights does not appear to be of decisive influence on the 



224 MODERN GERMANY 

quality of the work of the various city administrations. For, 
taken by and large, despite the fact that certain differentiations 
exist, the main tendencies of the work of administrations is 
everywhere the same. 

Everywhere, also, the prerequisite of administrative success 
is identical, namely, cooperation of citizens and professional offi- 
cials. This cooperation is extremely close. In the first place, 
the fact that all city administration is local in many cases gives 
the aldermen familiar with the conditions the advantage over 
the professional officials, w^ho are often strangers. Further, it 
is a distinctive characteristic of our system of self-government 
that the officials and the elected representatives of the citizens 
do not stand in the same relationship to each other as the 
Government and the popular representatives in the states. The 
division of power between Government and Parliament is 
nearly always such that the Parliament only has cooperative 
functions in regard to law-making and appropriation of funds. 
The actual administration, however, which is the part of the 
state's activity most keenly felt by the individual, is exercised 
exclusively by the Government. This is true not alone of Ger- 
many, but likewise of states with a parliamentary form of gov- 
ernment. Matters are quite different in the German city ad- 
ministration. Here the representatives of the citizens, the 
aldermanic body, are the executive power, enjoying equal rights 
with the ''magistracy." In those cities in which there is no 
''magistracy," the aldermen administer the city's affairs alone. 
It is self-evident, however, that so great a gathering as that of 
the aldermen (about 75 members in a city of 300,000; in Ber- 
lin, 150 members) cannot decide every single administrative 
question. For this reason the notion of "current administra- 
tion" has developed in our municipalities. Every important act 
of administration, such as all special matters of moment, and, 
of course, all fundamental questions, are decided upon by the 
entire aldermanic body, at least concurrently. At the same time, 
the current administration is not controlled entirely by the pro- 
fessional officials. For this purpose administrative deputations, 
or committees, have been created. These administrative commit- 
tees are the most ingenious contrivance of our city constitutions. 

Since the Chief Burgomaster, or the "magistracy," is respon- 
sible for the current administration, the committees are subor- 
dinate to them in a legal sense, it is true; but as a matter of 
fact, the committees are a means of making the aldermen, and 
even individual private citizens, permanent participants in the 
current administration. For although, generally, a professional 



MODERN GERMANY 225 

official is chairman of the committees, the vast majority of the 
members are aldermen or so-called citizen deputies {Biirger- 
deputierte) — that is to say, citizens who are elected as members 
of the committees by the aldermanic body, although they are not 
aldermen. With such a membership of the committees, it is 
impossible for the professional officials to conduct the adminis- 
tration otherwise than in agreement with the committees. The 
members of the committees, however, gain an insight into all 
the details of the city's affairs. The custom exists of having 
certain committee members constantly attend to a certain line of 
affairs. In this manner the city administration is conducted, in 
its smallest details, under continuous, active and decisive coopera- 
tion of the citizens. For as a rule the entire municipal adminis- 
trative field is divided up among the various committees. Thus 
we have committees for the administration of buildings, gardens, 
charities, schools, hospitals, bathing and other sanitary branches, 
cemeteries, savings banks, street railways, drainage, water-works, 
gas-works, electric works, slaughter houses, etc. ; in addition, 
according to the field of activity of the individual cities, there 
are committees for theatres, orchestras, museums, public libraries, 
harbor improvements, factory sites, forestry and universities. 
Further, there are special committees for individual undertakings, 
as for example, the building of a bridge, the making of treaties of 
municipal incorporation, cooperation in the building of a local 
railway, the starting of an exposition, etc. In these executive 
committees the citizens are called upon for extremely active 
administrative participation, for in these cases the citizens do 
not act from a distance and through the intermediary of some 
outside intelligence, as they do in the exercise of their federal 
suffrage right. The citizen here decides of his own knowledge, 
and the privilege therefore becomes an important duty. One 
ideal of citizenship is thereby achieved. 

The best proof of any public institution is furnished by its 
success. By their fruits ye shall know them. SchmoUer has 
already called attention to the fact that the excellence of the 
institutions of a state may be measured by the services rendered 
to the poorer classes. That these services are greater in the 
German Empire than in any other state in the world is disputed 
by no one who knows. In this connection, the activity of the 
German state as regards the poorer classes is to be measured not 
only from the point of view of the state — that is to say, on the 
assumption that the state wishes to maintain its human material 
in as good a condition as possible. Equally decisive is the de- 
sire to create real citizenship. This is apparent from the one 



226 MODERN GERMANY 

fact alone that the nucleus of these endeavors has always been 
the development of the school system. Germany is the country 
with the fewest illiterate persons. But likewise the social in- 
surance institutions (sick insurance, invalidity insurance, old- 
age pensions and accident insurance, together with the assist- 
ance given dependent relatives), are devised with care and fore- 
thought in such a manner that the persons insured are not 
alone not dependent on the state but that they themselves or 
their employers pay a considerable insurance premium. Hence, 
these insurance undertakings, owing to the feeling of right and 
security which they give to the insured, work for an enhance- 
ment of citizenship. I shall now endeavor to describe more in 
detail the achievements of citizenship in the field of self-govern- 
ment. 

As a determining factor the question may be asked, first, 
as to whether class politics are played in our municipal adminis- 
tration. In answering this question, one must start with the 
fact that the municipal representative bodies seldom reach their 
decisions from political considerations such as govern the poli- 
tics of the state. Thus, in a great number of cities, factions 
are not known in the representative bodies. In other cities, it 
is true, factions exist, but the lines of division separating them 
are not political in a broad sense, but of a communal nature. 
In a final group of cities, it must be admitted, the factions cor- 
respond to certain political parties of the state, but even with 
such conditions, experience shows that important municipal de- 
cisions are reached without decisive regard for political party 
programmes. This applies to a considerable extent even to the 
Social Democratic party, which is striving to form a faction of 
its partisans in every municipal body, as it does in the national 
representative body. Since our city administration, owing to 
the extent of its activity and to the degree of its independence, 
is so powerful a body, the result is that the decisions are pre- 
ponderantly made with a view to particular local conditions. 
These particular local conditions, however, usually cannot be 
included in a political programme, all the less so since every 
alderman has personal knowledge of the matters upon which 
he has to decide. For this reason, the work in the municipal 
bodies is far more personal than in the national representative 
bodies. This fact alone offers a certain protection against class 
politics, since personal opinions and private interests need not 
by any means coincide. Where they do agree, and where per- 
haps single families or groups of families possess a predomi- 
nating influence, there exists the danger of affairs being con- 



MODERN GERMANY 227 

ducted against the public welfare; this danger may as a rule 
be considered the greater, the smaller the municipality is. The 
^'houseowners' privilege," according to which half of the city 
representatives are houseowners, is regarded by many as a kind 
of legal basis for class politics. 

In spite of this privelege, however, in very many cities the 
houseowners are of the opinion that the city administration does 
not sufficiently consider their interests, and that, ow^ng to their 
burden of taxation, they stand in need of particular protection 
against the communal authorities. Now, the opinion of the 
houseowners is mistaken, but the very existence of such an opin- 
ion proves that one is not justified in speaking of a general 
houseowners' oligarchy in the city administrations. 

There are still other draw^backs which some persons thought 
they discovered in the text of the city constitutions but which do 
not exist in practice; as, for instance, the fear lest the city 
administration, as controlled by the "three-class" suffrage, might 
act anti-socially. As a matter of fact, in the majority of the 
Prussian cities, suffrage is proportional to the income, so that 
only under quite exceptional circumstances can the working class 
gain a majority in the aldermanic body. Nevertheless, the 
city administrations show an unmistakable social tendency. 
Practically everywhere, at least In all the larger communities, 
the spontaneous activity of the city authorities in one line or 
the other has surpassed, in many cases very considerably, the 
social legislation of the Reichstag. Even the question of insur- 
ance against lack of occupation, toward which the German Im- 
perial government has hitherto turned an unfriendly ear, has 
in many cities, in so far as single communities can undertake 
such a problem at all, been solved to a certain extent. Like- 
wise, the workmen in the employ of the city enjoy benefits of a 
social nature which are entirely lacking in the vast majority of 
private undertakings. 

Yet the number of the workmen employed by the cities is in 
many cases considerable. This is to be explained by the fact 
that the German municipalities, in ever-increasing degree, have 
taken over those great undertakings which are for the immediate 
benefit of the community. For us the thought is incomprehensible 
that the city's waterworks should not be under municipal adminis- 
tration. So, too, the gas and electric works are in a vast majority 
of cases under city management. The same is true of most of the 
tramways. All this was possible because the German cities were 
entitled to undertake these enterprises of their own volition, with- 
out need of any cooperation on the part of government. The 



228 MODERN GERMANY 

influence of capital, which is not slight in Germany, is equally- 
powerless to influence the decisions of the city administrative 
boards. It is true that in individual cases capital has shown itself 
friendly to the idea of having the city acquire public utilities. 
On the whole, however, bitter fights were fought, for it was a 
question for the cities not of acquiring possession of the under- 
takings, but above all, of doing this at a price which insured a 
return on the money. Undoubtedly capital is at the present 
moment endeavoring to maintain, as far as possible, what remains 
of its power in city works, and to recover lost ground as far as 
possible. Characteristic illustrations of this condition are the 
''mixed economic concerns" {gemischtwirtschaftliche Unterneh- 
mungen), which have been much discussed in Germany recently. 
In this species of enterprise great public undertakings are to be 
worked conjointly by the municipal administration and private 
capital. Outwardly, the creation of such "mixed economic con- 
cerns" is advocated on the ground that purely public enterprises 
are not conducted in a suflSciently business-like manner. Whether 
this claim is to the point or not is open to dispute. It may be 
stated, however, that in such enterprises, which are carried on 
for the public interests, the essential point is by no means only 
to place them on a paying basis in the sense of a private enter- 
prise; often the general economic condition of a city is benefited, 
when this aim is abandoned, as for example, when a tramway 
is run rather from the point of view of facilitating transportation 
than with an eye to high dividends. This is the common opinion 
in our cities. For this reason a year ago in the general session of 
the Diet of German Cities, the designation ''mixed economic 
concerns" was replaced by the new one of the "public enterprise 
under legally private form" {Offentliche JJnternehrnung in Pri- 
vatrechtsform) , This means that the German cities are deter- 
mined, even if in such great enterprises they profit by existing 
advantages of the private legal form of the concern — as, for 
example, when founding their electricity works on the basis of a 
stock company — not to let them lose the character of public utility 
concerns conducted exclusively for the public Interest. But opin- 
ions differ, likewise, in regard to the question whether the private 
legal form is advisable or necessary for the attainment of the 
desired goal. Thus, in regard to the gigantic electricity works of 
Berlin, which are soon to be taken over by the city, the attempt is 
to be made so to determine the changeable provisions of the city 
statutes that even without the private legal form the advan- 
tages of private management may, nevertheless, be secured for 
the new city undertaking; the directing and supervising board 



MODERN GERMANY 229 

are to enjoy the same powers as they would in a stock company. 

Unfortunately, I must refrain from consideration of the 
other fields of activity to w^hich the city administrations ex- 
tended in times of peace. The reader is referred to the pre- 
vious enumeration of the various administrative committees, 
which gives a general though by no means exhaustive idea of 
communal activity. That enumeration does not comprise all 
those matters which the city administration undertakes, not as 
intrinsically within its province, but which are referred to as 
affairs ''transferred by the state." Under this head, for ex- 
ample, is to be reckoned the police administration, which is in 
the hands of special government authorities only in the largest 
Prussian cities, and even so not in all cases. On the other 
hand, I cannot close my discussion without mentioning the ac- 
tivity of the municipalities since the outbreak of the war. 

The war tasks of the communes in the beginning were based 
upon legal obligations only to a slight degree. Even in regard 
to the granting of assistance to the families of soldiers, at least 
in the larger cities half of the burden rests on the shoulders of 
the municipalities, which must in addition devise proper means 
for carrying out the various measures. Thus, in every city the 
question arose as to what portion, if any, of the grants to sol- 
diers' families, should be paid to the landlord as rent, and un- 
der what conditions. It had to be decided whether grants 
should be made in the form of money or goods. The extending 
of help to the unemployed lay entirely in the discretion of the 
municipalities. It is necessary still to-day to continue this form 
of assistance, although our economic life has again reached a 
very high standard, for there are numerous branches of economic 
activity that are entirely suspended in time of war. In addition 
to this support, there are many direct contributions toward the 
needs of the army, such especially as furnishing quarters for the 
soldiers. A line in which work of the communes attained quite 
special importance was the providing of food. 

When, after several months of war, it was realized In the 
German Empire that special measures would have to be taken 
in order to make our food and provender supply hold out, the 
first attempt made was to secure the necessary amount and its 
distribution by means of private enterprise. To this end the 
War Grain Company was founded, whose task it was to buy up 
the necessary amount of grain for the last months of the harvest 
year. Two-fifths of the company's capital was contributed by 
the large German cities. In order to give an idea of the elas- 
ticity of the administration in the large cities, mention may be 



230 MODERN GERMANY 

made of the fact that It was possible to raise this money within 
a very few days. But after a few more months it became evi- 
dent that the method of private economic enterprise was not an 
adequate solution of the food problem. The Empire, therefore, 
took the matter in hand as a public task. As such, it was di- 
vided into two main undertakings, apart from the plan of or- 
ganization. One was the collection of the existing supply of grain 
and flour, the other was its distribution to the consumers. For 
collecting the supply, the form of private enterprise was adhered 
to with complete success, the purchase of the material being 
entrusted to commissioners of the War Grain Company — on the 
basis, it is true, of previous requisition. In later undertakings — 
as, for example, the securing of the supply of oats and potatoes — 
the method of collecting by private means was abandoned and this 
task was assigned to the counties in which the supplies lay. The 
county communal organizations took up this work with great 
energy. But even more general is the activity of the communes 
in the distribution of the supply to the consumers. In this con- 
nection, the most difficult task fell to the share of the cities. 
Many things are to be distributed, as oats and other provender 
to owners of horses, but especially flour in the raw state, or as 
bread to the consumers; care for the potato supply also was 
imposed on the cities. The attempt to limit the consumption 
of bread at first appeared difficult to the degree of impossibility. 
Nevertheless, the cities completely solved the problem within a 
few weeks after the order was issued by the Imperial govern- 
ment. Everywhere the new economic condition is evident from 
the presence of bread and flour cards. These cards are not or- 
ders issued against money for a certain amount of bread and 
flour; they are a manifestation of an absolutely new economic 
problem which the war has brought with it — the problem of 
supply. They give to the holder merely the right to purchase 
a certain amount of bread and flour, a right which he has not 
without such a card. It is characteristic of the German system 
of self-government that by no means all the cities have chosen 
the same form of bread and flour cards. Only such economic 
territories as, in certain respects, belong together, despite mu- 
nicipal separation, have effected a union. In many cases the 
cities have also linked themselves together with the surrounding 
country districts to form economic units. For the rest, the 
flour and bread cards show clearly that they are adapted to 
local conditions. The system of control is different in large 
and small cities. The amount of flour in proportion to bread 
varies according to the customary food consumption of the 



MODERN GERMANY 231 

inhabitants. The task of the cities, however, was not completed 
with the issuing of bread and flour cards. Less noticeable, but 
just as difficult, is the regulation of flour distribution to the 
bakers and dealers. It is thus not alone the measures taken 
by the Imperial government that deserve to be regarded as 
a remarkable achievement in organization ; even more noteworthy 
is the vigor with which the municipalities took hold of 
the great problem. The solving of the problem indicates 
nothing less than a complete change in our economic life. In 
the city administrations politically liberal views are in the as- 
cendancy, tending to uphold the freedom of private enterprise. 
But as little as this fundamental political conception hindered 
the municipalization of the great interests serving the public, as 
little has it been an obstacle when it was necessary to safeguard 
the people's food by means of quick action. 

The activity of the municipalities in the work of feeding the 
nation, however, goes much further. A considerable number of 
cities, especially the largest, held it to be their natural duty 
with the outbreak of the war to lay aside a certain emergency 
supply of the chief foodstuffs. The leading idea in doing this 
was mainly the consideration that in war-time, when the rail- 
roads are frequently subject to unexpected strain in transporting 
troops, a stoppage in supplies could easily take place. At the 
same time, from the very beginning the possibility of a certain 
shortage in foodstuffs in the last months of the harvest year was 
taken into consideration. In addition to these voluntary accom- 
plishments dealing with the various food supplies, it was made 
compulsory for the cities in the course of the winter to provide 
for a supply of non-perishable pork. The reason for this meas- 
ure was the economic consideration that, through the slaugh- 
tering of a number of millions of hogs, the danger would be 
eliminated of their being fed with food suitable for human be- 
ings. The solving of this task fell in great part to the cities. 
In its accomplishment the previously mentioned voluntary union 
of municipalities in the Diet of the German Cities {Stddtetag) 
facilitated the framing of uniform contracts, which in many cases 
are backed by government funds. 

All these achievements of the cities in war-time were accom- 
plished without serious dispute in the city administrations. Al- 
though in the municipal executive bodies tongues were not 
stopped by a general civic political truce, nevertheless action was 
speedy and energetic. In view of the novelty and vastness of 
the tasks, this seems to me to mark a great success in organiza- 
tion in the field of self-government. The success is all the 



232 MODERN GERMANY 

greater in view of the fact that for the accomplishment of these 
undertakings considerable sums of money had everywhere to 
be raised, which was accomplished without recourse to the open 
market. The finances of the cities proved to be in so sound a 
condition that for the new fiscal year, 191 5, in many cases no 
increase of taxation was necessary, while in other cases rela- 
tively slight increases sufficed. At the same time, no municipal 
administration repudiated any of its financial obligations. There 
was not even an interruption in the redemption of the city 
debts. 

In a state which possesses so efficient and independent a form 
of self-government, there lives assuredly the spirit of free citi- 
zenship. Indeed, our whole body politic is imbued with this 
spirit. The wholesome struggle in internal politics is only con- 
cerned with the limitations and the form in which that spirit 
is to manifest itself. Without doubt, continued development will 
tend to an ever fuller growth of the rights of the individual 
citizen. The power and strength of the German Empire must, 
of course, not be allowed to suffer on that account. For, al- 
though we desire to be free citizens, we wish to be such only 
on our free native soil and as members of a powerful state. 

Closing Word by Chief Burgomaster W ermuth of Berlin 

We are aware how many ill-considered opinions the world 
has formed in regard to the essence and value of the spirit of 
German citizenship. It will be difficult in the future, as it has 
been in the past, to prepare the way everywhere for a correct 
appreciation, nor shall we be successful in this with a single effort. 
But the war has advanced us materially in this respect. It has 
become an important witness for the truth, whose voice other 
nations will hear. It shows the Germans not as a nation re- 
stricted in their internal political life, under guardianship and 
in bonds and without political self-consciousness resting on con- 
viction; on the contrary, it reveals a picture of the consciously 
disciplined strength of an inwardly free commonwealth, which, 
ready for self-sacrifice and with a clear vision of its aims in 
each of its members, stands at the helm of its own destiny. 
What nation not imbued with a free spirit of self-determination 
could do this? What nation in such case would be able to raise 
herself, not only in culture and science, commerce and technical 
achievements, but also politically to the height achieved by Ger- 
many? 

It is true that the movement toward freedom which governs 



MODERN GERMANY 233 

our public life ever more strongly is not without checks and 
limitations. But wherever in our state organism we encounter 
such control, of which foreigners disapprove, it proves to be the 
very factor which has made us great and strong. What is fore- 
most in my mind is compulsory military service, which claims an 
important part of the strength of the nation and of its economic 
powers. It is dismissed with the contemptuous catch-word "mili- 
tarism," and yet in our ears it has a pleasant sound. It is the great 
leveller and educator, it is one of the tested foundations of our 
national life in which are rooted our strongest moral forces. 
We shall always retain this military duty, and we shall ahvays 
use our military power exclusively to protect ourselves against 
injustice; if used for other purposes, it would disintegrate. 
Equally important as the blessings resulting from compulsory 
military service must we regard those which spring from the 
long-standing institution of compulsory education, that has now 
broadened out into compulsory attendance at the so-called "con- 
tinuation schools." 

Our citizenship has ample room for free development. Uni- 
versal and equal suffrage throughout the German Empire guar- 
antees to the individual his proper influence on the fundamental 
principles of our public life. This finds expression in the right 
of legislation and control of the German Reichstag. But of 
special importance for the position of the citizen is his immedi- 
ate participation in the administration of public affairs, whether 
these be affairs of state or of the municipalities or of other pub- 
lic associations. More than anything else, this direct interest 
in the great public workshop gives to the right of citizenship 
its highest value and awakens as does no other factor the sense 
of solidarity, sharpening the sense of responsibility for future 
development. The broadest field in this connection is offered 
by self-government in the municipalities, which for more than 
a hundred years have regarded this as their most precious pos- 
session. The high development of the German city system is 
due to the free and untrammeled activity of the best men in 
their administration. The excellent results which have been 
accomplished in this line will be unconditionally acknowledged, 
even abroad. Especially under the stress of this world war 
have the German cities shown themselves amply prepared for 
the onrush of difficult tasks. And when, in the future, history 
shall render its decision as regards this great period, it will not 
neglect to give due praise to the unselfish work of German citi- 
zens in the self-government of the German municipalities. 



BOOK ir 
GERMANY'S ALLIES 



CHAPTER I 
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

A. The Inner Structure of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 

PROFESSOR FRIEDRICH TEZNER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 

VIENNA 

THE world has always been skeptical as to the solidity of 
the monarchy ruled over by the Austrian Royal House. 
Napoleon I contemptuously referred to it as a "geographical 
conception," by which expression he meant that practically all 
prerequisites were lacking for its existence as a state. Strange 
to say, no one ever took the trouble to learn by what means this 
conglomeration of countries, formed by the marriage of the 
Austrian dynasty with foreign dynasties, and lacking all inte- 
gral unity, has been able, from 1526, the year of its birth, 
down to the present day to play a world-historical role, which, 
as far as we can predict, it will continue to play for many 
years to come. 

The backbone of this unique commonwealth, to which with 
the passage of time other German countries have attached them- 
selves (Hungary and Bohemia, 1526), is formed by the "East 
Mark," erected by Charlemagne as the outpost of his vast empire 
against the Avars, the "yellow peril" of that time. This 
culturally important function, both for Christianity and Euro- 
pean civilization, was later effectively exercised by the "East 
Mark," developed into the Eastern Empire, or Austria, against 
the Magyars, and again in conjunction with a portion of the 
Magyars against the Turks. As already mentioned, in the year 
1526 the countries of the Hungarian and Bohemian crown at- 
tached themselves to the House of Austria — that is to say, to 
the ruling branch of the House of Hapsburg in Austria, the 
powerful dynasty of the Holy Roman Empire of the German 
Nation. They did this by choosing as their king Archduke 
Ferdinand, the later Roman Emperor Ferdinand I. From the 
standpoint of the controlling constitutional view at that time, 
Ferdinand, through marriage, had acquired clainis to the suc- 
cession in these kingdoms. But it is subject to no doubt that 
these claims to the royal power would have been unsuccessful 
had not the noble and religious oligarchic corporations in both 

237 



238 MODERN GERMANY 

kingdoms (known under the name of "estates"), believed that 
they would gain, from connection with a dynasty so powerful in 
the German Empire, security for their own preeminent political 
position in the face of inner disturbances — more especially revolts 
of the peasants — as well as against foreign attacks. For Hun- 
gary, it must be remembered, the Turkish danger was always 
imminent. In so far as the Hungarian and Bohemian nations 
remained under the rule of the nobility and the church, the 
preservation of both of these nations was dependent on the con- 
tinuance of the monarchy. The achievements of the dynasty 
for safeguarding and strengthening all the countries ruled over 
by it, were acknowledged by the estates of these countries from 
1720 to 1722; this they did, partly in the manner of the Hun- 
garians by offering the right of female succession to the dynasty 
threatened with extinction in its male branch; partly, like the 
non-Hungarians, by acknowledging the family law of 17 19 
founded upon this principle. The public acts of the dynasty 
and of the estates looking to this result are included under the 
general name of the Pragmatic Sanction, which might thus, in 
view of the pronouncement of the estates, be styled a plebiscite 
for the monarchy and the dynasty — were there not a contradic- 
tion of terms in the name "plebiscite" when applied to aristoc- 
racy and estates. 

The peculiar laws which governed the feudal monarchy and 
according to which the ruler could dispose of his prerogatives 
as of his own property, or the so-called patrimonial conception 
of the state, made it possible for the Austrian rulers, by means 
of their royal or princely right, to unite the countries under 
their power which resisted a joining together through a federa- 
tion of the estates. Supported by this patrimonial view of the 
state, tke various monarchs welded together those rights of 
rulership which belonged to them by virtue of the various con- 
stitutions, as well as those which were not dependent on feudal 
cooperation, to form a single sovereign right; they, then, by 
virtue of their prerogative of organization, created uniform or- 
gans of authority for the whole territory under their rule, for 
the purpose of gaining uniform exercise of the rights created 
by this welding process. 

At the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth 
century, the royal administration and legal procedure in the 
German-Austrian countries were remarkably well organized, 
when compared with the inefficiency of the preceding period; 
this organization extended to all conceivable conditions. The 
chief aim of the legal reform was to furnish protection to the 



MODERN GERMANY 239 

unfree peasants and other socially inferior groups of the popula- 
tion (the so-called minus potentes) against the misuse of power 
by the feudal over-lords, who possessed jurisdictional and police 
powers, or against such misuse by the authorities in existence 
under the system of self-government which obtained among the 
estates. The princes derived their authority for this reform from 
the "missionary" conception of their right of jurisdiction, accord- 
ing to which it was a power given to them by God for the 
suppression of every form of injustice, and in the exercise of 
which they were responsible to God alone. Their position was 
strengthened by the fact that the members of the estates, w^ho 
were at loggerheads among themselves, assumed the identical 
standpoint by appealing to royal assistance in their disputes. 

It was not possible to proceed with the same thoroughness in 
organizing the Hungarian and Bohemian territories, as these 
countries were burdened with vastly more powerful feudal 
groups than was the case in the German-Austrian lands. 

Nevertheless, the Austrian rulers, by firmness and wisdom, 
which were especially necessary in the case of the recalcitrant 
Hungarian estates, were able to maintain their jus belli ac pacis 
— that is to say, the military administration in the constructive 
or organizing sense of that word, as well as the management of 
foreign affairs. Further, they established the right of forming 
crown and governmental councils for consideration of the prin- 
ciples of government and of the governmental acts of the crown, 
as exclusive monarchical prerogatives and removed from the co- 
operation of the estates. In this manner, they were enabled 
throughout the whole territory under their rule to establish, 
within the above-mentioned limits, those uniform and central regu- 
lations which made it possible for the monarchy to carry out its 
world-historical role. The Austrian rulers were financially able 
to pursue their policy of centralization, for, according to the 
constitutional view of the time, they possessed unrestricted right 
of disposal as regards the income from the domains set aside in 
each country for the benefit of the monarch, and also as regards 
that accruing from certain tributes levied for the same purpose 
(the so-called "chamber revenue") ; in addition, they controlled 
the taxes which were voted by the estates. The underlying 
principle of this policy is known as the Austrian unity, or im- 
perial concept {Gesamtstaats- oder Reichsidee) . 

The extremely primitive form of the feudal-monarchic constitu- 
tions, which gave to royal absolutism legal authority to use its 
rights to the full scope permitted by the political situation, ren- 
dered it possible under Empress Maria Theresa, in the year 1749, 



240 MODERN GERMANY 

to establish both for the German-Austrian and the Bohemian 
lands a single supreme legal tribunal and a single office for 
the consideration and preparation of the government's decrees. 
For the same reason, it has been possible to maintain this central- 
ization down to the present day, whereas Hungary succeeded in 
resisting all centralization extending beyond the army adminis- 
tration, the administration of foreign affairs and the immediate 
participation of the Sovereign. Imperial decrees sent to Hungary 
could be promulgated only through the Hungarian Royal Chan- 
cellery. This was due to the fact that in Hungary the feudal 
system found a broader basis in the constitutionally organized 
lower and middle nobility, and was therefore more capable of 
resistance than in Bohemia, where the agrarian foundation of the 
prerogatives of the higher nobility became constantly more inse- 
cure, as the result of the agrarian reforms in neighboring Prus- 
sia. In this difference as regards the success of centralization is 
to be seen the reason for the later development of so-called 
Dualism. 

At all events, the efficiency of this centralization, carried 
through with such patience and foresight, was brilliantly at- 
tested at this period: all the uniform national states had ac- 
quiesced in the destiny prepared for them by Napoleon I, yet 
this state, which he had styled a ''geographical conception," un- 
dertook the role of ultima ratio and destroyed the fiction of the 
Emperor's invincibility. Through this success the monarchy 
aided the development of the idea of national freedom, which 
had been threatened by Napoleon's plans of universal power, at 
the same time that it created for itself the great problem which 
down to the present day governs its political life; as a result of 
the development of human rights, this problem took the place 
of that other one, which had been solved, of the suppression of 
the privileged estates. 

In the year 1804 the regent of the monarchy was proclaimed 
Emperor; in 1806 the royal sovereignty was announced as ex- 
tending to those countries that had stood in a constitutional 
relationship to the old historical German Empire, which was 
abrogated. With these countries Austria entered into the Ger- 
man Confederacy, founded in 181 5, but whose dissolution oc- 
curred in 1866, as the result of the unfortunate outcome of the 
struggle with Prussia for the leadership of Germany. 

The extremely difficult task of transforming the monarchy 
on a constitutional basis took place in the year 1867, after 
several failures between 1848 and 1867, and again after an in- 
terregnum of absolutism extending from 1849 to i860; the 



MODERN GERMANY 241 

result was that the non-Hungarian countries known as Reichs- 
ratslander gained permanent constitutional representation in 
the Reichsrat (Austrian Parliament), and that the Reichstag 
(Hungarian Parliament), under the form of a convention with 
the monarch — that is to say, by means of the so-called compromise 
— agreed to the demand for recognition of uniformity in the 
management of foreign afifairs and in the army organization. As 
a result the centralization, previously so extensive, became limited 
to those activities which at all times have been the absolutely 
undisputed prerogatives of the monarchy. In the matter of par- 
liamentary control of the affairs of state, the two agglomerations 
of territories which had been formed into states act independently. 
Despite the uniformity of the army organization, this independ- 
ence is maintained even in the furnishing of recruits and also 
as regards the system of defense, for which only an agreement on 
general principles is provided ; all the more is it true in regard to 
those affairs which are not common to both states. The contribu- 
tions of the two states toward the expenses of the common ad- 
ministration, the so-called quota, are agreed upon at regular 
intervals of ten years between the two parliaments and by sanc- 
tion of the monarch. For the same period of time, with the 
approval of both parliaments, the agreement of the two states, 
or the compromise, is effected in regard to the regulation of their 
customs and commercial-political relations; down to the year 
1907 this was in the form of a customs-union, but in that year 
it took the form of a treaty of customs and trade. This treaty 
extends also to the sumptuary taxes, which are so closely 
related to the customs, to the minting of coins and printing of 
paper money, and to other commercial-political matters. The 
fixing of the yearly budget of the two states for the common 
administration — the so-called common budget — whose larg- 
est item is for the army, is accomplished separately by means 
of two parliamentary bodies, the so-called delegations; these are 
elected by vote of the two chambers in either of the two parlia- 
ments and meet always at the same time in Vienna and Buda- 
pest, alternately. These delegations also exercise parliamentary 
control of the common ministers, according to the forms exist- 
ing for this purpose. This system of union between the two 
monarchic states is called dualism, not only because the ruler 
enjoys separate and distinct prerogatives as King of Hungary 
and Emperor of Austria, but also because of the separate parlia- 
mentary handling even of those affairs common under the union. 
The Emperor's autograph letter of 1868, announcing the change 
of the state's name from "Austrian Monarchy" to "Austro-Hun- 



242 MODERN GERMANY 

garian Monarchy," and of the ruler's title from "Emperor of 
Austria" to ''Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary," was 
Intended as an outward sign of the altered constitutional position 
of Hungary within the monarchy. 

Universal, equal and direct suffrage was established in the 
year 1907 as the elective system for the Austrian central parlia- 
ment, the Reichsrat, through the decisive influence of the 
Emperor, before which all obstacles yielded. In Hungary a 
movement has been launched by the monarch, as King of Hun- 
gary, for the development of the same elective system, which 
is already in preparation. 

In both states legislation has been decentralized. Among 
the Hungarian crown lands, the kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia 
and Dalmatia occupies a preeminent position, like that of a 
separate state, by virtue of which the constitutional relation be- 
tween Croatia and Hungary proper can be altered only through 
agreement between the Croatian diet and the Hungarian parlia- 
ment. The Croatian diet likewise controls cultural legislation. 
The head of the government, who is called banus. Is constitution- 
ally responsible to this diet. 

In Hungary proper not alone the administration of local and 
provincial Interests, but also to a great degree the administra- 
tion of the state, is carried on through the self-governing bodies 
of the municipalities and counties; the formation of these bod- 
ies. It is supposed, was effected by the administrative organiza- 
tion of Charles the Great; throughout the ages they have formed 
the bulwark of the political freedom of the ruling classes of the 
Magyars. 

As regards the kingdoms and countries represented In the 
Reichsrat and making up the state of Austria, they have 
throughout the whole period of constitutional growth formed 
the basis on which the Austrian state w^as built up. All of 
them, seventeen in number, have representative bodies in their 
one-chamber diets, which cooperate In legislation, especially In 
matters pertaining to agriculture, public works, charities, schools 
and municipalities; they have legislative rights as regards laws 
touching nationality, civil and criminal matters. Further, it is 
the practice of the Imperial legislative powers to turn over to the 
various countries control of all affairs within each one's sphere. 
The diets and the national committees elected from their midst, 
control the provincial administration or the administration of 
the land by virtue of the right of financial self-government consti- 
tutionally granted to them; they furthermore exercise oversight 
of the extensive self-government of the communities, which also 



MODERN GERMANY 243 

enjoy local police authority. The system of home-rule is almost 
republican, in so far as the central administration cannot auton- 
omously settle disputes with the independent local government 
of the country ; it must appeal to the Imperial Court for a deci- 
sion. The system is republican also in the fact that the state 
can establish its legal financial claims against a province only 
in the civil courts or in the Imperial Court, according to their 
private or public nature. The municipal authorities, as well as 
the highest communal authorities who supervise them, including 
the national committees, are called autonomous authorities, owing 
to their independence of the state ; for the same reason the central 
and autonomous administration are spoken of as a dual adminis- 
tration. 

The two countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were 
united to the monarchy in 1908, received in the form of an im- 
perial decree a catalogue of universal rights of citizens; they 
received also an almost complete constitution formed after those 
of the Austrian provinces, but containing some deviations due to 
consideration for the peculiar religious and national conditions 
of the two countries. The supreme government of the two 
provinces is in the lands of a common ministry. 

It is noteworthy that as early as 181 1, that is to say, in the 
epoch of pronounced absolutism and centralization, the univer- 
sal Civil Code {biirgerliches Gesetzbuch), regulating the civil 
law in the non-Hungarian countries, announced in articles 16 
and 17 that every human being has certain natural rights which 
are dictated by reason; and that all prerogatives resulting from 
these rights must be assumed to exist as long as their restriction 
by law is not proved. The same law announces in article 1459 
that the right of a person in respect to his own acts is subject to 
no limitation through the lapse of time. These principles of 
natural rights are the formal sanction of the efforts of the 
Austrian rulers, beginning as early as the sixteenth century, 
which looked to the improvement of the position of the bonded 
peasantry, who were under the dominance of their feudal masters 
and manorial lords; these efforts find their culmination in 
the elimination of this personal lack of freedom under Emperor 
Joseph II, and in the suppression in the years 1848- 1849 of the 
imposts and personal services to the over-lords, partly on the 
basis of indemnification and partly without such indemnifica- 
tion. To have brought about this legal condition without blood- 
shed, in the face of a socially powerful body of feudal nobility, 
is one of the great achievements of the Austrian policy. 

The constitution of April 25, 1848, which was the first effort 



244 MODERN GERMANY 

to found constitutionalism in the non-Hungarian provinces, con- 
tains in Article IV this important statement of natural rights: 
''The inviolability of nationality and language is guaranteed to 
all classes of society." 

This principle v^^as given emphatic expression in the following 
manner in Article XIX of the fundamental law concerning the 
General Rights of Citizens, which forms the basis for the develop- 
ment of Austria's law as regards nationalities: "All the dif- 
ferent races of the state stand on an equality, and each has an 
inalienable right to have its nationality and religion respected 
and preserved. The equality of the various languages in school, 
in office and public life is recognized by the state. In those 
provinces where more than two races live, public schools are to 
be so organized that each race receives the support necessary 
for the development of its language, without compulsion to learn 
a second tongue." Despite the fact that famous jurists have 
taken the position that this principle, as it stands, cannot be 
directly applied and that special laws are needed for its execution, 
nevertheless, the two highest courts — namely, the Imperial Court 
and the Court of Administration — have formulated, for the safe- 
guarding of public rights by means of ingenious decisions, a far- 
reaching protection of the national minorities in the various 
provinces; nor, in view of the strong nationalistic tendencies of 
the autonomous local authorities, has difficulty been encountered 
in its practical application. Further, the legislatures of the 
various provinces with mixed nationalities seek to attain the same 
object by means of thorough-going laws regarding language, 
school and electoral rights for the diet. 

The organizing of Austria's various nations by law into cen- 
tral and branch associations is in process of being carried out. 
This advance is due mainly to the noble-spirited writings of the 
publicists, Adolph Tischof, Otto Lang and Karl Renner. Le- 
gal development along this line has been less favorable in Hun- 
gary, owing to the undeniable obstacles created by the dogma 
of the national supremacy of the Magyar race. Nevertheless, a 
comparison of the legal position of the non-Magyar nationalities 
with that of the non-Russian nations of Russia, or with that of 
the barbarically suppressed Balkan countries, is quite inadmissi- 
ble. There are, furthermore, plain indications that in the im- 
mediate future, as a result of the contemplated adoption of 
universal and equal suffrage, the dogma of national priority will 
be subjected to further modification. 

As a result of the stubbornness and violence of the national 
iiisputes within the Monarchy and of the emphatic manner in 



MODERN GERMANY 245 

which the constitutional demands of the Magyar nation are 
customarily expressed, extremely unfavorable conclusions have 
been drawn throughout the entire world regarding the solidity of 
the Austro-Hungarian union. This unfavorable estimate may 
safely be assumed to have been one of the causes for the decision 
in favor of war by the Triple Entente. But from these national 
struggles, which, compared with the deathlike silence of the non- 
Russian peoples of Russia, must be regarded as a symptom of 
an extensive freedom of movement among the nations of the 
Monarchy, there has been developed, as we have shown, as a 
result of the hearty cooperation of the legislative and judicial 
branches, an admirable law system regarding the relation of the 
races among themselves, such as is found nowhere else. This 
may serve to give an idea of the extent of the demands of the 
various races, which, whenever necessary, are satisfied by judicial 
protection, without regard for the increased administrative diffi- 
culties. An admirable short summary of this ingenious system of 
law is to be found in a recent article from the pen of the Austrian 
jurist, Herrnritt, in the Austrian Zeitschrift fiir Oejfentliches 
Recht. This system regarding nationalities, at a period when 
nationalism has developed into a serious danger for the West- 
European world, represents a cultural achievement by the state 
of the highest order; the various races of the Monarchy have 
never realized its benefits more than at present, when Russia 
feels herself called upon to substitute her "civilizing and liberating 
mission" and her policy of nationalities for the work done within 
our borders by our own Monarchy. The Austrian Monarchy, 
owing to its ancient character as a tribunal of arbitration, in 
which point no other monarchy in the w^orld is to be compared 
to it, has for centuries been able to bind together its heterogeneous 
national elements into a conservative commonwealth ; it has aston- 
ished the entire world to see how these diverse elements prove 
equal to tasks in cooperation through the influence of the mon- 
archical power to which they would not have been equal through 
ties of confederation. And if we are again successful in re- 
pelling from Europe the Asiatic hordes, which England and 
France have so unexpectedly summoned and so powerfully sec- 
onded, history will be forced to ascribe a glorious share in this 
success to our monarchical system, that is the subject of such 
great misunderstanding. 



246 MODERN GERMANY 

B. Austria-Hungary's Foreign Policy 

PROFESSOR OTTOCAR WEBER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
PRAGUE 

The foreign policy of Austria-Hungary finds problems 
awaiting it in three directions: toward Germany, Italy and 
the Orient. The connection with Germany and Italy has existed* 
for centuries. It came about through the fact that the ruling 
princes of Austria, the Hapsburgs, became at the same time 
Roman-German emperors. Not alone in Germany, but in Italy 
also, the Empire has interests at stake, as the result of family 
possessions. After the dissolution of the German Empire in 
1806, there was created the German Confederation, in which 
Austria again played the leading role. But in the year 1866 a 
change took place. Austria separated from Germany, and under 
Prussian leadership was first formed the North German Con- 
federation, and then, following the Franco-Prussian War, the 
German Empire. The question arose in Austria as to what 
attitude she was to assume toward the new state. 

Austria had in Italy, on the one hand, her own possessions; 
on the other, near relatives of the Imperial family were ruling 
in the small Italian states. The Austrian occupation was re- 
garded as the greatest obstacle in the way of Italian unity. In 
1859, the Kingdom of Sardinia succeeded, with the aid of for- 
eign assistance, in acquiring Lombardy, and in 1866 Venetia. 
Between these two dates the Italian kingdom had been formed, 
into which the small Austrian states were absorbed. Despite 
this success, a portion of the Italians considered their task not 
yet accomplished, since territory occupied by compatriots was 
still under Austrian rule. From this fact was derived the doc- 
trine of Italia irredenta, which held that there was still an "un- 
redeemed" Italy. Even with the most liberal interpretation, the 
term could be applied only to certain parts of Istria and Dal- 
matia, which had previously formed part of the old Republic 
of Venice. The other portions of Austria-Italy had never be- 
longed to the territories which to-day constitute the Kingdom of 
Italy. Trieste, Gorizia and the County of Mitterburg in Istria 
have for centuries belonged to Austria ; while the Trentino, whose 
connection with Austria dates only from a century ago, was 
an independent bishopric. The second question, therefore, for 
Austrian diplomacy to decide was as to the attitude it should 
assume toward the new Kingdom of Italy and its ambitions. 

The problem is quite a different one as regards the Orient. 



MODERN GERMANY 247 

From the earliest times Austria had stood as a barrier against the 
tribes who poured in from the East: Avars, Magyars, Turks. 
It was a question of preserving Western civilization, and at the 
same time of carrying it into the East. Austria has always 
served as a connection between West and East : the course of the 
Danube — the great river flowing through the country — urged to 
a commercial connection with the Orient. With the incorpora- 
tion into Austria in 1526 of Hungary and Transylvania, this 
oriental policy gained a further impetus. Fresh acquisitions in 
the eighteenth century, like Galicia and Bukovina, rounded out 
still more the eastern boundaries of the Monarchy. 

The third question which demanded an answer was whether 
Austria, following the course of the Danube, should make new 
territorial acquisitions, or content herself merely with the eco- 
nomic conquest of the Orient. While Austria-Hungary early 
came to an understanding with Germany and Italy, her relations 
with the Power which also had important interests at stake in 
the Orient — namely, Russia — remained always doubtful. On 
this account the relations of the Danube State to Russia during 
the last sixty or seventy years have been of the greatest impor- 
tance. 

For the last two hundred years the aim of the Muscovite 
State has been to gain Constantinople and a passage into the 
Mediterranean. For this purpose It was necessary to destroy or 
absorb Turkey and split It up Into Its various elements — Slavs, 
Greeks, Rumanians. With the Slavs In the Balkan Peninsula, 
Austria-Hungary had intimate connection through her own 
South-Slavic subjects. Of these South-Slavs, the Croatians have 
always been distinguished by their pronounced attachment to 
Austria and a certain unfriendliness tow^ard Hungary. The 
feeling at the beginning of the eighteenth century that started 
the movement of the Pragmatic Sanction was a logical outcome 
of this. It established the mdlvisibillty of the Austrian coun- 
tries and the succession to the throne within their boundaries. 
The Croatians had feared lest they might be separated even- 
tually from Austria. Their South-Slavic sister-nation, Serbia, 
who is distinguished from Croatia by religion and script, found 
her chief point of accord with the latter country in hatred of 
Hungary. This w^as Intense enough to outweigh her affection 
for Austria. Thus movements against Austria always found 
encouragement on Serbian soil. Austria-Hungary's attitude 
toward Turkey and toward the latter's vassal states, as well as 
toward her own Slavic subjects. Is strongly influenced by Russian 
politics; In the changeable attitude of the latter toward Austrian 



248 MODERN GERMANY 

policy the key Is chiefly to be sought for the acts of the Austrian 
foreign minister. 

The relations between Russia, Austria and Prussia had been 
friendly since the "Holy Alliance" had transformed a romantic 
idea of Emperor Alexander I, of Russia, into a practical reality. 
Personal friendship among the monarchs strengthened this con- 
nection. In the year 1849 Russia helped to suppress the Hun- 
garian revolt. The manner In which this was done, it Is true, 
did not quite meet the wishes of the Austrian government. The 
message which the Russian general after the capitulation of the 
Hungarian army sent to his Emperor — "The whole of Hun- 
gary lies at Your Majesty's feet" — gave no intimation that the 
Austrians had cooperated bravely In the suppression of the Hun- 
garian revolution and that the Russians had merely been their 
allies. 

Russia herself over-estimated the value of her assistance to 
Austria. She believed that she had made the entire Austrian 
policy subject to her dictates. In the year 1853, trusting to 
this and filled with contempt for the other European Powers, she 
undertook an attack against Turkey. She had, however, made a 
mistake in her calculations. Not only did Austria refuse to 
cooperate with her In this attack against the Porte, but likewise 
France, England and later Sardinia proclaimed their opposi- 
tion to it. We are interested, however, only In Austria's attitude. 
She hoped to be able, under the guidance of Count Buol, to 
support the Western Powers, to persuade Russia to abandon 
her dangerous design, and thereby to gain territorial acquisitions. 
And this she thought to do without taking part In the war. 
This proved to be a mistake. The result was that without 
gaining the confidence of the Western Powers, she earned Rus- 
sia's bitter hatred, and In the treaty of peace (1856) was forced 
to give up the principalities of Moldau and Wallachia, which 
she had already occupied. Russia made Austria pay dearly for 
her course. As a matter of fact, she had no reason to resent 
the attitude of the Danube State, for if Austria had joined the 
other enemies of Russia, the latter might have been brought 
at that time Into the greatest distress, and the fruits of a suc- 
cessful war for Austria would probably have been the acquisi- 
tion of one or more of the Balkan States. One may say of 
Austria's policy at this time that it was weak, but uncondi- 
tionally peaceful. 

From this time on, at every turn, Vienna encountered Russia 
as an enemy. This enmity was without cause, for it was Aus- 
tria's foreign minister, Count Beust, who at the end of the six- 



MODERN GERMANY 249 

ties pointed out the possibility of altering the conditions of the 
peace of 1856, which had placed sharp limitations on Russia's 
naval power in the Black Sea. When later, during the Franco- 
Prussian war, Russia, of her own initiative, declared the agree- 
ment void, she was able to refer to Beust's proposition. Neither 
Germany nor Austria offered opposition to Russia, but it proved 
difficult to win England over. In the year 1871 the new German 
Empire was brought into being; Austria-Hungary accepted this 
condition without hesitation, and took successful steps to enter 
into pleasant relations with the new state and also with Russia. 
Beust's successor, Count Andrassy, followed wisely in this path. 
In the year 1872 there was a meeting of the three Emperors in 
Berlin, the immediate result of which was the establishment of 
friendly relations among them; and during the next year this 
led to treaties among the three Powers. Visits of Emperor 
Alexander II to Vienna and of Emperor Franz Joseph to Petro- 
grad rendered possible the settling of all delicate diplomatic ques- 
tions in a peaceful manner. 

But this truce was not destined to last long; critical days 
began in the Balkan Peninsula. The states standing under 
suzerainty longed more and more for full independence, and the 
peoples directly subject to the Porte wanted freedom. In Herze- 
govina a dangerous rebellion broke out, which communicated it- 
self to Bosnia, was encouraged by Serbia and Montenegro, and 
even affected the South-Slavic provinces of Austria-Hungary. 
So deeply was the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy affected by this 
that two absolutely unimpeachable witnesses, the Russian diplo- 
mat Count Ignatiev and Prince Nikita of Montenegro, expressed 
the thought independently of each other that Austria would 
have to interfere. Above all, however, Russia desired to profit 
by the disturbances in the Balkan Peninsula for her own pur- 
poses. As a prerequisite to this she had to be certain that 
Austria-Hungary would not attack her from behind. Hence 
in Reichstadt in Bohemia, on July 8, 1876, a treaty was made, 
according to which, in case of Russian success, the Danube 
State was to acquire a portion of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
This agreement was supplemented at the beginning of the 
year 1877 to the effect that these provinces were to fall 
entirely into Austria-Hungary's hands, not alone for occupation 
but for absolute possession. Protected in this manner, Russia 
began the war against Turkey, in which she at first suffered 
heavy losses; but later, when Rumania had joined her, bril- 
liant successes followed. Russia desired to profit unrestrictedly 
thereby. In the treaty of San Stefano (March, 1878), the 



250 MODERN GERMANY 

map of the Balkan Peninsula was completely altered. There 
was no more talk, however, of a cession to Austria-Hungary! 
The latter country could not allow itself to be treated thus, and 
since England also assumed an attitude of emphatic opposition 
to Russia, a great clash of arms seemed imminent. It was due 
to Bismarck that this catastrophe was prevented. 

In the Congress of Berlin, that lasted from June 13 to July 
13, 1878, Russia was forced to submit to material changes In 
the treaty of San Stefano. The destiny of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina was settled. On June 28, England's second representative 
at the Congress, Lord Salisbury, made the motion that the two 
provinces should be given up to Austria-Hungary for occupation 
and administration. For reasons of safety, she was also granted 
the right of military occupation of the district of Novl-Bazar 
(Sandjak). It would have been easy for Austria at that time 
to carry through the annexation of these provinces; neither 
England nor Russia would have been able to prevent this. It 
was due primarily to the consideration of Count Andrassy for 
Turkey, whose feelings he desired not to wound, that Austria- 
Hungary did not occupy them. The Sandjak of Novl-Bazar 
remained under Turkey's civil administration. 

A glance at the map shows how important the possession of 
these provinces is for Austria-Hungary. They furnish the nec- 
essary hinterland for the South-Slavic provinces, Dalmatia espe- 
cially gaining protection In her rear. It must not be forgotten 
that Herzegovina territory touches the Adriatic Sea at two 
places, cutting Dalmatia at these points. Further, It must be 
remembered that the continual disturbances in these countries 
were a constant danger to Austria-Hungary and that an end 
could be put to them only by firm and energetic administration 
on the part of Austria. Even the most uncompromising enemies 
of the Dual Monarchy cannot deny that It has accomplished 
important cultural work in the two provinces In the period since 
1878.^ Military occupation of the Sandjak was important and 
of value for Austria's political position, as by this means a 
wedge was driven between Serbia and Montenegro. It was 
assumed in foreign countries that Austria some day would take 
advantage of this advance post to make an attack against Sa- 

^ See Austrian Policy since 1867, by Murray Beaven, Oxford Pamphlets, 
1914, pp. 8-9: .. . "That Austria efficiently carried out the task entrusted to 
her is not now disputed. . . . The condition of Bosnia and Herzegovina at 
the date of their definite annexation in 1890 is a standing contradiction to Mr. 
Gladstone's Midlothian statement: 'There is not a spot upon the map of Europe 
where you can lay your fingers and say: "There Austria did good."'" 

See also The War and Democracy, by R. W. Seton-Watson, London, 1914, 
p. 146: "Great material progress had been made. Roads, railways, public build- 
ings had been created out of nothing, etc." 



MODERN GERMANY 251 

loniki, through the Vardar valley. A state with an aggressive 
military policy w^ould assuredly have taken this step in the 
course of the following years. 

We may be permitted finally to recall to the mind of the 
reader that at the Congress of Berlin the independence of Ru- 
mania, Serbia and Montenegro was established, the principality 
of Bulgaria created, and, in addition, a separate Turkish prov- 
ince of East Rumelia. The last two, after a few years, cele- 
brated their union. As a reward for Rumania's faithful assist- 
ance her "patron" (Russia) deprived her of the valuable province 
of Bessarabia, giving her in return only the Dobrudja. 

The attitude of Russia in these last years had been so unre- 
liable and so threatening to the general peace of Europe (as a 
result of Emperor Alexander II having given himself into the 
hands of advisors who preached the evangel of Pan-Slavism and 
were obsessed with the most rabid Germanophobia), that Prince 
Bismarck was most doubtful of the continuance of German- 
Russian friendship and sought to guard against a Russian attack. 
It w^as evident that such an attack would instantly have caused 
a war betv^^een France and Germany, and against this double 
danger Bismarck was called upon to protect the German Empire. 
He, therefore, made a treaty offer to Austria which met the secret 
wishes of Count Andrassy. Emperor Franz Joseph forgot in 
the most generous manner the events of 1866, and gladly agreed 
to this treaty. Bismarck succeeded in convincing Emperor Wil- 
liam I of the necessity of such an alliance. On October 7, 1879, 
a treaty was signed between Austria and Germany of a purely 
defensive character. It was aimed expressly against Russia and 
obligated both signatories, in case of an attack by Russia, to 
support each other with their whole strength, and to sign peace 
only in common. No other state was mentioned, but it was 
said that in case "such a Power" (meaning France) should attack 
Germany, or Austria-Hungary (probably indicating Italy), and 
should be supported in this attack by Russia — in such an event 
also the above-mentioned treaty should come into force. The 
treaty was drawn for no definite period of time, but was to 
continue automatically, unless abrogated. So clearly did it meet 
the needs of the two states, and so great a factor has it been for 
thirty years in preserving European peace, that it has thus con- 
tinued automatically since 1879. 

The fact must be emphasized that this treaty had a most de- 
sirable influence on Russia. In the year 1881 it was possible to 
renew, among the three emperors, the friendly conferences 
which, in 1884, led to the meeting of the three monarchs in 



a^2 MODERN GERMANY 

Sciernfewice. It was intended to prevent war-like complica- 
tions, and to this end misunderstandings were to be settled by 
discussion as they arose. This was a revival of the agreement of 
1872. 

Lord Salisbury called the signing of the German-Austrian 
alliance "an event of great joy"; three years afterward it re- 
ceived an important extension, which was greeted by England's 
hearty expressions of sympathy. 

In the year 1881, France unexpectedly occupied Tunis. Italy 
had designs upon this country; she regarded this ruthless act of 
France as the result of her own absolute isolation, from which 
she now made energetic efforts to free herself. The negotia- 
tions, begun in Rome, were brought to a relatively speedy con- 
clusion through the visit of the royal Italian couple to Vienna. 
As early as May, 1882, the alliance between Austria-Hungary, 
Germany and Italy was signed, which is known as the Dreibund. 
It is said to have been made for a period of twelve years, with 
certain clauses relating to its abrogation, and has subsequently 
been regularly renewed before its expiration. The last term 
ran until the summer of 19 14, but it was renewed as early as 
December 7, 191 2. We are not definitely familiar with its pro- 
visions ; it is known only that the three Powers have reciprocally 
guaranteed each others' possessions, and that the alliance is ex- 
clusively for purposes of defense. We know, further, that in 
the year 1902 it was supplemented by a provision touching Aus- 
tria-Hungary and Italy alone, to the effect that territorial ac- 
quisition in Macedonia by Austria-Hungary was to bring with 
it a compensation for Italy. This provision, however, was 
rendered nugatory by the recent Balkan wars. 

Count Andrassy retired from his position immediately fol- 
lowing the formation of the German-Austrian alliance; but his 
successors, no matter who they have been, have faithfully pur- 
sued his policy. This policy may be expressed in the following 
manner: continuance of the friendship with Germany and Italy, 
maintenance of correct relations with England and France, with 
whom Austria has but a few points of contact, careful preserva- 
tion of peace with Russia, strengthening and upholding of the 
Turkish Empire, and preservation of peace in the Balkans. 

To preserve friendship with Germany was the easiest of all. 
This was largely owing to the fact that Kaiser Wilhelm II has 
maintained the most intimate personal relations, not only with 
Emperor Franz Joseph, but with the latter's probable successors 
as well. We all vividly remember the close bonds of friendship 
which united the German Emperor both with Crown Prince 



MODERN GERMANY 253 

Rudolph and with Archduke Franz Ferdinand. This Austro- 
German friendship successfully stood the test on many occa- 
sions. To mention two striking examples will suffice. It was 
the Austrian diplomatic representative, Count Welsersheim, 
who, at the portentous conference of Algeciras (1906), at a 
very critical moment, supported Emperor Wilhelm, to use the 
latter's own expression, "as a most brilliant second"; Austria in 
1909 received a full return when her ally checked the threaten- 
ing attack of Russia, and thereby preserved peace. 

It was a much more difficult matter always to preserve peace- 
ful relations with Italy. The exaggerated ardor of Italian 
patriots, who were united in the effort to rescue "unreclaimed" 
territory {Italia irredenta), has been a stumbling block in the 
path of our well-intending statesmen; but in conjunction with 
the never-failing skill of Italian statesmen, it has proved possible 
for Vienna to overcome these obstacles. For the Italian Govern- 
ment was hitherto always wise enough to perceive that the great- 
ness and prosperity of the country did not depend upon the 
acquisition of a village In the Trentino or in Dalmatia, but that 
it did depend upon the development of Italian supremacy in the 
great and promising territory in North Africa. After Tunis had 
been lost to Italy, and her Abyssinia enterprise had come to 
naught, she finally turned her attention to Tripoli, and during 
the conquest of this country and the war against Turkey she 
found her rear most effectively protected by Austria. Questions 
of common interests between Austria and Italy in the Balkan 
Peninsula were also settled in a thoroughly satisfactory manner. 
Apart from the already mentioned treaty concerning Macedonia, 
it was necessary to confer in regard to Albania. According to 
a report which has never been contradicted, toward the end of 
the nineties a division of the spheres of interest in the Balkans 
was effected between Austria and Russia; through this division 
Albania would have come under Austrian influence. It was 
obviously important for Italy not to lose sight of the east coast 
of the Adriatic. In full appreciation of this condition, in the 
year 1897, and again in the year 1900, the Austrian Government 
gave the Italian Government the assurance that it desired to 
settle the future of Albania only on a basis of mutual under- 
standing. The result of this loyal agreement was that, when in 
19 1 3 the re-formation of the Balkan Peninsula was being dis- 
cussed, the two Powers conjointly advocated an independent 
principality for Albania, the practicability of which, it is true, 
has not yet been proved beyond doubt. 

As we have seen, through the meeting in Scierniewice, the 



254 MODERN GERMANY 

relation of Austria with Russia had taken on a more or less 
favorable aspect, which the ministers, Counts Kalnoky and Go- 
luchovski, strove honestly and successfully to preserve. Nor 
was this relationship disturbed by any direct Austro-Hungarian 
differences, such as border disputes in Galicia or Poland, or by 
commercial rivalry; the only disturbing factor was jealousy as 
regards the Balkans. 

In that connection there were many dangerous shoals to be 
crossed. As, for instance, when in the year 1885 Bulgaria and 
East Rumelia formed their union, and immediately war broke 
out between Bulgaria and Serbia; in 1886 the fall of the first 
Prince of Bulgaria, Alexander of Battenberg, took place, and in 
the next year the new Prince, Ferdinand of Coburg, was forced 
to sue for Russia's recognition. In these various affairs Austria 
succeeded in gaining many important concessions from Russia. 
These matters lead us to discuss in detail the relation of Austro- 
Hungarian politics to the rise and development of the various 
Balkan States. 

As early as the fifties in the last century, weighty voices in 
Austria had called attention to the importance of Serbia. Many 
persons believed that Serbia was destined to play the same role 
in the Balkan Peninsula as Sardinia had played in Italy, and 
Prussia in Germany. It was, therefore, in Austria's interest to 
maintain the most friendly relations with Serbia, without, how- 
ever, allowing this state to become too powerful. The first of 
these aims was accomplished at the time of the war already re- 
ferred to between Bulgaria and Serbia (1885-86), when the 
Austrian government placed an emphatic check on the victorious 
advance of Bulgaria into the heart of Serbia. The immediate 
result was a close treaty of friendship between Serbia and Aus- 
tria. As long as King Milan reigned, conditions remained un- 
changed. With the advent, however, in 1889, of Milan's son, 
Alexander, to the throne, the relation of the great state to its 
small, restless neighbor became less favorable. A condition bor- 
dering on anarchy, fostered by Russia, came into existence, and led 
eventually to the king's murder. The murderers placed Peter 
Karageorgevich on the throne, and Russian dominance now be- 
came evident in Serbia, driving the country into increasing en- 
mity toward Austria. The statesmen of Austria felt called upon 
to combat this unfriendly attitude in the commercial field and 
this led to the so-called **Hog War." The heavy economic 
losses which resulted from it rendered the name of Austria 
daily more odious, and drove Serbia unreservedly into Russia's 
arms. There may be people who hold the opinion that Austria- 



MODERN GERMANY 255 

Hungary might have acted with more consideration for Serbia's 
feelings, and have shown greater readiness in meeting the de- 
mands of the king's murderers, without regard to political eti- 
quette. Translated from diplomatic language into plain Eng- 
lish, this would mean that the statesmen who had gained power 
in Serbia should have been flattered by gold and favor. But, on 
the other hand, it must not be forgotten that this course was 
generously followed with regard to Montenegro, which has ex- 
isted down to the present time on Austrian gold ; yet, despite 
this fact, the Russian Czar was able to declare that Montenegro 
was ''Russia's sole genuine friend in the Balkan Peninsula." 

Another consideration to which weight must be given is the 
fact that, as a result of the racial affinity of the Serbs on the 
two sides of the Austrian boundary line, Serbian enmity early 
succeeded in arousing tendencies within the Empire which ren- 
dered a friendly attitude toward the new government in Bel- 
grade scarcely possible. 

The relations of Austria to Bulgaria have at all times been free 
from such difficulties; so that the Vienna government, after the 
failure of its efforts to support Serbia against Bulgaria, was 
able to turn, without scruple, to the advancement of the Bul- 
garian plans. The disagreement between Serbia and Bulgaria, 
which had assumed unexpected proportions as a result of the 
last Balkan War, offered a tempting opening for the Austrian 
statesmen, nor did the Vienna government need to have this 
pointed out to it a second time. Unfortunately, this led to less 
favorable relations with Rumania. 

Of the two non-Slavic states which, toward the north and 
south, guard the entrance to the Balkans, Rumania has from 
the start been favorably inclined toward the policy of the Drei- 
hund. She had felt all too keenly in 1878 the thanklessness of 
Russia, who, as already mentioned, had deprived her of the 
fruitful province of Bessarabia. Other factors, however, con- 
tribute to render Rumania's attitude comprehensible — the na- 
tionality of King Charles, who was never able to forget that 
he had been a German prince, and Italy's alliance with Aus- 
tria. There was naturally a bond of union between Rumania 
and the linguistically related country south of the Apennines. 
Rumania carefully abstained from participation in the last Bal- 
kan War, awaiting the development of affairs. When, after 
the victory of the Balkan League, disputes that eventually led 
to war broke out in regard to the division of Macedonia be- 
tween the previous allies, Serbia and Bulgaria, the two leading 
i^lav states, Rumania at the last moment drew her sword to 



256 MODERN GERMANY 

enforce a decision. The territorial extension which she desired 
was to be secured only from Bulgaria. The Viennese govern- 
ment thereby found itself in a difficult position — should it side 
with Rumania or Bulgaria? To decide this question in a man- 
ner above criticism was, perhaps, beyond human wisdom. At 
all events, the immediate result was in so far unsatisfactory that 
neither Bulgaria nor Rumania felt that their interests had been 
sufficiently considered; especially did the Bukharest government 
make this known through a perceptible cooling in its Austrian 
sympathies. Fortunately, however, great political policies are 
not controlled by temporary sentiment, but by permanent interests, 
and these tend constantly to lead Rumania back to the Central 
Powers. 

In this connection mention must be made of the fact that in 
view of the unavoidable action and reaction of interior and foreign 
politics, the governments both at Vienna and Budapest will find 
a rich field for activity after the war: a more general regard 
for the feelings of the Italian subjects in one part of the Empire 
and of the Rumanian subjects in the other will lead to a better 
understanding between the two states. 

As regards Greece, the other Balkan border state, she has 
always enjoyed friendly treatment at the hands of Austria- 
Hungary, as was repeatedly made clear at the time of the set- 
tlement of the Cretan question. 

It must not, however, be forgotten that all of these states of 
which mention has been made formerly formed part of Turkey 
in Europe, and that every increase in power of any of them 
denotes a weakening of Turkey. How difficult was it, then, to 
reconcile the preservation of Turkey with the benevolent atti- 
tude which the young, ambitious Balkan States expected of 
Vienna! In this connection it must be borne in mind that each 
sign of coolness from Austria-Hungary was apt to drive the 
states in question into Russia's arms. The difficulties which the 
various Austro-Hungarian ministers were called upon to meet are 
scarcely to be gauged. These difficulties were often still fur- 
ther increased by Turkey's recalcitrant attitude in regard to sin- 
cere suggestions of reform. 

During the last decade of the nineteenth century, Russian and 
Austrian politics in the Balkans were fairly at a balance ; no par- 
ticularly warm friendship developed between Austria-Hungary 
and Russia, but on the other hand there was no marked clash 
of opposing interests. In Petrograd diplomats were well satis- 
fied to be able to oppose to the Dreibund the alliance with 
France, which had taken shape during the years 1891 to 1895, 



MODERN GERMANY 257 

and efforts were made to preserve the friendly relations of the 
moment. Russian statesmen at this time conceived ambitious 
plans as regards Asia. They hoped to be able to carry them 
through without great difficulty; the only Power which might 
be dangerous to them in this connection, England, stood "in 
splendid isolation." These Asiatic plans demanded European 
peace as a prerequisite, and when, In 1897, Emperor Franz Jo- 
seph paid another visit to Petrograd, the opportunity was taken 
advantage of to divide the Balkan Peninsula into Russian and 
Austrian spheres of interest. The friendly understanding 
thereby achieved seemed to justify a hope that in the future 
every movement in the Balkan Peninsula would be observed by 
the Austro-Hungarian and Russian statesmen, and discussed 
by them before it could develop into a dangerous conflagration. 
The plan seemed to be successful, and a few years later it was 
decided to subject the Macedonian trouble to the same treat- 
ment. On October 2, 1903, the Russian and Austrian foreign 
ministers met at the Imperial Austrian hunting lodge at 
Miirzsteg and reached a definite understanding by which all 
problems arising in the future in the Balkans were to be solved 
in common. The Macedonian revolt was to be the first ques- 
tion so treated ; in this manner, the Austro-Russian understand- 
ing was confirmed, and Russia was able without anxiety to de- 
vote herself to her Asiatic endeavors. 

Russia's Asiatic plans had encountered opposition from a 
quarter where it had not been anticipated — Japan. In the year 
1904-5 war broke out between the two states, resulting, after 
stubborn resistance, in Russia's complete defeat. As a result of 
this war, an internal movement started in Russia, w^hich for a 
long time paralyzed the resources of the state and occupied its 
entire strength. While Russia was passing through this grave 
crisis, Austria-Hungary observed a strictly correct attitude. The 
possibility of proceeding to a change of the status quo in the 
Balkan Peninsula during this period (even if this had meant 
merely the final annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) was 
not taken advantage of by the government on the Danube. Aus- 
tria-Hungary's statesmen may perhaps be blamed for weakness 
at this point, but they can in no wise be charged with war-like 
proclivities. Austria-Hungary was at that time in just as favor- 
able a position for war as ten years later. The provisions of 
the Dreibundj which was intended for defense, not for attack, 
Vv'ere carried out literally. Russia was enabled undisturbed to 
recall her defeated regiments from Asia and to employ them 
for the suppression of the revolution — her influence in the Bal- 



258 MODERN GERMANY 

kans suffered not the slightest diminution. Austria-Hungary 
carried out the programme of Miirzsteg in a meticulously con- 
scientious manner. Count Goluchovski was displaced in the 
Vienna foreign ministry by Count Aehrenthal. But for the mo- 
ment Austria-Hungary's policy continued as before, although; 
European conditions had long since undergone a great change. 
This change must be briefly considered here, since the policy of 
the Danube State could not escape its influence. 

An English pamphleteer of the present war has characterized 
the Dreibund and its epoch, in a manner which calls for un- 
reserved endorsement. He states that the Triple Entente was 
created as a reply to the Dreibund, and he continues thus: 

**Both alliances were concluded originally as purely defensive. 
For twenty years European peace rested upon a secure basis, for 
the simple reason that there was no Power which might have 
profited by a disturbance of the peace." 

This is correct down to the last word — for if one reckons 
twenty years from the formation of the Dreibund one reaches 
the year 1902, and this was the first year of the reign of King 
Edward VH. Under him the one Power which might have had 
an interest in a disturbance of the peace, namely, England, came 
into the foreground. This is not the place to enumerate the 
reasons and the many proofs of England's belligerent attitude. 
The fact remains that at this time the encircling of Germany 
began, which was gradually to include Austria-Hungary also. 
There followed King Edward's trips to Paris, Spain and to 
Italy, in the course of which this policy was partly prepared and 
partly carried through. The crowning touch was put to it by 
the English king's visits to Ischl and Reval. We are unfortu- 
nately insufficiently informed in regard to these events, but the 
results plainly indicate their ^nature. The attempt to entice 
Austria to abandon the Dreibund was a failure; but, on the 
other hand, the pronounced differences between England and 
France and between England and Russia were temporarily elimi- 
nated. One could not long fail to see that storm clouds of the 
most threatening character were gathering at all points. 

Quite unexpectedly, however, even to the most trained ob- 
server, the storm broke in Constantinople. The Young Turk 
movement in 1908 brought old Turkey to her knees. The 
''Sick Man," for whose recovery the European doctors had so 
often vainly striven and who had been forced to swallow so 
many "reform pills," to no avail, was now finally made an end 
of; a new and youthful spirit, armed with all the modern meas- 
ures of Kultur (parliamentary system, etc.), was to rule at the 



MODERN GERMANY 



259 



Sublime Porte. The states of the Dreibund encouraged In the 
most emphatic manner this movement toward betterment at the 
Golden Horn, as it was in accordance with their conservative 
peace policy that the existing Turkish State be upheld. At the 
same time, however, it appeared to Aehrenthal high time finally 
to put an end to the uncertain status in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and frankly to apply the proper name to a situation which had 
in fact long existed. Austria-Hungary, through thirty years of 
unremitting effort, had so striven for the welfare of these occu- 
pied provinces that it appeared only right that the occupation 
should be changed into an annexation, as a reward for this labor. 
We will let the English pamphleteer speak again on this point. 
He says: 

"Bosnia-Herzegovina had been Austrian territory for thirty 
years, save in name only; and there was no more reason for 
assuming that Austria would ever leave these countries than for 
the assumption that Great Britain would willingly abandon 
Egypt." ^ 

How was this measure carried through? Far from springing 
a fait accompli on Europe, Austria had carefully prepared the 
ground for the annexation. According to our information, the 
Russian Foreign Minister Isvolsky, on June 19, 1908, suggested 
to his Austrian colleague the words which the latter afterward 
used. He did even more: he advised not only the annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, but likewise that of the Sandjak. In 
September of the same year the two ministers met at Buchlau 
in Moravia. Aehrenthal made no secret of his intention to 
carry out the annexation. The Russian minister seems to have 
agreed in principle, but with diplomatic slyness at the same time 
he attempted to gain for his own state what in June he had 
already hinted at: he demanded a further revision of the Treaty 
of 1856, namely the opening of the Dardanelles to the Russian 
war fleet. Russia was at last to gain the long-desired entrance 
into the Mediterranean. The demands of the two ministers 
stand in marked contrast to each other as regards their import. 
One of them desired only clearly to establish an existing condi- 
tion, whereby the actual relations of the Powers would not suf- 
fer the slightest derangement; the other sought to force the 

'^Austrian Policy since 1867, Beaven, pp. 16-17. See also The War and 
Democracy, by R. W. Seton- Watson, p. 146: "To any impartial observer it had 
been obvious from the first that those who dreamt of Austria-Hungary's vol- 
untary withdrawal from the two provinces were living in a fool's paradise. 
The formal act of annexation merely set a seal to thirty years of effective 
Austrian administration. , . . Austria had come to stay, and Aehrenthal, in 
annexing the provinces, felt himself to be merely setting the seal to a docu- 
ment which had be»n signed a generation earlier. . . ." 



26o MODERN GERMANY 

Eastern question into a new phase and greatly to strengthen 
Russia's power. 

Both statesmen, however, separated in seeming satisfaction. 
As was later learned. Count Aehrenthal offered no objection in 
principle to the passage of the Russian ships through the Dar- 
danelles, on the condition that certain measures of precaution 
were taken for the safety of this maritime highway, similar to 
those taken with regard to the Suez Canal. But this matter 
was by no means ripe for action and settlement, while there was 
no reason for delay as regards the Austro-Hungarian proposi- 
tion. In connection with Bulgaria's proclamation of the change 
to a kingdom, Austria-Hungary completed the annexation of the 
two provinces on October 5, 1908. 

Thereupon a storm broke loose in the Russian, English and 
Serbian press, which w^as calculated to make one believe that the 
three Powers had suffered injury in the most unheard-of manner. 
As a matter of fact, they seem to have been surprised only by 
the speedy action of the Austro-Hungarian minister, whereas 
there could be no room for doubt as to his intention, and also 
as to harmlessness of the act. Isvolsky asserts, however, that 
he had been outwitted by von Aehrenthal — a fact which does 
slight honor to his skill as a diplomat. The date of the annexa- 
tion, it is true, seems not to have been fixed in Buchlau, Aehren- 
thal promising to write once more beforehand to his colleague. 
The Russian received this letter in Paris on October 2, but 
allowed the following days to pass without making a move. Not 
until a week later, in London, did he make an outcry and pub- 
licly declare that he had been duped. 

Russia and Serbia stood in need of an excuse for their anger 
against Austria-Hungary, and England also desired to let the 
Vienna government feel the force of her displeasure for having 
resisted the English bait. Both sides began to arm, war ap- 
peared inevitable between Austria and Serbia, and Russia 
seemed ready to take part. 

In this connection one step of the Austrian minister must be 
clearly remembered. Simultaneously with the annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austria-Hungary surrendered her val- 
uable and important position in the Sandjak and gave this terri- 
tory back to Turkey. An act of such unselfishness is unknown to 
history. Thereby Austria abandoned her designs on Saloniki 
and retained for herself only the commercial conquest of the 
Balkans. It might have been expected that the new Turkish 
government would appreciate Austria's moderation and give its 
blessing to the rechristening of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unfor- 



MODERN GERMANY 261 

tunately, the new rulers at Constantinople were badly advised, 
and offered the most stubborn opposition to Austria's policy. 
Only as a result of extended discussion, and of a boycotting 
which bore heavily on Austria's commerce, followed finally 
by the payment of a large sum of money, was the approval of 
the annexation gained in Constantinople. 

Meanwhile, a veritable witches' sabbath had come upon 
Europe, and it required a very emphatic declaration by Germany 
that if Russia attacked Austria the German Empire would be 
found by the latter's side, to force Russia to call a halt, thereby 
placing a damper on the Serbian outburst. But the wick con- 
tinued to smoulder with much evil-smelling smoke. Serbia 
declared herself threatened in the highest degree by conditions 
which she had calmly contemplated for thirty years, and she now 
sought to mobilize Serbians in Austria-Hungary for her own 
purposes. Austria's desire for peace, for which her surrender of 
the important Sandjak had again given so convincing a proof, 
was contemptuously interpreted as weakness. It became an 
axiom in the Balkan states, especially in Serbia, that Austria 
was a dying power. It was claimed that the patriarchal 
respect which the aged Emperor Franz Joseph enjoyed among 
his subjects scarcely sufficed to hold the state together. This 
view was spread throughout the whole political world, was 
everywhere more or less accepted, and influenced opinion against 
the Danube State in the most remarkable manner. As excuse 
for the credulous, who have since had their calculations upset 
by Austria's cohesive strength, it must be stated that they were 
unfortunately to a great extent supported in their view by 
Slavic voices within the Monarchy itself. This is an ex- 
tremely regrettable confession, but one which cannot be with- 
held in devotion to truth. It was not a question of agents 
provocateurs who were paid by the Austrian Government to 
mislead foreign countries, but of conscienceless, traitorous scoun- 
drels whose company we do not begrudge to our enemies. 

Count Aebrenthal, who had guided the ship of state with 
firm hand during a difficult period, became seriously ill and 
was forced to make place for Count Berchthold. Difficult 
tasks awaited this diplomat as he undertook the burdens of 
office. Serbian discontent continued uninterrupted, partial 
mobilization had to be undertaken anew, Austria's commerce 
suffered under continued threat of war, and the state paid 
heavily for this apparent peace. 

The Balkan Alliance continued meanwhile to be quietly 
formed. Before the Young Turkish state could develop its 



262 MODERN GERMANY 

full strength, the one-time vassals of European Turkey hoped 
completely to destroy it. 

The Balkan War broke out. Austria-Hungary took no 
steps to furnish aid to Turkey — a course which would have 
been to her political advantage — but abandoned the Balkan 
Peninsula to the Balkan peoples. Turkey was conquered and 
lost nearly her entire European possessions. A violent dispute 
immediately broke out in regard to the booty, the allies being 
unable to agree on the division of the spoils. Serbia was de- 
termined, before all, to reach the Adriatic and acquire a harbor. 
Montenegro likewise demanded a portion of Albania, together 
with Scutari, the old Albanian capital. The Vienna Govern- 
ment offered uncompromising opposition to both of these de- 
mands; in this it enjoyed the most ardent support from its ally, 
Italy, which could permit as little as could Austria, a Slavic 
great power to gain a firm footing on the east coast of the Adriatic 
or occupy important portions of Albania. For it was perfectly 
clear that Serbia or Montenegro would serve merely as proxy 
for Russia. The two allies were successful in their opposition, 
and Serbia, ousted from the west, turned toward the east. It 
was demanded that Bulgaria surrender Macedonian territory, 
upon which she had already placed her hand ; over this dispute 
w^ar broke out between the two previous allies, the results of 
which have already been discussed. The peace of Bukharest of 
19 1 3 is the epilogue to these conflicts. 

Serbia's machinations against Austria, incited by Russia, con- 
tinued to increase in violence. The tension between the two 
Powers became unbearable. On June 28, 19 14, the explosion 
occurred. Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his consort were 
shot down in Serajevo by Serbian murderers. This death was 
really a dramatic fatality. It had been said of the murdered 
Archduke that had he lived he would have worked for an im- 
provement of the condition of the Slavs in Austria; certain is it 
that his whole environment had educated him to Slavic sym- 
pathies. It would be presumptuous positively to assert that the 
Archduke would have substituted for the Dualism a Trialism in 
Austria, by which the South Slavs would have been enabled to 
play an important role. Nevertheless, such an intention must 
be considered as within the realms of the possible. By this means 
the South Slavic inhabitants of Austria would perhaps have been 
able to win over their brothers beyond the border and thus offer 
the strongest check to Serbia's propaganda in Austria. All these 
dreams were shattered by the death of the Archduke. A 
thorough-going search for the actors in the tragedy and their 



MODERN GERMANY 263 

backers, which Austria was in duty bound to make, led to persons 
who were in positions of honor and trust in Serbia. Indeed, the 
tracks led even beyond the Serbian boundary. It w^ould have 
been unworthy of a great state to permit such a band of murderers 
to remain at its borders without making an effort to avenge the 
crime and to prevent a recurrence of similar events, which the 
next time might involve the monarch himself. Vengeance was not 
demanded in the first heat of anger, but only after four weeks 
had elapsed and after contempt had again begun to be expressed 
at Austria's weakness. It was demanded that an investigation 
of the strictest kind be made by the Serbian government, and 
that guarantees be given that the affair would not degenerate 
into fine phrases and regretful shrugging of the shoulders. 
The sole possible manner of securing a serious investigation was 
to undertake it with the cooperation of Austrian officials. Only 
w^ith such control would it have been possible to get to the bot- 
tom of the matter, and to prevent the Serbian government from 
encouraging such crimes in future. But precisely against this 
condition did the Serbian government protest most violently, 
thereby giving proof that It had cause to fear the investigation. 
A government quite uninvolved In the affair might quietly have 
submitted to this formality. That Austria had at last developed 
energy was regarded In Belgrade as an insult.^ 

Although Austria's demand was justified and, as pointed 
out, offered the only guarantee for a rigid prosecution of the 
investigation, the Vienna government would have been willing, 
as we know to-day, to renounce its demand at the instigation 
of its ally, Germany. But Russia, desiring war, did not await 
the result of German intervention, but mobilized, and thereby 
started the World War. 

If we now throw a comprehensive glance back on the Austro- 
Hungarlan policy of the last twenty or thirty years we cannot 
but arrive at the conclusion that it has been conservative and 
peace-loving in the highest degree. True friendship towards Aus- 
tria's allies, and friendly readiness to meet her rival, Russia, 
half-way — such have been its characteristics. 

Austrian diplomacy refused to take advantage of favorable 
opportunities to Increase its power, such as the Russo-Japanese 



1 See Austria- 
at Cleveland; Ne 



Hungary and the War, Ernst Ludwig, Consul of Austria-Hungary 
■Jew York, 191 5, p. 65. An interesting precedent is noted. On 
June 10, 1808, Prince Michael Obrenovich of Servia was assassinated in 
Topchider. The traces of the murder led to Servians living in Hungary. For 
this reason an investigation was started by the Hungarian government. There- 
upon Servia requested that Servian officials be allowed to assist in the investi- 
gation, and the Hungarian government, having nothing to hide, consented 
without hesitation. 



264 MODERN GERMANY 

War. One Is almost tempted to say that It neglected to pro- 
tect the Turkish Empire against Its vassals. It abandoned the 
Balkans to the Balkan nations, and protected its own Interests 
only to the minimum of necessity. For herself Austria desired 
and received nothing beyond the possession of the two provinces 
which had been offered to her by Russia and almost forced 
upon her by Europe. Nor were these provinces taken until 
thirty years of beneficent service had been rendered to them. 
But all this restraint availed Austria nothing. At the moment 
when she showed courage to demand vengeance for a crime 
without parallel, her enemies attacked and sought to punish 
her for the sole crime which she had committed — namely, that 
of living. 

History, the judge of events, will undertake In more peaceful 
future times the Impartial award of praise and blame. It 
will establish this fact: the Austro-Hungarian policy may fre- 
quently be accused of unduly calm reserve and caution, but 
never of belligerency or desire for war. The best expression 
of this is to be found In a statement of the universally revered 
Emperor Franz Joseph: 

"Austria-Hungary can never wage an ofEensIve war, she 
^ust wait until she Is attacked." 



CHAPTER II 

TURKEY 
PROFESSOR CARL BECKER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BONN 

TURKEY'S accession to the cause of the Central Powers 
was a great surprise to outsiders. For many years we 
had been accustomed to see the Sublime Porte skillfully play 
one Great Power off against the other, without identifying her- 
self with the interests of either. The friendly relations of 
Germany and Turkey were a matter of common knowledge, 
but so was the deep-seated influence of the Entente Powers. 
From Germany and Austria-Hungary the Porte had nothing to 
fear; at the beginning of the war England, Russia and France 
had solemnly guaranteed her territorial possessions in case of 
loyal neutrality. The Ottoman Empire, moreover, had shortly 
before suffered the terrible disaster of the Balkan War; party 
conflicts were raging within its boundaries, and sweeping re- 
forms demanded attention. In short, even a superficial acquaint- 
ance with conditions seemed to show that Turkey's traditions 
and interests dictated absolute neutrality. Nevertheless, from 
the beginning of the war those in authority at Constantinople 
left no stone unturned in the effort to be prepared for a pos- 
sible struggle on four fronts against the Entente Powers; and 
when finally the demands of the Western allies became un- 
reasonable, in the last days of October, 19 14, they drew the 
sword. 

The official publications of England and Russia make it 
appear as if peaceful Turkey had been plunged into an under- 
taking of incalculable consequences and of a nature contrary 
to her true interests, through pressure from Germany exercised 
through the German military mission and through the cruisers 
Goeben and Breslau, which the Turkish Government had pur- 
chased. For purposes of anti-German propaganda, this expla- 
nation is admirable; unfortunately, it does not accord with the 
facts. The English and French fleets lay at the entrance to 
the Dardanelles; the faintest sign, therefore, from the Sublime 
Porte would have sufficed to bring relief from unwelcome Ger- 
man coercion. The German military mission might have been 
rendered innocuous just as easily as the English naval mission. 

265 



266 MODERN GERMANY 

But these considerations are not to the point. Turkey entered 
of her own initiative into this war, which is for her a war of 
defense in the strictest sense of the word. The fact that the 
decision of the cabinet was not unanimous proves nothing as to 
the government's desire for war — it is a matter of common 
knowledge that several of the English ministers resigned their 
portfolios. That Turkey was in close touch with her German 
advisers in regard to this decision is only natural. But the very 
fact that she had selected German advisers and that she had 
joyfully welcomed German ships in the Dardanelles proves 
conclusively that in responsible Turkish circles an identifica- 
tion with the German cause was desired from inner conviction. 
According to the Turkish, as well as to the German view, the 
interests of the two countries were identical. The development 
of the German friendship into a German-Turkish community 
of interest, in the face of the political supremacy of the Entente 
Powers on the Bosphorus and of the French and English 
influence in matters of education and the press — that is the real 
problem of the German-Turkish alliance. 

The only possible course for the Asiatic states, If they wish 
to survive despite the European policy of power, lies in strength- 
ening themselves internally by making use of the ideal forces of 
the modern state and in adapting themselves to the demands of a 
world organized along capitalistic lines. The decisive problems 
are, therefore, those of the state and of economJcs. The problem 
of civilization, or culture, is inseparably connected with each of 
these. Hence, that Asiatic state will show Itself most capable of 
survival which is able to graft the new requirements onto the 
ancient roots of Its strength, and which gains the opportunity for 
organic development through outward conditions of peace. Japan 
occupied this unique position, thanks to her insular situation far 
removed from Europe, and thanks to the homogeneity of her popu- 
lation and to the adaptability of her ideals of government and of 
her civilization. China, which might easily follow in the same 
course, is forced to contend with other and more serious diffi- 
culties: ancient historical divergencies between the provinces, 
the proximity of the Great Powers, whose greed for land and po- 
litical and commercial interests run counter to the strengthening, 
even to the preservation of China, and finally childish experi- 
ments with a form of state that disregards all national tradi- 
tions. But, from every point of view, the position of Turkey 
favors survival the least. 

Geographically, Turkey invites the interference of the Great 



MODERN GERMANY 267 

Powers. Placed at the meeting-point of three continents, she 
commands the natural gateway into Asia and threatens the 
flank of Africa. If strengthened in a military way, she might 
block land communication between the Mediterranean and the 
Indian Ocean, she might indeed threaten the water connection 
between these two seas. As mistress of the Bosphorus and 
of the Dardanelles, Turkey holds in her hand the key to the 
international commerce of all the Mediterranean powers. At 
the same time, her territory is by nature one of the richest in 
the world and the seat of the most ancient civilization of man- 
kind. There where the Babylonian, the Assyrian and the Greek 
civilization has bloomed, as well as that of the Caliphs, a new 
and glorious world might at any moment arise. The ruins and 
deserts of Asia Minor call, as it were, for the living w^aters of 
European organization. 

Even more complicated are the ethnographic conditions. Tur- 
key unfortunately is not inhabited by Turks, as Japan is by 
Japanese; Turks and Arabs, Armenians and Kurds, Greeks and 
Bulgarians are forced to live side by side in this empire, not 
to speak of smaller remnants of other races. This mixture of 
races was much worse before the Balkan War, and in this 
respect the painful amputation of the European provinces was 
undoubtedly beneficial to Turkey. The racial mixture, how- 
ever, is to-day still a problem. This multiformity, however, 
would not be such an impediment did the peoples in question 
live entirely within the Turkish boundaries. But the bulk of the 
Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians, the Christian citizens of 
Mohammedan Turkey, live outside of Turkey. Especially do 
the Greeks flirt with the thought of liberation and the realization 
of the national ideal of a Greater Greece. Their enthusiasm, 
therefore, for the renaissance of Turkey is not great. Likewise 
the Bulgarians, who are not very numerous, regard themselves 
as "unredeemed." The Armenians are scattered throughout the 
entire empire, but the main portion of the nation dwells in Russia 
and Persia and the recollection of their national independence lives 
unquenched in their hearts. The unfavorable position of the 
Russian Armenians influences them, it is true, in the main to be 
loyal cooperators in the rebuilding of Turkey; but certain circles 
have sought too long by sanguinary means to force the interfer- 
ence of Europe and have suffered too greatly from the Kurds to 
be able entirely to repudiate this past. Of the Mohammedan 
peoples, the uncivilized Kurds are not for the moment to be 
considered in the work of cooperation; while the Turks and 
Arabs, the most important national elements, stand in sharp racial 



:268 MODERN GERMANY 

opposition to each other. The Turks are the master nation, 
they have conquered all these countries and peoples, they are the 
upholders and the military backbone of the state. The glorious 
traditions of Turkey are bound up with their name, with their 
national dynasty. The Arabs, on the other hand, are the chosen 
people of religious tradition, according to the Mohammedan 
view the chief among the nations ; in their aristocratic pride they 
submit only with inward protest to the rule of the Turks, who 
excel them in capability and especially as regards character. The 
leadership of Islam properly belongs to the Arabs. But the 
opposition between Turks and Arabs is by no means the whole 
of the problem. The Arabs are split as regards religion; their 
most industrious racial relatives are the Catholic Syrians, to whom 
for a double reason Turkish supremacy is hateful. Both peoples, 
finally, are represented beyond the boundaries of Turkey, and 
Pan-Turkish interests are furthered among the Turks, Pan- 
Arabic interests among the Arabs — a fact which does not con- 
tribute to simplify the ethnologic problem of the Ottoman State. 
National and political boundaries thus coordinate at no point; 
we have here the difficulties of Austria-Hungary translated to 
the Orient. They are increased still further by an economic 
factor. The nations most active commercially of Turkey are 
Christian, especially the Greeks and Armenians. They have 
for a long time furnished the commercial as well as the cultural 
connection with Europe, or more properly expressed, with the 
Levantines, the South-European emigrants who settled on the 
east coasts of the Mediterranean, where they served to advance 
the economic interests of European expansion. The elder 
Turkish civilization oppressed and molested this class, and In 
consequence it sought the protection of those powers interested 
in the weakening of Turkey. Such ancient habits are not to be 
uprooted on the spur of the moment, by means of a still very 
imperfect constitution. The ruHng race of Turks has not been 
able. In view of its national character and traditions, to com- 
pete commercially with these elements. The Anatolic peasant, 
upon whose labor In the last analysis the welfare of Turkey 
depends, is too undeveloped and too ruthlessly exploited to 
form the nucleus of the national economic system of the Moham- 
medan-Turkish state, though, together with his Arabian co-reli- 
gionist In Irak, he will one day be called upon to play this role. 
Political power and economic strength, the two fundamentals 
of a modern state, are thus divided among different peoples in 
Turkey, a fact which plainly tends to sharpen racial contrasts. 
Then, too, there is the constantly threatening danger of commer- 



MODERN GERMANY 269 

clal and political interference by great and small Powers, which 
see in the evolutionary conflicts in Turkey only the "beginning 
of the end," and eagerly await the moment which, with the 
ruin of Turkey, will bring the long hoped-for and carefully 
prepared realization of their secret desires. 

Previous to the age of capitalism, of commercial intercourse 
and imperialism, these centrifugal elements of Turkey were 
held in check by the patriarchal and absolute Islam state. Herein 
the Turkish-Islamic elements, strengthened by Arabs, Kurds 
and Albanians, ruled not alone de facto, but also de jure, as a 
master caste over the economically active Christian Raja peoples. 
If the latter provided public revenues, the former bore arms 
for their protection. The real state was formed only by the 
faithful; the Christians were subject peoples, who as regards 
their individual and legal rights formed separate groups under 
the protection of the Turkish government. The Turkish 
Sultan was the absolute ruler, for the Turks had conquered 
the Arabs and Kurds, although the latters' position as Moslems 
was a different one from that of the non-Moslem races ; the fiction 
of the Islam state with the Caliph at its head was preserved. 
The Sultan as the most powerful ruler in Islam claimed the 
Caliphate, that is, the temporal leadership of the faithful. He 
was the protector of the Holy Cities, he waged his wars as 
Holy Wars (djihad), he was the protagonist of the Faith 
against Heresy. The Holy Law of the Sheriat was the law of 
the state, although in practice it was frequently not applied, or 
was supplemented by secular laws, the so-called kanun-namehs. 
With all the conscious strength of racial bonds, the Ottoman 
state rested upon a purely religious foundation. Nationalistic 
thought is in the Orient a product of most recent development. 
The state was held together by the will of the ruling Turkish 
class and supported by the consciousness of religious solidarity 
among its Mohammedan subjects. The Christians were sub- 
ject foreign peoples, like the Tartars in present-day Russia. 
The economic bond, well into the nineteenth century, was the 
Turkish feudal system, which was not based like the Western 
system on land, but on rent and tax-rent. It lies in the nature 
of Orthodox Islam to spread ; if it retreats its destiny is sealed. 
Turkish supremacy is slowly being crowded out of Europe, and 
the previously so despised "heathen" are beginning gradually 
with their commerce, with their political power, and above all 
with their ideas, to undermine the ancient conception of the 
state. The superior strength of the modern state is recognized, 
hence the work of reform by Mohammed II. The army was 



270 MODERN GERMANY 

reorganized, the feudal system gave way before the provincial 
constitution, European jurisdiction and legal equality of the 
Christians was proclaimed ever anew, but never, or only par- 
tially, made a reality. The previously contemptuously granted 
"capitulations" became an unbearable burden, which robbed the 
growing modern Turkish state of all freedom of movement. The 
premature ultra-liberal experiment of a western constitution 
{mid hat, 1876) was crushed by the reaction of Abdul-Hamid. 
The power of the state became a despotism. Opposed to the 
advance of European ideas, the Sultan emphasized more and 
more his title as Caliph. With increasing feebleness, he attempted 
a policy of prestige-seeking by gathering, at least theoretically, 
around his tottering throne the Mohammedans of the whole 
world, who, in the face of increasing intercourse, become more 
conscious of their solidarity, although their political union is 
no more than a Utopian dream. Europe, therefore, ignorantly 
regarded him as a Prince of the Church, a sort of Mohammedan 
pope. But absolutism in its exaggerated form led to a catas- 
trophe. Young Turkey came into being with the watchword of 
the French Revolution. 

The belief in the omnipotence of modern ideas gives the Turk- 
ish Revolution and the resulting attempts at reform a touching 
character. Only gradually and following bitter experiences were 
the ideal value of historical inheritance, and the importance of 
power for practical politics recognized as the real state problem 
of the present. The question arises : How must the new Turkish 
state be organized under the above described geographic, ethno- 
graphic and historical conditions, if it is to assert itself? 

Self-assertion was the goal clearly in view of everybody follow- 
ing the revolution; indeed, in regard to the question of sover- 
eignty, there w^as a marked sensitiveness, even where this 
sovereignty was nothing more than a name. Bulgaria's declara- 
tion of independence, the Bosnian and Cretan questions were 
the source of almost as great excitement as later the Tripoli 
and Balkan wars. Up to the time of the outbreak of the World 
War, the degrading tutelage of the "capitulations" was keenly 
felt. All interference of the Great Powers in internal affairs 
was indignantly resented. Maintenance of Turkish independ- 
ence — this was the first, the fundamental demand of Young 
Turkey. No protectorate, of whatever nature it might be, no 
international supervision was to be endured. But for the carrying 
through of this program, strengthening of the state was neces- 
sary, and before all a reorganization of the army. This task, 
however, demanded as a prerequisite the purifying of the consti- 



MODERN GERMANY 271 

tutional conception of the Empire. But on this point there was 
a wide divergence of opinion among the different parties, and 
the embittered conflicts of the various committees were mainly 
in regard to the fundamental attitude toward the problem of 
the state. There was a violent struggle as to the form of govern- 
ment — whether It should be that of a union or of a federation — 
and also as to its character — whether a neutral Turkish national 
state on a constitutional basis, or a state of the Caliph of all 
Islam. 

The first of these questions was the chief point of dispute 
between the Committee for Unity and Progress, on the one hand, 
and the Liberals, on the other. A Turkish statesman has char- 
acterized this antithesis, which seems to him also a structural 
antithesis, as the difference between the centralization of France 
and the decentralization of England and her daughter states. 
"At bottom, the battle of the two parties was In effect that 
between the Ideas of Auguste Comte and those of John Stuart 
Mill and Desmoullns." Closely connected with this was the sec- 
ond problem of state, although on this point the defenders of the 
different theories frequently united in a single party. Should 
the various nationalities and religions be brought together with 
equal rights and duties under the standard of Ottoman national 
unity? This was the view especially of the theorists from 
Paris. Or should the Turks, as the rulers, dominate all and 
seek contact with their ethnological relatives beyond the borders 
of the Empire? This was the hope not alone in many circles in 
Constantinople, but equally among the tools of Russia. Or, 
finally, should the glorious Caliph tradition be preserved as de- 
veloped by Abdul-Hamid, and Pan-Islamism be used as a weapon 
against the outside world, as many among the Mohammedans 
held, especially the Arabs and the rank and file of the army? 

The Turkish parliament and the struggles of the committees 
have often been severely criticized; but could such a portentous 
decision be reached without conflict? The ideals of the Caliphate 
as a state and those of the French Revolution cannot be com- 
bined without compromise. 

The liberal, European neutral form of government was at 
first triumphant; Christians, who had previously been excluded 
from the army, were now admitted. Utopians throughout the 
world were jubilant. It had not been a revolution, it was de- 
clared, but an evolution. It was proper that the form of state 
should thus develop of itself. The experienced politicians of 
the old regime, however, continued to rule, the Young Turks 
not immediately assuming the actual direction of affairs. Time 



272 MODERN GERMANY 

was to be granted for the new ideas to make their way. This 
was the great mistake in the calculation. Power, not ideas, is 
the decisive factor in all historical development. Presently out- 
lying territories were lost, while within the Empire itself con- 
fusion reigned ; in short, the exigencies of the battle for existence 
forced the advocates of centralization to assume responsibility. 
The idea of a federal state gave way at the moment of need, 
because those upholding it coquetted with the possibility of foreign 
protectorates and thereby endangered the basis of the state's 
preservation. 

The army, as the upholder of the revolution, was forced to 
seize the reins of government, or all would have been lost. 
All "imported" desires of the theorists had to be sacrificed to 
the necessity of maintaining the morale of the army. Thus, under 
the spur of necessity, return was made to the old conception of 
the Islam state, with retention, however, of the constitution. 
The Christians in the army had not measured up to the standard ; 
but neither had the Turkish soldier proved of great value in a 
secular war for the unfamiliar conception of the "Fatherland." 

"Fanaticism is the only motive able to move the Anatolian 
soldier. . . . The idea of a fatherland is foreign to the Turkish 
mind, and the Young Turk Committee that had striven to 
create 'Ottomanism' achieved naught." These are the words of 
a French eye-witness of the Turkish collapse in the Balkan war.^ 
For the army, the state conception of Islam was a necessity. The 
emphasizing, however, of the Islamic idea in the constitutional 
state had become less dangerous, as the result of the Balkan 
War, since the most important Christian provinces had suffered 
amputation, and the Islamic element was numerically far in 
excess in this new and diminished Turkey. In addition, there 
had been a steady stream of Mohammedan immigration from 
the lost provinces. Further, in the Islam state Arabians and 
Turks, the most important national elements, were able to work 
peacefully together on the basis of historical tradition, and with 
typical Oriental disregard of nationality. A decisive factor, 
finally, was the knowledge that the European Powers with 
Mohammedan subjects regarded with suspicion the idea of the 
international solidarity of Islam; but since the days of Abdul- 
Hamid the Turkish government had learned how to play on this 
string. To counteract the increasing pressure of the Powers, 
the decision was reached in Constantinople to cultivate Pan- 
Islamism as a political weapon. The Young Turks desired to 

1 Histoire de VEmpire Ottoman, Le Vicompte de la Jonquiere, Paris, 1914 (2me 
ed.), Vol. II, p. 396. 



MODERN GERMANY 273 

be an Islamic Great Power, and by means of the international 
nature of Islam they thought to increase their prestige. Thus, 
the outcome of the constitutional struggles and of the military 
reverses has been a centralized Islam state — not the state, how- 
ever, of the old Caliphate, but a modern constitutional state, 
with the Caliph at the helm and with Pan-Islam tendencies. The 
Christian subjects enjoy freedom and equality in the Turkish 
Empire, but the state religion is Islam. We have a parallel in 
the religious character of the Christian constitutional states, 
Austria and Russia. In the same manner that Russia is waging 
a war for the realization of ancient religious ideals, so likewise 
the Sultan-Caliph proclaims the holy war of Islam. The Turkish 
demands, on the basis of this solution of the problem of state 
are: self-preservation, strengthening of the army, a constitution, 
and the Islamic character of the state. 

The economic problem has, of course, not yet been solved; 
but its elements, so far as the state's interests are concerned, are 
evident. Every genuinely Turkish policy must reckon with the 
inherited economic conditions and with the natural treasures 
of the soil. The new state authorities, however, despite their 
good intentions, found themselves face to face with a difficult 
situation springing from inherited conditions. In their efforts 
to pursue a national economic policy, they ran counter to foreign 
interests at every turn. Foreign policy and economic reform 
were inseparably bound together. This resulted not only from 
the backwardness of the country, but very largely from two fur- 
ther fundamental causes, one historical, the other economic: 
from the "capitulations" and from the lack of capital in Turkey. 

The "capitulations" have developed from old commercial 
treaties. As regards the state, their chief economic significance 
lies in the fact that tariff increases require the approval of the 
treaty Powers, and that Europeans enjoy immunity from taxa- 
tion. The customs duties are exclusively ad valorem. In recent 
years they have been gradually raised from eight to fifteen per 
cent. The economic condition is monstrous which allows a state 
no tariff differentiation, either as regards countries or classes 
of goods. In case of an increased need of revenue, quite uncon- 
templated economic inj'ury may result. Every fractional tariff 
raise must be arranged with the Powers, each of whom demands 
compensation in the form of commercial or even political con- 
cessions. But even this is not all. The immunity from taxa- 
tion of the Europeans, who are almost exclusively merchants, 
makes it impossible adequately to tax the natives engaged in 



274 MODERN GERMANY 

commerce, since they would thereby be rendered incapable of 
competition. It has thus hitherto been impossible, though these 
circles are financially the most competent, to tax them cor- 
respondingly, and the chief burden has been laid on the feeble 
shoulders of the rural population. The leading men of Turkey 
longingly awaited the moment when it would be possible to 
free themselves from this economic strait-jacket, to say nothing 
of the restrictions placed upon the authority of the state as 
regards police and judicial matters. The war has at last 
opened the way in Turkey for healthy reforms in these fields, 
especially for the regulation of the finances on an independent 
basis. 

Lack of capital in Turkey, both government and private, 
was another incentive for the policy of interference. The fact 
that the Turkish national bank, la Banque Ottomane, is an 
absolutely French undertaking, will not be gone into further 
at this point, important as it is; but Turkey is a thoroughly 
typical debtor state. In the balance of trade the item of commer- 
cial paper stands exclusively on the debit side of Turkey's ledger. 
In order to secure money for her loans, she is driven to great 
sacrifices — indeed, the attempt has even been made to force her 
to grant political concessions in return for loans. For economic 
and strategic reasons, extension of her railroads was needed. 
European private capital was eagerly offered for these promising 
undertakings, but behind the companies stood the political repre- 
sentatives of the capitalists, and their desires were defeated or 
hindered by competing states. The Anatolian railway was not 
allowed to be continued through the eastern part of Asia Minor, 
since Russia considered her boundary threatened thereby; and 
even the Hedjaz railway, which had been built by Turkey herself 
with non-European capital, was refused a terminus on the Red 
Sea, since England feared for the Suez Canal. When one Power 
gained a concession, despite the protests of the other Powers, the 
latter immediately demanded indemnity concessions. Turkey's 
national economic policy, therefore, was not dictated by her own 
interests, but by the private economic interests of European 
capitalists, or by the political ambitions of the great Powers. 

As long as Turkey worked in conjunction with all the Powers, 
there could be no great uniform plan for her benefit, or for 
strengthening the country internally. To throw herself un- 
reservedly into the arms of any one of the Powers was not possible 
without a complete breach with all the others; and the danger 
was always present that the price of healthy economic develop- 
ment might be the loss of independence. For was there a single 



MODERN GERMANY 275 

great Power which had an interest in seeing Turkey strengthen 
herself as an independent state? Was not the desire of all of 
them to gain economic spheres of interest in order to pave the 
way for territorial acquisitions? The interests of the Turkish 
state demanded European guidance, since economic reform could 
not be achieved independently. The more uniform this guidance 
was, the better it would be. The natural leader of Turkey, 
from the Turkish point of view, must be that great Power whose 
own interests demanded a strengthening of Turkey. But did such 
a Power exist? 

Before we attempt to answer this question, however, we must 
contemplate the economic problem from the economic point of 
view, in the narrower sense of the word. What are the economic 
conditions and demands for the future suggested by Turkey's 
natural treasures? Soil and climate predestine Turkey as an 
agrarian state along great lines. Grain is not the only factor 
in this connection ; the most important place is held by the 
product which has greater value in the world's market — cotton. 
In addition to the well-watered territory of Southern Anatolia, 
which offers a fine field for this staple, the ancient country be- 
tween the Euphrates and the Tigris, where cotton even grows 
wild, is one of the natural places for its cultivation on a vast 
scale. Were the necessary irrigation provided, results might 
be achieved according to the statement of the English engineer, 
Sir W. Willcocks,^ which would far surpass in quality and quan- 
tity the Egyptian product. New Turkey must reckon with this 
great potential factor in determining her future political attitude 
toward the Powers. 

But Turkey has also an industrial future. In view of her 
stage of development, she will not be able for many years to 
count upon native industries of a quality equal to those of Eng- 
land or Germany, since a high grade of popular education is 
a prerequisite for this. But she will be in a position before 
long to provide independently for the industrial utilization of the 
products of her soil by simple weaving and milling industries. 
The production of petroleum w^ill be another important activity. 
There are petroleum deposits of great extent in Asiatic Turkey, 
not to speak of mineral treasures which are as yet almost un- 
touched. Turkey's interest, therefore, demands that if she is 
to enter into closer relation with any Power, not only must the 
political aims of the two states be reconcilable, but their natural 
economic conditions be complementary, so that Turkey may 
be hindered neither politically nor economically in her justifiable 

1 The Irrigation of Mesopotamia, 1905. 



276 MODERN GERMANY 

development into a modern state, but assisted in a full and 
speedy evolution. 

What, then, must be the nature of Turkey's foreign policy, 
on the basis of her political and economic needs as outlined above ? 
To continue to solve the problem as hitherto — namely, with the 
rival cooperation of all the Powers — has already been shown 
to be irreconcilable with Turkish interests. Let us for this 
purpose examine the political and economic relation of the vari- 
ous states to Turkey. 

Russia, Turkey's powerful northern neighbor, must at the 
start be rejected as a possible mentor, for the Muscovites are 
hereditary enemies of the Ottomans. The gradual advance of 
the Russians, first to the banks of the Black Sea and then around 
this great inland body of water, was made at the cost of Turkey. 
The Dardanelles are the historical goal of Russia's imperialistic 
policy, they are the gateway to the ocean for Russian trade, 
while for the Russian Church the possession of Constantinople 
and Jerusalem would mark the fulfilment of century-old long- 
ings. Political hopes, economic necessity and religious antitheses 
make Russia the natural enemy of Turkey. Far from strength- 
ening Turkey as a state, for more than a century the policy of 
the Czars has been in every way to weaken her as much as 
possible. Whoever strengthens or supports Turkey is the enemy 
of Russia. This is the explanation of Russia's anger against 
Germany in the matter of the German military mission of 
19 1 3-1 4. The view taken by public opinion in Russia at the 
time was "that a real strengthening of Turkey appears to the 
Russian Empire as something which must be prevented." ^ Rus- 
sia, it is true, saved Constantinople in the Balkan War from being 
engulfed by the Bulgarians; but this she did not in order to 
preserve it for the Turks, but that she might conquer it for 
herself, as Sassonov boldly stated on February 9, 19 15, during 
the war session of the Duma. Whatever may be thought re- 
garding the indiscretion of this statement, nevertheless it formu- 
lated the will of the nation. ^ In keeping with this, Russian 
schools, churches and commercial enterprises were established 
for the purpose, not of strengthening, but of undermining Tur- 
key. Moreover, Russia is an agrarian state like Turkey, she 
produces the same things in great quantities; her industries are 
in a state of infancy to which Turkey's might easily attain — 

^ Deutschlands auswdrtige Politik 1888 his 1913, Count Ernst zu Reventlow, 
p. 383. 

2 See Preussische Jahrbiicher, Mitrofanov, 1914- 



MODERN GERMANY 277 

hence, economically an alliance between Russia and Turkey would 
be contrary to reason. In such a case, Turkey would sink, 
politically as well as economically, to the condition of a Russian 
province, and Russia would merely acquire a few additional 
enslaved foreign peoples. 

But if Russia was the hereditary enemy of Turkey, until re- 
cently England was her traditional friend. Up to the last few 
decades of the nineteenth century, England had a genuine interest 
in the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire : English and Turkish 
interests seemed identical. 

England's interest in the maintenance of Turkey was two- 
fold — it was governed by colonial as well as international con- 
siderations. With one hundred million Mohammedan colonial 
subjects of her own, England could not with impunity view 
the growing sentiment of Pan-Islamism. Since the mutiny of 
1857, rio security was felt regarding the Islamic population of. 
India. Friendly diplomatic relations with the Sublime Porte 
were sought in order that England might pose as the protector 
of Islam and thereby influence the loyalty of the Indians. The 
chief factor, however, in England's Turkish policy was her 
antagonism to Russia. The high tide of this feeling was reached 
at the time of the Treaty of Berlin. In keeping with an old 
principle of action, England avoided the creation of a land 
boundary between her own possessions and any Continental Great 
Power, and for this reason she strove for the preservation of 
Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan as the natural buffer states 
between the Russian and English spheres of interest. The aban- 
donment of this policy w^as not the result of a sudden decision, 
but was due to a number of motives. After the opening of the 
Suez Canal, despite England's efforts to prevent it, this direct 
course to India became so important that Great Britain was 
forced to occupy Egypt. The Red Sea, however, is a continua- 
tion of the Suez Canal. This meant for England the beginning 
of the problem of an Arabian question. But at the same time 
the new course of English policy, commonly called Imperialism, 
had been entered upon. 

In addition to the Cape-to-Cairo program, there arose the 
new battle-cry "From Cairo to Calcutta!" Egypt, which was 
still legally a Turkish province, became the corner stone of 
the British world empire. The occupation of Egypt, called 
temporary In all ofliicial statements, became thereby definitive. 
The friendship between England and Turkey suffered a severe 
strain. The logical extension of this policy could result only in 
the severance of the Arabian provinces from the Ottoman Em- 



278 MODERN GERMANY 

pire. Only if weakened, could Turkey be permitted to remain 
mistress of the borderlands of the Red Sea. England, therefore, 
began to foster throughout Arabia the seditious elements and to 
hinder the strengthening of Turkey. The rebels in the province 
of Asir, in the Yemen district, which had never been entirely con- 
quered by Turkey, found support and encouragement from Eng- 
land. The Hedjaz railway, which is vital for the strengthening 
of Turkish influence in Arabia, could not be continued to the 
Red Sea, owing to English opposition. Turkey, it is true, was 
badly advised in the unfortunate Akaba affair. Further inland, 
where the Bedouin Empires of the Banu Sa'ud and of the Banu 
Rashid stood opposed to each other, the former, who were enemies 
of the Turks, gained the upper hand by means of English 
weapons. As a consequence, Turkey saw herself forced to fur- 
nish weapons to the Banu Rashid; this was a measure which 
cut both ways as regards the peace of Arabia and Mesopotamia. 
This policy carries us through the Central Arabian uplands 
to the Persian Gulf, where Turkish supremacy had never been 
very firmly established, although individual local sheiks and other 
rulers found it to their advantage to accept an official Turkish 
title. The extension of British influence to this point was 
part of the policy that aimed at the protection of India's flank, 
and that did battle against the pirates and slave-dealers, and is 
not to be construed as a manifestation of political enmity to 
Turkey, any more than England's relations with the southern 
coast of Arabia. The treaty with Maskat in 1798 was aimed 
rather at France and Holland. The treaties in the early part of 
the nineteenth century, also, were merely treaties of commerce 
and friendship — thus England's connection with the Gulf was 
legitimate and long-standing. As early as November, 1839, 
the first Anglo-Indian report was published in regard to the 
harbor of Koweit, which later became so celebrated; but in the 
period of imperialism these treaties gradually acquired a different 
character. One little sheik after the other renounced the right 
of negotiation with foreign powers — in 1892 the Sheik of Bah- 
rein, in 1899 the Sheik of Koweit. These are protectorate agree- 
ments with careful avoidance of the word. But Turkey like- 
wise asserted certain claims to Koweit, whose sheik was a Turk- 
ish kaimmakam, and to Bahrein. Koweit became of the greatest 
importance for Turkey with the beginning of the Bagdad rail- 
way, as for a long time it was regarded as the only possible 
terminus of that road. England, however, sought to gain posses- 
sion of this harbor. It was not until 191 3 that an agreement 
was reached in regard to Koweit between England and Turkey, 



MODERN GERMANY 279 

by which Turkey was forced to yield to English pressure along 
the whole line. England at the same time sought and gained 
a free hand in respect to Bahrein. At about the same period 
Ibn Sa'ud occupied the last Turkish possessions on the Persian 
Gulf in which Turkish garrisons were still to be found, namely 
the districts of El-Hasa and El-Katif. According to the general 
belief of the Orient, Sa'ud is merely a tool of England. Thus 
at the very moment when Turkey's outside possessions began 
to be of importance for the increase of her strength, she found 
herself face to face with the silent and tenacious Arabian policy 
of England, seeking to deprive her of one province after the 
other. 

In regard to England's ultimate aim, however, there could 
be no doubt in the mind of any thinking Oriental after her action 
in Persia. Russia, following her disastrous defeat at the hands 
of Japan, had ceased to be England's chief opponent. Germany 
was so greatly strengthened that England changed her traditional 
Asiatic policy fundamentally, in order to secure a free hand 
against Germany. The idea of a buffer state was definitely 
abandoned in the Persian Treaty of 1907, and North Persia was 
sacrificed to Russia. In his book, *'The Strangling of Persia'* 
(London, 1912), W. Morgan Shuster has shown the absolute 
lack of scruple in the course which was followed. He had been 
employed to reorganize the finances of Persia. But as this did 
not agree with the interests of Russia, he was forced to yield. 
He says: 

''Russia is now (April 30, 1912) the sovereign power in 
Persia. She is the practical and effective ruler of the country. 
The whole of Persia is to-day a satrapy. The peoples, however 
brutally treated, have no means of protest. Fear, deadly sicken-, 
ing fear of the prison, noose and torture, is the force with which 
Russia governs." (p. 236.) 

Accordmg to Shuster's opinion, however, responsibility for 
this lies with England, who, from dread of Germany, has sacri- 
ficed every one of her ideals in her Asiatic policy. "British 
prestige has suffered all over the world, and the English people 
are openly dissatisfied because they can no longer appear as 
the friend of weak and struggling nations." The Turks under- 
stood this. The interest of the British world empire, as conceived 
in the Foreign Office after 1907, demanded the dismember- 
ment of Turkey, for in view of the unparalleled rapidity of Rus- 
sia's advance in Persia, the Persian Gulf was threatened unless 
Russia could be deflected toward the Dardanelles. Arabia, 
Mesopotamia and South Persia to be given to England; the 



28o MODERN GERMANY 

north of Turkey to Russia — such was the plan which would 
have fulfilled Muscovite hopes and at the same time have realized 
the uninterrupted English overland connection of Cairo and 
Calcutta. Furthermore, this would have given the death blow 
to Germany's ambitions in Turkey. Such political aims are 
seldom realized by a direct process; but only by keeping these 
ultimate aims of England in mind is it possible to understand 
her policy toward Turkey. This has been openly admitted by 
French observers. Rene Pinon speaks thus of England : 

"She boldly assumed the offensive, encouraged the revolts of 
Yemen and Hedjaz, gave shelter in Egypt to the committees of 
the 'national Arab party,' despatched the engineer Sir William 
Willcocks to Mesopotamia — provoked finally the Koweit aifair 
and profited by that of Tabah." ^ 

The aim of all these undertakings was to weaken Turkey. 
And that policy which had been successful in Egypt, should 
it not be feasible also in other Arabian provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire? 

England's imperialistic course and her understanding with 
Russia rendered her impossible as a political guide for Turkey, 
whereas from a purely economic point of view she seemed to be 
predestined to be such. France, the oldest friend of the Porte, 
was for similar reasons excluded from this candidacy, despite 
the fact that since the days of Francis I her enmity towards Aus- 
tria had frequently brought the two countries together in a 
community of interests, that the "capitulations" had developed 
mainly from French treaties, that the modern Orient is quite 
controlled by French cultural ideals, and that France is not alone 
the traditional banker but likewise the chief creditor of Turkey. 
The author of the anonymous Oxford pamphlet No. 39 ("Tur- 
key in Europe and Asia") even regards this indebtedness of 
Turkey as the chief reason for her continued existence down 
to the present day. France, it is true, has for a long time 
advanced claims against Syria. She has no desire to be excluded 
from a division of Turkey ; but on the other hand, French inter- 
ests might easily have become reconciled with the maintenance 
of Turkey. It is even possible that Russia's advance may have 
disquieted her ally on the Seine, but France was ready to sacri- 
fice everything to her policy of revanche. Therefore, she sec- 
onded the Anglo-Russian political work of undermining Turkey, 
and this she did with her most characteristic weapons — with her 
press and her financial policy. The aim of the latter especially 
was to keep Turkey in leading strings: on the occasion of the 

1 L'Europe et I'Empire Ottoman^ Rene Pinon, Paris, 1908, p. 392. 



MODERN GERMANY 281 

loan (1910) France did not hesitate to demand the right 
of political interference in the internal affairs of the Turkish 
ministry of finance. This caused, as is well known, the failure 
of the transaction, and Germany thereupon sprang into the 
breach; the money was, it is true, not so cheaply obtained, but 
on the other hand it brought with it no political humiliation. 
From the purely commercial point of view, France, with her 
plentiful capital, might very well seem a desirable friend to 
an impecunious Turkey; but Turkey, growing in strength, did 
not offer the needed commercial advantages; for France does 
not possess a highly developed industry like England or Ger- 
many, but exports to Turkey simple articles manufactured en 
masse, which might be produced equally well in Turkish territory 
within reasonable time. The two countries are not comple- 
mentary to each other in respect to trade, but are competitors. 
Further, such satisfactory deals could not be made by French 
bankers with Turkey if she became strengthened. Hence, while 
it was to France's interest to maintain Turkey, it was so only 
under the status quo. The financial independence of Turkey, 
on the basis of an active trade balance, which would be in keeping 
with the country's own interests, ran counter to the interests of 
the money market of Paris, and on that account was undesirable 
in the eyes of the French government. 

Thus as regards the Entente Powers, there was no great 
objection to the dismemberment of Turkey — at all events, they 
were all equally interested in her gradual disintegration and 
the prevention of her renascence. But Turkey did not fall to 
pieces; for before an agreement had been reached as to her 
dismemberment she had found a strong helper in Germany. The 
accession of Emperor Wilhelm II to the throne coincides, approx- 
imately, with the time when Germany, through her economic 
development, was forced into the path of world politics. Follow- 
ing the Emperor's first visit to Constantinople (1888), the 
building of the Anatolian railway was started; the second visit 
(1898) ushered in the period of the Bagdad railway. To the 
superficial observer it appeared that a new power, in addition 
to France, England and Russia, had entered the lists In order 
to gain economic concessions from disintegrating Turkey, and 
thereby to lay the foundation for claims to territorial acquisi- 
tions in the final division. It so appeared without doubt; In 
Germany, too, "unofficial" politicians spent their time in "an- 
nexing" Anatolia and Syria in order to secure colonies for 
Germany's future excess of population. And yet a glance at the 



282 MODERN GERMANY 

map, at Germany's unfortunate geographical position, shows the 
folly of such plans. In the face of the Mediterranean Powers 
and Russia, a German colony on Turkish soil would have proved 
a still-born child. The German Imperial policy proceeded from 
healthier considerations, and had none but economic aims. Herein 
lies the fundamental difference between the German Oriental 
policy and that of every other state, with the possible exception 
of the United States. Since Germany could not think of occupa- 
tion nor of protecting herself even in local possessions, she advo- 
cated the independence and the strengthening of Turkey. There 
was system in this policy, for in Morocco and China the same 
course had been pursued. Germany discouraged premature re- 
forms, which would have led only to a guardianship for the 
Oriental states, or even to the dominance of some especially inter- 
ested Great Power. This may have given rise to the opinion that 
Germany was the upholder of barbarism. 

"In Macedonia, as in Russia, as in China, as in Morocco, as 
everywhere, the interests of William II run counter to the 
needs of humanity," says Victor Berard. ^ 

The author is undoubtedly right in stating that our policy 
was not of a sentimental kind, but was guided solely by German 
Interests. But those interests did not demand territorial acquisi- 
tions, as was the case with the other Powers, but exclusively 
economic Influence. In the entire Islamic world, In North Africa, 
in Egypt, in India, everywhere where higher races had first been 
commercially exploited by European Powers and then deprived 
of their political rights. It had been demonstrated that territorial 
acquisition was, In the long run, a mistake; this policy had. It 
Is true, been of great advantage for a few generations, but with 
the increasing education of peoples capable of development it had 
Inevitably led to serious conflicts. In view of this fact, Ger- 
many had no intention, in the general division of the Oriental 
world still remaining independent, to acquire even a slight 
portion for her exclusive exploitation; on the contrary, a much 
better bargain was anticipated through the maintenance of the 
Oriental states, since we reckoned on being able more than to 
hold our own In a market thrown open to international compe- 
tition. From this point of view, therefore, a strengthening of 
these states, especially of Turkey, was desirable In our own 
Interest; for only a strong state Is In a position to develop Its 
trade to Its own advantage without diplomatic concessions. It 
Is only necessary to follow this course of reasoning to realize that 
Germany promised to be for Turkey an ally whose help and 

1 La France et Guillaume II, Paris, 1907, p. 208 ff. 



MODERN GERMANY 283 

advice the latter state could accept, since Turkey was not the 
object of, but a partner in, Germany's political reckoning, and 
that not alone from an economic point of view. 

In his book, In which he justifies his foreign policy, Prince 
Billow says regarding this point: 

"Especially since the Oriental voyage of the Emperor and 
Empress have our relations with Turkey and Islam been care- 
fully nurtured. These relations were not of a sentimental na- 
ture; we had, on the contrary, an important economic, military 
and also political Interest In the maintenance of Turkey. The 
country was for us, both from the economic and financial point 
of view, a fruitful field of activity, to which Rodbertus and 
Friedrlch List had already called attention, and which we have 
cultivated to great advantage. In the undesirable, but not Im- 
possible case of a general war, the military strength of Turkey 
might have been a very perceptible factor on our side. Turkey 
was the most desirable neighbor possible for our Austrian allv. 
That her collapse might be a loss for us was revealed by the last 
army bill, which resulted from the situation brought about by 
the Balkan War. — Turkey has for many years remained a useful 
and important link In the chain of our political relations." ^ 

From the point of view of these military and political Interests, 
it Is explicable that the German Empire, following old Prussian 
traditions, at the very beginning of Its Turkish economic policy 
assisted in modernizing the famous Ottoman Army. Likewise, 
German-built railways did not serve economic purposes alone. 
In many places. In planning the course of the line, economic 
advantages were sacrificed to the strategic desires of the Turkish 
general staff. During the period of absolutism, many a desirable 
plan could not be carried through, but there was no lack of 
good will and sincere work; a Frenchman, Victor Berard, who 
is by no means a friend of Germany, Is forced. In speaking of 
the Graeco-Turklsh war, to acknowledge the success attained. 
He says: 

''Without the discipline and the strategy of von der Goltz, 
the army of the Caliph would never have gained the Thessallan 
victories." ^ 

Rene Pinon, another unbiassed Frenchman, thus characterizes 
the German policy: 

"The certain and permanent interest of Germany Is to pre- 
serve and Increase the Turkish power, and to make use of it 
in order to extend her own power throughout the domain of 

^ Deutschland unter Kaiser Wilhelm II, Vol. i, p. 31. 
' La mort de Stamboul, p. 96. 



284 MODERN GERMANY 

Islam. To galvanize the Sick ]\Ian, to fortify his army for the 
purpose of using it as an auxiliary for her own political designs — 
such is the interest of Germany and such is the policy of the 
Emperor. Thus the Ottoman Empire continues, despite so many 
predictions, stronger perhaps than it has been for a long time, 
at all events more Mussulman, more Turkish." ^ 

With these words, a political opponent frankly admits that 
the German policy, by its very character, has served the best 
interests of Turkey. He is forced to admit the same of Ger- 
many's economic policy, especially as regards the effect of 
the Bagdad Raihvay: 

''If, then, the Bagdad Railway is to become an instrument 
of domination, this may well be for the benefit of the Turks and 
of Islam. As for Germany, if she succeeds in carrying through 
her gigantic enterprise she will, without doubt, gain political 
advantage from it, but she will find it primarily a means of 
economic expansion, a market from which her products will 
be scattered throughout Central Asia." - 

That Turkey also would enjoy great economic profit from it 
is self-evident; demand increases with traffic facilities, and autor; 
matically revenues from customs and taxes rise. The history 
of the Chem'in de Fer Ottoman d'Anatolie has again proved the 
fact that railways, even when they show a private deficit, never- 
theless pay well from a government point of view, and this is 
the best justification for the "kilometer guarantee" granted in the 
case of the German undertakings. But even more important 
for Turkey than the increase of revenue, is the fact that through 
her railways the distant provinces have been brought so much 
nearer to the capital that her political solidarity gains in strength 
through the greater mobility of troops and officials. 

The great problem of the German-Turkish relations is char- 
acterized by the catchword "Berlin to Bagdad." Political enmity 
has seen in this an effort by Germany for dominance; Turkey 
has been spoken of as "a German province," or at all events a 
German protectorate over Turkey has been thought possible. 
The problem, however, is purely economic; it would be non- 
sensical to develop a future protectorate in a military way to 
the point of being self-protecting, not to speak of the geographical 
and political obstacles to a possible German desire for conquest. 
No, Bagdad and Berlin stand here in opposition, as the termini 
of a vast railway undertaking that is approaching completion, 
and which binds together countries of quite different commercial 

1 L' Europe et I'Empire Ottoman, p. 76. 
'Ibid., p. 334. 



MODERN GERMANY 285 

structure and renders possible an exchange of their products. 
It makes them independent of inimical competition, of the attacks 
of enemies, and above all of the dominance of the sea. What is 
in question, therefore, is a great unified trade territory as the 
basis of political friendship. Every one of the states through 
which the line passes — the German industrial states in the north, 
the great Turkish agrarian state in the southeast, and the Balkan 
states in between — will seek to carry out their own national 
policy; but they all have the same interest in exchanging their 
products through this new artery of international communica- 
tion. Although, on account of the lower cost of transportation 
in times of peace, freight will be sent by sea, nevertheless pre- 
cisely the present international crisis shows the incalculable 
importance of such a secure means of land communication, 
which is comparable in importance to the great trunk lines of 
the United States. Germany, however, has not the least inten- 
tion of taking advantage of Turkey's economically undeveloped 
condition by crushing her with capital. The experiences of other 
states have taught us that a political friendship can never con- 
tinue if the stronger party exploits the weaker economically. 
The attempt, at all events, will be made to protect the future 
economic interests of Turkey, against ephemeral private interests, 
even of German entrepreneurs ; for only in this manner can 
there be permanent profit. Thus the words "Berlin to Bagdad" 
have also an idealistic meaning. They symbolize the friendly 
relations between Germany and Turkey, they show the path 
which Germany has followed in opening up the riches of Turkey 
for the Turks, as well as for the whole world, the path along 
which Germany will continue to provide Turkey with whatever 
of a material and spiritual nature she needs for her inner de- 
velopment. 

The identity of German and Turkish interests was so evident 
that Abdul Hamid, in pursuance of a wise policy, turned ever 
more emphatically toward Germany. In view of the unpopu- 
larity of absolutism which had finally led to political caricature 
and to oppression, it was easy for our enemies to represent ''reac- 
tionary" Germany as the fortress of the old regime, and the 
enemy of Turkish freedom. These disseminations found, it 
is true, no credence among the military circles of the Young 
Turks, who had learned the blessing of German industry; but 
they encountered belief among the refugees who had been 
affectionately welcomed in Paris and London, and who after 
the successful revolution controlled the opinion of the thoughtless 



286 MODERN GERMANY 

mob with French catchwords of freedom. But even they, after 
a period of error, were won back by the force of facts to Abdul 
Hamid's pro-German policy. A ''former Grand Vizier" who 
is friendly to the Entente Powers, has recently in a neutral 
publication admirably characterized this reversal. His course 
of reasoning brings us directly to the threshold of the war. He 
writes : 

"All that Germany had done to uphold Turkey, as providing 
her with the weapons of war, sending a military mission, ab- 
stention from active participation in anti-Turkish movements, 
great works of public utility — the Young Turks had attributed 
all this to the personal friendship of the sovereigns or even to 
a desire for 'fat' and onerous contracts. All the Franco- 
English acts Karmful to Ottoman interests, as the seizure of 
Egypt, questions regarding the frontier of Yemen and Akaba, 
the Armenian, Cretan and Macedonian questions, the benevolent 
protection of Greece, the protectorate of Tunis, the occupation 
of Metelin, etc. — all these were considered only as a natural 
consequence of a tyrannical system and of a disastrous political 
course, and not as marking a new departure in the policy of 
the states who were the authors of these moves." ^ 

For this reason. Young Turkey with Kiamil, the friend of 
England, threw itself into the arms of Great Britain, who at the 
time of the separation of Bosnia and Bulgaria, reached the 
zenith of her influence. Gradually, however, the truth began 
to make itself felt. Russia was unmasked as an accomplice in 
the Bosnian affair, and she recognized Bulgaria after establishing 
her influence at Sofia. After the fall of Kiamil, brought about 
through internal causes, England treated the Young Turks as 
her enemies and supported the opposition. 

"The Young Turks, full of illusions as regards the liberal 
sentiments of Western Europe . . . were greatly astonished 
to find that this liberal Europe had welcomed Ottoman consti- 
tutionalism not as a new instrument of Turkish unity but rather 
as a new means of separatism for the Christian races in Turkey." 

Europe made concessions to "Liberal Turkey" as little as she 
had done when Turkey was "absolute." The furious press 
campaign against the Turkish loan of 1910, which even frightened 
off England from undertaking it, shows the unreliability of the 
feelings of the Western Powers. The sale of the German men- 
of-war and the granting of the loan through Berlin and Vienna 

1 "Reflections sur le role de la Turquie," Revue Politique Internationale, 
November and December, 1914, p. 351 ff. The editor says the writer of this 
article is "a very high person who played a role of the first importance in the 
events of the last five years." 



MODERN GERMANY 287 

showed where Turkey's true friends were to be found. Russia 
feared that a strong Turkey would permanently block her way 
into the Mediterranean, England entertained similar fears for 
Egypt. "The Young Turks were thus brought to retrace their 
steps, to enter into a path of German friendship which appeared 
to them to offer a better way out." 

Even worse was the effect of the reproaches which were ad- 
dressed to Young Turkey from the camp of the Entente Powers. 
They were blamed for their nationalism because, on the basis 
of local autonomy, a crowd of small and easily influenced 
states had been hoped for on Turkish soil. When it was found 
that this dismemberment of Turkey had not come about on a 
crie au national'isme a outrance. (Nationalism was bitterly de- 
nounced.) The non-Turkish peoples enjoyed greater freedom 
than the Algerians and East Indians; they were forbidden only 
to foment revolution, and to educate their children in an anti- 
Turkish spirit. ''What barbarism ! Better the old regime!" This 
was repeated ad nauseam. Equally grotesque did the reproach 
of Pan-Islamism appear to the Turks. The Mohammedans of 
Russia, England and France did not enjoy the political rights 
to which they were entitled. 

"The European and American, and even certain Asiastic peo- 
ples, have cast off the yoke which deprived them of human rights. 
Is It so extraordinary that the Mussulmans have the same ideas 
and the same desires? It seems that it is extraordinary, since 
as soon as a Mussulman begins to manifest them, to feel himself 
the equal of other men and to demand an amelioration of his 
social and political condition, this Is branded as the crime of 
Pan-Islamism. — A Caliphate Is not tolerated which may become 
a symbol of progress for Mussulmans in general. If German 
diplomacy has been able successfully to undergo severe tests at 
Constantinople, this was because the Turks felt that this diplo- 
macy was not directed to the disruption of the Ottoman Empire, 
nor to an encouragement of disruptive elements, nor that it 
was an indication of violent opposition to the renascence and the 
progress of the Islam world." 

When things were going badly for Turkey, the German press 
was the only one which did not join In the joyful acclaim of the 
victory of the Balkan States. "It was the Anglo-French joy at 
this period which destroyed the political reputation of Klamil 
Pasha, caused his overthrow and the return to power of the 
Young Turks." 

When, following the war, Turkey strove for internal re- 
forms, the prerequisites were an increase in the tariff and the 



288 MODERN GERMANY 

building of railways. Certain territory had to remain unopened, 
because Russia so desired, and the building of the Bagdad Rail- 
way, which meant the laying of the foundation for Turkish 
prosperity, was deferred and the necessary tariff increase not 
permitted, because the Entente Powers did not consider the 
welfare of Turkey but desired only to place obstacles in Ger- 
many's way. When in future the diplomatic history of this 
period is written, "it will be seen what enormous sacrifices 
Turkey had consented to in order to enjoy — and that with 
restrictions — the rights and advantages which the smallest Chris- 
tian state (Montenegro, for example) acquired at its birth." 

Plainly perceptible at this time was the influence of Russia, 
which blocked all progress, and in the face of which even Eng- 
land did not dare to send English police officers to Turkey for 
her reform of the provinces. 

At this point the war broke out, and Turkey immediately 
declared her neutrality. England's first act was to confiscate 
the two Turkish dreadnoughts which had already been paid for 
and were to have been turned over to Turkey at this time. ''The 
seizure was made without warning, without the slightest attempt 
at courtesy, and no offer was made by the British government 
to pay back at least the price of the two ships." 

Turkey, then, as is well known, purchased the German ships 
Goeben and Breslau. The storm which thereupon broke out 
against Turkey in the Entente press, the threats which were 
made against her, the plans for dismemberment which were 
evolved — this was well calculated to awaken among the Turks 
the conviction that their last hour had come, "that the plans 
projected in the form of threats had already somewhere been 
reduced to writing." 

Preparations were, therefore, made for war, but the first 
blow was not struck until the French and English fleets already 
lay in the Dardanelles, and Russian mine ships were strewing 
mines at the entrance to the Bosphorus. 

This presentation of the case by a leading Turkish statesman 
sounds quite different from the English Blue Book. That at 
this time, and after such experiences, Turkey no longer trusted 
in the promise of the Entente Powers to observe her integrity 
can astonish no one. The same guarantee as to her territory 
before the Balkan War, though given by all the Powers, had not 
prevented her from losing her European provinces. Could she, 
then, now trust to the deceitful promises of her natural enemies, 
who had banded together to destroy her sole natural protector 
in order themselves to have a free hand in the Orient? For 



MODERN GERMANY 289 

Russia, this war was admittedly a struggle for Constanti- 
nople, and as regards England the Bagdad Railway question 
played an important role. The Sultan, therefore, unfurled the 
standard of the Prophet as a last recourse. If he summoned the 
Moslems of the whole world to a Holy War, it was done for 
the reasons stated above. He emphatically embraced the cause 
of the German Empire; for only from Germany, which has an 
interest in her preservation, can Turkey expect help. 



BOOK III 

OUR ENEMIES' POLICY OF FORCE 



CHAPTER I 

ENGLAND'S POLICY OF FORCE 
PROFESSOR ERICH MARCKS, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH 

THE British world empire is the greatest known, not alone 
to the history of modern times, but to that of ancient as 
well. It has grown to its present proportions through stages 
clearly and logically resulting one from the other. In this de- 
velopment there have not been lacking pauses and digressions, but 
the coherence of the whole is of impressive unity. Likewise, the 
means employed are uniform and of constant recurrence; every- 
where a policy based on force, a chain of conquests, of life-and- 
death struggles, prompted by as bellicose a spirit as that of any 
other nation — indeed, one is tempted to say, as that of any 
nation save Russia in the world with which we are familiar. 

This development does not begin until a late period. The long 
conflicts for the conquest of France form an older, independent 
series. The modern history of England commences with the 
Tudors, the inauguration of her far-aiming foreign policy with 
Ehzabeth. England had first to free herself, economically and 
politically, from the power of other states, before being able 
to assume her own position in the world. Of tremendous im- 
portance in that connection was her separation from the Catholic 
Church; it assigned to England her place in a definite inter- 
national group and influenced deeply her internal spiritual devel- 
opment. It gave an impulse toward independence, both internal 
and external. But the most important factor in the develop- 
ment of the country was its insular position. This became decisive 
after Europe's entrance upon what may be styled the "oceanic" 
period: from 1600 on, England influenced the Continent, from 
an outside position, in trade and politics, while herself turning 
to the sea and the outer world. She seized upon the Baltic, the 
North Sea, and then the Atlantic Ocean; gradually she became 
the shipbuilder and merchant for the majority of the European 
nations. The sea was for her the source of everything: inde- 
pendence, security, acquisition of goods and territory; the ocean 
protected her and saved her from having powerful neighbors. 
Thus, she was able to hold fast in her internal life to parliament, 
popular administration and government, avoiding the establish- 

293 



294 MODERN GERMANY 

ment of a powerful, armed monarchy, such as was necessary on 
the Continent. England was able, undisturbed, to develop the 
characteristics of her race — namely, individual energy, called 
forth by contact with the sea; personal freedom, complemented 
but not suppressed by a strong government. Thanks to the sea, 
she was free to turn to the outside world, herself protected in 
the rear. But in doing this, without being chained to Europe, 
she never lost touch with the Continent — not alone, however, be- 
cause Europe remained the field for her commerce. English 
politics never ceased to lay hold on and influence the Continent, 
at first rather in a defensive manner, then more and more as a 
deliberate policy. The division of power on the Continent was 
always for England one of the fundamental conditions of her 
own existence; it influenced her attitude toward the world be- 
yond Europe; but at the same time, owing to a hundred com- 
mercial and political ties, she always continued to be a European 
Power. Her insular position enabled her to enjoy the tremendous 
advantage of being able to exercise her influence on the Continent, 
without finding herself forced to tie up her strength in so doing. 
The Continent was always involved in its own affairs, in its own 
differences and antitheses; England was able to influence it 
without being drawn too strongly into the vortex. The country 
grew thoroughly accustomed to this untrammeled position, to the 
fact that it had no neighbors, and that it would never have any, 
not even on the sea — this came to seem more and more a God- 
given privilege. The limitations under which other Powers suf- 
fered, owing to their geographical position, did not exist for Eng- 
land. The security furnished by her girdle of waters challenged 
her, as it were, to venture out into limitless space and to regard 
every check as an injustice. 

The course to be followed by the island people lay plainly indi- 
cated; only gradually, how^ever, was it entered upon. England 
started out by freeing herself from ancient European bonds, and 
by rendering innocuous her neighboring states, Scotland and Ire- 
land, which she united to herself. She sought to find a path 
midway between the two great Powers of the sixteenth century, 
France and Spain, and to maintain her own independence. Her 
real entrance onto the stage of modern world history did not begin 
until the struggle of Elizabeth against the more powerful of 
these two states, namely, the Spain of Philip H. In this con- 
flict, political and religious independence went hand in hand 
with England's first strong bid for maritime trade, for the 
treasures of the New World, for gain and adventure. States- 
man and merchant, pirate and admiral united in the efifort, 



MODERN GERMANY 295 

and this union remained characteristic for England's future. A 
strong touch of daring and lawlessness marks all of England's 
world struggles throughout the centuries down to the present 
day. And through it all there was the union of trade and state, 
the control of all commercial and colonizing expansion by the 
government of the country; these two forces have worked in- 
separably together, trade and maritime enterprise always being^ 
backed by the power of weapons. Already in the struggle against 
the Armada (1588), a sturdy feeling of patriotism, a crude 
national pride, bound all other motives, noble and ignoble, into 
a firm unity. Upon this victory against Spain was founded 
the pride and glory of the greatness and culture of the Eliza- 
bethan period — the greatness of Shakespeare. But the ambition 
of the younger generation, impatient of the aged Queen, was 
already eager for extensive enterprises of conquest in the Spanish 
and American world. 

The first Stuarts brought about a reversal; England sank 
back into herself, inglorious and inactive. The Puritans under- 
took the colonization of North America in opposition to the 
home policy. Not until fifty years after Elizabeth's death — 
that is, after the year 1650 — did a second impulse for an English 
world policy manifest itself out of the confusion of the Puritan 
Revolution: Oliver Cromwell renewed the war against Spain 
and added that against Holland. He acted as a Protestant, 
yet nevertheless attacked the neighboring Protestant state. He 
desired to acquire Spanish colonies and gained a footing in the 
West Indies, he led England politically and as a warlike state 
into the Baltic and the Mediterranean; but his greatest blow 
was delivered against the commercial rival across the Channel, 
through the sea battles of Robert Blake, which were decisive 
not alone for the moment but also for the future. Religious 
faith, power and commerce were again as closely bound together 
as under Elizabeth, but this time the attack proceeded exclusively 
from the English side, and the lust of conquest spread far and 
wide. This impulse was directly transmitted to posterity, which 
indirectly, despite all resistance, inherited also the spiritual senti- 
ments of the Puritans. England was permeated through and 
through by their sternness, their self-discipline, their love of work, 
their economy, their national and religious ambition. Eng- 
land's expansion in the world was due, in no small degree, to 
the spirit of Puritanism which she had imbibed. From the 
Puritans, also, was derived her claim to play the role of the 
people chosen of God from among the nations, singled out with 



296 MODERN GERMANY 

especial moral right to force her way into the world for the 
universal good. 

The Restoration of 1660 carried the foreign and colonial policy 
of Cromwell's times to further development; it also led to a 
continuation of the war against Holland. Then, after Holland 
had been rendered innocuous, the struggle against France claimed 
first attention. The same causes are again operative : in addition 
to religious factors, those of a purely secular nature, as expressed 
in the opposition to France's threatening political and military 
power, and even more pronounced than in the case of Holland, 
to her commercial rivalry. For France under Louis XIV did 
not aim alone at the hegemony of the Continent. She rose 
rapidly in industry and trade, and under Colbert's leadership 
turned her attention to the sea, and even beyond, and became the 
first colonial power of the time. London and the Whigs took 
up the fight along the whole line and turned the struggle into 
a commercial and world war. 

This was waged as a gigantic duel with the weapons of force 
for the possession of the world, and with power and wealth as 
the prize. The battleground was Europe : allied with the French, 
England had at first repressed the Netherlands; her policy was 
now to proceed against France, hand in hand with the Nether- 
lands and Europe. King William HI of Orange formed this 
union and left it as an inheritance to posterity; in 1688 and 
1 701 he led Europe against the French hegemony. More closely 
than ever before, England identified herself with the European 
coalition : the common enemy bound them together. Spain's 
power had long since been broken, and the Austrian branch of 
the Hapsburgs inherited from the Spanish not its threatening 
greatness, but only its hatred of France. 

England announced the principle which she had previously 
supported In practice: the principle of the European balance of 
power, which she applied against every Important European 
state. It became England's chief weapon against the French, 
and grew Into an essentially English theory. Its effect has always 
been to create such a balance among the Continental states 
that England's accession to any group rendered this mt the 
strongest; England is the fifth wheel to this wagon; balance 
of power means England's dominance of power. From her island 
she holds the Continent In suspense and remains the arbiter of 
all; she paralyzes the strongest state on the Continent which 
might become inconvenient to herself, by means of the other 
states, which she organizes and leads. She becomes the ally 
of the enemies of her enemy. In this manner she defeated 



MODERN GERMANY 297 

Spain and Holland ; and thus she sought to gain the Emperor 
against France. She opposed the greatest military Power by 
the second greatest, or if possible by a collection of Continental 
states: as Austria, Prussia, German Middle States, Italian 
states. Savoy, and occasionally Russia. England herself sent her 
armies and her generals across the Channel; or she preferably 
employed Continental troops for her service; while paying her 
Continental allies, she herself also took part in the struggle, but 
her real battlefield remained the sea, her peculiar weapon the fleet. 
She fought with France and sought to prevent the union of 
France with Spain and with Spain's vast colonial possessions; 
she forced her way into the Spanish-American trade, and seized 
the slave trade; she finally had to fight the Bourbons in both 
Paris and in Madrid. She opposed Spain through her alliance 
with Portugal, and through the acquisition of Gibraltar she 
assured the entrance into the Mediterranean for her fleet. Time 
and again, through wars and peace congresses, she rearranged 
Europe according to her own advantage, but always on the plea 
that she was doing it for the good of the other states, for the 
balancing of their power. In the 126 years since 1688 she brought 
about one war after another: according to Sir J. R. Seeley, more 
than half the time w^as spent in war, and even the ''years of 
peace" were often enough an open conflict. ^ 

There were pauses, increases and decreases in warlike activity, 
but the guiding impulse was furnished by professional soldiers, 
and this impulse was active even in times of truce. The elder 
Pitt brought thus, in four short years following 1756, his country 
and its future under the control of his stormy ambition, of his 
world-embracing policy of power — one of the most imperialistic 
of English history. He was consciously an aggressor; he desired 
war and gain; he and his like — statesmen, generals, admirals, 
controlled the course of events, and were the real leaders of 
the great mass of merchants and business men and colonists. 
During that century, says Seeley, England's history lies not in 
England, but in America and Asia; the expansion of England 
becomes the dominant fact of this period. Pitt's saying is familiar 
that America was won on German battle fields, indicating the 
world-wide significance of the Seven Years' War, when the 
dice were really cast for the possession of Canada and for the 
future of India. Following 1600 and 1650, the year 1760 
indicates a new epoch : the idea of conquest occupies the fore- 
ground. By seeking to hold the colonial empire in subjection 
to the motherland, England lost the thirteen North American 

^The Expansion of England, Sir J. R. Seeley, London, 1901, p. 20. 



298 MODERN GERMANY 

colonies, it is true. France had her revenge for Canada, by 
encoura«ging this revolt. But on the sea England was successful 
against France and her allies. Precisely at this period, about 
1780, for the first time a number of seafaring neutrals formed 
a union against England's attacks on neutral trade. The loss 
of the Thirteen Colonies appeared to have disrupted England's 
colonial empire, and in fact, the situation was discouraging: 
nevertheless, the younger Pitt again resurrected his country, 
and in India the development continued uninterrupted. In 1773, 
India gained something more like a state organization through 
a governor general, the country was drawn closer to Parliament 
and the central government, and in India English supremacy, 
English wealth and English conquest grew uninterruptedly. 
Periods of peace, of acquisition, were always followed by far- 
reaching wars, and this possession now for the first time became 
internally and externally of real importance for England. 

From tJiis point of view, as from every other, the epoch of 
the French wars reached its culmination during the last years 
of their duration. Pitt unwillingly entered the war against the 
French Revolution; the feeling of the English nation, as repre- 
sented by Burke, supported such a policy all the more ardently, 
with a passionate consciousness of old and deep-lying antagonism. 
From 1793 to 1815 the world war was, in its last analysis, a 
war between France and England; Napoleon accepted the entire 
inheritance of four generations and in grandiose manner sought 
to realize it. The battle was for everything: for the Continent, 
the seas and the colonies, for trade, not alone that of the enemy, 
but likewise of his allies and of the neutrals; and in this war 
England at last won universal supremacy over trade and colonies. 
She crushed the French, Spanish and Dutch shipping trade, and 
the Franco-Spanish fleet. She sought, in the same manner as 
Napoleon, to cut of^ the enemy commercially. She secured a 
firmer footing in the Mediterranean and in Africa; she assured 
the route to India; she robbed the Dutch and French of Cape 
Colony and of the islands which controlled this route ; she waged 
under Wellesley the last decisive war against the French — India 
now for the first time assumed its full importance. Canada and 
the West Indies had never been lost; the balancing weight of the 
world empire, however, had now definitely been shifted to India — 
it continued to develop around the Indian Ocean. 

At one and the same time England fought for, and upon the 
Continent; she pursued her old policy of letting the Continental 
Powers bear the main burden of the land warfare. There were, 
however, years when she appeared to the Continent as the com- 



MODERN GERMANY 299 

mon enemy, for the reason that she maltreated every state upon 
the sea, destroyed all trade and disturbed the existence of all 
neutrals. Again, in 1800, an alliance of neutrals was formed 
against England — she disrupted It by force. The resulting 
hatred was great and explicable; the coup d' etat against Copen- 
hagen in 1807, by which a possible future rival was ruthlessly 
and pitilessly crushed, aroused wide-spread and deep dissatisfac- 
tion, and Canning's coolly practical justification of the pretended 
necessity by no means pleased the neutrals. The United States, 
with its trade unbearably restricted by France and England, 
and long maltreated by England, in 1812, after long hesitation, 
declared war on the unfriendly motherland, and hoped by this 
means to acquire Canada. By this time a reversal of feeling 
in Europe had already taken place: the pressure exerted by 
Napoleon, his universal supremacy, drove all the Continental 
states into England's arms, and with their assistance she tri- 
umphed in 1 8 14-15 over her deadly enemy, the tyrant of the 
world. As the ally and almost the leader of the Continent, 
she again regulated in Vienna the affairs of the Continent in her 
own interest. The arch enemy was conquered, but it w^as not 
intended to annihilate him. Germany was not to be allowed to 
become too great, while Prussia was to be divided into an Eastern 
and a Western portion, and Russia's future growth was to be 
checked in time. The European balance of power was again 
in the foreground — the struggle of 1688 was at an end. 

Throughout a long war period England had stood in the fore- 
front; for one hundred and twenty-five years every war had in 
the last analysis been her war. For fifty years she was now 
able to enjoy the fruits thereof in peace. This time she had 
protected herself for many years to come. From 1815 to 1865, 
and again to 1874, her attention was carefully fixed on European 
politics; she soon withdrew from the group of the conservative 
Eastern Powers, and fell back jealously upon herself. Wherever 
able, she created counterbalances to these powers, encouraged the 
smaller rising states against them, and thereby increased her own 
strength. From 1830 she relied upon France, which had grown 
liberal, but at the same time remained France's distrustful rival. 
Every independent manifestation of strength by France — in the 
eastern Mediterranean, in Spain, upon the sea, before and after 
1848, w^as carefully watched' and suppressed. Friendship and 
enmity alternated under Louis Philippe, and especially under 
Napoleon III. Palmerston desired to prevent the latter's alliance 
with Russia — the French fleet aroused suspicion and angry 
panic in England. Nevertheless, the antagonism towards Russia 



300 MODERN GERMANY 

was in the foreground. This had its root in India, and spread 
by way of Afghanistan, to the routes to India, Egypt and the 
eastern Mediterranean. It early led to rivalry in the Turkish 
question; Russia desired to subdue or annihilate Turkey; on 
that very account England protected her and closed the Mediter- 
ranean to Russia — indeed, even the maintenance of a fleet on 
the Black Sea was denied to her. This antagonism again burst 
forth in the Crimean War in 1854, which, viewed from a broad 
standpoint, was primarily England's conflict and England's suc- 
cess. The war expelled Russia from the Balkans, but turned 
her all the more definitely toward Central Asia. For a long 
time this remained England's sole European war. Her diplomacy 
was as energetic and belligerent as could be desired, and in Lord 
Palmerston (1830 to 1865) there was a strong consciousness of 
power which achieved many successes; but on the whole diplo- 
matic measures were sufficient. 

Thus protected, with the prestige of her former victories, Eng- 
land turned during these two generations back to her own peculiar 
field — the world beyond Europe. With the exception of Russia 
alone she here encountered no rival. She w^as able to employ 
peaceful weapons, and in this period, since she was without oppo- 
sition, she depended for the conquest of the world upon her trade, 
her industry and free colonization. This was the dawn of the 
days of her great world-surpassing epoch, which reached its full 
glory toward the middle of the century. Freedom of trade cor- 
responded to the position of supremacy of British industry, in- 
ternally and externally; the liberal period developed the method 
and the doctrine of freedom in every field of human activity, 
in commercial policy, as well as in constitutional matters and 
those concerning Imperial administration. Conviction and in- 
terest went hand in hand. Likewise as regards the Imperial 
policy, the state withheld its hand: it gave the widest possible 
rule to the great colonies ; it left the settlement of the new terri- 
tories, especially of Australia, to economic enterprise alone. It 
was inclined to hold the reins of colonial administration as 
loosely as possible. While the Conservatives were in favor of 
having the state control the colonial policy, the Radicals held 
that it would be wisest to grant absolute freedom to the colonies 
and to India, that the best thing would be to get rid of them. 
In the Colonial Office, there was for a long time, to say the 
least, a spirit of negligence, of the most pronounced abstention 
from interference. This was the characteristic tone of the period. 

England on that account, however, did not cease to hold 
fast to her traditions of a policy of force. The two tendencies 



MODERN GERMANY 301 

existed side by side. The conception of a strong governmental 
policy gained the upper hand in India. Despite all reforms, 
conquest and war still remained in full force there. The 
possession and the security of the Empire led automatically to 
expansion; the governor generals, Lord Hastings and Lord 
Dalhousie, continued in a warlike manner down through 1850 
the work of Wellesley. Finally there came the Sepoy Rebellion 
of 1857, ^^^ the taking over by the government of the East 
Indian Company. Force was here the only possible measure. 
Trade spread this policy further, beyond Farther India and 
toward China. The infamous Opium War of 1840, which 
was waged by official England to uphold the poisoning of China- 
men with opium against China's opposition, to protect Anglo- 
Indian merchants in their profits from this trade and to increase 
it, while strengthening England's position in the Chinese Empire 
— this war, which was coolly and with conviction defended by 
the Liberal Palmerston, was quite in the spirit of the mercantile 
policy of the eighteenth century; trade and power indissolubly 
bound together. In i860 there came the aftermath of the war: 
wherever England found force necessary for breaking up and 
strangling the world she employed it ruthlessly even in these 
liberal days. 

At the same time, in Europe and America she was the protector 
of struggling national states, of their emancipation and of their 
freedom. This, like the liberal commercial policy, corresponded 
to the sentiments of the new ruling middle class and at the 
same time redounded to the profit of British politics. This course, 
however, was not everywhere consistently pursued. Where, as in 
the case of Turkey and Austria, the old ruling state was needed 
by England's interests as against Russia and where it therefore 
had to be protected from the young national movements directed 
against it, there at times she found herself between two fires 
and occasionally in great embarrassment — as in the case of the 
Balkan nations, the Poles, and Hungarians, and for a time also 
in relation to the Italians. While on the whole she encouraged 
Italy's rise, she was all the more opposed to that of Germany. 
Thus she supported Denmark, in spite of all national and liberty- 
loving claims of Schleswig-Holstein and of the German nation. 
She did not desire any Germans between the Baltic and the 
North Sea, just as she had looked with disfavor on the German 
Customs Union and the economic unity of the nation. England's 
encouragement of the principles of freedom and nationality has 
always ceased when her own commercial and political advantage 
was at stake. Indeed, this encouragement was in great part 



302 MODERN GERMANY 

inspired by her advantage. Wherever England supported a 
nation struggling for freedom, in South America or in Southern 
Europe, this was always done in the well-considered interest of 
British trade, and English assistance always meant a carefully 
placed mine to be sprung against a possible rival among the Great 
Powers. The parliamentary freedom to which she generously 
helped her proteges by no means always corresponded to their 
political maturity and their general welfare. Considerations of 
practical British politics were always dominant, seeking to make 
capital with the public abroad out of this reputation of English 
love of freedom. This does not mean that public opinion among 
English Liberals, who took pride in these humane achievements 
of their country, was insincere; even English diplomacy was not 
necessarily so. But, as in the case of her war against France, 
England has always skilfully understood how to make herself 
appear as the benefactor of the whole world. Her own interests 
at this time corresponded to many humane desires, in which her 
own people believed, and she profited by this coincidence to appear 
before herself and before the world as liberal, cosmopolitan and 
ready to help, when in reality she acted in the main solely for 
herself. Her cousins in North America, whom at all times she 
sought to impress by these moral means, experienced to their cost 
how strong the prompting of force nevertheless remained in 
England. How keenly felt were the disputes in regard to the 
Oregon boundary, after the year 1840. How decisively in the 
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, with a certain matter-of-course air, did 
England assume rights regarding the future Panama Canal 
(1850). Above all, how puzzling and insultingly one-sided was 
the attitude of Liberal England in the American Civil War, her 
sympathy for the slave-dealers against the Union springing from 
commercial selfishness and political rivalry. 

Her political motives remained unchanged. Outwardly, she 
was peaceful and liberty-loving; without doubt, this corresponded 
to the secret wishes of dominant Liberalism; it corresponded 
absolutely to the sentiments of the idealistic, radical wing of the 
party represented by Cobden, Bright, and Gladstone. The oppo- 
site view was supported by Palmerston, but he died in 1865; 
internal conflicts and the great Gladstone Reform Ministry forced 
foreign measures into the background for a period of ten years. 
Liberal England had Its fling. But then, from 1874 on, Benjamin 
Disraeli brought about a radical change. 

The conditions which were the basis of England's relation 
to the world since 18 15 underwent a change between i860 and 
1870. The development of the Continent had been completed, 



MODERN GERMANY 303 

new national states came into existence, and pressed Austria 
and France into the background ; on the other side of the ocean 
the Northern States had been victorious, and the welding of the 
Union was complete. In America, as well as in Germany, a 
strong competition grew up against England, who had previ- 
ously stood alone. Free trade suffered an eclipse, protection 
gained the upper hand, new industrial states claimed recognition, 
new world Powers began to assert themselves as England's peers. 
The world, which had stood empty since 181 5, open only to 
England, gradually again became filled, and England again 
found herself with competitors. In Asia, Russia advanced as 
a dominant power; in the Balkans Pan-Slavism sought to gain 
a footing. Disraeli was the first to strike a blow against this: 
he awoke the spirit of English imperialism, the English sense 
of power, the English policy of battle, from the half-slumber of 
recent times to a new activity. His conception turned toward 
the great world without; he united romanticism and realism, 
national tradition and the free fancy of individual genius, and 
lo ! England stood among the nations with a sword in her hand. 
In 1878 by threats of war she drove Russia back from Constanti- 
nople, she resumed with more vigor the older task of protecting 
India. Disraeli acquired the Suez Canal shares and the island 
of Cyprus; in South Africa, which his predecessors had half 
allowed to slip through their fingers, he assumed a firm policy; 
here, as in the North, he secured the route to India; he set 
the imperial crown upon the head of his Queen. He it was 
who announced that England was not a European, but pre- 
eminently an Asiatic powder. The fresh air of a new period 
swept through the land under his leadership (1874 to 1880). 

Once more Gladstone and the party of peace gained the 
upper hand. But in 1882 Gladstone, much against his will, was 
forced to carry out the testament of Beaconsfield and seize 
Egypt. He was forced to take up the struggle in regard to 
Afghanistan against Russia, who, repulsed from Constantinople, 
turned again with renewed energy toward India, and in 1885 
he came to the verge of war. Asia thus drew him also into the 
current of world politics. Further, Africa always demanded his 
attention: on all sides new Powers stretched their hands toward 
the Dark Continent — in addition to France — England's old rival 
— Italy, Belgium and Germany. In 1884-85 Bismarck gathered 
all these threads in his hand, strengthened the Congo State, and 
assured freedom of trade in Central Africa against England, 
acquired colonies for Germany in Africa and the South Seas, 
and by international pressure compelled unwilling England to 



304 MODERN GERMANY 

recognize her new competitor. The English colonists at the Cape 
and in Australia became alarmed; the motherland heard their 
cries. The new era was well under way; England, now plainly 
deprived of her previous supremacy, returned to the old principles 
of her former period of conflicts. Her indifference regarding 
the course of events continued precisely as long as she remained 
without a competitor: when this was no longer the case, she 
changed her system, and imperialism again assumed the helm, or, 
rather, now for the first time really grasped it. 

The intellectual work of preparation was of an older date; 
as early as 1868 Sir Charles Dilke had referred to the unity of 
the Anglo-Saxons and of their world-civilizing power; his telling 
reference to "Greater Britain" possessed political power in itself.^ 
There now began the flood of real imperialistic literature. In 
1883 Seeley published his lectures on the British Empire, which 
in ''The Expansion of England" celebrated the spirit of English 
history. This was a book of immeasurable creative power, com- 
parable in its sentiments with Treitschke's writings, but plainly 
far more influential as regards future development than the lat- 
ter's books have ever been. In his "Oceana" Froude shortly after- 
ward depicted South Africa and Australia, attacked the dis- 
rupters of the Empire, the Little Englanders, and hoped in the 
future for a United British Empire in place of the United King- 
dom. ^ Seeley 's closing chapter (p. 312) in the same spirit called 
his country into the ranks of the world states, the greatest growing 
Powers, such as North America and Russia — "Will England sink 
to the level of Spain?" The new sentiment made its way in 
these years. The idealism of Gladstone, which threatened to dis- 
rupt the Empire, suffered shipwreck in 1886 in the Irish Ques- 
tion; the Unionists came into power. Beaconsfield triumphed 
from beyond the grave; from 1885 on Salisbury opposed the ad- 
vance of Russia, and did this by means of a strengthened and in- 
dependent Bulgaria. In this manner, he checkmated his ancient 
enemy in the Balkans; in the conflicts of the following years he 
stood behind Austria, Italy and the entire Dreibund in opposition 
to Russia and France ; the English fleet played an important role 
as a potential factor at the time of the crisis of 1887. 

From then on the system of imperialism became more firmly 
established, year by year. By it England sought to protect India, 
through rounding out its boundaries and extending them, and 
through its Balkan policy. Again, after a pause, the conquest 

1 Greater Britain : a Record of Travel in English-Speaking Countries, by Sir 
Charles Dilke, London, 1868. 

2 Oceana, or England and Her Colonies, by J. A. Froude, London, 1886. 



MODERN GERMANY 305 

of the Soudan was resumed and the same system established in 
Egypt. In South Africa Britain entered upon a series of rapid 
conquests, by means of which it was intended to restrict the 
Transvaal and to limit the development of the German colonies. 
South Africa's importance for the Empire increased as a "way 
station" for India, and the connecting of the northern and south- 
ern portions of the Dark Continent, the ambitious plan for a line 
from the Cape to Cairo, took form in men's minds. The new 
system was also developed from within ; the problems of imperial- 
ism were thought out, solved and carried forward by great 
organizations. We shall not at this point trace in detail these 
movements during the period from 1885 on. It was a question, 
indeed, of holding together the vast Empire, which before had 
appeared destined to disruption, and which now, with the rise 
of new foreign Powers, for the first time it was sought properly 
to strengthen. The problem was to protect English industry 
and its export, and to render its millions of workers secure as 
regards food and maintenance. It was a question of drawing 
together the moral and commercial, as well as the military and 
political forces ; the unity of the race, of its civilization, commerce 
and power were at stake. The problems of the customs union, 
of the defense union of the motherland and the outlying posses- 
sions came into being, and henceforth remained in the foreground 
of British politics; the question arose what organization was to 
be given to the vast Empire which was to be created, and also 
what share the great colonies were to receive in determining the 
Imperial policy. These questions had to be answered by the social 
and political powers in England, by her citizenry, by the army of 
workers, whose influence was of such recent growth — in short, 
by all the industrial classes. In addition, the new money powers 
which were rising, together with, and above those of trade, were 
concerned in the solution of these problems — the Stock Ex- 
change, the "city," the individual capitalists living from in- 
comes, all of whom ranged themselves by the side of the indus- 
trial North of England, and whose wealth encircles the Empire 
and the world. The question of England's foreign policy was in 
the hands of these powers. The old Liberalism of Gladstone 
had but little understanding for this problem of force, but the 
new period rejected the old doctrine; the new Liberals, like 
Rosebery, became imperialists; the workers of Birmingham, 
with their leader, Joseph Chamberlain, deserted to the camp of 
the Unionists, and in their own interest advocated the "will to 
world power"; even more emphatic was the approval of the 
Stock Exchange. The decision was taken before all else to 



3o6 MODERN GERMANY 

strengthen the Empire, to render its world position secure 
through preparedness, especially as regards the navy, which was 
being constantly increased, and to draw closer all inner bonds, 
at the same time that an aggressive foreign policy was pursued. 

This course of action is quite explicable. As long as no other 
Power interfered in those parts of the world on which England 
had placed her hand, she abstained from appropriating the land 
in its entirety; she was willing to permit peaceful development, 
but only under one condition: that no other state should inter- 
fere. But other states had now appeared in the arena. Hence, 
it was a question of grabbing everything in sight. A mania for 
conquest seemed to take hold upon England; the manner in 
which she laid hands forcibly upon all within reach was astound- 
ing. From 1883 to 1885 Germany had acquired her modest 
colonial empire, the most unpretentious of any of the great na- 
tions, in West, Southwest and East Africa, and in the South 
Seas. There is no need to name the territories and their extent; 
their number is insignificant, and they have been but slightly 
added to during succeeding years. A long list of British 
annexations occurs as early as the seventies, and in 1882 these 
are followed by that of Egypt. From 1884 on there was con- 
quest upon conquest in Africa, year after year, in north and 
south, east and west, Rhodesia and the adjoining territory form- 
ing the climax. In addition, there were the South Seas and 
East India, Beluchistan and Upper Burma, the Afghanistan 
border lands — always something new, constant increase in terri- 
tory, treaties on all sides, wars everywhere. The conquest of 
the Boer States in 1900 marks the culmination, but by no means 
the end, of this policy. Certain later occurrences will be men- 
tioned as occasion offers. It has been estimated that Eng- 
land's colonies are approximately one hundred times the size 
of the motherland, and ten times the extent of the colonies 
of all other countries together; that Britain rules over about 
one-fifth of the world's territory and one-fourth of the inhabi- 
tants; that in the quarter-century since the great recrudescence 
of the policy of annexation, England has occupied an extent of 
territory approximately equal to that occupied in all the preced- 
ing centuries. She aimed at being the greatest of Powers, from 
every point of view, as regards the strengthening of old 
possessions as well as the acquisition of new ones; and the leader 
of this policy knew whereof he spoke when he cited the law 
according to which "the great states are constantly becoming 
greater and the small states smaller" (Lord Salisbury, 1899). 

England had taken from the others whatever she was able 



MODERN GERMANY 307 

to take. Naturally, this was not done at random; there was a 
distinct plan, and the insatiability with w^hich it was followed is 
shown by the facts. The plan for Africa has already been 
touched upon. It is identified with Cecil Rhodes, the brilliant 
financier and statesman, in whose veins Howed the blood of the 
first adventurous, piratical conquistadors of Elizabeth's time 
— "from Cape to Cairo!" The war against the Boers was 
planned by Rhodes, and Chamberlain inherited the policy and 
carried it through. It was by no means a battle for gold 
and diamonds alone, but for political power, for supremacy in 
South Africa, for a universal imperial goal along heroic lines. 
One may have an understanding for it, but it is impossible to 
deny that it was an aggressive struggle for power. It belongs 
to the same order of wars as those on the East Indian frontiers, 
which spread uninterruptedly on all sides, toward Asia, Persia, 
Arabia and Egypt. The ancient English impulse toward power 
has remained here in its primitive and unexhausted strength. 
In this connection it is plainly to be seen that the Liberal oppo- 
sition against this tendency had never gone very deep. The 
British nation as a whole has regarded itself for centuries 
as a master nation; this feeling constantly drew fresh nourish- 
ment from the Indian Empire. The thought of renunciation 
did not occur to England, She was fond of justifying her 
own desire by the excuse: We dare not withdraw from India 
(nor from Egypt now) for the sake of the natives. We have 
no desire to deny that this foreign dominance produced beneficial 
results as to civilization; but against those blessings are to be 
reckoned great and oppressive burdens and drawbacks for the In- 
dians and the Egyptians, while both countries have been admin- 
istered and ruled over and exploited, commercially and polit- 
ically, for the benefit of England, and not for that of their 
inhabitants. We may think this natural, but in doing so we 
place ourselves in opposition to the attitude which the English 
themselves love to assume and with which everyone is familiar — 
England's gain is the gain of the whole world. Every nation 
and country, they say, which comes under British rule should 
rejoice, and the rest of the world must rejoice with them, for 
British rule means enlightenment and civilization. 

As the result of her history, England is much given to regarding 
in a naive and childlike manner her interests as identical with 
those of the whole world, her existence as synonymous with 
that of humanity. In speaking of "humanity," she means Eng- 
land; in uttering the word "cosmopolitan," she thinks of her 
own nationality, of her own Empire, which enjoys the his- 



3o8 MODERN GERMANY 

torical advantage of being identical with European civilization 
throughout great stretches of the world's territory. She is only 
too ready to forget that other national individualities have 
grown up in the world by her side, with a longing to press 
outward, and that they, too, are conscious of their own worth 
and desire to assert their own State and their own Kultur 
in addition to the English. She has too great a desire to see 
the whole map of the earth painted in one color. The world 
to-day demands more pronounced differences. England's claim, 
however, and likewise her mania for the annexation of all 
unclaimed land, is in opposition to this; her presumption is, 
accurately speaking, limitless. The most cultured among the 
leaders of the new imperalism, a disciple of Gladstone, as Secre- 
tary of State once expressed himself on this point in classical 
manner, in the early days of the movement. 

"The Little Englanders," said Lord Rosebery in 1893, "hold 
that our Empire is large enough. That would be true if the 
world were elastic; but since it is not so, we have no choice 
but to keep pegging out claims for the future. England has 
to consider not only what she wants now, but also what she 
will require hereafter. It is our heritage and responsibility 
that the world, in so far as we can mould it, be populated by 
Anglo-Saxons. We shall grossly fail if we shirk the responsi- 
bility laid upon us — we must not decline to take our fair 
share in the partition of the world which has been forced 
upon us." ^ 

It is impossible to speak more clearly or in terms more 
exclusive of others. A more unconditional aiming at power 
cannot be conceived than is here expressed by the representative 
of the state ; nor must it be forgotten that the power of the state 
stood behind the speaker, with its new weapons in army and fleet, 
especially with its fleet, which was uninterruptedly increasing. 
This striving was the result of the reaction against the new na- 
tions, its growth was logically organic and limitless. It was 
incited to increase by the dangers which constantly threatened 
the Empire. All the colonies and dominions of the Empire 
have that which England herself has not — namely, neighbors. 
India has the Russians and the Japanese, Australia the Japanese, 
Egypt has Turkey at least and perhaps others as well. South 
Africa has the Germans, the West Indies and Canada the 
United States. Even if the United States harbors no evil de- 
signs, there is a permanent and natural threat simply in the 
geographical conditions; the consciousness of certain antitheses 

* The Annual Register . . . for the Year 1893, London, 1894, p. 68. 






MODERN GERMANY 309 

between the two great Anglo-Saxon states has from time to time 
made itself felt, and it continues to persist beyond the intention 
of individuals and historical periods. The force of progressive 
development and growing self-assertion of the individual countries 
continues operative, and keeps alive the question as to how long 
this ''World Venice," with the sea for streets,^ will continue to 
exist, and whether the form of a federation offers means for bind- 
ing it together permanently. 

How narrow is the foundation of the motherland for this 
maritime empire! Ireland, in unreconciled opposition, stands 
against the main island, and Ulster against Ireland. Classes 
struggle against each other within the social bounds of the 
motherland and the workers threaten with revolutionary meas- 
ures. Discord and anxiety everywhere — will the Empire be 
able to conquer them? In civilization, trade, race, history and 
sentiment England possesses many unifying forces, and the 
English political leaders seized upon these and sought to 
unify them and strengthen them; in this the colonies assisted 
the motherland. But despite the strength of these forces and 
of these efforts, heavy clouds have during the last thirty years 
continued to hang above the Empire. This has been seen and 
realized with increasing anxiety. A final factor entered. Into the 
problem. The Imperial policy was begun under Disraeli in 
the period after 1874, as a foreign policy In the narrow sense; 
as such since the heyday of Imperialism it has recorded its great- 
est achievements. For beside and above all future dangers of a 
general nature, was the immediate tangible danger: England 
had enemies all over the world who threatened the Empire. 

We have seen these enemies; there was Russia; there was 
France. The troubles with France in North Africa continued 
through the whole of the eighties and nineties of the last cen- 
tury. Russia and France formed their Dual Alliance about 
1890, directly against Germany and Austria, but Indirectly 
against Great Britain, who was the common enemy of both. 
The nearer the end of the century came, the more clearly was 
the Dual Alliance seen to be directed against England. The 
movements on the Continent forced England to increasing cau- 
tion; her far-famed "splendid isolation" constantly became 
more precarious. She had, however, since the Congress of 
Berlin never lost touch, more or less direct, with Germany and 
the Dreibund. Through the centuries Germany had hitherto 
been her ally, the fighter of her battles on the Continent. Eng- 
land's relation to Austria, of ancient date, and her relation to 

1 The Expansion of England, Seeley, p. 288. 



310 MODERN GERMANY 

Italy, which the new kingdom had inherited from old Savoy, 
were continued under Lord Salisbury. In the important crisis 
Bismarck had acted with him and with Disraeli, at the same 
time always emphatically upholding the independence of the 
German Empire. The great Chancellor, from his position at 
the center of Europe, had influenced all the States of the world 
and held all the strings in his hands; he had always been incon- 
venient to England and not a little disquieting. He remained 
unassailable, however, because world interests wexe not yet pre- 
dominant in Germany. But following his fall, Germany took 
her place directly in the world arena, and after 1894 she broke 
with England and in a manner sought touch with France and 
Russia. She defended her position in Africa and acquired a 
footing in East Asia. Her economy became part of the great 
stream of the world's economy, and the government was thereby 
forced to provide in a political and military way for the future 
of German industry, for its exports, and for its human masses, 
in the same way as England had done under like circumstances. 

Germany had no choice. If she was not to languish and 
starve, she had to pursue a world policy and to base her power 
on a fleet of her own. She forced her elder cousin on the other 
side of the Channel to take notice. The English nation did so 
grudgingly, and with evident distnist and displeasure greeted this 
new commercial and military- Power which was in process of 
formation; expre>:sions were heard that sounded harsh and 
threatening in German ears. The attitude of the British govern- 
ment was dillerent. Public opinion in Germany during the 
Boer War burst out as threateningly as in the other European 
states, especially in France; following the clash which the Kruger 
telegram unexpectedly brought about, the German government 
maintained an absolutely correct attitude; this neutral support 
during the South African struggle was very valuable to Eng- 
land. These were England's most diflicult years. English 
statesmen between 1900 and 1 902 gave expression to their 
astonishment that their country was so hated by neighboring 
peoples; there was a feeling similar to that of 1800. England 
sought Germany's friendship. She desired to win Germany as 
her protector against Russia. For the last quarter of the nine- 
teenth century Russia was for England the successor of Louis 
XIV and of Napoleon I; Russia and France were her daily 
anxiet}- during the last ten years of the century. The English 
standpoint was primarily dictated by the interests of her world 
empire ; but precisely this consideration brought her into opposition 
to the Dual Alliance. Her safety or her danger was dependent, 



MODERN GERMANY 311 

as we saw from the beginning, in the narrowest sense on the 
division of power on the Continent, and in Europe in general. 

Every appearance of a strong Power in Europe was for Eng- 
land an innovation which required an immediate explanation, 
and nearly always she regarded it as a threat. Such appearance 
was watched with jealous eyes. In 19 12 an Anglo-American 
of passionate English sympathies expressed this fact as an uncon- 
ditional doctrine. He warned England, as an incentive, that 
her position in the world depended upon allowing no Great 
Power to arise, especially in her neighborhood ; thereby he simply 
dogmatized the English custom of centuries.^ Did this system 
of suppression and attack drive England to oppose Germany's 
development? Not at the start — Russia was for England the 
original enemy. Between 1898 and 1903 English politicians 
thought that Germany might perhaps become England's ally — 
that is to say, her "soldier" against Russia. But Germany could 
surrender her freedom, make an enemy of her neighbor in the 
East and become dependent on England, only if England 
was ready to make corresponding concessions. But such was 
not the case. There was no English-German alliance, and 
Germany remained untrammeled. Instead, therefore, England 
turned to Japan. The military power which England needed 
against Russia was set in motion in the East, instead of in the 
West. The Japanese thrust, which it was intended should drive 
Russia from the Far East, resulted automatically in driving her 
forward in the West, which meant against Austria and Ger- 
many. 

The Japanese War was an English war of attack. Russia 
was defeated, and collapsed internally for a while. At the very 
start of the campaign (in the spring of 1904) England made 
her Morocco Treaty with France. This was the same France 
whose African expansion in 1898 had run amuck of England 
at Fashoda, on the Upper Nile, and who at that time had 
given way pitifully enough before England's threats of war; 
since then the two former enemies had drawn together. It 
has been asserted that the agreement of 1904, whereby England 
was to receive Eg\pt and France Morocco as a recompense, 
was entered into for reasons of imperial policy, and not as a 
measure against Germany ; England, it is claimed, desired merely 
to secure Egypt against France, and only as a result of Ger- 
many's opposing France in Morocco did the treaty take on an 
anti-German spirit. This explanation seems to me untenable in 
every respect. England already held Egypt securely, without 

1 The Day of the Saxon,, General Homer Lea, London and New York, 19 12. 



312 MODERN GERMANY 

having to recompense France; the retreat from Fashoda had 
shown this very clearly. Naturally, it lay within the conception 
of the imperialistic policy to obviate any further claim of France 
in the Nile Valley — to that extent the treaty was a welcome 
corroboration. Nevertheless, it was directed from the very 
start against Germany; such was its real intent. No one could 
doubt that a far-reaching treaty with France, with important 
secret provisions, and which brushed Germany aside without 
more ado, implied enmity against Germany — indeed, that it was 
aimed directly against Germany. France had at bottom always 
been inimical to Germany; since 1871 she had never known any 
other purpose than revenge; secondary objects in her colonial 
policy had gained only a temporary place in her program, and 
in a crisis had always been sacrificed to revenge. Whoever placed 
his hand in that of France knew the significance of such an act 
— knew at least, what France expected. Following Germany's 
refusal and the alliance with Japan, the treaty indicated Eng- 
land's definite turning against Germany as its fundamental inten- 
tion: it inaugurated, after certain preliminaries, the first great 
move in the policy of Germany's isolation {Einkreisung) . 

The history of this policy does not come within the scope 
of the present article. It is our aim only to connect it with 
this general review of England's policy of force. The sole 
question here is whether England's attitude toward Germany 
since 1901 and 1904 is to be understood from this point of view. 
This question must be answered affirmatively. England's enmity 
does not spring mainly from friction in Africa and the Near East, 
as has been stated, from clashes between her imperial policy and 
Germany's expansion — although such clashes are naturally not 
to be denied; it results primarily from Germany's power in 
general, which was objectionable to England, in an especial degree 
after Russia had been reduced as desired. At this time Ger- 
many created her fleet. To the commercial inconvenience caused 
by Germany were now added her military and political power. 
Therefore, the old game was played again: England sought 
to isolate the new rival, by uniting the latter's enemies into a 
league; as she had done for centuries, she turned against the 
strongest Continental state and armed the others against it. 

There followed tTie misunderstanding connected with the de- 
parture of the Russian Baltic fleet for the Far East and with 
the Dogger Bank incident, which must have held a strong 
danger of war not yet understood by us; there followed the 
complications regarding Morocco, in which from the start, before 
and after Delcasse's fall, England pursued a markedly un- 



MODERN GERMANY 313 

friendly policy toward Germany. I do not propose to relate 
here the Morocco Affair; nor the gradual concentration of the 
British fleet in home waters as a move against Germany; nor 
the history of the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907. I am con- 
cerned only with the disclosure, revealed by this second treaty 
aimed at Germany's isolation, of the motives of England's policy. 
Here again the threat to Germany, it is claimed, was the result, 
not the motive of action. England and Russia divided Persia 
into three portions: a Russian, an English, and between them a 
neutral sphere of influence. England thereby secured the way 
to the sea and to India. Did she enter into this treaty for the 
sake of India? Incidentally, no doubt: her policy is always 
universal, and it must be considered from the Asiatic angle. The 
treaty protects India and the routes from Cairo to India. But 
w^as England at that time in need of protecting herself against 
Russia? Russia was defeated, and only beginning to rise again; 
she was not in a position for the moment to undertake anything 
against India. England was strong at this time, not Russia. 
The understanding with England closed for Russia the southern 
passes, as the Japanese War closed the routes toward the Far 
East. The protection of India was desirable, but it was by no 
means imperative. The real importance of the treaty lay in the 
fact of an agreement having been reached between the two giant 
empires and in the course upon which it now definitely forced 
Russia — namely, against Turkey, the Balkans, Austria and Ger- 
many. It was a truce between the two great World Powers ; this 
time again the threat was really intended for Germany. Nor 
was this the case merely because the German plan for the Bagdad 
railway encroached on the Asiatic territory which England desired 
to control for the sake of the connection with India. This im- 
perialistic consideration did not later prevent England and Ger- 
many from reaching an agreement (to which the latter had 
always been open) in regard to the Bagdad railway, in the treaty 
of 191 4, the carrying out of which the war prevented. 

The true significance of the treaty of 1907 was the shackling 
of Germany, from considerations of general policy. The anti- 
German spirit in the Russian government and England's jealousy 
of Germany joined hands in this effort. Whether the aim of this 
policy of isolation was war or the suppression of Germany 
need not be discussed here. What, however, England feared 
from Germany, using every means in her power to prevent it, 
was expressed by Sir Edward Grey in a speech in the House of 
Commons in March, 1909, in a diplomatically negative form, 
although quite positive as regards intent. This was after the 



314 MODERN GERMANY 

first failure in the attempt to isolate Germany. England feared, 
he said, Germany's attempt to dominate and dictate the policy 
of the Continent, and to bring about thereby a complete and 
deliberate isolation of England. This intention existed, accord- 
ing to English suspicion, and he desired to prevent its realization ; 
therefore, he acted to this end according to tradition.^ 

The ten years following the Boer War are a history of 
increasing English power. Settlement was sought for those 
problems of imperialism of which I have spoken. Chamberlain 
developed his great agitation for a protective tariff; imperial 
reform was ardently striven for, but nowhere were there definite 
forms or clear prospects. Success attended England's foreign 
policy, but not her imperial policy; yet her standing in the world 
advanced greatly. Her export trade increased in a correspond- 
ing manner; the anxiety regarding commercial retrogression 
which might have been felt between 1895 and 1900 had long 
been overcome. Nevertheless, the King and his diplomats 
labored unceasingly on the ring w^hich was to encircle Germany. 
Sacrifice on sacrifice was made to Russia, to Japan and to France 
for the sake of this "encircling" policy ; the Mediterranean front 
was much weakened. A great system was created for injur- 
ing the present enemy at future cost. It was unmistakable that 
all this converged against Germany. The danger of the sacri- 
fices which were made to the friends of to-day, who were the 
probable enemies of to-morrow, was clearly perceived; peace- 
loving Liberalism emphasized this strongly, as also its own 
desire for peace, basing its arguments on ideal and economic 
reasoning. But the voice of the Imperialists drow^ned out all 
others; nor were the crises of 1909 and 191 1 capable of silenc- 
ing it. 

England was in the throes of a panic at the thought of a 
German invasion, as she had been shaken in the seventeenth 
century by the "No Popery" outburst, and in the nineteenth cen- 
tury by the dread of the French fleet. Lord Roberts carried on 
his agitation for the strengthening of the army, for universal 
compulsory service, and he held up the spectre of Germany to 
frighten his countrymen. Reference has been made to Homer 
Lea's fanciful dissertation. The war-enthusiastic American made 
this announcement to the English apodictically and with cold- 
blooded fanaticism : In permitting the union of Germany, England 
lost the citadel of her European power; she dare not allow any 
European state to become too great. Germany desires to destroy 
England's power and to erect a German Empire upon the ruins. 

'^Parliamentary Debates, 1909, Vol. Ill, p. 58. 



MODERN GERMANY 315 

England must prepare to resist, she dare not permit such a 
Power to exist; the crisis is at hand, war is unavoidable. Wars 
have created this Empire and w^ars will lengthen or shorten its 
existence. Lea's appeal is dedicated to Field Marshal Roberts. 

In the year 19 13, the historian Cramb gave a series of lectures 
on Germany and England, which in book-form stirred the entire 
Anglo-Saxon world. ^ They are a consistent, eloquent exhorta- 
tion for preparedness, for compulsory service, for war. Cramb, 
also with violent generalization, with forceful deduction, con- 
structs a belligerent Germany, a Germany bound to be belligerent. 
He ratiocinates the necessity for this war. He, too, glorifies Rob- 
erts and war; he desires war for England, for her position of 
powder. He is a war idealist. His was a thorough-going militar- 
istic sermon, and most remarkable was the echo which it later 
awakened. This militaristic movement was not the only one, 
but success proved that it was the strongest. 

Although the Liberal government rejected general compulsory 
service. General Hamilton, in a book - to which Viscount Haldane 
contributed an introduction, brought forward his convincing 
reason for a paid army. It was a most astounding and instructive 
argument for Germans; he maintained that only a paid army 
permits of what is an impossibility with a popular army: that is, 
wars of offense in far-distant foreign lands, and in keeping with 
British traditions and British Imperialism, a strong foreign policy 
— in other words, a policy of conquest. The army and the fleet 
carry on war, the other classes quietly continue their work and 
foot the bills. "The mass of the nation, therefore, does not find 
war so terribly tragic." This was the voice of English tradition; 
the nature of England's conquests, even those of the last twenty- 
five years, was accurately expressed by it, and there was no inten- 
tion of abandoning this policy. Least of all was there any desire 
in England to renounce maritime supremacy. An irresistible 
wave in favor of such a policy of force, proceeding from the 
most diverse sources, swept over England. 

Given a sincere desire, it is not difficult to understand 
why England, on account of her imports, if for no other reason, 
regards with suspicion the possibility of a strong foreign fleet 
in her hom.e waters. As was previously asserted, her history, 
her long isolation have spoilt her. Her claims have become 
and remain limitless. Wherever a possible rival arises she sum- 

1 Germany and England, by J. A. Cramb, late Professor of Modern History, 
Queen's College, London; New York, 19 14, p. 43 ff. 

2 Compulsory Service. A Study of the Question in the Light of Experience, 
by General Sir Ian Hamilton, with an Introduction by the Right Hon. R. B. 
Haldane, London, 19 10. 



3i6 MODERN GERMANY 

mons the world against the new competitor, and as she has always 
done, reproachfully identifies her own interest with that of 
mankind in general. She desires once and for all to hold open 
for herself and for her world empire the routes to her colonies, 
— that is to say, the oceans ; whoever seems even to threaten these 
routes is the enemy of England and of humanity; no growth 
of power sufficient for this purpose is to be permitted. The sole 
guarantee of this desire of England is seen in the increase of 
England's actual maritime supremacy, her absolute dominance 
of the seas. England desires also to hold open the overland 
routes which lead to her colonies, and she seeks to exclude all 
outsiders from them^the routes from the Nile to South Africa, 
and from the Nile to the Indus and the Ganges. She lays her 
hand heavily upon the offenders wherever they may be: in each 
case it was Germany who felt the weight of her displeasure. 

England has united the world against Germany to-day, pri- 
marily for the reason that Germany's power was too close at 
hand and inconveniently great — she is playing against us the 
game of 1689 ^nd 181 3. Her procedure and her motives have In 
no wise changed, her policy is that of attack and alliance, as 
always. Her enemy, to be sure, is no longer the same. Ger- 
many's ambitions have never been universal, like those of Na- 
poleon I or of Louis XIV, never has she exercised or attempted 
a European hegemony; not even against England did she assume 
the offensive. She was content to remain a nation like the 
others, striving for her portion of light and air. The universal 
policy existed solely in England, in no wise in Germany. Does 
England not also block the way of the other Powers? Does 
she not with her allies threateningly enclose Italy in the Mediter- 
ranean? Do not national states, national fleets arise in all parts 
of the world? Does not each one of them, in its effort toward 
development, feel the oppressive hand of this ancient ruler of 
the world, who lords it over the seas? Does she not embitter 
the life of neutrals more than ever by seeking to enforce against 
them her own arbitrary rules, as in 1780 and 1800? Where are 
the small states, the embryonic nations, which England claims 
to protect to-day? Her hand lies heavily upon them all. The 
only one which she protects, the pretendedly neutral Bel- 
gium, was from the start her ally and accomplice. England has 
assumed the offensive not alone toward us. Her imperialism, 
her alliance with Russia, her animosity towards Germany have 
urged her on for a number of years to a deadly attack against 
Austria-Hungary and Turkey, her previous friends — she seeks 
to destroy them also. England claims she is fighting for law 



MODERN GERMANY 317 

and the existing order — in truth, she is upholding her ancient 
supremacy. For this she sacrifices old and new states, historical 
Austria, the last states of Islam, the recently created power of our 
Empire. She protects France, because France serves her ends and 
has become harmless to her. But an energetic and live state must 
force its way against England's claim to rule the world, and fight 
to gain the right of existence. 

If England really introduces universal compulsory service, then 
as regards international politics for the first time will she become 
a nation in the fashion of the others — a nation which measures 
its political responsibility, the responsibility for war, with terrible 
earnestness by the tribute of blood which all of its sons pay; a 
nation which through this responsibility learns self-control, order 
and patience. The history of England's past, to which she holds 
fast to-day and which she has striven to continue in the present, 
is a history of wars of conquest, of wars of attack, whose aim 
was to protect her growth in the outside world and to destroy 
every European rival; it is a history of wars, of aggressive 
policy, of aggressive world policy, always and at all points. 
It may be regarded as imposing: the cohesion of this world- 
nation In respect to population, territorial possessions, civilization 
and power is still impressive. To plead the advancement of the 
interest of humanity is possible for British self-assurance and 
British cant only owing to hypocrisy or to the infatuation of the 
other nations which she seeks to deceive. England is fighting 
for herself and for a worn-out, world-supremacy the claims of 
which run counter to the national life of the present and of the 
future. She is fighting for a universality of power, which in 
reality is the narrowest and the most selfish which the modern 
w^orld has seen. For this reason she has brought together under 
arms, true to her policy of 1904 and 1907, the nations who have 
for long been displeased by Germany's new manifestation of 
vitality. From the narrow point of view, this was perhaps 
clever, as she seeks to weaken one of her enemies by the others; 
but it is scarcely wise from the point of view of far-seeing wis- 
dom; it was, however, thoroughly In keeping with England's 
history. This England has been fond of representing as a 
history of peace and benevolence — it has never been such. 
English commerce and Kultur have forced their way as roughly 
and ruthlessly as In the case of any nation in history; more 
deliberate almost than with any other has been her policy from 
time immemorial of simply exterminating every rival. Thus 
it has been, and thus it Is still to-day — the freedom of the world 
demands that there be a change in the future. 



CHAPTER II 
FRANCE'S POLICY OF FORCE 

PROFESSOR PAUL DARMSTADTER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
GOTTINGEN 

OUR greatest historian has said that in 1870 the German 
army was fighting Louis XIV. This statement holds 
in fact a great truth ; it means that the foreign policy of France 
during the last three hundred years has been guided by one 
purpose, that its aims have been pursued with absolute consistency 
throughout the changing periods of history. These aims consisted 
in the expansion of France to the so-called natural boundaries 
of the Rhine, Alps and Pyrenees, in her domination in Middle 
and Southern Europe, and in the founding of a great overseas 
empire. The execution of these plans naturally aroused the 
opposition of other Powers; Spain, the German states under the 
leadership of Austria, and especially England saw in these French 
efforts a menace to their vital interests. Powerful coalitions be- 
tween the Island Kingdom and the Continental Powers brought 
about the defeat of the French plans. The great colonial empire 
which, in the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth 
centuries, had been built up in North America by painful labor, 
was lost in the Seven Years' War, as irretrievably as were the 
bold hopes of gaining the upper hand in East India. The 
hegemony in Middle and Southern Europe which Napoleon 
achieved, could not be maintained; indeed, after his fall the so- 
called "natural boundaries," which had been conquered in the 
Revolutionary Wars, had to be surrendered. But it is char- 
acteristic of the exceptional tenacity of French policy that even 
after the destruction of these plans, after the collapse of her 
hopes, France attempted, by new means and new paths, the 
achievement of the old ambitions — to extend France's territory 
in Europe and to build up a powerful world empire. 

The peace treaties of 1 814-15 forced France back within the 
boundaries which had existed under her old kings, and left her 
only a few scant ruins of her colonial possessions: several West 
Indian islands, Cayenne, a couple of East Indian cities, the 
Island of Reunion, and the colony of Senegal, which was at 
that time quite unimportant — all in all, scarcely 100,000 square 
kilometers, with at the most one million inhabitants. 

318 



MODERN GERMANY 319 

The terrible state of exhaustion in which the country found 
itself after the Napoleonic Wars prevented it for the time being 
from contemplating expansion in Europe, but even in the Restora- 
tion period there was a beginning made tow^ard the creation of a 
new colonial empire. The monarchy of Louis Philippe and 
the Second Empire continued to advance along these lines. The 
foundations for a new colonial empire were laid in Algiers on 
the West African coast, in Madagascar and on the Red Sea, in 
the South Seas and Farther India. An attempt was made to 
gain influence in the Levant, especially in Syria and Eg}'pt — 
indeed, even in America an effort was made to continue the old 
tradition, although in a new form. The fact that the French 
world policy of this time did not achieve more imposing results 
w^as due to the opposition of England, despite the Entente 
Cordiale. It is, however, due also to the fact that France never 
entirely abandoned the hope of realizing the old ambitions of 
her European policy. In the southwest the "natural" boundary 
was won back in i860; in 1870 the hope was entertained of a 
similar gain in the northeast. This hope, however, was not 
realized : France was driven back from the Rhine to the Vosges 
Mountains, and in addition lost a part of her Moselle terri- 
tory. Her ambition for supremacy in Middle Europe was shat- 
tered by the founding of the German Empire. 

The peace of Frankfort in this way destroyed the hopes which 
the French had entertained for several hundred years and in 
part already realized. No wonder, then, that all their efforts 
w^ere devoted to undermining this peace, which many regarded 
as only a truce. No measure w^as spared to keep alive the memory 
of the lost provinces and hatred of the victor. The lost prov- 
inces, whose inhabitants had been an object of contempt on ac- 
count of their faulty knowledge of the French language, became 
almost a cult and in schools, in newspapers and in literature the 
''poor" inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine, "who were groaning 
under German oppression," were represented as martyrs, and 
the recovery of the lost brothers as the holiest duty of France. 
The legal status created by the Peace of Frankfort was recog- 
nized in no school book, on no map, and not even in scientific 
books and magazines. With the exception of Jean Jaures, there 
was scarcely a leading politician who accepted the state of 
affairs resulting from 1871. Sentiment and historical recollec- 
tions plaj'cd their part in this — bonds of friendship and relation- 
ship, as w^ell as here and there the honest belief that the "lost" 
brothers were suffering under German rule. The politico-mili- 
tary consideration that Alsace and Lorraine, Strassburg and 



320 MODERN GERMANY 

Metz represented sally ports against Germany, and that espe- 
cially from Alsace South Germany might be held in continuous 
check, was not lost sight of. Immediately following the conclu- 
sion of peace, the way was prepared from a military and 
diplomatic point of view for the war of revanche. In 1872 
universal military duty, after the Prussian model, was legally 
introduced into France; later it was still further developed in 
the Defense Law of 1889. In no country of the world has 
the so-called ''Prussian Militarism" been more relentlessly car- 
ried through than in the French Republic. Diplomatic prepara- 
tions encountered serious obstacles, as no Power indicated a readi- 
ness to enter into a treaty with the Republic, whose internal 
firmness as yet evoked but little confidence. 

As the re-conquest of the lost provinces was out of the 
question for the moment, French policy again sought, as it had 
done after 181 5, to counter-balance the losses suffered in Europe 
by colonial acquisitions. In this it remained true to its old 
traditions. But from this endeavor of French policy after 1878 
resulted this remarkable situation : France encountered the stub- 
born and sometimes bitter opposition of England, while from 
Germany she met with the most uncompromising encouragement, 
and often with vigorous assistance. In the years 1884-85, when! 
Jules Ferry directed the destinies of France, and again occasion- 
ally during the nineties, w^hen Hanotaux was at the helm on the 
Quai d'Orsay, did France and Germany work in harmony in 
the field of world politics. Jules Ferry warned his compatriots 
against "forever keeping their eyes turned toward the blue line 
of the Vosges," and neglecting all else that was happening in 
the world.^ At this time, and even later, many Germans may 
have thought that the old differences would disappear and the 
old wounds heal, but those who thought thus — and their num- 
ber in Germany was not small — were in sad error as regards 
the sentiment of the French nation. French policy, it is true, 
gladly accepted German support in order to attain a definite 
goal, but never through gratitude did it lose sight of that other 
goal which it considered more important. So far-seeing a states- 
man as Jules Ferry, who desired no more than to work hand 
in hand with Germany in clearly circumscribed fields, encountered 
the most bitter opposition from many of his compatriots, and 
after his fall (1885), there was a violent revival of the revanche 
doctrine; this reached its height in the temporary triumph of 
that thoroughly doubtful character, General Boulanger. It was 

^ Jules Ferry, by Rambaud, p. 394. 



MODERN GERMANY 321 

due only to the great restraint of Germany that war was avoided 
at this time (1886-87). 

A prominent American historian says in his book regarding 
the genesis of the World War in 19 14: "The French have 
been ready for war with Germany, whenever they saw a good 
opportunity, for the last forty years." ^ French diplomacy has 
for forty years striven to create such a favorable opportunity. It 
was apparent to French statesmen that, in view of the increasing 
population of Germany and of the stationary French census, 
there was no prospect of success so long as France was de- 
pendent upon her own strength. The efforts of French diplo- 
macy were, therefore, turned to bringing about the strongest 
possible coalition against Germany. As Austria, upon whose 
support she had based her expectations after 1870, showed signs 
of reaching an understanding with the new German Empire, 
Russia presented herself in the first line as a possible ally of 
France. As early as 1872 the Temps suggested an alliance with 
the Empire of the Czar. German diplomacy early recognized 
such a possibility, especially after the Russian Chancellor Gort- 
schakov, in 1875, boastfully claimed the credit for having saved 
France from a new German attack. After the relation between 
Germany and Russia, following the Congress of Berlin, had 
become plainly less friendly, and especially after the signing of 
the treaty between Germany and Austria, an alliance betw^een 
Russia and France was advocated as a countermove by Russian, 
as well as by French politicians. 

It must not be forgotten that the opposition which existed at 
this time between the two Powers and England in regard to 
world politics was a further important factor in making the 
signing of the treaty seem desirable. Nevertheless, for a long 
time there was hesitation on grounds of principle in Petrograd 
at entering into an alliance with the Republic. But this scruple 
was finally overcome, as many believe, on account of the pro- 
English turn which German politics took and on account of the 
non-renewal of the so-called Mutual Guaranty Treaty (Riick- 
versicherungsvertrag) following Bismarck's fall. There can, 
however, be no doubt that had there been a war between Ger- 
many and Russia previous to 1890, French muskets would 
have "gone off by themselves." In addition to the plainly 
existent community of political interests between the two states 
at this time, the close financial relations which bound them 
together must not be forgotten. As an outward sign of the 
agreement, in July, 1891, a French squadron proceeded to 

^ The War in Europe, by Albert Bushnell Hart, p. 139. 



322 MODERN GERMANY 

Cronstadt, on which occasion the proud autocrat of Russia 
listened, standing, to the Marseillaise. On August 27, 1891, 
notes were exchanged between the two governments sealing the 
understanding, which was extended by a military convention, and 
in 1894 changed to a formal alliance. 

The Franco-Russian alliance was, according to the intent 
of French politicians, primarily directed against Germany, and 
was intended at a favorable moment to lead to war and 
to the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. It is easy to understand that 
Alsace-Lorraine was a matter of entire indifference to Russian 
statesmen; they desired to use the alliance for exploiting France 
financially and for advancing Russian politics against England 
in the Near and Far East — in case of necessity of course also 
against Germany. Those French politicians who saw in the 
extension of the colonial empire an important task for the 
French government, counted upon making use of Russian sup- 
port against England. According to the change in the relation 
of France and Russia to England, their own relation to Germany 
became now more friendly, now less so. In 1894 France and 
Germany together opposed England when she seized upon 
a strip of the Congo State. In 1895 Germany, Russia 
and France joined hands in East Asia. But when the German 
Empire, as the result of the telegram which the Kaiser sent to 
President Kruger, on the occasion of the repulse of the Jameson 
Raid, appeared on the verge of a serious conflict with England, 
the French government let it be announced in London that 
France had only one enemy, and that was Germany. Thus, 
despite all colonial rivalries, France was ready to support Eng- 
land in a war against Germany; or, in other words, at that time 
also she placed Continental above world politics. This attitude 
of France had naturally marked effects on Germany's policy, 
while France herself was thereby brought to suffer the greatest 
humiliation she had known since 1871 — the "Fashoda" episode. 

The improvement in the relations between the two Western 
Powers dates from the very same year, 1898, the year of 
Fashoda. Delcasse, who directed France's foreign policy after 
this year and who doubtless perceived the growing hostility 
between Germany and England, made it his main object in life 
to bring about a close understanding between England and 
France, and to carry through the idea of revanche by means 
of this alliance. This plan of the clever Southern Frenchman 
gained in probability of realization when, with the accession of 
King Edward VII (1901), a decided shift took place in British 
policy — England, like France, now saw in Germany her chief 



MODERN GERMANY 323 

opponent. Indeed, England was even ready to pay a high price 
for French friendship and to fulfill France's dearest wish on the 
stage of world politics: in payment for the recognition of her 
de facto supremacy in Egypt, England granted a free hand to 
France in the greater portion of Morocco. Thus, by the agree- 
ment of April 8, 1904, the chief goal of French policy was 
achieved, the ancient opposition to England was checked, and 
the possibility created of carrying through to realization, in 
alliance with Great Britain, French wishes as regards Europe. 
It remained only to bring the understanding with England into 
agreement with the Russian alliance. The differences which 
existed and still exist between England and Russia are undoubt- 
edly more fundamental than those between England and France 
— more so, probably, than those between England and Germany. 
Nevertheless, English and French diplomats, working together, 
were able in 1907 to bring about an understanding between 
Russia and England, which did not remove the antipathy betv^^een 
the two Powers, it is true, but merely bridged it over. It is 
not possible to-day to decide who deserves the greatest credit 
for the creation of the Triple Entente, but the chief gain from 
it undoubtedly accrues to France. The three Powers were held 
together by their common hatred of Germany. According to 
the intention of the French — and with that alone are we con- 
cerned at this time — the Triple Entente was to serve for the 
realization of the revanche idea, in the manner of the previous 
alliance with Russia. The Entente was still further extended 
by military agreements with England, which were primarily 
directed against Germany, and through an exchange of notes 
(1912) which was not formally a treaty, but which in reality 
bound England, as the Military and Naval Convention had 
done, to support France. French politics had at last been suc- 
cessful, after nearly forty years of effort, in bringing about the 
powerful coalition with which it was intended to destroy the 
German Empire. 

There was, however, much more to the European policy of 
France than the forming of treaties with Russia and the under- 
standing with Great Britain. It was, to be sure, out of the 
question for France, after the occurrences of 1870-71, to resume 
plans for a Confederation of the Rhine, such as Napoleon 
had undertaken. But ardent encouragement was given to the 
anti-German propaganda in Alsace-Lorraine. It is not known 
to what extent other disruptive movements within the German 
Empire and within the allied Hapsburg Monarchy received 



324 MODERN GERMANY 

encouragement from French sources. The manner in which 
intelligent Frenchmen, even in private conversation, threw 
doubt upon the unity of the German princes and races was 
astonishing; they were inclined to overestimate the importance 
of occasional separatist expressions of individuals and newspapers. 
This was still more pronounced in respect to the disagreements 
of the peoples of the Monarchy on the Danube, among whom 
the Czechs especially enjoyed the sympathy of the French. 

The principal aim of French diplomacy, particularly in the 
last ten or fifteen years, was at all points to undermine German 
policy, to weaken Germany's position in the world, to destroy 
her alliances with other states, and to draw the latter within 
the sphere of France's influence. French statecraft in these 
efforts, in which it was naturally encouraged by Russia and 
England, made skilful use of two weapons whose power we 
must not underestimate: French Kultur and French capital. 

French Kultur, and especially its chief organ of expression, 
the French language, has something quite irresistible for many 
peoples. If it possessed for those of the Germanic race at times 
a decisive influence, it is only natural that its attraction was even 
stronger for the Romance nations, who not infrequently regard 
it as the only Kultur; from the superiority of the French article 
to their own they draw the easy conclusion that in the political 
sphere also France is entitled to stand as the leading represen- 
tative of the Latin peoples. 

Not less important was the extremely adroit use of French 
capital for the increase of the political influence of France. 
French capital is invested in government loans, railways, indus- 
trial undertakings and newspapers of other countries, and thus 
made serviceable, not only for the commercial, but for the 
political aims of France as well. 

The influence of France is naturally greatest in French-speak- 
ing countries, such as French Switzerland and Belgium. For 
a time it seemed that united Italy would be permanently removed 
from the French sphere of influence. The occupation of Tunis 
by the French (1881) impaired the political relations betv^^een 
the Italian kingdom and France and brought about Italy's union 
with the Central Powers. Italy was successful also in freeing 
herself from the economic tutelage of France, and the hope did 
not seem without foundation that Italy would create for herself 
a system of Kultur independent of France. In spite of the 
unfriendly attitude which for many years France had mani- 
fested toward all Italian efforts to achieve power — reference 
need be made only to the support which France gave to the 



MODERN GERMANY 325 

Abyssinian Chief, Menelik — French diplomacy was, nevertheless, 
successful in making its influence again strongly felt with the 
''Latin sister nation." Here again Delcasse was the guiding 
spirit: In order to make the Italians forget Tunis, he offered 
to them the much less valuable Tripoli as recompense. The 
minister was seconded In his efforts by the French ambassador 
in Rome, Barrere, who understood the art of Influencing Italian 
public opinion in favor of France. The unremitting emphasis 
on the Latin relationship, the encouragement of ''irredentist" and 
republican movements, the activity of the Freemasons, who were 
encouraged by France, and the attraction of French Kultur, 
which is for many Italians irresistible, caused wide circles in 
Italy entirely to mistake the true Interests of the country and 
to ally themselves politically with France.^ 

The argument that France was the leading Latin power 
was of course made use of In Spain. Although French capital 
there plays a much greater role than In Italy, there are In Spain 
powerful factors against the dominance of French influence. Old 
traditions, as well as recent experiences of the Spaniards In the 
Morocco affair, operate against France's propaganda along the 
lines of civilization and finance. Catalonia, however. Is entirely 
under Prench influence. Portugal Is dependent on France cul- 
turally, but politically and economically on England. 

In the eastern part of the Mediterranean French propaganda 
can look back upon a tradition extending over many hundreds 
of years. France claims the protectorate over the Roman 
Catholics In the Orient. The Alliance Israelite is active in 
working for France, and large amounts of French capital are 
invested In Turkey In all sorts of undertakings. Although 
France has In the Orient very important material and cultural 
interests, nevertheless she has made her policy as regards Turkey 
quite secondary to the wishes of her Russian ally, and thereby 
lost her traditional Influence in the Ottoman Empire. Indi- 
rectly, the revanche policy stood here In the way of the realiza- 
tion of other important French Interests. The policy of France 
as regards the Balkan States has also of recent years mainly 
served Russian purposes. Worthy of mention Is the fact that 
in Greece and Rumania France has been able to awaken sym- 
pathies which in great part are traceable to cultural propaganda; 
and the further fact that Greece Is also financially dependent on 
France. 

France's greatest success since 1871 In the field of world 

1 In the meanwhile Italy has broken with the Central Powers and joined the 
Triple Entente. 



326 MODERN GERMANY 

politics has been in the building up of a new colonial empire of 
vast extent. Her traditions here lead back to the time of 
Richelieu and Louis XIV. The desire to increase France's 
power and greatness, to find a recompense for lost territory 
and to reap military laurels, have all been determining factors 
for the French imperialism of early and modern times; but it 
would be unjust were we to fail to give due weight to the fact 
that other important considerations of an economic and politico- 
military nature also influenced the men who built up the modern 
French colonial empire. France possesses no superfluous popula- 
tion, and she has therefore no need to-day for settlement colonies. 
On the other hand, territorial markets removed from competi- 
tion are for France all the more valuable, since in many branches 
French industry is no longer able successfully to meet competition 
in the free markets of the world. The import of raw materials 
and food stuffs from her own colonies is also a matter of moment. 
It is very important for a country with so large a capital at 
its disposal to be able to invest it advantageously in colonies. A 
great colonial empire must be protected by obtaining footholds at 
certain points along the important routes of international trade. 
Finally, there is a connection between France's world policy 
and her revanche policy; the French endeavored more and more 
by the enlistment of the inhabitants of their colonies to fill out 
the vacancies resulting in the ranks of their army through the 
falling birth-rate. New colonies represented, therefore, the 
strengthening of France for her European task. 

The resumption of the French colonial policy has been in- 
fluenced by the general tendency of the times toward colonial 
expansion. France, who possessed a chain of colonies on the 
Dark Continent, felt naturally the greatest interest in an occur- 
rence of such historical importance as the division of Africa. 

Although in this manner ancient traditions, sentiment and 
important interests forced France to take part in world politics, 
public opinion at the start was without enthusiasm for colonial 
expansion, in part even inimical to it. Great political parties, 
such as the Radicals and the Monarchists, often offered the bit- 
terest opposition to a colonial policy, whose supporters numbered 
statesmen belonging to the moderate party. The opposition stood 
out against this world policy partly on grounds of principle, but 
chiefly because the country was thereby turned aside from its 
real task, the preparation for the war of revanche. The greatest 
successes which France has to show since 1871 were achieved in 
conscious opposition to the revanche policy, in cooperation with 
Germany and against England. 



MODERN GERMANY 327 

From the collapse of her American colonial empire, France 
had saved certain fragments: the small islands of St. Pierre 
and Miquelon, Martinique and Guadeloupe, as well as French 
Guiana. The Monroe Doctrine barred the way to an expansion 
of the French colonial possessions. It is worth}- of remark that 
France is the sole European power which has endeavored to 
violate the ]\Ionroe Doctrine (at the time of Napoleon III). 
It is also remarkable that even after 1871 the French colonial 
empire in America gained by expansion, although the gain was 
unimportant in size: in 1877 France acquired from Sweden 
the little Island of St. Barthelemy, without protest from the 
United States. Not without justice does an American historian 
call attention to the fact that this occurrence is of the same 
significance as the sale of St. Thomas to Germany; yet against 
such an act, when only suggested, the American press violently 
protested.^ In this connection it must also be mentioned that a 
French company first undertook the building of the Panama 
Canal, an undertaking which, as is known, came to grief, but 
which nevertheless shows the ambitious French world policy. 
The American journalists and scholars, who are never weary of 
talking of the "German danger," which is supposed to threaten 
America also, should glance at the map of the West Indies, 
and then ask themselves the question from which direction the 
United States, and especially the Panama Canal, might have to 
expect an attack. 

France has been able to awaken for herself in the United 
States widespread sympathy, which is in part traceable to the 
ancient brotherhood in arms during the American War of Inde- 
pendence, in part to the similar republican form of government. 
The French have recently undertaken a very active cultural 
propaganda both in North and South America. Latin America, 
even more perhaps than Latin Europe, regards France as the 
leading Latin nation and Paris as the center of culture of the 
whole Romance world. South Americans who have gained 
wealth delight to spend it on the Seine, where they are honored 
by the nickname of *'rasta." In addition to the cultural propa- 
ganda, we must not overlook the important part played by 
French capital in South American undertakings. In the South 
Seas, since the thirties of the nineteenth century, France has 
controlled a number of islands, of which the most important 
is Tahiti; under the Second Empire, New Caledonia was ac- 

1 The IMited States as a World Power, by Archibald Cary CooHdge, New 
York, 1908, p. no. 



328 MODERN GERMANY 

quired, and under the Third Republic several further groups 
of islands, which, however, are of no great importance. 

Far more important has been the French expansion in East 
Asia. In the face of England's great superiority, the increase 
of France's ancient East Indian possessions was not to be thought 
of; in compensation, however, she was able to acquire a great 
colonial empire in Farther India. Here Napoleon III laid the 
foundation through the acquisition of Cochin-China and the 
protectorate over Cambodia. Under the Third Republic French 
rule was extended, especially through the initiative of Jules 
Ferry, over Annam and Tonkin, and from these varied elements 
the great and promising colony of Indo-China was formed. 
French diplomacy was able to secure "spheres of interest," in the 
neighboring countries of Siam and China, which represent far- 
reaching opportunities for the capital and industry of France. In 
South China France has possessed since 1898 a point of support 
in the harbor of Kuang-chow. As for the rest, the Far Eastern 
policy of France has had to show the greatest consideration for 
the interests of her Russian ally. 

France's expansion in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean 
stands in close connection with her East Asiatic polic}^ She 
sought to follow England's example in obtaining stations on the 
route to East India. On the old route around the Cape of 
Good Hope, France possessed, as an inheritance from former 
times, the Island of Bourbon or Reunion; from the days of 
Louis XIV, she had laid claim to the great Island of Mada- 
gascar, and at the time of the Restoration these had been revived 
and had led to the acquisition of the small island of St. Marie, 
on the east coast of Madagascar. At the time of the July 
Monarchy certain islands to the northwest of Madagascar were 
occupied. During the eighties of the nineteenth century mem- 
ories of the old claims and traditions were awakened. After 
a bloody war a protectorate was established over Madagascar in 
1885, and after a second war the island was declared a French 
colony in 1896. Even before the opening of the Suez Canal, 
Napoleon III had laid claim in 1862 to Obok on the Red Sea, 
on the new route to India. This small colony was further 
extended during the eighties of the nineteenth century; it 
acquired considerable importance through the seizure of the 
harbor of Djibuti, and especially through the relations which 
were established with neighboring Abyssinia. 

By far the most important field of French expansion, how- 
ever, in recent years was in the northwest of the Dark Continent. 



MODERN GERMANY 329 

France pursued various aims, all of which were not fully real- 
ized. In the Mediterranean, where Algeria and Corsica already 
belonged to France, an attempt was made to bring the whole 
northern coast line of Africa from the Straits of Gibraltar to 
the Suez Canal under her rule. 

As an Atlantic power, France, who possessed various col- 
onies at the west coast of Africa from Senegal to the Congo, 
aimed at occupying the greatest possible extent of territory on 
the Atlantic coast-line, at providing as great a hinterland as 
feasible for the coast colonies, and then at binding these coast 
colonies to each other through the hinterland, where this was 
not possible on the coast itself. 

Finally, the plan was entertained of effecting a territorial 
connection between the Atlantic possessions and those lying on 
the Mediterranean. We need not decide the question whether, 
and to what extent, the attempt was made to create an empire 
through Africa from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. 

Ever since the French had gained a firm footing on the soil 
of Algeria, their aim had been to win political and economic 
influence in the neighboring states, Tunis and Morocco, and 
to incorporate these territories at a favorable moment into their 
North African empire. The possession of these two commer- 
cially valuable countries was, according to the French view, abso- 
lutely necessary for the security of Algeria. Tunis, as well 
as Morocco, holds a supremely important position as regards 
world politics, the latter lying at the Straits of Gibraltar and 
the former at the narrow dividing line between the western and 
eastern halves of the Mediterranean. But precisely for this 
reason England, who had watched with the greatest displeasure 
the conquest of Algeria by the French, opposed their occupation 
of further territory on the North African coast. Italy also 
desired possession of Tunis, to which, aside from geographical and 
historical reasons, she thought she possessed just claims, since 
great numbers of her sons had emigrated to the country and 
were there active in all branches of life. It appears that Eng- 
land was at first inclined to support the Italian claims. Offers 
of a like nature w^ere made in 1876-77 to the Italians from the 
German and Austrian side. But the irresolute Italian govern- 
ment failed to take advantage of the opportunity^ and Britain 
preferred to reach an understanding with France in regard to 
the protectorate of Tunis. It may be that it was more to the 
advantage of Britain's maritime interests if Tunis, Sardinia and 
Sicily were not in possession of the same state; a misunder- 
standing between the two sister nations was at that time entirely 



330 MODERN GERMANY 

in line with Britain's policy. The controlling consideration, 
however, was the desire to bring France under British influence 
and to prevent the threatening alliance with Russia. ' At the 
Congress of Berlin (1878) the British delegate, Lord Salis- 
bury, offered to the French delegate, Wadington, Tunis as com- 
pensation for Cyprus, which England had at that time received 
from Turkey. "How long are you determined to leave Carthage 
in the hands of the barbarians?" the English statesman is de- 
clared to have asked. Bismarck also agreed, since he hoped, 
but as events proved falsely, that the colonial activity of the 
French would draw them away from the revanche idea. The 
French government, however, hesitated a number of years before 
making use of the authorization, as many statesmen feared a 
breach with Italy; moreover, public opinion was unfavorable 
to plans of colonial expansion. Meanwhile the Italians sought 
to strengthen their economic influence in Tunis by all possible 
means, in the manner later characterized as penetration pac'ifique. 
The French government, with Jules Ferry at its head, seized 
upon boundary violations by a Tunisian tribe as an excuse for 
occupying the country. In April, 1881, French troops entered 
Tunis, and on May 12 of the same year the Bardo Treaty 
was concluded, whereby the country became practically a French 
colony. 

It appears that in France in the eighties the project was 
entertained of extending French rule to Tripoli, but to these 
plans the British government is said to have offered the most 
determined opposition. Later (1900, or perhaps earlier) the 
decision was reached to surrender Tripoli to Italy, together 
perhaps with other concessions, in return for the recognition of 
the French claims to Morocco. This decision was all the easier 
since France had definitely renounced claims to Egypt. 

If France was able to proffer w^ell-founded claims, from a 
historical, material or cultural standpoint, to any country in the 
world, it was Egypt. As early as the eighteenth century various 
statesmen had contemplated the conquest of the country of the 
Nile and the cutting of the Suez Strait; the bearing of the tri- 
color to the land of the Pharaohs by Napoleon meant only the 
carrying out of plans that had long been in incubation. Even 
after the failure of the Napoleonic expedition, French influence 
had remained dominant in Eg>^pt. The Suez Canal was a French 
undertaking. It is not without its tragic side that precisely 
this work, which was a triumph of French capital and of French 
intelligence, should have destroyed French influence in Egypt. 
England followed the building of the canal with the greatest 



MODERN GERMANY 331 

distrust and disapproval; after it was once completed, Great 
Britain sought to gain control of the canal and of Egypt. The 
history of the occupation of Egypt by the English, which need 
not be related at this point in detail, was the result of many 
shady intrigues and of a not always consistent policy on the part 
of British statesmen. France had several opportunities to main- 
tain her old influence, or at least to prevent the one-sided occupa- 
tion by the English in 1882. It is possible that an Anglo- 
French occupation of Egypt would have had the same results 
as the Prusso-Austrian action in Schleswig-Holstein in the years 
following 1864. At all events, the French parliament, which 
on July 19, 1882, refused by a large majority the credit de- 
manded by the Freycinet Ministry for the occupation of the 
Suez Canal, missed the last opportunity to secure for France a 
voice in determining the destiny of the Nile country. In reach- 
ing the decision, for which Clemenceau as leader of the oppo- 
sition bears the chief responsibility, the controlling motive was 
the fear lest France's military position in Europe be weakened 
through sending troops to Egypt. Thus here again the policy 
of revanche stood in the way of a world policy: the French 
would not have been forced out of Egypt, if they had not placed 
greater value upon the possession of Alsace-Lorraine than upon 
all territorial acquisitions. 

Only with difficulty and most reluctantly did the French 
reconcile themselves to the accomplished fact of English su- 
premacy in Egypt. The result was a long-continued unfriend- 
liness between the two Western Powers. France sought in 
other latitudes a recompense for the lost Land of the Pharaohs, 
and as England possessed interest in these districts, the an- 
tagonism between the two countries grew bitter. It was in this 
situation that Germany and France began the cooperation already 
referred to, which, it is true, lasted only a short time but which 
greatly assisted the expansion of the French colonial empire. 

Beside Indo-China and Madagascar, the chief scene of this 
expansion was West Africa. From the seventeenth century 
France possessed settlements on the Senegal; w^ith the beginning 
of the eighteenth century the idea had been broached of penetrat- 
ing into the interior by following the course of the Senegal 
River and thus founding a great African empire. General 
Faidherbe, in the middle of the nineteenth century, revived these 
plans and by force of arms subdued the territory drained by the 
river; in addition, in the period from 1830 to 1870, the French 
acquired a series of settlements on the West African coast, on 
the Rivieres du Sud, on the Ivory Coast, in Dahomey and \n 



332 MODERN GERMANY 

Gabun, which, however, were without connection and without 
hinterland, and hence of but small worth. The zealously prose- 
cuted exploration of the Dark Continent, in which numerous 
Frenchmen took part, showed that the interior of Africa was 
of much greater value than had previously been assumed. It 
was, therefore, quite natural that the Powers possessing colonies 
on the African coast should seek to expand them toward the 
interior. From the end of the seventies, the French, following 
the plans of Faldherbe, sought to extend their rule toward 
the Niger. 

Gradually, the idea was conceived of conquering the entire 
basin of the Niger, of uniting it on the one hand with the 
colonies of the Gulf of Guinea, and on the other with Tunis 
and Algeria, passing through the Desert of Sahara. Starting 
from Gabun, the French explorer, de Brazza, had undertaken 
an expedition Into the interior and planted the French flag on 
the Congo (1880). French expeditions traversed the Desert 
of Sahara, the Niger territory and the territory lying north of the 
Guinea coast, and the diplomats sought to make use of the results 
of these expeditions, which consisted of treaties with native 
chieftains covered with the latter's ''crosses," as legal titles In 
their dealings with other states. For from 1880 competition for 
African colonies became very keen. The mysterious "Interna- 
tional Association," behind which King Leopold II of Belgium 
concealed himself, signed a great number of treaties In the 
Congo Basin; in 1884 Germany raised her flag at numerous 
points on the West African coast, and Portugal and Spain re- 
vived ancient claims. England, however, opposed French ambi- 
tions on the Niger and the Congo. The British were successful 
in 1884 in bringing the coast line of the Lower Niger under 
their rule and in excluding the French from the extremely 
valuable territory along the mouth of that stream. By cun- 
ningly recognizing Portugal's historic claims, they sought to 
bring the Congo Territory practically under their own control. 
But at this point Germany and France, Bismarck and Jules 
Ferry, joined in opposing them. Through this united action of 
the two Powers the British-Portuguese intrigue was defeated, 
and the work of the Belgian king was rescued. 

By the treaty of February 5, 1885, France acquired the 
broad territory between the coast and the lower stretches of the 
Congo, which was later greatly Increased. Further, she suc- 
ceeded in securing a preemption on the new Congo State. The 
boundary division between the German and French colonies 
caused no difficulty. Bismarck had impressed on those who 



MODERN GERMANY 333 

crossed the seas to found colonies the duty of treating the French 
claims with the greatest consideration, or, as he once expressed 
It, of regarding them as "taboo." If this close understanding 
between Germany and France, as It existed in 1884-85, had been 
of longer duration, presumably both Powers in their negotiation 
with England would have achieved far more favorable results. 
But after the fall of Jules Ferry, a marked estrangement occurred 
between Germany and France. Germany found herself thus 
forced to approach England again and to limit the aims of her 
colonial policy far more than would have been necessary had 
the pleasant relations of 1884-85 continued. After 1885 there 
occurred a marked relaxation In colonial expansion in France 
also. The negotiations w^ith England regarding the limitation 
of mutual spheres of interest in West Africa led to the agree- 
ment of August 5, 1890, which in French colonial-political 
literature is regarded in much the same manner as the treaty of 
July I, 1890, in German writings. The causes for the two 
treaties are probably to be sought in the international grouping 
of states, which at that time w^as very favorable for England — 
that is to say. In the unfriendly relation between France and 
Germany. 

The agreement of August 5, 1890, fulfilled a desire of the 
French colonial party: it secured for France the territorial 
connection between her possessions on the Senegal and the Niger 
and those on the Mediterranean; but on the other hand, it sur- 
rendered to England the broad stretch of territory between the 
mouth of the Niger and Lake Tschad, to a line corresponding 
approximately to the southern boundary of the desert. Reckoned 
in square kilometers, France obtained a vast stretch of land, but 
most of It was desert. "The Gallic cock," Lord Salisbury is 
said to have remarked mockingly, "has obtained a lot of sand 
in which to scratch." England gained on the map a much 
smaller territory, but it was fertile and thickly settled. 

Even after 1890 many boundary questions were still un- 
settled ; it was still uncertain whether the French Dahomey 
district would maintain its territorial connection with the posses- 
sions on the Niger, and whether the French Congo district 
would obtain a connection with the possessions on Lake Tschad. 
Germany, who from her Cameroon colony would have been able 
to break the connection between the French Sudan and the 
Congo colony, again showed herself most friendly: In the treaty 
of February 4 — March 15, she abstained from the extension, 
accorded to her by England in 1893, of the Cameroons to the 
boundary line of what was then the Egyptian Sudan. In the 



334 MODERN GERMANY 

treaty of July 23, 1897, Germany regulated the northern bound- 
ary of her Togo colony in a manner most favorable to France. 
The settlement of the boundary between their mutual posses- 
sions at the bend of the Niger led to extremely delicate negotia- 
tions between France and England. An understanding was 
reached in the treaty of June 14, 1898, by which the Dahomey 
colony obtained a union m ith the possessions in the Sudan. The 
West African colonies of the Germans, English and Portuguese 
were henceforth merely '^enclosures" in the vast French colonial 
empire. 

The ambition of the French colonial party, however, which 
in 1895 ii^ the person of Hanotaux had again won an important 
influence in political matters, looked even beyond this. It is 
not possible to determine with absolute certainty the extent of 
their ambitious plans in detail, whether they aimed merely at the 
extension of the French colonial empire to the Upper Nile, or 
whether they wished to extend the French sphere of interest as 
far as the Red Sea; certain it is that it was desired to open up 
"from above" the entire Egyptian question anew. The time 
seemed favorable for this: England had serious difficulties in 
South Africa, and appeared, moreover, to be at odds with Ger- 
many. France had assured herself of aid from the Congo Stat& 
and Abyssinia. In this connection, as a link in the chain of far- 
reaching undertakings, is to be considered the Marchand Expe- 
dition, to which a much more innocent interpretation was sought 
to be given after its failure, and especially after the formation 
of the Entente Cordiale with England. England was successful 
in her attempt to defeat the whole French plan. The British 
government, on March 28, 1895, through Sir Edward Grey, 
declared most emphatically that it considered the whole territory 
of the Nile as its sphere of interest and that an advance by 
France on the Nile territory would be regarded as an "un- 
friendly act." 

In 1896 England undertook the reconquest of the Egyptian 
Sudan; and when in July, 1898, Marchand finally reached the 
valley of the Nile at Fashoda, the greater part of the Sudan 
was already in the possession of the English. On September 2, 
1898, the English entered Khartum, and the victor (Kitchener) 
proceeded to Fashoda and ran up the British flag. France's 
position thus became untenable. Marchand found himself facing 
a greatly superior force. More important still, however, was the 
fact that France lacked all support in Europe. As a result of 
the policy pursued by France, Germany had again come to an 
understanding with England, and Russia was not inclined to 



MODERN GERMANY 335 

support France in an African dispute. The French govern- 
ment, therefore, saw that it would be forced to yield, unless 
it was willing, single-handed, to enter on a hopeless war with 
England. Marchand was ordered to retire from Fashoda. The 
plan of extending the French colonial empire to the Nile had 
suffered final shipwreck. In the treaty of March 21, 1899, 
which set the seal upon the defeat at Fashoda, France was forced 
to renounce those territories which had previously belonged to 
the Egyptian Sudan, especially the province of Bahr-el-Ghazal. 
In compensation, the territories of Wadai, Borku, Tibesti, Kanem 
and Baghirmi were added to the French sphere of interest. 

France had thus, it is true, not achieved all the aims of 
her African policy, but she had been successful in acquiring a 
vast connected territory, which extended from the Mediterranean 
to the Congo and to the Gulf of Guinea, from the Atlantic Ocean 
to the western border of Egypt. 

There was lacking to the great French colonial empire in the 
North and West of Africa only the final cornerstone to com- 
plete the colonies lying on the Mediterranean and the Atlantic 
Ocean — namely, Morocco. Many diplomatic negotiations were 
undertaken from 1889 to 1902 in regard to the countries grouped 
under this name, but as yet little is known with certainty re- 
garding their nature. In 1900 France purchased Italy's agree- 
ment to a protectorate over Morocco by granting her a free 
hand in Tripoli ; she conceded two zones of influence to Spain, 
which announced historic claims to North Morocco and new 
claims to the coast lying opposite the Canary Islands ; ^ nego- 
tiations are also said to have been undertaken between Ger- 
many and France. England's opposition, however, to the com- 
plete occupation of Morocco by the French had hitherto been 
most stubborn. It was a traditional guiding principle of Eng- 
land's policy to allow no foreign colonies in the neighborhood of 
the Straits of Gibraltar. But this principle, like many other 
maxims and traditions of the older British policy, was sacrificed 
to higher considerations — that is to say, to the enmity toward 
Germany. The British government decided to permit France 
to seize Morocco. This was the essence of the agreement of 
April 8, 1904, which in addition regulated a series of other dis- 
puted points. In this connection, the recognition by France 
of English supremacy in Egypt, which had already been implied 
by the agreement of 1899, was not of great importance. Although 
the agreement contained the customary phrases, as, for example, 

1 In the end, however, the treaty was not ratified by the Spanish Government. 



336 MODERN GERMANY 

"that France has no intention of changing the status quo In 
Morocco," no one could entertain any doubt that France had 
now a free hand there — with one important limitation: the 
northern part of the Sultanate, the territory lying on the Straits 
of Gibraltar, was apportioned to Spain. By the treaty signed 
on October 3, 1904, the Spanish sphere of interest was more 
clearly defined, and in addition to the district in the north, an- 
other in the southwest of Morocco was surrendered to Spain. 

The Franco-English agreement of April 8, 1904, contained 
provisions regarding Morocco, Egypt and various other parts 
of the world ; but it was undoubtedly, according to the intent of 
its creators, an attack on the position of the German Empire as 
a World Power. The land which lies on the Atlantic Ocean 
at the entrance to the Mediterranean is one of the most im- 
portant districts of the world from the international point of 
view. It is rich in undeveloped natural resources, and if German 
trade with the Sultanate was not yet very important, neverthe- 
less the future held out glittering prospects. Morocco was, more- 
over, one of the few remaining independent Mohammedan king- 
doms, and it lay in the interest of German policy as a whole to 
maintain them as far as possible. Prince Bismarck, it is true, 
had once said: "We should be glad to see France take posses- 
sion of Morocco; she would then have her hands full, and we 
should not grudge her the increase of her territory in Africa as 
a recompense for Alsace-Lorraine." 

This statement, however, was made in the year 1880. France 
had since then acquired many districts in Africa, and Bismarck 
had not been able to foresee that she would ruthlessly shut oH 
this territory from the free competition of other countries, in 
so far as this was not prevented by definite agreements. The 
international position of the German Empire had, moreover, 
completely changed since 1880. But even if this had not 
been the case, the manner in which the agreement of 1894 
between France and England, with the approval of Spain, 
Italy, and Russia, had disposed of a great country was neces- 
sarily calculated to arouse the protest of Germany.^ The Con- 
vention of Madrid of 1880, in which Germany as a signatory 
Power took part, offered the opportunity for interference. The 
German Emperor declared on March 31, 1905, in Tangiers that 
he considered the Sultan of Morocco an independent ruler, and 

^ Le ConMct Franco-Allemand en 1905, Guilbert and Ferrette, p. 84: "There 
is nothing so vile and so contrary to our traditions as that attitude of bluster 
and brag in ignoring Germany and treating her as a negligible quantity." 

See also the private utterances made by M. Delcasse as quoted in the same 
book, p. 83. 



MODERN GERMANY 337 

the Imperial Chancellor protested openly against the contem- 
plated and already begun "Tunification" of Morocco. As France 
at this time — the time of the Russo-Japanese War — was de- 
prived of Russian support, she declared herself ready, after some 
hesitation and following Delcasse's resignation, to discuss the 
Morocco question in an international congress. This was held 
in January, 1906, at Algeciras. Thanks to the diplomatic sup- 
port w^hich the majority of the Powers gave to France, the latter 
country was able, despite the formal declaration of Morocco's 
independence, to obtain a controlling position in the Sultanate, 
which made it possible for her to carry through her program 
without directly offending against the decrees of the conference. 

In the following years, with various excuses, France con- 
tinued to occupy by military force other portions of the Sultanate. 
The extremely peaceful procedure of the German government, 
which often went too far in the opinion of one portion of the 
public, suffered these encroachments with great restraint ; indeed, 
in the agreement of February 9, 1909, Germany expressly recog- 
nized "the special political interests of France" and asked only 
for consideration of the economic interests of Germany. The 
expectations which were entertained on the German side, and 
which did not concern Morocco alone, were not fulfilled. The 
French continued to extend their power in the Sultanate, and 
finally, in May, 191 1, they occupied Fez. The German govern- 
ment therefore dispatched a warship to the harbor of Agadir, in 
order to cause France to enter upon new negotiations regarding 
Morocco. 

The Algeciras Act, which was based upon the sovereignty of 
the Sultanate, could no longer be upheld. Morocco was in 
complete disorder, and there was nothing left for Germany 
but to bring about a reconsideration of the whole Morocco 
question. It has always been alleged by the French and Eng- 
lish that Germany desired to obtain a portion of Morocco for 
herself. This view has been at all times categorically denied by 
those in authority in Germany. It was the intention of the 
German imperial government to obtain a compensation, after 
the precedent set by the other Powers, for the surrender of 
Morocco to France — such a compensation was sought for and 
obtained in Central Africa. France was forced by the agreement 
of November 4, 191 1, which moreover guaranteed the free com- 
petition of all nations in Morocco, to surrender a portion of her 
Congo colony to Germany. In return, Germany recognized the 
French protectorate in Morocco. The final demarcation of 
the two Spanish spheres of interest, which were considerably re- 



338 MODERN GERMANY 

duced, took place in the treaty of November 27, 19 12. So far 
as is known, no agreement has up to the present been reached 
regarding the city of Tangiers. 

Thus, in these long drawn out negotiations, France has in 
the main been successful in enforcing her will. She was com- 
pelled, it is true, to agree to the surrender of considerable terri- 
tory, which, moreover, divided her Congo colony at two points, 
but she obtained what was far more important — namely, su- 
premacy over the greater part of Morocco. France's African 
empire was now complete. 

The French world policy of the last generation has been 
extremely successful. A territory of over ten million square 
kilometers, with a population of about forty million, is to-day 
subject to France; by far the greater part of this territory has 
been acquired since 1880. The Sahara Desert, it is true, occupies 
a very large portion of the French colonial empire; the number 
of Europeans in this entire empire amounts to a million at the 
most, and many of these are not of French nationality. But broad 
districts in North Africa, on the Niger, on the Guinea Coast, 
in IMadagascar and in Indo-China are fertile, rich in resources, 
already valuable to-day, and capable of great development. The 
commerce of the French colonies has recently advanced with 
great strides. France's own trade with them in recent years has 
been estimated at one and one-half to two billion francs. France 
manifests the desire to exclude the trade of other nations from 
her colonies, and indeed in such a manner, according to the 
view of clear-sighted Frenchmen, as to have done serious eco- 
nomic harm not only to the colonies but also to France herself. 
Is France, with her stationary number of inhabitants and her 
industries, backward in many branches, in a position to develop 
along all lines so great a colonial empire? 

The hopes which Bismarck once entertained from his encour- 
agement of France's world policy have been in no sense fulfilled. 
Despite this world-political success, the French have not ceased 
to keep their eyes fixed on **the blue line of the Vosges Moun- 
tains." On the contrar3% the revanche idea has become more 
pronounced, especially of late years. The ^lorocco question 
revived the animosity toward Germany, and the manner of its 
settlement, which brought about a surrender of French territory, 
left a sting in the minds of many Frenchmen ; but there were 
other important factors which led to the resumption of France's 
Continental policy. The alliance with Russia and the entente 
with England set narrow limits to French policy in all parts of 



MODERN GERMANY 339 

the world. There was neither in the Near nor in the Far East, 
nor in Africa, further territory in which France could undertake 
conquests without trespassing on British or Russian interests. 
The union of the "Bear" and the "Whale" in common hatred of 
Germany seemed to offer the most favorable, and perhaps the 
last opportunity for the recovery of the lost provinces on the 
eastern border; for it was plain to be seen that this union 
promised to be of short duration. All the more important 
was it, therefore, to make the best of the opportunity. 

It is extremely difficult to-day to lay the responsibility on any 
one individual or group of individuals, but there is no doubt that 
from 1912 on public opinion in France was systematically incited. 
Much of this may be ascribed to the agitation for the revival 
of the three-year period of service; but this measure itself was, 
w^e may assume with certaint}', a preparation for war. The feel- 
ing of France, as reflected in her press and literature, became 
pronouncedly more warlike than it had been since 1887. Glori- 
fication of war, descriptions of alleged oppression of the Alsace- 
Lorraine inhabitants, venomous attacks on leading German citi- 
zens, contemptuous references to German conditions and institu- 
tions, especially as regards the German army — these comprised 
the daily reading of the French. The future will have to deter- 
mine to what extent this policy of inciting feeling against Ger- 
many practised by the French press was influenced by Russian and 
English efforts, and by English money, and whether the English 
and Russian press received their inspiration from French sources. 
It would be unjust to deny that there were currents opposed to 
this excess of jingoism. Up to the time immediately preceding 
the war, men were not lacking who raised a warning voice and 
urged an understanding with Germany. The essentially un- 
important occurrences in Luneville and Nancy showed how 
thoroughly unfriendly the feeling of the nation had become, as 
the result of the conscienceless campaign of the press. The 
belief in France's great superiority in aviation intensified the 
self-confidence of many to an extreme point ; numerous pamphlets 
were already busy with the "destruction of Germany"; the 
leading men were entirely in the grip of the new nationalistic 
tendency, which was celebrated by word and pen as the "new 
spirit." And when Russia prepared to seize the sword in an 
affair quite foreign to French interests, France did not hesitate 
a single moment to begin the w^ar of revenge against Germany. 



CHAPTER III 
BELGIUM AND THE GREAT POWERS 

PROFESSOR KARL HAMPE, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
HEIDELBERG 

BELGIUM is, according to the opinion of her first king, 
Leopold I, "the most threatened country in the world"; she 
has, as Banning, the clever henchman of Leopold II, writes, 
"nowhere political or military boundaries." She turns the sides 
of her triangle directly toward the Great Powers, who from 
time immemorial have disputed with each other for predominance 
within her boundaries. Nor does she contain within herself the 
firm kernel of ethnological unity. Were her fate to be decided 
according to the rule by which our enemies seek to dazzle the 
whole world — namely, freedom and independence of even the 
small nationalities^ — Belgium, like Switzerland, would imme- 
diately be broken up into fragments, for, in the oft-quoted words 
of a Belgian, Pol de Mont, director of the Antwerp Museum, 
"there is no Belgian nationality." The Flemish-Germanic 
majority and the Walloon-Romance minority stand in such sharp 
contrast that one can scarcely speak of cultural unity; even 
this "artificial" nation seemed recently seriously threatened with 
disintegration. Thus in the Belgian microcosm the great Euro- 
pean contrasts have for a long time met in conflict. 

Under such conditions, how was the continuance of an inde- 
pendent small state in any wise possible? As is known, the 
state, together with its neutrality and its "antiquarian" name, 
is mainly the creation of the Great Powers at the Conference of 
London in 1831 — an "experiment," as it was styled by its first 
king and again by a Belgian minister at the national celebration 
of 1880, an experiment to which at first scarcely greater vitality 
was ascribed than in our own days to Albania, that creature of 
the Great Powers called into being in a moment of desperation. 
If, nevertheless, Belgium did not only continue to exist for more 
than eighty years but developed in an astoundingly successful 
manner, are we justified in assuming that in this she was protected 
exclusively by the continuing force of the treaty which called 

1 This rule, of course, may by no means be applied to Ireland, India, French 
Flanders, Savoy, Nice, Corsica, Finland, Russian Poland, the Ukraine, etc. 



MODERN GERMANY 341 

her Into being? To think thus would be to exaggerate the im- 
portance of such an agreement. Rather did the Belgian state 
show unexpected powers of life, in the first place, because its 
roots struck more deeply into the past; and in the second, be- 
cause the same conditions continued as had called it into exist- 
ence. In other words, the nature of the Belgian state is to be 
understood only historically, and in order to grasp many mani- 
festations of the most recent time one must go far back into the 
past. 

The Southern Netherlands have from time immemorial been 
a frontier territory, important in war and for the spread of 
civilization. When from the third to the fifth century, A.D., 
the Salic Franks pressed forward at this point against the 
Romanized Celtic-Germanic Walloons, the manner of their set- 
tlement determined for all time the destiny of the country. 
For it was in the great northern marsh districts, and in a por- 
tion of the neighboring hilly land, that the invaders advanced 
without serious opposition into the neighborhood of Boulogne. 
Meanwhile, as the southerly forests and hilly districts offered 
protection to the aborigines, the latter maintained themselves in 
the main unmixed. Thus at this period those ethnographic and 
linguistic divisions became marked which for almost fifteen hun- 
dred years, with unexampled tenacity, have maintained them- 
selves without material changes. A line from west to east, 
running somewhat north of Armentieres to a point south of 
Maastricht, divides the Flemish-Low-German district in the 
north from the Walloon-French district in the south.^ With 
passionate stubbornness, the struggle has been carried on for 
many hundreds of years about this ethnological and linguistic 
boundary; the Germanic portion, it is true, has suffered some 
losses, even in addition to the capital city of Brussels. If we 
Germans of the Empire have been guilty of any mistake, it is 
that we have remained too unsympathetic, in justifiable consid- 
eration for national susceptibility, while in France there has 
been absolutely no reserve on this account. 

The World War has torn the bandage from our eyes and 
relaxed this unduly great restraint. The struggle of our Ger- 
manic brothers, although they may at times manifest distrust 

1 It is generally believed that Belgium is more French than anything else, 
but statistics show that at the close of the year 19 lo the population was divided 
according to the languages spoken as follows: 

Flemish (Low German) 3.832,193 or 54.05 per cent 

High German 77,395 or i.i per cent 

Walloon-French 3,180,003 or 44.85 per cent 

In round numbers, of 100 Belgians 55 speak the Germanic, 45 the Romance 
or Latin tongue. 



342 MODERN GERMANY 

toward us, Is from now on our struggle; the Flemish speech, 
w^hich seems rustic and unpolished to the Celt, sounds, at least 
to such of us as are accustomed to the Platt-Deutsch of North 
Germany, homely and familiar, refreshing in its unspoiled pic- 
turesqueness and expressiveness, and in its vital force that springs 
from the depths of the popular soul. It deserves protection 
against being engulfed by other languages. 

The older history of the Belgian Netherlands has little to 
say of such linguistic struggles; undoubtedly, this peculiar 
north-and-south division, which left the Romance districts in 
the East bordering on the German Rhine country and carried 
the Germans to the extreme West, was an element in prevent- 
ing the complete absorption of these national remnants by Ger- 
many and France, respectively, and In giving to them at an 
early date a certain Individuality; this rendered them valuable 
cultural intermediaries between the two great nations. This 
Individuality, however, down to the year 1830 never developed 
into complete political independence; never, despite notable 
struggles, were these Southern Netherlanders able, like the Dutch 
and the Swiss, to maintain themselves permanently against a 
world in arms — their position did not render this possible. De- 
pendence was the historical form of their existence. 

When the central kernel In the world empire of Charle- 
magne, through the discord of his grandsons and the unfortu- 
nate Treaty of Verdun, had shrunk to the small disorganized 
Franklsh Middle Kingdom, which was destined in rapid disin- 
tegration to be swallowed up by Its eastern or western neigh- 
bor and which became for both of these neighbors a source of 
endless disputes down to the present World War — at this early 
date the attempts to maintain an independent buffer state could 
not possibly prove a permanent success. As soon as Germany 
overcame her internal disunion, her established strength acted 
upon the Belgian Netherlands like a strong magnet on loose 
pieces of iron: from 925 on they became, together with the 
whole of Lothar's state, a settled German possession. The 
German Imperial boundary included from that time on the 
greater part of present-day Belgium, extended in the south with 
the Bishopric of Cambral even far into French territory, fol- 
lowed the Scheldt to Ghent, and from that point turned north- 
ward toward the coast, leaving the purely German Flanders on the 
west of the Scheldt In French possession. German rule was 
here quite dependent on the destinies of the German Emperors. 
As long as the latter remained in full power, German sovereignty 
was energetically upheld. With the weakening of the Imperial 



MODERN GERMANY 34a 

authority, from the beginning of the thirteenth century on, the 
Imperial administration began to disintegrate and to become a 
mere over-lordship. When in the sixteenth century the Im- 
perial power and sovereign authority over the Netherlands v^ere 
united in the House of Hapsburg, it appeared at the start as 
if in the Burgundian County (15 12) the reins w^ere once more 
to be drawn tighter. But the dynastic interests of the Haps- 
burgs ran counter to those of the Empire, and in the final reg- 
ulation of Charles V, in 1548, the separation from the Em- 
pire was continued in favor of sovereign independence. Never- 
theless, the fact that those parts legally belonged within the 
Empire remained for the future unchallenged. The archbish- 
opric of Liege, which was in the Westphalian district and was 
generally ruled by Bavarian princes, remained as strong a mem- 
ber of the Empire as the other principalities. Not until the 
period of the Revolutionary Wars, in the years from 1792 to 
1794, was the separation of the Belgian Netherlands from Ger- 
many completed. 

These facts are only too likely to be left out of consideration. 
Certainly, we do not pine for a return to the Holy Roman Em- 
pire of the German Nation. Nevertheless, it would be foolish 
were we to seek to underestimate, in our relations to our Ger- 
manic relatives on the other side of the present-day boundaries 
of the Empire, the strong ideal value of a common past and a 
one-time common governmental allegiance. What, then, would 
become of the Belgian people without the tie of historical mem- 
ories? It w^as discovered in the recent Balkan Wars that in the 
case of Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs, modern claims to power 
were based upon, and inspired by, causes lying far in the past. 
We, for our part, have refrained at all times from attempting 
to press such historical rights, but when the Frenchman treats 
it as a matter of course that he should found the boundary 
claims of his country on ancient. Gaul, surely, our nearly nine- 
hundred-year-old possession may also count for something in 
our favor. 

These memories touch the Belgian but little, it Is true. For 
him, at least in former times, local autonomy has always pos- 
sessed more value than independence as a state. Subordination 
to a higher state power, if not all too oppressive, has been 
generally held by him as quite bearable, if only local independ- 
ence, traditional customs and freedom were protected, and his 
commercial prosperity secured. When these possessions were at- 
tacked, he protested stubbornly and energetically ; but the heroic 
period of his history, w^hich was also the epoch of splendor of 



344 MODERN GERMANY 

his cultural development, did not begin until the German im- 
perial power was already on the decline. The independence of 
his state was a matter of little moment to the Belgian ; he found 
himself in the midst of the great world conflicts, dependent in 
the main entirely on himself, and like the hero of his ancient 
popular epic, Reineke Fox, in dealing with the Bear and Wolf, 
he was forced frequently to maintain himself with cunning and 
prudence against superior enemies, against France's desire of 
conquest, and against England's selfish interference. Since he 
was always able to profit by the rivalry of these two nations, 
their hundred-year struggle, together with the complete paraly- 
sis of the German imperial power, was the basis for the up- 
growth and bloom of the quasi-independent neo-Burgundian 
state, which united for the first time the separate territories of 
the Netherlands. The present-day Belgian proudly looks back 
to this state, despite the character stamped upon it by foreign 
dominance, as the precursor of the modern state. As soon as 
the condition of impotence had been overcome, both in the East 
and West, Burgundy's neutral position, it is true, was at an end. 
In the titanic struggles of the Hapsburgs with the Valois kings, 
in the presence of the immediate French danger, Burgundy suc- 
cumbed to the superior powers of attraction of the Hapsburg 
state. For a small state, which was not in a position to pro- 
tect itself by its own strength against superior enemies, this con- 
nection was by no means the worst imaginable condition, pro- 
vided the protecting Great Power was not too far distant nor 
too different in spirit, and provided it did not make its motto 
the suppression of justifiable individuality and the exploitation 
for its own purposes. This was not to be feared from the closely 
related German Empire, in which there was always more than 
enough readiness to respect individuality. Unfortunately, the 
union took place at first with the absolutely foreign and uncom- 
prehending, stiff-necked and intolerant World Power represented 
by the Spanish branch of the Hapsburgs. The Southern Neth- 
erlands, after brave attempts at independence, let slip, under 
the pressure of religious disagreement, the final opportunity of 
the year 1579, and withdrew from the heroic struggle of their 
northern Protestant brothers. They, therefore, remained bound 
to the Spanish Empire, and the coldness and rigidity of this 
moribund organism soon penetrated their inner being. The 
sombrest period of their history followed the Peace of West- 
phaha. Belgium, paralyzed by the closing of the Scheldt and 
the cutting off of her sea trade, was henceforth, to use the ex- 
pression of Pirenne, *'a body without a soul, a cause for dis- 



MODERN GERMANY 345 

pute in connection with treaties, a barrier, a battlefield." Fi- 
nally the reversion to the German line of the Hapsburgs (171 3) 
slowly brought to the exhausted country once more peaceful re- 
cuperation. 

Meanwhile France had taken up again with great energy the 
expansion toward the Rhine boundary which she had system- 
atically begun as early as the thirteenth century. For two 
hundred and fifty years she kept the Belgian Netherlands in 
a state of uncertainty. There lies before me a recent book 
by the Flemish historian, Josson, which I should like to see 
widely disseminated.^ France's aim is pictured vividly on the 
title-page: La France places her foot triumphantly on Belgian 
soil and plants the blue-red-white tricolor in Brussels. This, 
indeed, has always been France's aim. Time and again, under 
the self-delusion of a natural right to the Rhine boundary, 
has France sought to conquer the country. During the two 
hundred years following the Peace of Westphalia, Josson 
counts not less than fifty-two French invasions — an average of 
one every four years! The intermissions were filled out by 
an ardent propaganda for French civilization, which prepared 
the ground for the inevitably following military attack. This 
aggressive tendency survived every change in the form of 
government. It manifested itself under Louis XIV, violent, 
lawless and destructive; only the united strength of affrighted 
Europe, under England's leadership, was able in the end to 
check it. Under the feeble rule of Louis XV the lust of con- 
quest was only suppressed, not extinguished ; and in the epoch of 
the Revolutionary Wars and of the Napoleonic Empire it 
reached its highest imaginable point. Far more dangerously 
even than a century before was the balance of power on the 
Continent threatened, and once more England, for her own 
advantage, sprang into the breach. 

British interest in the opposite coast line of Flanders had been 
very keen even toward the end of the Middle Ages, and had 
led to the Hundred Years' War with France. Flanders was 
the centre in the great struggle between Philip II and Eliza- 
beth. Cromwell's policy was governed by opposition to Catho- 
lic Spain and to the rival sea power of Holland, and this led to 
the occupation of Dunkirk (1658). Following the uncertain- 
ties of the British policy under the last Stuarts, William III of 
Orange finally turned back to the historical straight line in 
recognizing the attacks of France against the Netherlands as 

"i-Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijand van Vlaanderen en Wallonie (843-i9i3)» 
by Josson, Breda, 1913- 



346 MODERN GERMANY 

the chief danger for England as well as for Holland; through 
his action the European balance was re-established. This was 
the grouping for one hundred and fifty years: England allied 
with the eastern enemies of France, generally with a small 
personal stake in the Continental wars, for even at that time 
she preferred to fight her battles with foreign troops. Her gain 
w^as on that account all the greater, since frequently at the 
eleventh hour she left her allies in the lurch, in order to make 
sure of her booty without loss of time. 

While France's attacks were again and again repulsed, steps 
were taken to prevent any other Great Power from gaining a 
dangerous hold on the Flanders coast, or even from developing 
peacefully its maritime strength. When, therefore, Austria's 
claims to the Spanish inheritance in the Netherlands could not 
very well be disputed, England took measures not alone for a 
permanent suppression of Belgium's sea trade, but also crippled 
the Hapsburg supremacy in a military sense through a provision 
made in the Boundary Treaty granting Holland the right of occu- 
pation of important fortresses on the Belgian southern frontier and 
on the sea coast. According to the expression of Ed. Descamps, 
"Belgium was between the Dutch anvil and the English ham- 
mer." This was the first attempt to transform this part of the 
Netherlands, for British purposes, into a species of neutral bul- 
wark against France's desire for expansion. This attempt 
failed miserably within a generation, for, in 1745, neither the 
Dutch garrisons nor English assistance were able to protect the 
country against the attack of French troops. Subsequently the 
fortresses, which were occupied only as a matter of form by the 
Dutch, fell to ruins, until finally Joseph H forced their evacua- 
tion. All protection was lacking when the French Revolution 
threw all diplomatic safeguards to the winds. Shortly before, 
England, as well as Prussia and Holland, had guaranteed to the 
House of Hapsburg its Belgian possessions "in eternity." Eng- 
land, however, did not enter the world war on account of this 
paper treaty, but because the danger threatening the Nether- 
lands and the opening up of the Scheldt River imperilled her 
own military and commercial interests. Despite her active par- 
ticipation with her Continental troops, she was not able to pre- 
vent the incorporation of Belgium in the French Republic, nor 
later in the Napoleonic Empire. 

The foreign dominance, continuing for twenty years, which 
now began for the country, did not fail to leave its imprint on 
Belgium, although the oppression was deeply resented. The 
definitive breach with the past of the Middle Ages, the central- 



MODERN GERMANY 347 

izing tendencies and democratic ideals, French law, civilization 
and feeling for the state, exercised a deep and lasting influence, 
especially on the kindred Walloon portion of the population, 
which explains their later actions. 

Outwardl), the violent enmity of France and England con- 
tinued to control the destiny of Belgium. While thirty for- 
tresses on the southern border were finally dismantled, Napo- 
leon devoted unremitting attention to safeguarding the sea coast 
and the Scheldt. We are familiar with the gigantic plans which 
aimed at making Antwerp the strongest fortress and the great- 
est naval port of the Continent, the most powerful arsenal of 
the French fleet — *'a pistol leveled at the heart of England." 
We are also familiar with the counter-measures of England: 
The ill-fated Walcheren Expedition in the summer of 1809, 
and the siege of Antwerp (1814), which was so brilliantly con- 
ducted by Carnot. At this period, when the Emperor's star 
was already in decline, all peace negotiations came to naught 
principally owing to England's demand for the abandonment of 
Belgium, which Napoleon stubbornly refused; nor was it due 
to chance that during the Hundred Days the last great decision 
was fought out on these battlefields. 

It was now necessary to find a new solution for the security 
of the Belgian territory, without allowing it to fall into the 
hands of a Great Power inimical to British interests. England 
believed that she would best meet both conditions of the prob- 
lem by advocating the country's union with Holland, under the 
monarchy of William I of Orange. She insisted all the more 
emphatically upon Holland's gaining Belgium, since she herself 
appropriated the valuable Dutch colonies of Ceylon and Cape 
Colony, and despite this fact reckoned upon the compliance of 
her one-time rival. The new English creation, however, was 
destined speedily to show itself as incapable of life. Adequately 
to protect Belgium against France was far beyond the power of 
the little Dutch army, which was not even able to garrison the 
fortresses which had been developed on the southern frontier 
under Wellington's direction with the so-called French "con- 
tributions," and which were intended to transform the country 
into an immense bulwark against France. The Powers were 
forced to hold themselves ready for any emergency, and in the 
secret treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, of November 15, 181 8, they 
apportioned, for the event of war, the occupation of Belgian 
frontier fortresses between England and Prussia. 

The old Boundary Treaty was thus in a sense revived under 
a new form. But the boundarv was that of a state at odds with 



348 MODERN GERMANY 

itself. The religious and economic differences of the north 
and the south were irreconcilable. Serious mistakes of the intol- 
erant Dutch Protestant government led to neglect of the favor- 
able opportunity for throwing the balance permanently in favor 
of the Germanic element and the native Netherland speech 
throughout the entire state, and drove the Flemish clericals and 
the Walloon Liberals into each others' arms. The downfall of 
the Dutch rule came about through the influence of the July 
Revolution of 1830. The rebels, it is true, would never have 
been able to maintain themselves by their own strength. France 
stood behind them. Napoleonic memories had become stronger 
from year to year; "revenge for Waterloo," reestablishment of 
the ''natural boundaries" — such was the violent demand. French 
agents encouraged the Belgian revolt; French volunteers by 
the thousands filled the ranks; France threatened invasion with 
her troops; a French prince, Louis Philippe's second son, the 
Duke of Nemours, was chosen by the Belgian Congress as king, 
which meant a younger French branch on the throne, as in the 
Wars of the Spanish and Austrian Successions; and this 
amounted to nothing less than a disguised annexation. Only 
owing to fear of a threatening European war did the Citizen 
King refuse his consent. But the French army marched twice 
into Belgium, nevertheless, rescued the defeated revolutionists 
from the Dutch troops (1831), and forced the surrender of 
Antwerp (1832). It is plain that under the mask of European 
politics the Belgian revolt was a new phase of French expansion 
toward the Rhine; but in keeping with the bourgeois-capitalistic 
character of the Orleans monarchy, it was carried out with 
milder methods, according to the principle announced at that 
time in the Journal des Debats, that there is another way of 
destroying states than by war — namely, by protecting them. 
Under such circumstances France, it is true, had to be content 
with a partial success; for the opposition of Europe, which was 
still united, was too pronounced against a new expansionist 
move by France. 

That Power which had created the kingdom of the United 
Netherlands as a bulwark against the southwest could, least of 
all, calmly contemplate its destruction. Wellington had at one 
time thought of throwing English troops into the reconstructed 
frontier fortresses, but Lord Palmerston, in unison with the 
representatives of the three Eastern Great Powers, at the Con- 
ference of London, in 1831, preferred another solution. On 
that occasion, for the first time in the whole course of history, 
the attempt was made to place the Belgian Netherlands on their 



MODERN GERMANY 349 

own feet, free of all connection with any other power. With- 
out the creation of some new method of protection, this would 
of course have been tantamount to surrendering the country to 
France. For Belgium was entirely incapable of defending her 
numerous fortresses. The decision was therefore taken at the 
Conference of London to raze a part of them at once, so that 
at least the remainder might be kept up. Even of these Talley- 
rand remarked: "If peace continues, the Belgian fortresses 
will fall of themselves, since no one will repair them; in case 
of war we shall take them." The new protection which was 
to render them superfluous was the neutralization of the coun- 
try. The dependence on any single state was to be replaced by 
dependence on the five European Great Powers, in the form of a 
guarantee of neutrality. To continue our previous figure, the 
country was no longer to be subjected to the irresistible attrac- 
tion of any one magnet, but was to be kept under equal influ- 
ences from all sides, in a state of apparent freedom and inde- 
pendence. This was a pis aller for the sake of avoiding, or at 
least deferring, a settlement by arms with France; for "all pre- 
requisites were at the time lacking for a final settlement of the 
thousand-year-old War of Succession between the Gauls and the 
Germans for the ruins of the ancient Middle Kingdom of Lo- 
thar, the grandson of Charles the Great." The attempt was 
watched on all sides with mixed feelings and with but slight 
confidence; in the Belgian National Congress the neutraliza- 
tion was attacked as prejudicing the independence of the state, 
as reducing it to the condition of a hermaphrodite; even Well- 
ington in the House of Lords declared that it was absurd to 
regard this guarantee of the Powers as sufficient protection. 
Tw^enty-five years later (June 8, 1855), Lord Palmerston, the 
real father of this neutrality, and who benevolently character- 
ized Belgium as a "daughter," was not inclined "to attribute 
great importance to that kind of obligation." After long and 
difllicult negotiations, the Belgian state was thus called into being, 
and finally recognized by the Dutch King, as the one most con- 
cerned, following stubborn opposition and renewed explanations. 
What was the reason that this "experiment," in spite of all 
doubts, succeeded beyond expectations? It was primarily owing 
to the fact that the system of balance of power on the Euro- 
pean continent, which allowed no single state to advance its 
boundaries into the Belgian territory, w^as so important from a 
military point of view. England, which was the strongest World 
Power at the time, would merely have robbed herself of her 
insular impregnability by occupying the coast of Flanders, and 



350 MODERN GERMANY 

she was able to carry out her plan of excluding every Conti- 
nental Great Power from the country in no more convenient man- 
ner than by maintaining Belgium's neutrality. The smoothing 
of the course of the young state was, moreover, greatly helped 
by the personality of the first king, the cautious, far-sighted 
Leopold I, of Coburg, despite the limitations placed upon him 
by the constitution. In a certain sense, one may even declare 
that it was owing to him that Belgium immediately succeeded 
in emerging again from the state of isolation which so little 
corresponded to her position and past. For the extremely active 
house of Coburg, which was scattered throughout nearly all the 
European countries, was, in itself, a little World Power. Leo- 
pold I was from the start England's candidate, owing to his 
tendencies and connections. Accordingly, he continued to strive 
to preserve the closest touch with the great Sea Power across 
the Channel, and chiefly by this means did he save Belgium 
from entire submersion by French influence, at a period when 
the middle European states were entirely occupied with their 
own internal affairs and their mutual relations. Under the 
pressure of the four Great Powers, he even agreed to renew with 
them the secret treaty once entered into with the King of the 
Netherlands against France (December 14, 1841), with the 
result that measures were taken against a possible threatening 
of the fortresses, Prussia, for example, obtaining the right of 
entering and garrisoning them. There have been disputes as 
to the interpretation, the legal and practical significance of this 
treaty, for which the constitutionally provided approval of the 
Chambers was never obtained. This, however, is certain, and is 
admitted by Descamps, who so ardently represents the Belgian 
point of view, that in its intent it was a breach of the neutrality 
that had been so recently solemnly announced.^ The Belgian 
delegate at that time likewise designated it as ''compromising." 

France, nevertheless, had no need to be dissatisfied with the 
course of events. She had gained all that was to be gained 
without fighting. While the Eastern Powers had made no secret 
of favoring the rights of the Dutch King, France repeatedly 
assumed the attitude of the seemingly disinterested and noble 
rescuer of the new independent Power, thereby arousing long- 
continuing sympathies, which gave birth to a legend directly 
counter to the truth. The inordinately praised Belgian consti- 
tution was thoroughly French in spirit; the language of the 
government, of the administration and of the army, trained by 
French officers, was that of France. ''Every endeavor of our 

^ La neutralite de la Belgique, 1902, p. 282 ff. 



MODERN GERMANY 351 

government," the influential leader Rogier, a man of French 
extraction, ventured to w'rite to Lord Palmerston, "must look 
to the destruction of the Flemish race, in order to prepare the 
way for Belgium's union w^ith our great fatherland, France." 
King Leopold himself, through his marriage with Louise, tliz 
daughter of Louis Philippe, protected himself against any future 
attacks of the Orleans Court; but by so doing he further 
strengthened the French influence. Nor did he hesitate on one 
occasion to make use of the threat against the Eastern Powers 
that he did not fear war with them, as in such an event he 
would throw himself unreservedly into the arms of France — a 
course which was plainly irreconcilable with his duties of neu- 
trality. 

In France, which was weakened in a military way, a period 
of quieter and more peaceful propaganda had followed upon 
the determined attacks made by the Revolution and Bonapart- 
ism. He who possessed patience might well, with Guizot, call 
the new order of affairs "a. brilliant solution for France of the 
Belgian question," or with Talleyrand give expression to the 
conviction that the future would bring about union, at a 
cheaper price than seemed possible at the moment. On Novem- 
ber 16, 1834, however, Le National of Paris said: "The day 
will come when, in case of a European war, Belgium's neutral- 
ity will disappear, at the desire of the Belgian people them- 
selves. Belgium will as a matter of course place herself at 
France's side." 

The year 1840 threatened to involve France in the whirlpool 
of war, when, as compensation for her diminished prestige in the 
Orient, she sought to obtain the Rhine boundary, and her states- 
man, Thiers, let it be understood that France "would not allow 
herself to be blockaded by neutral powers." At this time the 
French government had already informed itself as to the de- 
fensive strength of Belgium. In case that was not sufficient, it 
was said, to prevent the passing of an army corps through her 
territory for the purpose of threatening the French border, 
France would regretfully see herself forced to send troops into 
the country for this purpose. The "bourgeois monarch," however, 
did not in the end venture on this occasion to carry his words 
to a military conclusion. This lack of a boldly expanding policy 
was undoubtedly no small factor in his final fall. 

As regards the Second Republic, the aged Prince Metternich 
was of the opinion that from France, shaken as she was, her 
neighbor need not fear a political war, but only a war of propa- 
ganda. The two kinds of warfare were scarcely to be distin- 



352 ' MODERN GERMANY 

guished, however, when in the Spring of 1848 hundreds of 
armed volunteers pressed across the Belgian frontier, in order 
to stir up the population and to enforce incorporation with 
France. Only through the cautious measures of the Belgian 
government, and through the bold act of an engineer who 
drove the railway train of the revolutionists directly into the 
midst of Belgian troops, was it possible to stifle the movement 
by the trifling skirmish known as that of Risquons-Tout. 

Scarcely was the sky cleared of this and similar clouds when 
the situation was completely changed by the coup d'etat of Na- 
poleon III — for the moment to Belgium's advantage. It was 
the universal belief that the country, to use the expression of 
King Frederick William IV, "would be the next victim of 
the crowned bird of prey." In fact, Napoleon III, according to 
the testimony of OUivier, considered Belgium **as an artificial 
creation erected in the path of France's greatness, which had 
no right to inviolability." If, at the start, despite many signs 
of unfriendliness and threats, he held himself in restraint, 
this was in the main due to consideration for England, whose 
friendship, so long as he did not feel himself firm upon the 
throne, could not fail to seem more valuable to him than a pre- 
mature gain of territory. During the Crimean War the Belgian 
government, in the same manner as Sardinia, properly refused 
the invitation of England and France to enter the war on their 
side against Russia, basing its refusal on Belgium's duty as a 
neutral. But the more fortune smiled upon Napoleon and the 
more France again raised herself to the position of arbiter of 
Europe, the more plainly in speeches, newspapers and pamphlets 
was the French desire for annexation expressed. Leopold I, it 
M^as said, was merely *'a sentinel of the Holy Alliance against 
France," "a kind of English prefect," who prevented Belgium 
"from returning to the motherland"; neutrality was "a chimera 
and an impossibility" ; "France would not feel herself freed 
from the stain of Waterloo until Waterloo itself should have 
become French." 

To reconcile the annexation of Belgium with the freedom 
and independence of the various nationalities, which he had 
found it to his advantage to advocate, was for Napoleon evi- 
dently not a difficult task, since in a note found among his 
secret papers he "proved" that there was no such thing as Bel- 
gian neutrality. In his circular of September 16, 1866, he an- 
nounced: "An irresistible power . . . forces the nations to 
unite into great bodies and causes states of the second class to 
disappear. . . . The Imperial French Government . . . has 



MODERN GERMANY 353 

recognized annexation as demanded by an absolute necessity." 
Since the historical opposition of Great Britain had to be 
reckoned with, Napoleon hoped to seize his prey in union with 
Prussia. After the annexation of Savoy and Nice, the English 
Prince Consort Albert remarked (October 6, 1861) that in the 
same manner Belgium would soon be the price for German 
unity. As early as 1862, the secret negotiations with Bismarck 
began, in which the latter, despite apparent agreement with the 
Emperor's longing for annexation, nevertheless in the end left 
him in the lurch. Anyone familiar with the course of events 
can only smile at the statement that Bismarck treacherously sug- 
gested the annexation plan to Napoleon, in 1865, in Biarritz. 
He did not, however, wish to lose the benevolent neutrality of 
the Emperor before he had made a reality of German union; 
therefore, on August 20, 1866, he made Benedetti draw up 
under his own eyes and give to him the proposition for an 
alliance which was to bind Prussia to assist in France's assault 
on Belgium and her conquest of Luxemburg. He then pro- 
ceeded to systematic delay in the matter. 

While the Central Powers of Europe continued to grow 
stronger year by year, without France's receiving the hoped-for 
compensation, the old cry of ''revenge for Waterloo" was 
changed into the new demand, "revenge for Sadowa"; and Na- 
poleon HI, whom his early luck seemed completely to have 
deserted, saw himself compelled, almost against his will, in or- 
der to maintain his throne, to continue the pursuit of the elusive 
prey, stealthily, by paths which promised to lead him to success 
without danger of war. Owing to this, Belgium in the suc- 
ceeding years was repeatedly brought to the verge of destruc- 
tion. The first route led through Luxemburg. "Once there," 
said Benedetti, on January 7, 1867, to Ollivier, "we shall be on 
the road to Brussels; w^e shall arrive there all the sooner." We 
are familiar with the plan of purchase which was negotiated with 
the King of Holland, and also with the masterly skill with 
which Bismarck succeeded in frustrating it, so that the Emperor 
was forced to be content with a scant apparent victory — the 
Prussian evacuation of the federal fortress of Luxemburg and 
the declaration of the little country's neutrality, under the united 
guarantee of the Powers. This guarantee, however, according 
to the construction put upon it by the British government in 
Parliament, at the most gave to the individual guarantor the 
right of interference in the case of a breach of the neutrality, 
but did not impose this as a duty; moreover, it automatically 
ceased when one of the guarantors violated the neutrality. 



354 MODERN GERMANY 

The second attempt bore an even more friendly appearance. 
This was the resumption of former plans to unite Belgium with 
France in a customs union, by way of preparation for a later 
political union. Informed by Bismarck concerning Napoleon's 
intentions, the British government despatched a confidential note 
to Paris, in which it declared a customs union or a military con- 
vention as irreconcilable with Belgium's neutrality.^ Thereupon 
the Emperor sought to obtain the end which he tenaciously held 
in view by a third course, which was to place the world face to 
face with an accomplished fact. This was the purchase of the 
railways of the Grand Luxembourg Company by the French 
Eastern Railway Company, immediately behind which stood the 
imperial government. This was not conceived as a means 
merely for enforcing a customs union: the aim, above all, was 
the military control of these important railways leading to 
Brussels, Liege and the Dutch boundary. When the Belgian 
government, determined to defend its independence, through 
an emergency ordinance made any such disposal of the railways 
conditional on its approval, thereby voiding the contracts of sale 
which had already been perfected, for a while the most serious 
consequences seemed unavoidable. ^'Belgium opens the gate- 
ways into Germany for us," wrote Napoleon to War Minister 
Niel, on February 19, 1869, "we can advance from there over 
the lower Rhine to any point desired." 

Le Moniteur Diplomatique wrote on March 11: "It is a 
mistake to believe that the neutrality of Belgium would be 
irreconcilable with the passing of a French army through her 
territory. The most authoritative publicists admit that neutral 
states may permit the passing of the army of a foreign state." 

Niel drew up a plan of mobilization for the conquest of Bel- 
gium. Despite all this, extreme measures were again avoided 
and a compromise brought about in no slight degree through the 
skill of the Belgian Minister, Frere-Orban, and as a result of 
the political situation, which portended an interference on the 
part of England. 

If one reviews these constant attacks by Napoleon in the 
sixties, there can be no doubt that the Franco-German war was 
destined to decide the question of Belgium's existence. For only 
the fear of an alliance between Prussia and England had hith- 
erto caused Napoleon to hesitate. If the Continental enemy 
had been disposed of, England would never have checked the 

1 This recalls the "Conventions anglo-belges" of 1906 and 1912, discovered 
bj?^ the German authorities in the archives of the city of Brussels. They would 
have constituted a breach of Belgium's neutrality, according to the opinion of 
the British government of 1868. 



MODERN GERMANY 355 

victorious French advance into Belgium. The most clear-sighted 
observers of the events of those days agreed on this point. "Were 
Germany defeated," said Bismarck to Moritz Busch — "a catas- 
trophe I pray to God to prevent — the English could be of no 
assistance to the Belgians; they themselves would be glad to 
remain safe in their own country." And in the House of Com- 
mons, Disraeli referred to the Rhinelands, which had been guar- 
anteed to the Prussian state in 181 5, as if to indicate that 
through their conquest by France, Belgium's independence would 
be irrevocably lost. 

Nevertheless, at the beginning of the Franco-German war, 
while the strength of the enemies may have seemed approximately 
equal, England, outside the scene of action, was able to play the 
pleasant role of casting the decisive vote in favor of preserving 
Belgium's neutrality. Gladstone's attitude, it is true, betrayed 
great fear of being drawn into the whirlpool of war. He ap- 
peared at first to be satisfied with the declaration of both Pow- 
ers that Belgian neutrality would be respected until violated by 
the enemy. When finally Bismarck published Benedetti's treaty 
of^er of 1866, Gladstone took a further step, as the result of 
aroused public opinion in England, and doubtless also because he 
feared lest the two enemies, following an indecisive battle, might 
reach aft understanding at Belgium's expense.^ He denied ex- 
pressly in the House of Commons, on August 10, England's com- 
pelling duty to protect Belgian neutrality, irrespective of exist- 
ing circumstances, and declared this view, referring to Lord 
Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, to be "a rigid, impracticable 
construction of the guarantee." In the interest of England, 
however, he had on the day before considered it necessary to 
effect a separate agreement with each of the two belligerent 
governments to continue for twelve months after the end of the 
war; according to these agreements, in case of violation of Bel- 
gian neutrality by either France or Germany alone, England's 
military forces were to proceed on Belgium's soil against the 
offending Power, together with the troops of the other state. ^ 
Although the revival of the guarantee of 1839 was contemplated 
at the expiration of the specified period, nevertheless a diminu- 
tion of its importance was inevitable, since such separate agree- 
ments were considered to be necessary in extreme circumstances; 

1 This fear existed among the better classes in England, according to Sir 
Robert Morier. See his statement of August 9, 1870: "Do they not see that 
it is Germany that is with its best blood defending the integrity of Belgium, 
whilst we are making speeches at the Mansion House?" (Memoirs, II, 164-167). 

2 Sir Robert Morier (Memoirs, II, p. 208) remarks that this excludes any 
activity of the only valuable factor, viz., Britain's naval forces, and he calls 
it a "monstrously absurd treaty." 



356 MODERN GERMANY 

important personages, such as the French historian Sorel and the 
oft-mentioned Belgian Major and later Chief of Staff, General 
Ducarne, considered the treaty of 1839 as entirely abrogated in 
consequence. 

Without her own mobilization and frontier guard, Belgium, 
it is true, would have been the scene of bloody battles, despite 
the treaty. In the French council of war, before the battle of 
Sedan, it was earnestly debated whether the surrounded army 
should not force a passage into the Departement du Nord 
through Belgian territory; fear of the seventy thousand Belgian 
troops on the frontier alone caused the plan to be abandoned. 

''I can assure you," declared General Chazal, who was Bel- 
gian Commander-in-Chief in the military commission of 187 1, 
"that General Wimpffen and the officers of his staff, who came 
to my camp after the battle of Sedan, made no secret of the 
fact that this plan would have been carried out if our frontier 
had not been well guarded and if they had not considered us 
strong enough to resist every attempt of this kind." ^ 

The few thousands who nevertheless fled over the frontier 
after the capitulation of Sedan were easily disarmed. 

As regards the preservation of her neutrality, Belgium owed 
most to the German victories. This was clearly appreciated in 
the country, especially in Flemish circles, in which a feeling pre- 
vailed as if an evil dream had been dispelled. At this time the 
Flemish poet, Emanuel Hiels, sang thus: 

How shall we, German brothers, our gratitude express 
To you, whose brav'ry saved us when sore was our distress 
From Prankish bands of robbers, who came with this design: 
O'er Meuse and Scheldt to lord it, and o'er the German Rhine? — 
How shall we prove we're grateful? Your death heroic saves 
Our Flanders, too, from danger, from peril's rushing waves. 

King Leopold II, who in the dangers of 1867 had sought to 
secure support in the east by the marriage of his brother with a 
HohenzoUern princess, declared, on September 18, 1870, in a 
letter to Crown Prince Friedrich, that he expected great things 
of the new German Empire, which he regarded as representing 
the revival of order and justice in Europe; and in the Crown 
Prince's reply, written under Bismarck's influence, attention was 
called to the guarantee which Belgium gained through a strong 
Germany; the country had nothing to fear either from Ger- 
many, he declared, or from France, so long as the former re- 
mained strong. 

^La neutralite beige, Woeste, Paris, 1891, p. 58; La defense de la Belgique, 
Brussels, 1907, p. 200 S. 



MODERN GERMANY 357 

The history of more than forty years has proved the truth 
of these words. The period of unceasing danger to her existence 
was followed by an epoch of peaceful security for Belgium, in 
which she was able to develop her strength, in the main in close 
connection with Germany's economic rise. During this long 
period there seems to be only one moment mentioned in the enemy 
war literature when Belgium's existence is claimed to have been 
threatened by Germany. In the spring of 1875, Bismarck, in 
the warlike state of mind attributed to him in view of France's 
increasing military strength, is said to have been determined 
upon the destruction of Belgium and ready to divide the country 
between Holland and France. As a matter of fact, conditions 
were quite the reverse. As I have been able to convince myself 
by documentary proof, France was the state in which plans for 
such a division as a compensation for Alsace-Lorraine were en- 
tertained, not alone in the peace negotiations of 1871: in the 
following years the French minister repeatedly suggested to 
Prince Bismarck that such an equivalent might be found in Bel- 
gium. The Third Repubhc, then, by no means abandoned the 
historically consistent French tendency toward expansion; weak- 
ness and isolation imposed merely a temporary restraint upon 
her. From time to time, however, the old desires gained defi- 
nite expression. Nor are we dealing here only with the words of 
irresponsible writers Hke Victor Hugo, Girardin, Lepelletier, 
Cassagnac, Jouet, who demanded as compensation for Alsace- 
Lorraine the advance of the northern boundary to the Rhine 
and the annexation at least of the Walloon provinces of Bel- 
gium, but also with the utterances of generals and ministers of 
war, hke Zurlinden (1887) and Etienne (1906), who have un- 
reservedly proclaimed such ideals.^ 

The more France pushed her preparations for carrying out 
the revanche idea, the more threatening became the danger 
to Belgium of being again surrounded by the waves of the titanic 
struggle and perhaps of being drawn into the maelstrom. So 
long as weakened France, single-handed, faced a powerful, sati- 
ated and indisputably peaceful Germany, this danger w^as small; 
it grew when in the eighties the Republic acquired increasingly 
strong support from the Russian Empire. Belief in the efficacy 
of neutral guarantees has never been very great in the minds of 
serious politicians and officers of Belgium; on the contrary, the 
vital needs and the relentlessness of military necessities control- 

1 For details see Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijand van Vlaanderen en WaUonie 
(843-1913), by Josson, Breda, 1913, P- 650 ff. 



358 MODERN GERMANY 

ling a Great Power met with an understanding that to-day seems 
suddenly to have been lost. 

*'We are convinced," for example, says the military writer, 
Navez, ''that the states guaranteeing our independence fully in- 
tend to stand by their obligations. But this intention does not 
bind them very strongly. Their leaders consider, not without 
justice, that their primary duty is to their own nation, which has 
placed its destinies in their hands. The law of self-preservation, 
the fear of becoming the helpless prey and victim of another 
Power — this overrides for a state all other considerations: salus 
populi suprema lex esto." 

And the Belgian general, Dejardin, remarks: "In war situa- 
tions occur the demands of which are more imperative than the 
most solemn treaties." ^ Again and again, clear-sighted men 
have emphasized the fact that for her complete security Belgium 
could depend only on her own strength. During the German- 
French crisis of 1887 the Belgian system of defense was sub- 
jected to new examination and reform. 

It had already at that time deteriorated far enough from its 
original purpose. For a long time nothing had been left of the 
bulwark created by the Great Powers against France. The nu- 
merous fortresses on the southern frontier, which required more 
than a small mercenary army to hold them, had fallen to ruin 
at the middle of the century and become useless. Although dur- 
ing the time of the weak and isolated monarchy of Louis Phi- 
lippe, reliance could be placed, for lack of better help, on the 
counter-efforts of other Powers, in the fifties there was need of 
taking measures in keeping with the new conditions resulting 
from the rise of Napoleon III. At this time the plan of making 
Antwerp a strongly fortified military camp, which would offer 
the army in case of foreign invasion a place of refuge and the 
chance to maintain itself until the coming of outside help (espe- 
cially from England), was adopted after long preparations and 
disputes (1859). Compared to the previous neglect of all pro- 
tection, this was a definite step forward for Belgium ; and that 
was the reason why France, where it was customary to regard 
the little neighboring state as certain prey, viewed the change 
with highly unfavorable eyes and attributed it to British or 
Prussian influence. Napoleon III even resented the razing 
of the fortresses on the French frontier, and had the audacity 
to protest to the Belgian minister, Rogier, at the dismantling of 
some of them, on the ground that in the event of an invasion of 
the imperial troops becoming necessary they might have served as 

1 La defense de la Belgique, by Navez, pp. 285-287. 



MODERN GERMANY 359 

points of support.^ The French protests at the strengthening of 
Antwerp must be viewed in the light of such pretensions. As a 
matter of fact, the absolute stripping of the extensive southern 
frontier represented a considerable yielding to France compared 
w^ith previous times. 

In the sixties the first construction of the Antwerp fortifica- 
tions was undertaken, and after the Franco-German War fur- 
ther improvements were carried out in the light of these experi- 
ences, and again extended after 1906 on a still greater scale, in 
keeping w^ith the development of technical know^ledge. This 
system of defense, it is true, was the merest minimum with 
which to maintain independence: it was not sufficient in case of 
a new European conflict to prevent the passage of an enemy 
army from either direction, an eventuality which was becoming 
constantly more probable on account of the mutual strengthen- 
ing of the Franco-German border. The plans of Brialmont, 
proposed in the period after 1882, had that eventuality in view 
and were therefore directed towards perfecting the Meuse for- 
tresses. Liege and Namur were intended as main bridgeheads 
to serve as points of support of the field army and to form, to- 
gether with Antwerp, the great protective triangle which, it 
was hoped, would close the country on both sides. At the time 
of the war alarm of 1887, sanction w^as obtained for the im- 
mediate carrying out of these plans, advocated with especial 
warmth in an anonymous memoir later attributed to C. Ban- 
ning, director of the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Af- 
fairs, who stood very close to the King. 

Again we must not allow ourselves to be deceived by the 
outcry raised in the French camp. In the succeeding years a 
press campaign was carried on systematically against the Belgian 
throne and government, based on some genuine documents stolen 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brussels, Banning's 
memorial among them, and on spurious and counterfeited pa- 
pers. This culminated in the. direct accusation against King 
Leopold II of having violated the obligations of Belgium's neu- 
trality by entering into a military convention with Germany, 
which was represented as providing in certain eventualities — 
namely, a threat from the French side — for the entrance and 
occupation by German troops, in a manner similar to the 
secret treaty of 1831. The strengthening of the Meuse fort- 
resses, it was claimed, had been in the interest of Germany and 
Belgium, which, according to an article in the Figaro^ was now 
to be regarded merely as a German province. The accusation 

"^Frerc-Orban, II, by Hymans, pp. 7 and 71. 



36o MODERN GERMANY 

was false. It was emphatically denied in Belgium by those per- 
sons best in a position to know, such as Woeste and Beernaert. In 
a sitting of the Chamber on February 5, 1890, de Chimay, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared that the Belgian govern- 
ment appreciated its obligations of neutrality: "to assert that 
it has violated these obligations by treaties, that it has bound 
itself to one or the other of its neighbors — this is to invent a 
ridiculous fable." 

What is interesting to-day in these happenings is that the 
existence of a one-sided military convention on Belgium's part, 
as protection against a threat to her neutrality, was regarded, 
not alone by French complainants, as an inexcusable breach of 
her obligations of neutrality, but also by authoritative representa- 
tives of the Belgian government as well.^ The attitude which 
in 1887 was taken in England as regards the possibility of a 
German (or French) passage through the Belgian territory is 
also remarkable. In The Standard, the official organ of the 
government at this time, on February 4, 1887, a sharp distinc- 
tion was made, in the letter of an unnamed diplomat and in the 
leading article, between "the merely temporary exercise of the 
right of way and the permanent illegal occupation of territory." 
Only in the last case, not in the former "trifling breach of law," 
it was said, did England's honor and interest call for interfer- 
ence. 

The leading article, which is, of course, more important, says: 
"If one or the other were to say to England, 'All the military 
approaches to France and Germany have been closed ; and only 
neutral approaches lie open to us. This state of things is not 
only detrimental, but fatal to our military success, and it has 
arisen since the Treaty guaranteed the sacredness of the only 
roads of which we can now avail ourselves. We will, as a fact, 
respect the independence of Belgium, and we will give you the 
most solemn and binding guarantees, that at the end of the 
conflict, Belgium shall be as free and as independent as before.' 
If Germany (and, of course, our hypothesis applies also to 
France) were to use this language — though we trust there will 
be no occasion for it — we cannot doubt what would be the 
wise and proper course for England to pursue, and what would 
be the answer of the English government. England does not 
wish to shirk its true responsibilities. But it would be madness 
for us to incur or assume responsibilities unnecessarily, when 

1 See "La neutralite beige violee par rAUemagne," by Juliette Adam, Noiivelle 
Revue, 54 (1888). 



MODERN GERMANY 361 

to do so would manifestly involve our participation in a tre- 
mendous war." 

The similarity with the occurrences of 19 14 is striking. The 
German Empire acted at the latter date precisely according to 
the English suggestion of 1887; but that which was previously 
a "trifling," and hence bearable breach of law, now became 
(since England desired a break and welcomed a cause of war 
that would lend itself to propaganda) a crime, to suffer which 
would have besmirched England's honor. 

An unprejudiced appreciation of the Meuse fortresses shows 
that far from representing a threat to France, they amounted to 
a further strengthening of the defense system against Germany. 
This resulted rather from the geographical conditions than from 
the intention of the Belgian government, which at that time 
undoubtedly earnestly desired protection on both sides. For 
Liege, which was not only stronger but also nearer the outer 
circle, could not but be regarded as a more efficient check on 
the short German border line than the weaker Namur, which 
was situated further inland and commanded only the angle be- 
tween the Sambre and the Meuse. Moltke declared in 1890 that 
at least a part of the fortifications on the Meuse seemed to be 
directed against Germany. In view of her thoroughly peaceful 
intentions, Germany might, nevertheless, have been satisfied 
with the new system, if this had offered genuine protection 
against a French advance. But, according to the opinion of all 
Belgian and foreign experts, it possessed one great weakness: 
after deducting the garrison forces necessary for the extensive 
fortifications, the remaining field army was much too feeble to 
be able to operate successfully. 

''The fortifications on the Meuse," declared Moltke further, 
"will be a burden to Belgium as long as she cannot mobilize 
70,000 additional men, and this she will be able to do only 
with a sj^stem of recruiting which meets the demands of our 
epoch." 

Neither the Crown nor the military leaders in Belgium were 
lacking during the following years in correct appreciation of the 
situation.^ This was especially true of the War Ministry. Laws 

1 From among the numerous Belgian writers, I quote only Navez, La defense 
de la Belgique, p. 288: "After the war the victorious state would say to us: 
'Since you have proven incapable of protecting my frontiers by an adequate 
defense of your own territory, as you were bound by the treaties to do, I 
shall henceforth take care of the matter myself, and therefore I shall occupy 
your country. Your carelessness in the question of national defense entitles 
me to do so.' " A similar standpoint was taken by M. Lebeau, ex-Minister 
of State, a man who was instrumental in the foundation of the Belgian state, 
in a speech delivered before the Brussels Chamber on February 16, 1855. He 
said: "History teaches us what becomes of neutralities which are supposed to 
. be sufficiently guaranteed by what is sometimes termed 'a scrap of paper.' 



362 MODERN GERMANY 

were constantly proposed which were intended to lead by gentle 
degrees from the antiquated mercenary system to the universal 
duty of bearing arms. The clerical legislative majority, by its 
determined opposition, was guilty of the crime of serious pro- 
crastination, and the government was also frequently weak 
enough to leave its own party in the lurch. 

Might not this evil condition easily lead to a secret under- 
standing with a foreign Power, in violation of neutrality, in 
order to provide in case of necessity the protection clearly recog- 
nized as needful but hitherto neglected? Germany did not fail 
frequently to urge Belgium to strengthen herself defensively. 
From Bismarck's much-discussed saying in 1887 that Belgium's 
neutrality would be best protected if she provided herself with 
a good army, there is a chain of similar opinions down to the 
statement of Emperor William II, when in 1912 he was able 
personally to convince himself of the admirable reorganization 
of the Swiss army: "I wish that I were as well protected on 
my right flank as I am on my left." These are plain warnings, 
which give the lie to the long-contemplated plans of conquest 
that our enemies attribute to us. When at last by the adoption 
of the military program of 1909, and especially that of 191 3, 
the desired goal seemed nearly attained, it was too late for the 
events of 19 14, since the last military law would not have been 
fully enforced until three years later. 

During the armed peace of the nineties between the Dual 
Entente and the Dreibund, as long as on both sides there was 
still hesitation in bringing about changes in the actual con- 
dition of Europe, and while Russia acted as a restraint on 
France, Belgium had reason to feel safe to a certain degree; in- 
deed, so strong was this feeling that a remarkable capitalistic 
and imperialistic development took place at that very time in 
the little state. 

The man who for his own advantage guided the country into 
these new paths was its King, Leopold II. He united in him- 
self the business sense of the Coburgs and Orleans in an un- 
canny manner — indeed, in the end, this degenerated almost into 

Undoubtedly, owing to the power of public opinion, such neutralities exert 
in our present day a much greater force than in former times. However, 
we should not commit the error of believing that no duties are connected with 
this neutrality, or can grow out of it. We must be able to safeguard our- 
selves, at least to a certain degree; and if ever we were to neglect such an 
important interest and forget so great a duty, we should thereby expose our- 
selves to the eventuality of the other side declaring to us what the First Consul 
of the French Republic declared to the Republic of Venice: 'If you had 
known how to protect yourselves against a cotip de main, if you had known 
that the enemy could so easily gain entrance to you and that he was on the 
point of occupying a strategic position detrimental to my army, I would not 
have entered your territory.' " See also Frere-Orban, II, by Hymans, p. 27 ff. 



MODERN GERMANY 363 

monomania. He was through and through a ruler of the great 
merchant type, with a world-embracing outlook, a cool, calcu- 
lating imagination and ruthless determination, of absolutely 
worldly disposition — in the one-sided development of his char- 
acter a peculiarly striking figure, who in many respects gave to 
Belgium her modern stamp. It is sufficient at this point merely 
to recall the manner in which, in the face of British opposition 
but w^ith Bismarck's benevolent encouragement, he developed the 
Congo State in the eighties as his exclusive, personal creation; 
how, since 1890, already involving the state in his undertakings, 
he carried through that extreme capitalistic system which com- 
bined the most successful financial exploitation with the darkest 
social defects; how the desire for Belgium's greatness was 
strangely mixed in him with the most arrant selfishness, so that 
finally his own people were forced to take the Congo from him 
as a Belgian colony, as the result of painful and costly negotia- 
tions. The final result is of importance: The Belgium of 1908, 
who ruled over an immense colonial empire eighty times as large 
as herself, was no longer that little state which had once 
been created as a European bulwark against France and which 
later, in the system of the balance of power, with difficulty main- 
tained its place in the scale. Whatever her writers on constitu- 
tional law may say in theoretical justification of her colonial 
acquisitions, the fact remains that the basis of the neutrality 
treaty of 1839 had been thereby seriously disturbed. 

Permanently guaranteed neutrality demands in return a self- 
denying regard for the prescribed limitations. This small state, 
however, without a merchant fleet or vessels of w^ar, had en- 
tered the field of broad world politics. Able to maintain her- 
self only by the guarantee of her creators, not by her own 
strength, she had adopted in Africa the imperialistic policy of a 
Great Power, in the last analysis at the expense of others. Her 
neutrality, which was always a delicate and fragile thing, through 
the connection with the vast African empire, was subjected to a 
test of strength to which, in the long run, it was scarcely likely 
to prove equal. The position is not tenable that this colonial 
empire, together with the entire Basin of the Congo, has been 
neutralized since the Berlin Act of 1885, that only peaceful cul- 
tural tasks here came into question, and that for the settlement 
of differences of opinion there were other than warlike means. 
For a colonial policy always remains a policy of force, and the 
policy in the Congo State was of this nature in an especially 
marked degree, despite the humanitarian mantle which was at 
first so readily used as a disguise. In view of the primitive 



364 MODERN GERMANY 

stage of civilization in the colonies, misunderstandings and 
clashes were inevitable, as experience had already amply taught 
under the rule of Leopold II. Even if, as was of course possible, 
they did not lead to armed conflict, there nevertheless resulted 
manifold questions of common interest, of dependence and dis- 
pute which could not fail to have a prejudicial effect upon the 
neutral position of the motherland. Did not France's right of 
preemption, guaranteed by the separate treaties of 1884, 1894 
and 1908, contain the germ of favoritism which, as the Franco- 
German negotiations of 191 1 have shown, might become a 
source of serious inconvenience for Belgium? In addition to 
Portugal, England for the first time had become the immediate 
and deeply interested African neighbor of the Belgian territory 
{Katanga), a neighbor upon whose favor or disfavor the de- 
velopment of the Congo colony depended to an important de- 
gree. It is not yet possible to determine to what extent the 
outburst of indignation in England over the Congo atrocities, 
which in its essence was no doubt sincere, was made use of by 
the British government, which took a hand in the affair and 
long deferred the recognition of the Belgian colony, as a means 
of political pressure to support counter-demands in Europe. 
That m Belgium serious fears were entertained along this line 
is undoubtedly shown by an article in the influential clerical 
publication, Bien Publique, of November 20, 1907, which char- 
acterized the British consular agents who were gathering ma- 
terial in the Congo State for new accusations as heralds of a 
future annexation, and declared that the independence of Be)' 
gium herself might be endangered through such occurrences. 
The Brussels Socialist, C. Huysmans, was not so far wrong 
when he declared at the Socialist Congress in Nuremberg in 
1908: ''Belgium has not annexed the Congo State; it is the 
Congo State which is annexing Belgium. Belgium has become 
involved in the Anglo-German dispute, and our happy neutrality 
has thereby been seriously impaired." ^ 

Finally the far-reaching concessions for exploitation of the 
country and for railroads in the interior of the Congo colony, 
which Leopold II had granted as late as 1906 to English, French 

^A similar opinion was uttered immediately before the war by the Belgian 
deputy, de Brouckere (Neue Zeit, July 31, 1914): "The annexation of the 
Congo State was decided on and it was believed that we would rule the colony. 
To-day, it is recognized that the colony is ruling us. We have entered the 
circle of the World Powers without expanding our little territory, and the 
great ones will not let go of us again. . . . To-morrow perhaps England, who 
considers military duty a burden only within her own boundaries, will again 
call on us to observe our obligations. What will the Government do? Will 
our big money interests permit the Government to offer a resistance which 
sooner or later must lead to our renunciation of the Congo?" 



MODERN GERMANY 365 

and American syndicates, involved manifestations of favoritism 
w^hich were apt, in certain circumstances, to involve the govern- 
ments in question. On the other hand, Belgian capitalism, 
v^'hich had waxed fat on the temporarily unheard-of Congo earn- 
ings, had long since expanded beyond the boundaries of the 
state, and everywhere, in European foreign countries, had built 
railroads and street railways, exploited mines and called num- 
berless other commercial undertakings into being, without, in 
time, taking precautionary measures to insure the financial sta- 
bility of the great banks. 

A capitalistic expansion of this kind, of course, could not be 
forbidden to the business men of a neutral state. Nevertheless, 
the vast scope of these international activities, which King Leo- 
pold continued to encourage by example and precept, were not 
without their serious aspects. They created a large number of 
connections and opportunities for disputes, and in view of the 
interlocking of modern economic and political affairs, this might 
easily lead the Belgian state into an attitude of partiality among 
the groups of Great Powers. In truth, Belgian capital was more 
and more used in ways advantageous to France and members of 
the Triple Entente: her investments, for example, in Russia, 
exceeded by nearly a half-billion francs those in other countries, 
and the number of joint-stock undertakings preponderatingly 
financed in Belgium was exceeded only by those capitalized in 
France.^ This fact could scarcely fail to be of influence on the 
policy of the state as a whole in critical times, and was apt to 
lead to an internal jeopardizing of its neutrality, which, as the 
Belgian statesman, Frere-Orban, once declared "demands a cer- 
tain balance of influence in the field of material affairs." 

Belgium's neutrality in Europe had for a long time found its 
strongest support in England. Not, however, that this state 
regarded the sanctity of treaties with especially great respect! 
This pretence, which the article in The Times of March 8, 191 5, 
frankly abandoned, was industriously made use of in Eng- 
land only during the first months of the war for purposes of 
propaganda. Previously such pretenses had by no means always 
been regarded as necessary; on neither side of the Channel was 
it considered possible to disguise the fact that England's attitude 
toward Belgium was determined not by noble, unselfish feelings, 
but by pure self-interest. In a speech recently rescued from 
oblivion by A. Schulte, the former Minister of Foreign Aflfairs, 

1 See Annuaire de la Vie beige a I'etranger, 1912, p. 213 ff. Belgian capital 
invested in Russia is given as amounting to 441,000,000 francs, and the Belgian 
companies in France are said to number 172, as against 112 in Russia and 
50 in Germany. 



366 MODERN GERMANY 

de Favereau, declared in the Senate, on December 8, 1909, in 
speaking of the guarantor Powers in general: 

''You see, gentlemen, that if one weighs the value of this 
guarantee, one becomes convinced that it was not dictated by 
magnanimous feelings toward Belgium, but by considerations 
which affect the Powers personally. And one comes to the con- 
clusion that their intervention in our favor, when the moment 
comes, will be controlled by the demands of their own interests." 

An article in The Tiines of January 29, 1906, had raised 
this question with special reference to England. Voices, how- 
ever, were to be heard which spoke in quite a different key. 
In his strange book, "The Day of the Anglo-Saxon" (1912), 
which is dedicated to Field Marshal Lord Roberts, the Ameri- 
can Anglo-Saxon, Homer Lea, declares (p. 226) English oppo- 
sition to the violation of neutral territory to be wrong, "for the 
British Empire is not moved by the sanctity of neutrality. It is 
only a means of evading responsibility and shifting it upon those 
nations which delude themselves with the belief that such decla- 
rations are inviolable; whereas no nation has violated neutral 
territory and denied their obligations more frequently than the 
Saxon." Let us read, in addition, how the Englishman, Major 
Stewart Murray, speaks in his essay, "The Future Peace of the 
Anglo-Saxons" (p. 40), of Britain's breach of neutrality against 
Denmark in the year 1807, which George Canning also sought 
to justify on the ground of necessity: "Nothing has ever been 
done by any other nation more utterly in defiance of the agree- 
ments of so-called international law; we considered it advisable 
and necessary and expedient, and we had the power to do it; 
therefore we did it. Are we ashamed of having done so? 
No, certainly not ; we are proud of it — for people of this country 
to talk of the sanctity of international law is nothing but hy- 
pocrisy or ignorance." 

As far as the Belgian state is concerned, it is immaterial 
whether England was impelled to protect its neutrality through 
respect for the treaty or through selfish interests. But an effec- 
tive protection was to be expected only as long as in Europe's dis- 
cordant camps Great Britain maintained an impartial, isolated 
position, enabling her to prevent either side from a violation of 
Belgian neutrality, for fear of arousing her enmity. As soon as 
she made an end of her isolation and took sides, this barrier was 
removed, for if all the guarantor Powers fell to fighting 
among themselves, whose interference was then to be feared? 
It may, therefore, be stated that the decision as to Belgium's 
neutrality was reached ten years before the entrance of the 



MODERN GERMANY 367 

German troops, at the time when England, through her treaty 
with France (1904), established connection with the Dual Alli- 
ance and soon thereafter managed to overcome her natural aver- 
sion to Russia. The neutrality of Belgium in effect ceased to 
exist when it was realized that in a future world war the British 
power would be thrown to the side of France; when the con- 
ference of Algeciras (1906) proclaimed the new alignment of 
states to the whole world, and plans were hinted at regarding a' 
military cooperation of England and France, and the landing o| 
a British expeditionary force; when a saying of Lord Kitchener 
was going the rounds: "The boundary of the British Empire 
in Europe is not the English Channel, but the line of the 
Meuse" ; and when Lord Roberts let it be known that in August, 
191 1, the fleet and the army had stood ready to interfere in 
Flanders. It began to be realized in Belgium that the war of 
the future would not halt at the boundary of the country, like 
that of 1870. "Will the new policy which England appears to 
have adopted," inquired Favereau, in the above-mentioned speech 
in the Senate in support of the army bill of 1909, "allow her to 
play in future the benevolent role the benefits of which we have 
hitherto enjoyed? Will she not, in the moment of danger, find 
herself bound by ties which, as regards one of the combatants, 
will deprive her of that complete independence that is essential 
to her activity in our behalf?" And he suggested the disquiet- 
ing possibility of a permanent occupation of Antwerp by Great 
Britain. The army bill of 191 3 was even officially based on the 
consideration that England had abandoned her position of isola- 
tion and joined one of the two groups of Powers; henceforth, 
it was claimed, she would no longer be in a position, as in the 
past, to protect Belgian neutrality.^ 

It is thus all the more to be lamented that Belgium still clung 
to the British power. "They would protect us even against our 
will," says the Brussels senator, Hanrez, in a speech on Septem- 
ber 2, 1908. This led, as many signs indicated, but as could 
not be proved until the Anglo-Belgian Conventions of 1906 
and 191 2 were found, to a secret abandonment of the obligatory 
impartiality, to an important military surrender to the Western 
Powers, and to a premature decision regarding action in a future 
war. The warning of the Belgian minister, Woeste, was disre- 
garded: "For us to become the ally of one of our neighbors, to 
permit ourselves to be involved in an adventure as its follower 

1 In this connection see the remarkable pamphlet of the French socialist, 
Francis Delaisi, La guerre qui vient, Paris, 19 n, P- 25. (American edition, 
Tfie Future War, Boston, 191 5, p. 56.) 



368 MODERN GERMANY 

— this would be to transform Belgium into a battlefield, and to 
bring down upon us the fate of the conquered, and perhaps con- 
demn us to be devoured by the victor." 

The Belgian government is not the only one to bear the 
blame for thus taking sides in a manner which its position for- 
bade ; it was fully supported in this step by the influential classes 
of the country. Although many an individual German may have 
had cause to appreciate friendly assistance, and although on 
occasion there may have been an official exchange of courtesies, 
nevertheless the latest attempts at Belgian justification picturing 
the relationship as quite undisturbed until the war upset things 
in an entirely unexpected manner, give an absolutely false impres- 
sion. Undoubtedly, the commercial and industrial superiority of 
Germany, especially as manifested since the nineties, and her 
great abundance of strength were not precisely pleasant for a 
weaker neighbor; but in the presence of the envy, distrust and 
hatred thereby created, it was far too often forgotten in Bel- 
gium to what extent the country was by nature dependent on 
this hinterlandj which in the commercial treaties of 1892 and 
1905 had made much appreciated concessions to Belgium. It was 
likewise forgotten that among the purchasers of Belgian export 
goods Germany stood first on the list, with the yearly expendi- 
ture of a billion francs, and that Antwerp had grown to be 
one of the most important harbors in the world solely through 
its German connections, without which it would be a city of 
the dead. Instead of appreciating these and further facts, the 
Belgians let themselves be more and more deceived by an inimi- 
cal press campaign, which claimed to see in every German mer- 
chant the pioneer, or even the spy, of the Prussian military in- 
vasion. In the end the Belgians threw themselves so unre- 
servedly into France's arms, ''the true fatherland," ^ that in 1913 
a Walloon official of calm judgment recognized the danger for 
Belgium, and in a pamphlet that is well worth reading sought to 
give his compatriots a clear understanding of German methods 
and ambitions — without finding great response, it is true. ^ 

On the French side, of course, no stone was left unturned 
since the beginning of our century to push the "peaceful penetra- 
tion" which the Third Republic had set itself as its immediate 
goal. In this field it enjoyed great advantage over the German 
competitor, through the adoption of the French language by the 
Walloons, while the separation of High and Low German had 

* See Frankrijk de eewvenoude vijand van Vlaanderen en Wallonie (843- 
1913), Josson, Breda, 1913, p. 677. 
^Belgique et I'Allemagne, published under the pseudonym "Integer," I9i3. 



MODERN GERMANY 369 

made the German-speaking part of the Netherlands an isolated 
linguistic island. There was in France full appreciation of the 
powerful weapon which the language represented; it was the 
medium of an ancient, refined, fascinating Kultur, which for 
hundreds of years had held the ruling classes of the Belgian 
people captivated. "We desire to annex the free intelligence," 
announced the French consul, Crozier, in Antwerp, in 1909, and 
on the Flemish side at least it was well understood what this 
meant. The statement of the former burgomaster of Brussels, 
Karel Buls, sounds like the commentary to this: ''The Bel- 
gians who assist in the annexation of their brains are paving the 
way for the annexation of their native soil." 

Only in this connection can the tremendous expenditure be 
understood which government and society in France, year in, 
year out, devoted to propaganda in Belgium. Of primary con- 
sideration was the press, for which, in addition to a flood of 
honors and "ribbons," a secret fund of 200,000 francs was pro- 
vided for in the yearly budget of the Republic. It was, there- 
fore, not surprising that the hearts and pockets of the Belgian 
editors opened in sympathy to the "great nation." Another 
easy method of winning their adherence was to employ them 
as paid reporters for French newspapers, whereby they were 
in a measure reconciled to the unpleasant competition of Pari- 
sian newspapers, which were sold in enormous quantities in 
the streets of Belgium. The convenience of the paper-shears 
(which played no part in the case of German newspapers, owing 
to linguistic reasons) finally set the seal on this Franco-Belgian 
press alliance. It is an old story, the manner in which Uln- 
dependance Beige, according to the saying, was for many years 
only La Dependance Franqaise. During the first Morocco 
crisis the semi-official Journal de Bruxelles itself had to ad- 
mit, on August 7, 1906, that a portion of the Belgian press re- 
peated in a parrotlike manner every accusation made on the 
French or English side. During the second Morocco crisis of 
191 1 these occurrences were repeated in an even more flagrant 
manner. Evidently on this occasion anxiety as to the fate of the 
Belgian Congo was also a factor. Although it was finally estab- 
lished in the press that the proposal to use this territory as a 
compensation had emanated from France, but had been rejected 
by Germany, distrust of Germany nevertheless continued to un- 
dermine public confidence. The intention of economic conquest, 
at least, was ascribed to the Empire, and it sounded like a voice 
in the wilderness when occasionally the fact was justly appre- 



370 MODERN GERMANY 

ciated that in the Morocco Treaty, Germany, by safeguarding 
international commercial interests, had benefited Belgium also.^ 

The expression, the **Moroccanization" of Belgium, which 
was coined at that time, was not exactly a compliment to the 
independence of the little state. As a matter of fact, the wave 
of French influence was not limited to the press alone. The 
next important field was that of the schools. In contrast to the 
few German schools in Belgium, there were a large number of 
institutions directly supported by France, which in their text- 
books proclaimed the fact that the "Rhine throughout the 
whole of its course" is the natural boundary of France. In 
addition, there was theatrical propaganda in its various forms — 
performances by the Comedie Francaise (at the instigation of 
the French government), variety theatres, music halls, moving 
pictures. Furthermore, there were lecture courses in the Uni- 
versite des Annales, which was founded in Brussels in 1909 on 
the French model; the united propaganda of the Associations 
pour la vulgarisation de la langue jranqaise, which was con- 
nected with the Alliance Francaise; the congresses which 
brought together all those of Gallic sympathies at Liege ( 1905) , 
Brussels (1910) and Mons (1911) ; numberless visits from one 
side to the other, and fraternization feasts, especially at the in- 
ternational exhibitions of Brussels (1910) and Ghent (1913). 
French participation in the latter was undisguisedly admitted by 
the Minister of Commerce, David, in the Parisian Chamber of 
Deputies, as being a demonstration against the plan of founding 
a Flemish university; Belgian protests, which were published 
against such an interference, complained that France was show- 
ing clearly that she already considered Belgium as conquered 
territory. 

In view of all this, it is not without its tragi-comic side to 
notice how these Walloons and the Franskiljons, forgetting 
their German extraction, outdid each other in their addresses of 
welcome, their grateful homage to French power, civilization 
and language, while the Parisian guests, accepting the trib- 
utes with offhanded politeness, met these Belgian parvenus 
with an air of cool scorn, expressive of their secret disgust. If 
the burgomaster of the metropolis. Max, imagined that he was 
making' an especially happy remark in calling "the Brussels 
boulevards a continuation of those at Paris," the name "Brus- 
sels" indicated in French mouths merely a "district" of Paris, 
the whole of Belgium an "appendage," a "corner" of France. 
"Ideas, land, inhabitants, everything is miserable in Belgium," 

^ Belgique et I'Allemagne, p. 59. 



MODERN GERMANY 371 

was the opinion of Taine; and Beaudelaire held the people to 
be "the most stupid in the world." When Octave Mirbeau 
poured the vials of his contemptuous and derisive wit over the 
Belgians, it was too much even for his victims, despite their 
long-suffering tolerance of all that proceeded from the south- 
western quarter of the Continent. 

The propaganda extended also to the military field. In 
France the Dual Alliance and the Entente had greatly increased 
the army's confidence in its strength. In Belgium this feeling 
was given most emphatic expression by the defiant French monu- 
ments which were erected in Waterloo (1904), Antwerp 
(1905), Fleurus (1906) and finally even in Jemappes (1911), 
where now at the top of an obelisk a golden Gallic cock recalls 
the Austrian defeat of 1792, which led to the annexation of 
Belgium by the First Republic. ''Another monument in honor 
of France," said one of the Belgian newspapers at the time; 
''if things continue in this fashion, in the end we shall have to 
present Belgium to them in gratitude for the monuments." The 
Walloon author, Dumont-Wilden, together with his friend, Leon 
Souguenet, were present at the unveiling ceremony. They had 
just returned from a trip through Alsace-Lorraine, the impres- 
sions of which they described in a book, "The Victory of the 
Conquered" (1912), in the most anti-German manner, employ- 
ing the vocabulary that has since become so popular of "Attila," 
"barbarians," "brutality," etc. 

The sight of German troops in the two provinces had awak- 
ened in their minds only one thought, "The enemy! Belgium's 
enemy also!" They were now taking delight in the great 
demonstration at Jemappes. "Here likewise in Belgium a new 
feeling had been born ; the eyes of the people were opened to 
the danger from the East, and it was not an idle act devoid of 
courage when ten thousand coal miners began to sing the Mar- 
seillaise." They realized that "danger threatened exclusively 
from the East, and it occasioned a feeling of relief among the 
Belgians to know that in the worst event they would not have 
to fight against the French Republic, the liberator of Belgium 
and of the Scheldt." 

When in 19 12 funds were to be gathered for increasing the 
French air fleet, Belgium contributed by entertainments given 
to this end. 

It looked as if a large portion of the Belgian population, 
chiefly the politically most influential part, were coming to share 
more and more the views of the monthly magazine, Les Marches 
de L'Est, which had been started in Paris in 1908, and accord- 



372 MODERN GERMANY 

ing to which Belgium was reckoned as part of the Eastern prov- 
inces of France, together with Luxemburg, Alsace-Lorraine and 
French Switzerland. The Belgian newspaper, Reveil JVallon, 
founded in 1907, already developed a regular program for Bel- 
gium's union with France, first of all in customs, post, mutual 
recognition of citizenship, etc., and closed with the words: "We 
are enemies of Prussia, and all our sympathies are with good 
and kind France, whose misfortune has only increased our love. 
We remain thoroughly Walloon when we defend French civi- 
lization." In view of such feelings, the deafening cries of ''Vive 
la France r even in the Belgian Chamber of Deputies, may be 
understood, when in the sitting of February 6, 191 3, a clerical 
member ventured to describe the French election laws as rotten. 
At this period the Walloon state official who has already been 
mentioned, wrote: "As things are now progressing with us, we 
are steering automatically in piping times of peace directly toward 
French annexation." ^ 

Viewing all this together, one is justified in doubting whether 
this was an attitude suitable to the inhabitants of a neutralized 
state. In view of so one-sided an attitude, is it surprising from 
a social, economic, political and military standpoint if in Ger- 
many there grew up a deep distrust of the fairness of her "neu- 
tral" neighbor? 

The Flemish were not partners in these acts, at least not 
such as were conscious of their racial bonds and who had not, 
like Maeterlinck and Verhaeren, long before the war, taken up 
their position in the Gallic camp. All who sympathized with 
the Flemish movement had, it is true, carefully avoided all con- 
nection with Germany, but they had nevertheless been forced 
constantly to repel the attacks of the French propagandists and 
their Belgian adherents. The movement was on the whole 
purely Belgian, yet it doubtless deserves the most whole-hearted 
sympathy, and in its invisible connections with the political par- 
ties, the most thorough study by Germans; but at this point it 
claims attention only in its ultimate aims, as affecting the nature 
of the Belgian state. Whoever regards this as merely a linguis- 
tic and literary movement is familiar only with its beginnings 
in the forties and fifties of the last century. The language was 
merely the most obvious expression of national individuality. 
To bring the language again into repute after long suppression 
and obscurity, to win for it a favorable position in the general 
cultural development — this was the chief object. To attain 
this end was possible only by overcoming the dominance of the 

^ Belgique et I'Allemagne, p. 134. 



MODERN GERMANY 373 

Gallic party and by giving to the Belgian state, according to 
the relative strength of its races, a predominantly German char- 
acter, or at least one of racial equality. The continuing democ- 
ratization of political life, resulting from the extension of the 
franchise and the proportional system, caused this phase of the 
movement to be constantly more strongly emphasized, and 
brought about from the early seventies in the legal, administra- 
tive and military fields notable legislative successes looking 
toward equality. In the educational field, however, the strug- 
gle continued with varying successes and defeats up to recent 
times; if, as regards the public and secondary schools, some 
results at least were achieved, although with slight guarantee 
of permanence, this was doomed to remain miserable patch-work 
unless the Flemish population were enabled to secure national 
university education. For in the last analysis everything de- 
pended on the attitude of the upper classes. As long as ad- 
vanced education was to be obtained only with a French stamp 
and was valued only from that point of view, and such educa- 
tion alone guaranteed vocational advance; as long as the higher 
official positions were almost exclusively open to Walloons and 
Franskiljons, all legal successes were deceptive, for there was 
an absolute lack of Impartial administration of the laws. In 
the main, although with certain enforced concessions, the ruling 
class stood upon the principle of government which had once 
been laid down by Rogier: 

*'An effective administration demands a single recognized lan- 
guage. For Belgium this can only be French, and to attain the 
desired end it is necessary that all positions In the civil and mili- 
tary administration of the country be Intrusted to Walloons or 
men from Luxemburg; in this manner the Flemish will tempo- 
rarily be deprived of the advantages appertaining to these posi- 
tions and thereby be forced to learn French. The Germanic ele- 
ment In Belgium will thus gradually be eliminated." 

To overturn this principle was the real significance of the de- 
mand for a Flemish metamorphosis of the University of Ghent; 
therein lies the decisive importance which this institution gained 
in the struggle of nationalities during recent years. The nearer 
success seemed along this line, the more violent became the coun- 
ter-efforts. On the Walloon side this was taken to indicate the 
end of their supremacy, and if this result was really unavoidable, 
at least there was no desire to be tyrannized over by the Flemish 
in future as the Walloons themselves had tyrannized over the 
Flemish up to that time. If they could no longer be the ruling 
party In this somewhat stormy union, in which serious frays 



374 MODERN GERMANY 

were not infrequent, then preferably separation from bed and 
board. The idea of administrative separation along Walloon- 
Flemish lines, which had been proclaimed for the first time in 
1897 ^f'd originally opposed as a dangerous vagary, gained 
strength perceptibly after the cry of Emile Dupont in the Senate 
sitting of March 9, 1910, ''Long live administrative separation!" 
When the general elections of 19 12 again brought disappoint- 
ment to the extreme Radicals and left them w^ithout the means of 
breaking the power of the clerical majority, who for over a quar- 
ter of a century had been at the helm, the Liberal Walloons de- 
clared in favor of the principle of a separation at the Congress of 
Liege, on July 7, 19 12, thus hoping to obtain supremacy at least 
in their part of the country. Shortly thereafter in the Hainault 
provincial council, the proposer of the reform, Andre, declared 
that Belgium was suffering from Jacobin centralization. She 
would have to return to local autonomy.^ Reference was made to 
the relation of the German Federal States to each other; there 
was discussed a sort of imperial parliament, perhaps after the 
model of the Austro-Hungarian "delegations," standing over the 
two districts with Brussels as neutral territory between them. ^ 
While Hainault and Liege had already been won over to the idea, 
the clerical provinces of Namur and Luxemburg opposed it for 
fear of a liberal majority in the future "Wallonia." The Flem- 
ish members maintained an attitude of expectant disapproval, 
but at the end they were not entirely irreconcilable. In both 
camps there were, it is true, warning voices, which characterized 
separation in administration as "a disastrous rending of the na- 
tional unity." Nevertheless, the idea seemed to gain support 
and Belgium to be on the verge of dissolution. For, in the light 
of the whole situation, there cannot be the slightest doubt that 
a Wallonia with an administration of her own was merely a prep- 
aration for French annexation. Did not Jules Desiree, one of 
the chief protagonists of the idea, describe Wallonia as "a por- 
tion of reconstructed France," and did not the newspaper, 
Flandre Liberale, say, in its issue of June 26, 1912: "An enor- 
mous number of Walloons would at the present moment be de- 
lighted to be united to France. One needs only to have friends 
and relatives in Wallonia to be absolutely convinced of this." 
But in such a case would the little Flemish nation, overrun by 
French partisans, have been able to maintain its independence? 

^ Belgique et I'Allemagne, p. 133: The author maintains that German decen- 
tralization, which serves to multiply intellectual and artistic centres within the 
Empire, corresponds better with our traditions than the centralization of the 
French capital. See also Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijand van Vlaanderen en 



Wallonie (843-1913). Josson, Breda, 1913, p. 835. 
2 See Pour la separation, Jennissen, 191 1. 



MODERN GERMANY 375 

The future seemed to hold the most serious Internal dis- 
turbances for Belgium, when suddenly the World War changed 
all this and drove the quarrelling factions temporarily together. 
But, looking beyond the natural bitterness and grief of the 
present, the Flemish should realize the importance of this hour 
of destiny which has rung for them. For those who w^ish to 
hear, the voices of all who hope for a victory of the Western 
Powers are clearly revealing a secret joy: "This is the end of 
the Flemish movement!" In the Petit Journal of Paris, on De- 
cember 21, 19 1 4, Gerard Harry, the friend of the Walloons, 
declared that the Flemish had now realized the uselessness of 
their dialect, that it was without value, like a vitiated coin, and 
that they w^ould henceforth be advocates of the supremacy of the 
French language in Belgium. Will they be ready for suicide in 
this manner, or will they remember one of the co-founders of 
their national movement, the poet Hendrik Conscience, who 
called them "the advance guard of the German race"? Will 
they take to heart the words of one of their noblest, the historian 
Leon Vanderkindere, who, in comparing France with Germany, 
exclaimed: "Here a dying civilization, yonder a civilization 
full of strength and glory! Are we then condemned always to 
follow France and to turn our back upon the future? The 
Flemish population is also Germanic. Will not this poor little 
branch, which has been separated so long from the parent stem, 
at last begin to flourish anew?" 

However the final decision of the Flemish may turn, the 
German Empire should not allow itself to be deceived in the 
slightest degree by a temporarily unfriendly attitude; for it is 
greatly to its own interest, by carefully considering racial pecu- 
liarities and religious leanings, to maintain and strengthen a 
Germanic bulwark against the ever-renewed Gallic attacks. 

What guarantee in the world conflagration of 19 14 could this 
inwardly disrupted state, with its insufficient army, its one-sided 
government, and the overwhelming French sentiment of the 
strategically more important southern part of the country, offer 
to the German Empire? During recent years talk of the 
coming war had constantly become more frequent and disturb- 
ing. The writings of high-placed, mostly French officers, which 
sought to depict its probable course, were numerous. All those 
which have come under my observation have assumed, as a mat- 
ter of course, that Belgium would be drawn into the struggle, 
fighting always on the side of France, never on that of Germany. 
As a matter of fact, on both sides of the border strategic prepa- 
rations for war had for years been under way. It is a one- 



376 MODERN GERMANY 

sided, partial view in the current military writings of our ene- 
mies, and occasionally also in those of neutral foreign countries, 
to attribute an exclusively offensive character to the German 
preparations, and to them alone.^ The camp at Elsenborn had 
been for a long time the object of continual anxiety in Belgium, 
just as truly as the double-tracking of the few German railway 
lines leading to the Belgian border. The aim of these lines was 
undoubtedly mainly strategic, and the German General Staff 
would have neglected its duty if it had not taken all possibilities 
into consideration. Why defensive considerations, such as the 
need of quickly throwing an army to the border against a Franco- 
English thrust, should have played a decisive role in this connec- 
tion must be seen by every one except such as desire at any price 
to find proof of a long-prepared and deliberate German con- 
quest of Belgium. How untenable such one-sided accusations are 
cannot be better shown than by the printed words of a Walloon 

in 1913. 

The German invasion, he says, is regarded "as certain, as 
inevitable, without any one apparently pausing to consider how 
insulting this matter-of-fact assumption is for Germany and her 
leaders. As regards the contrary case, namely a French invasion, 
it is hardly mentioned except as a matter of form. The con- 
struction of the railway lines is spiritedly discussed, without the 
question being asked what part, in case of a conflict, would be 
played by the French railway company whose line runs to the 
fortress of Namur. However this may be, can one doubt that if 
the French (and we, of course, in their train) are fully pre- 
pared to see the Germans break through into Belgium, the Ger- 
mans on their side are not less convinced that their possible 
enemies have the same intention? They assert — and not with- 
out reason — that the French are already familiar with the way. 
If the Eiffel railway lines, as they declare, possess a strategic 
character, it is due to the above fact. And if the French pene- 
trate from one side, will not the Germans enter from the other?" ^ 

In this connection we must hold before our mind's eye the 
map of the south and west. Corresponding to the encampment 
of Elsenborn (47 km. from Liege), there were on the French 
border: Givet (35 km. from Namur); Maubeuge (67 km. 
from the capital city of Brussels), for which during the last ten 
years expenditures had been made and which, as was commonly 
known, contained vast stores of English munitions;^ Lille (65 

1 See America and the World War, Theodore Roosevelt, 191 5. P- 21. 

2 See Belgique et I'Allemagne, p. 28. • , \ 

3 See Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijand van Vlaanderen en Wallome (843-1913), 
Josson, Breda, 19 13, p. 860. 



MODERN GERMANY 377 

km. from Ghent), and Dunkirk (60 km. from Bruges). In 
addition, there were the forts of Valenciennes, Hirson, Mezieres 
and Longwy.^ The network of railways was naturally, in view 
of the active traffic on some portions, far more highly developed 
and provided the amplest facilities for the speedy transport of 
troops. "Within a few hours after the beginning of hostilities," 
says the Belgian general, Dejardin, "the enemy would be able 
to occupy Courtrai, Tournai, Ath, Mons, Manage, Charleroi 
and Namur." ^ 

The seacoast facing England was absolutely unprotected. 
The German public was acquainted with the military arrange- 
ments between France and England, and with the intention In 
case of war immediately to land a strong British expeditionary 
force. Further evidence of this was given by the indignation of 
the French and British press at the proposition which was made 
in the summer of 19 10 in the Lower Dutch Chamber for the for- 
tification of Flushing. It appears that English attempts were 
made to bring Holland also into the military system aimed at 
Germany. But this state knew better than Belgium how to pre- 
serve its neutrality, and sought to provide in Flushing a new 
and firm support, which, by controlling the southern branch of 
the Scheldt, might prevent the sending of English troops to Ant- 
werp through Dutch waters. By adopting the proposal, despite 
the interference of the French government, after some delays 
and changes, in June, 1913 (just in time), and by immediately 
putting it into operation, Holland acted not alone for her own 
interest, but within her rights. Nevertheless, the Entente press 
and its Belgium imitators accused Holland of favoring Ger- 
many, and tried to show by constitutional law that Holland had 
at least no right to refuse passage to forces which were intended 
for the preservation of Belgian neutrality. 

During this entire dispute the entrance of the troops of the 
Entente Powers into Belgian territory was treated by French 
and English military writers as a matter of course. An article 
of a military attache in the Echo de Paris, copied without com- 
ment on January 3, 19 12, in the Independance Beige, esti- 
mated the British troops which could be landed in Antwerp, 
Bruges and Ostende within from eight to ten days to reinforce 
the Franco-Belgian forces guarding the district around Namur, 
at 100,000 men; it demanded a definite military understanding 
between France and Belgium. Arnold White, the writer for 
the British Admiralty, spoke of the cavalry forces which General 

1 See Frankrijk de eeuwenonde vijand van Vlaanderen en Wallonie (843-1913), 
Josson, Breda, 1913, p. 859; La defense de la Belgique, Navez, p. 242 ff. 

2 Cf. La defense de la Belgique, Navez, p. 245. 



378 MODERN GERMANY 

French was to lead against the Rhine. ^ On October g, 1912, 
the semi-official newspaper, La Metropohj was able to announce: 
''The government is aware that even those states among the 
guarantors of our neutrality upon whom we have hitherto 
thought we could most firmly count, consider our protection as 
only relatively sufficient; nor do they conceal this fact, but on 
the contrary they have let it be known that in case of an inter- 
national conflict in which Belgium was the battlefield, foreign 
bodies of troops would enter the country for the purpose of 
strengthening our insufficient defense." 

How could the German General Staff have failed to consider 
most earnestly the probability of an enemy attack through Bel- 
gium? Oceans of ink have been wasted in foreign countries in 
the effort to twist the unauthoritative strategic schemes of Ger- 
man military writers, in which Belgium figured as a factor, into 
proof of German longing for conquests. Does not justice at 
least demand that the far more numerous plans of a like nature 
on the other side be not entirely disregarded? Reference has 
already been made to them, and at this point only a few espe- 
cially characteristic utterances need still be cited. ''The best 
means for the military conquest of a country," writes the French 
major, Boucher, "is to flood it beforehand in times of peace 
with one's adherents." ^ That which is here attributed to Ger- 
many had been amply provided for, as we know, by France, espe- 
cially in the Walloon provinces. 

The corroboration is scarcely needed which is found in Jen- 
nissen: "Reputable Walloons have, in addition to the duty of 
protecting the country against German imperialism, the further 
duty of guarding France against a rear attack, the renown and 
happiness of that country being an object of their desire, as the 
health of the whole tree is desirable to the individual branch." ^ 

"We might," says Major Chenet, "content ourselves with 
dragging out the conflict in Lorraine, while the main attack was 
made through Belgium with the united French, English and 
Belgian forces. This plan seems the wisest if we are really de- 
termined to take the offensive. We gain touch in this manner 
with our allies, and a successful battle brings us within a few 
days across the Rhine, with the result that the German forces 
would be driven to a hasty retreat from Lorraine." * 

Even La France Militairej the organ of the French Gen- 

^ Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijand van Vlaanderen en Wallonie (843-1913), 
Josson, pp. 818-819. 

^ La Belgique a jamais independante, Boucher, 1913, p. 10. 

^ Pour la separation, Jennissen, 191 1, p. 16. 

* Neutralite beige et invasion allemande. Lecomte and Levi, Paris and Brus- 
sels, 1914. P- 583- 



MODERN GERMANY 379 

eral Staff, said on January 14-15, 1906, without any thought of 
a German violation of Belgian neutrality: "It may well be 
that for reasons of strategic interest, which are undeniable, a 
portion of the German army will seek to reach the French north- 
ern boundary by passing through Luxemburg, just as it may also 
be that a French army, for equally strong strategic reasons, may 
seek to operate on Belgian soil." ^ 

We need only mention the fact that such a thrust would have 
been a risk of the most serious sort for Germany, at a moment 
when she needed all of her forces without exception for repelling 
the Franco-Russian attack and when she saw herself threatened, 
by the greatest naval Power in the world. One additional fact 
must be mentioned : the Krupp works lie scarely one hundred 
kilometers from the Belgian border, in the poorly guarded in- 
dustrial territory of the Ruhr district. One need only imagine 
a similar position for Creusot near the Franco-Belgian border — 
at Noyon, for example — in order to estimate the danger for 
Germany. 

Protection in this direction was absolutely necessary. When 
on August 2, 19 1 4, Germany demanded the right of passage 
through Belgian territory, with the promise of full indemnifi- 
cation, she asked only for that which had been regarded by Eng- 
land as admissible in 1887 and which was not plainly forbidden 
by Belgian neutrality. In the case of Belgium's benevolent neu- 
trality, the German government was ready to pledge itself in 
addition "to guarantee after the war the territorial interests 
and the independence of the kingdom," and "to withdraw from 
the country immediately following the signing of peace." This 
offer was even repeated on August 10, after the storming of 
Liege. 

The Belgian government, however, bound as it was by inclina- 
tion, agreements and completely one-sided military subservience, 
refused the offer on both occasions. Incited to resistance by 
England, for her own advantage, and trusting to the supposedly 
superior strength of the Triple Entente, it preferred war — in- 
deed, it allowed the struggle in part to degenerate into an irregu- 
lar guerrilla conflict, and thereby brought the miseries of such 
a war upon the land. 

There is a strong touch of antique tragedy in Belgium's fate, 
for which the Belgians have to thank the perverted policy of 
their ruling classes. As if deceived by an ambiguous, misleading 

1 See La defense de la Belgique, Navez, p. 203. It surely is no mere coin- 
cidence that at the very same time (the middle of January, 1906) Lieutenant- 
Colonel Barnardiston had his first interview with the Belgian General Ducarne. 



^8o MODERN GERMANY 

and yet in the end true oracle, they thought (wrongly) to see 
the danger exclusively in the East ; but only the one-sided hostile 
measures which they took to meet it and which involved them in 
guilt, transformed into reality that which they had mistakenly 
feared. 



CHAPTER IV 
RUSSIA AND PAN-SLAVISM 

PROFESSOR HANS UEBERSBERGER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 

VIENNA 

SINCE the time of Catharine II, Russia's foreign policy has 
been based primarily on the fomenting of a spirit of an- 
tagonism between Prussia and Austria. Martens, the Russian 
writer on constitutional law, remarked that Catharine II, with 
wonderful foresight and political tact, had made use of the 
irreconcilable difference between Prussia and Austria to enforce 
her will against both. Although Frederick II and Joseph II 
recognized the danger of the enormous increase of Russia's power 
owing to the mutual antagonism of the two countries, they were 
both prevented, partly by circumstances and partly by their ad- 
visers, from directing their own policy in such a manner as to 
counteract it. For a whole century Russian diplomacy was able 
to make use first of one and then of the other of these two mu- 
tually opposed states to further Russian interests, whether in 
Polish, Oriental, or other questions, to advance Russia's boun- 
daries constantly further westward, and to secure for her a 
decisive position as arbiter even in Germany's internal affairs. 
Both Austria and Prussia, through distrust of each other, and 
often for the sake of momentary success, have deliberately ren- 
dered aid to the Russian power. Russia, however, was all the 
time most careful to see that neither of the rivals should be- 
come too strong, and then, in the consciousness of victory, render 
impossible the policy that Russia had previously pursued with 
such success. 

It was an axiom of Russian diplomacy to permit German 
unity neither under Austrian nor Prussian leadership. Nicho- 
las I, who regarded himself as the bulwark of European 'legiti- 
macy" and who was never weary of urging Austria and Prussia 
to suppress with armed force every movement in Western Eur- 
ope directed against such legitimacy, immediately abandoned this 
principle when he became frightened by the possibility of German 
unity and strength. When the Parliament at Frankfort, at the 
beginning of its activities, seemed to promise the union of Ger- 
many, the Czar immediately overcame his hatred of the Febru- 

381 



382 MODERN GERMANY 

ary Revolution and of the new French government. On August 
30, 1848, the Imperial Russian Chancellor, Nesselrode, wrote to 
Count Kiselev, who had formerly been Russian Minister at the 
French court, but was then in Paris merely as unofficial repre- 
sentative of Russia, that an absolute solidarity of interest ex- 
isted between Russia and France, in regard to Germany, for the 
union of which the Parliament of Frankfort was laboring. 

"It is unquestionably true," wrote Count Nesselrode, "that 
matters for serious consideration will arise, for Russia and 
France, if these dreams take on any degree of reality, through 
the creation of a strong united Power at the center of Europe 
— of a Power which is not provided for by existing treaties, 
which represents a nation of forty-five million people, which 
is obedient to only one central authority and which disturbs 
every balance, at least in the form in which it has previously 
existed." ^ 

The government of Nicholas I showed by this that, in order 
to keep Germany weak and hence internally disunited, it was will- 
ing even to act hand in hand with a government owing its exist- 
ence to a revolution. That the Czar also was more than ready 
to renounce his attitude of opposition to the revolution, if to the 
interest of Russia, may be shown by still another fact, which 
has become of special, almost pragmatic interest to the policy of 
Russia as regards Austria down to the present day. Under his 
government and with his approval, there began again that under- 
mining work of Russia which aimed to incite the Austrian Slavs 
against their own empire and to corrupt them to this end by 
rich stipends. The first one to furnish this weapon to Russian 
diplomacy w^as Michael Pogodin, professor at the University of 
Moscow. He w\as the chief supporter of the official nationalism 
approved by the Czar, with its trinity of doctrines: autocracy, 
orthodoxy and Russian nationality. At the beginning of 1840, 
on his return from a trip to Austria, he rendered a report of 
his journey to the Minister of Instruction, Count Uvarov. The 
tenor of his deduction is that Austria resembles an aged tree 
rotten at the core, which is doomed to destruction by the Slavs 
who are constantly growing more conscious of their own strength. 
Austria, he said, feared Russia more than any other Power, be- 
cause all her own Slavs down to the Adriatic Sea sympathized 
with Russia and looked to her for their freedom. Just as Fate 
seemed to offer to Poland under Sigismund III and to Sweden 
from the time of Gustavus Adolphus down to Charles XII the 
possibility of creating a world monarchy, so now the time had 

'^ Recueil des Traites et Conventions, Martens, 15, p. 237. 



MODERN GERMANY 383 

come for Nicholas I, since two empires, Turkey and Austria, 
were at the same moment given into his hand. Pogodin did 
not content himself with foretelling the impending disintegra- 
tion of Austria; he also indicated the means by which this 
process might be hastened, through modest expenditures of money 
and support of the various scholars and declared supporters of 
Russia, as well as by flooding the Slavic provinces of Austria 
with Russian literature and orthodox propaganda. And Czar 
Nicholas I, the unyielding autocrat, the incarnation of legiti- 
macy, was so much pleased with this report of Pogodin that he 
caused his approval to be expressed to the writer and made him 
a present of two thousand rubles. 

Pogodin's impressions of his travels found the proper soil for 
their dissemination and philosophic justification in the circles of 
Slavophiles which were at that time springing up in Moscow. 
The year 1848 aroused the wildest expectations. "Before the 
dawn of another day," wrote Ivan Kireevskij, on May 2, 1848, 
''Austria will fall to pieces. Slavic states are beginning to crys- 
tallize out of her." ^ The greatest satisfaction was aroused in 
Russia by the Slavic Congress at Prague, and especially by the 
mass publicly celebrated in Prague according to the orthodox 
ritual by the ex-priest, Stamatovich, from Neusatz; in his sermon 
he glorified Peter the Great, Stephen Dusan of Serbia, and the 
Hussite leader, Zizka. Even before this historical occurrence, 
Fedor Tjutczev, the celebrated poet of Slavophile circles, whose 
influence on Alexander II was especially great, had called atten- 
tion in his memorial, ''Russia and the Revolution," to the Hus- 
site traditions of the Czechs and to their importance for the fu- 
ture union of the Austrian Slavs with Russia. The revival of 
the Hussite religion and its union with orthodoxy would natur- 
ally greatly have simplified the problem of the incorporation of 
the Austrian Slavs with Russia. In his memorial Tjutczev 
calls Russia and the Revolution the two sole real powers of 
Europe, although standing in sharpest opposition to each 
other. It is indicative of his lack of scruple that he nevertheless 
finds it reconcilable with his strictly conservative and anti-revo- 
lutionary principles with regard to the future of Bohemia, to 
declare in the j-ear 1841, in referring to a statement of Hanka, 
the Czech scholar and Russian pensioner of unsavory memory: 
''Bohemia wnll not be free, independent and absolute master in 
her ow^n house until the day when Russia again enters into 
possession of Galicia." ^ 

1 Life and Works of Pogodin, Barsukov, 9, p. 262. 

2 Russian Archive, 1873, p. 925 ff. 



384 MODERN GERMANY 

In view of this attitude of influential Russian circles toward 
Austria, it is no wonder that Nicholas I regarded himself as 
Austria's special protector and assumed this role likewise toward 
Prussia. This "protectorate" was oppressive for Austria, espe- 
cially after the death of Emperor Francis. At his accession to 
the throne, Emperor Francis Joseph found himself facing a 
difficult situation in this respect. The Russian assistance in 
Hungary, which the Czar had in a certain sense given to himself 
in order to prevent the spread of a successful revolution in Po- 
land, had served so to strengthen his pretensions to a protectorate 
over Austria that a break could not be avoided. Nicholas now 
considered that the moment had come to realize Russia's desires 
in the Orient, regardless of Austria. He was so sure of himself 
that he did not even consider it necessary to inform the Austrian 
Court, and to inquire whether, without serious injury to its 
vital interests, it could render the assistance which the Czar held 
to be a matter of course. Austria herself was expected to assist 
in the establishment of Russian supremacy in the Danube princi- 
palities, in the Balkans and on the Bosphorus. The breach, 
therefore, was inevitable. The Crimean War showed for the 
first time what power Austria and Prussia possess as against the 
rest of Europe, and what influence the two may exercise on the 
configuration of Europe if they act together. But the time had 
not yet come to give to this union a permanent and settled char- 
acter. The old differences seemed likely to be settled by an 
appeal to arms, and this appeal was made. Russia's hatred of 
Austria rendered this manner of settlement possible; Bismarck's 
genius, however, looking far ahead, by the manner in which he 
settled the conflict, laid the foundation for the later alliance 
and for the present loyal brotherhood in arms between Prussia- 
Germany and Austria-Hungary. 

The Crimean War was, therefore, the cause of Russia's aban- 
doning her system of balance between Prussia and Austria and 
of her violent hostility towards Austria. The result of the war 
did not permit Russia, it is true, to take immediate vengeance 
on Austria; but she made no secret of her enmity. Only the 
pressing need for the solution of a number of great problems, 
such as the emancipation of the serfs, diverted her attention from 
Austria. In addition, there was the Polish rebellion of 1863, 
which served in a measure to cool the sympathies of the other 
Slavs for Russia. Characteristic, however, of the real aims of 
the Russian policy is the well-known memorial of 1864, La Po- 
litique du Present, which was written probably for Alexander II, 
at the command of the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Gorczakov. 



MODERN GERMANY 385 

Peace must be preserved, it was argued, because Russia was 
in need of it in order, through the development of her com- 
merce, her system of communication and her military strength, 
to become better prepared for the solution of her future prob- 
lems. The Slavic peoples of Austria were urged to remain 
quiet until they had acquired the power to disrupt the Aus- 
trian state, and the same admonition was given to the Slavs 
of Turkey. The danger of the Austrian Slavs becoming Ger- 
manized was represented as passed. In 1858 the so-called Slavic 
Charity Committee had been founded in Moscow under Im- 
perial auspices, and its activities soon spread to the Austrian ter- 
ritories. This organization had been made directly dependent 
on the so-called Asiatic Department of the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, which had entrusted it with the unofficial Pan-Slavic agi- 
tation in Austria. A number of distinguished personages, such as 
the ex-]VIinister of Instruction, Count Uvarov, the Curator of the 
Moscow Educational District, A. N. Bachmetev, Secretary of 
State, Count Bludov, indeed even the Empress Maria Alexan- 
drovna, who in this was acting under the influence of Countess 
Antonina Dmitrievna, Bludov and the poet Tjutczev and his 
daughter, were either active in the management or else supported 
the committee annually by large contributions. The Russian 
government acted from this motive when, contrary to its usual 
custom, it permitted on the occasion of the Pan-Russian ethno- 
graphic exhibition in Moscow not only a Pan-Slavic section to 
be attached to it but also the holding of a political congress, 
although this plan had given occasion for violent press attacks. 
The large number of Czechs who appeared were no doubt an 
especially pleasing sight for the Russian ruling classes. Precisely 
from this quarter, however, an unpleasant incident was to arise. 
The leader of the Czech deputation, Rieger, had given his prom- 
ise to the Parisian Polish Committee to speak at the congress for 
the Polish cause. When he did this at the banquet at Sokol- 
niki, in a manner calculated not to offend the Russians, and then 
proceeded to say that efforts must be made to grant rights to the 
Poles and thereby to close the circle of all the Slavs, his speech 
was received not only with murmurs of disapproval and whis- 
tling, but Prince Czerkasskij gave him a sharp reprimand by 
referring meaningly to the manner in which the Poles were 
acting toward the Galician Ruthenians. With ruthless frank- 
ness, unusual for an official personage such as he was, Prince 
Czerkasskij called attention to the oppression of the Ruthe- 
nians in Galicia by the Poles, and urged these to grant to the 
Ruthenians that which the Russian government in the King- 



386 MODERN GERMANY 

dom of Poland had granted to the Poles. He did not even hesi- 
tate to remind his hearers that East Galicia was not Russian 
territory-, and to imply indirectly how painful it was that it was 
not then united with Russia, as it had been from 1809 to 18 14. 
The Slav Congress ended with this dissonance. 

Shortly after the Moscow Slav Congress, there appeared — in 
the winter of 1869-70 — in the magazine Zarja that sensational 
series of articles by Nikolai Jakovlevich Danilevskij, which in 
1 87 1 was published under the title, ''Russia and Europe," and 
which since then has run through a number of editions and be- 
come the gospel of wide circles of Russian intellectuals. Its in- 
fluence has remained remarkably strong down to the most recent 
times and in the most influential circles. Danilevskij was the 
first to state and develop in a systematic manner the policy of 
the destruction of Austria and Turkey. The Oriental question 
is, according to him, a question of all Slavdom, and it therefore 
concerns Austria and Turkey in like degree. It can be solved 
satisfactorily only through the splitting up of both empires. 
Austria, to whom at one time had fallen the duty of protect- 
ing Europe against the Turks, had fulfilled her mission, he 
says, as early as 1740, and since that time had lost all justi- 
fication for her existence. The existence of Turkey had 
ceased to be justified the moment that Russia became strong 
enough to take the Balkan States under her wing. Turkey's 
mission was to keep these Slavs from being Europeanized. In 
place of these empires, according to Danilevskij, there must be a 
Slavic Federation, with Russia in control, and with a Russian 
Constantinople at the centre; in addition, there must be joined 
to Russia the whole of Galicia and a portion of North Hungary, 
styled in Russian terminology "Hungarian Russia." Included 
in this federation w^as to be reckoned, moreover, a Bohemian- 
Moravian-Slovak kingdom, consisting of Bohemia, Moravia and 
Northwest Hungary; a Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian kingdom, 
consisting of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Old 
Serbia, North Albania, the so-called Vojevodina and the Banat 
of South Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Carniola, Tri- 
este, Goricia, Gradiska and Istria, two-thirds of Carinthia and 
a fifth of Styria as far as the Drau; a kingdom of Hungary, 
formed from the remaining portions of Hungary and that part 
of Transylvania inhabited by Magyars; a kingdom of Rumania, 
consisting of Moldavia, Wallachia, parts of Bukovina, half of 
Transylvania, etc. The numerous plans for dividing Austria- 
Hungary, as discussed in Russia in newspapers, magazines and 
public meetings immediately following the outbreak of the war. 



MODERN GERMANY 387 

were mainly along the lines laid down by Danilevskij. One 
point must be emphasized : Danilevskij was more honest than 
the present generation.^ He frankly admitted that Europe 
and Russia have nothing in common, and that they must stand 
opposed to each other throughout all the future. 

At the same time, but independently of Danilevskij, the dis- 
tinguished Russian military writer, General Rostislav Fadeev, 
published a brochure animated by the same hatred of Austria- 
Hungary; in this he argued that the Oriental question was to 
be solved in the Russian manner, but only after the destruction 
of Austria-Hungary. For Fadeev also the Oriental question is 
a Pan-Slavic question, the solution of which, in accordance with 
Russia's desires, can be permitted by Austria-Hungary only at 
the risk of her own existence. Hence, as Field Marshal Paskie- 
vich declared, the road to Constantinople leads through Vienna. 
Fadeev did not hesitate to state plainly that in the conflict with 
Austria-Hungary reliance might be placed on the Austrian Slavs. 
It was only needful to gain their confidence ; but this Russia could 
do by freeing Galicia. Fadeev said that were one to ask any non- 
Russian Slav, he would reply: ''What confidence can Russia's 
cousins have in her when her very brothers, who sigh and pine on 
her borders, can hope for no help from her?" In 1849, 1859 and 
1866 the "unhappy" Galician Russians might have been freed 
without trouble. When this six-hundred-year-old captivity of Red 
Russia was ended, continues Fadeev, the West Slavs would be 
ready to listen to Russia. She would then stand geographically in 
the midst of the West Slavs, and in addition, by the reclaiming of 
Bessarabia, the connection with the South Slavs would be rees- 
tablished. Although more cautious than Danilevskij, Fadeev 
intimated the final goal to be a Pan-Slavic Federation on the 
ruins of Austria and Turkey, with the Czar at the head as the 
successor of Constantine the Great, and with the Grand Dukes 
as federal princes.^ 

While Fadeev believed that Prussia could not permit the 
destruction of Austria, and that on this account the former's 
enmity was to be reckoned with — in which circumstance he esti- 
mated at its true value the united military strength of the previous 
rivals — Danilevskij was of a different opinion down to the time 
of the Franco-Prussian War. Till that time he was still in- 
clined to regard Prussia as the sole ally of Russia in the solution 
of the Oriental question — that is to say, in the destruction of 
Austria-Hungary and Turkey. Impressed by the German vic- 

^ Ritssia and Europe, Danilevskij, p. 423 ff. 

^ Mnenie vostocnom voprose, Fadeev, St. Petersburg, 1870. 



388 MODERN GERMANY 

tories, however, and regardless of the fact that Russia reaped 
immediate advantage from them, he revised his previous opinion 
even before the capture of Paris and declared France to be the 
future ally of Russia and the possible coming German Empire 
to be Russia's most dangerous potential enemy in the matter of the 
partition of Austria-Hungary and Turkey. With Machiavellian 
perspicacity, Danilevskij demonstrated that it did not lie in 
Russia's interest immediately to interfere in the conflict and to 
save France from the imposition of severe terms of peace. Such 
a peace as seemed probable w^ould create a permanent breach 
between Germany and France and prevent the two Powers from 
uniting against Slavdom in Russia on the basis of European or 
Latin-German interests. Nor was a victorious France, in Dani- 
levskij 's opinion, even with a renewal of the friendship of the days 
of Tilsit for Russia, desirable from the Russian point of view, 
since the latter country could not support France's ambitious 
plans which might easily lead to conflicts, causing France to renew 
her previous Polish intrigues. Russia, also, would follow a 
strongly conservative policy along German lines, in view of the 
expected danger of revolutionary or democratic propaganda. 

"On the other hand, in case of Germany's victory and the 
temporary weakening or even humiliation of France, all these 
prejudices and influences will lose their force. France, whom 
only Russia can support In the recovery of her political position, 
will, even though reluctantly, have to abandon her encourage- 
ment of supposed Polish Interests, If these run counter to her 
own vital interests. Russia, willy-nilly, will cease to support 
Prussia and Germany, if they venture boldly and undisguisedly 
to pursue aims of their own which are opposed to the evident 
interests of Russia." ^ 

Further, through the defeat of France, Russia, he claimed, 
would regain the affection of the so-called Slavic Intellectuals 
outside of Russia who, as the result of the French Revolution 
and of France's services for the national unity of Italy, as 
well as because of the liberal expressions of French authors, 
politicians and statesmen and of many really sympathetic traits 
of the French national character, had hitherto been devoted to 
France and had hoped to win her support; this hope, however, 
had proved deceptive, since in the belief of the French, as of 
other Europeans, the fruits of f r-eedom were not to grow and ripen 
for the Slavs. Russia, he said, would appear as the sole llbera- 

^ Rossija i frank o-germauskaja Vojna, Zarja, 187 1; reprinted in Shornick 
poUticeskich i ekonomisceskich slatej, N. J. Danilevskago, St. Petersburg, i%o, 
p. 27. 



MODERN GERMANY 389 

tor of all the Slavs, in view of the opposing interests of Germans 
and Slavs, of their century-long struggle and of the antipathy 
with which the German character was viewed by the Slavs and 
Latins, as well as in view of the fact that France after her de- 
feat would be fully occupied in healing her wounds and looking 
after herself. 

"No one except Russia can save the Slavs from being en- 
gulfed by Germany; no one except the Slavs can be Russia's 
permanent guard against the ambitions which will not delay in 
manifesting themselves with such clearness that only those born 
blind can continue not to see them." ^ 

Danilevskij closes this remarkable exposition by calling atten- 
tion to the fact that Russia at that moment (that is to say, be- 
fore the proclamation of the German Empire in Versailles) 
found herself in this dilemma: "All our sympathies are with 
France, but political interests compel us to wish for Germany's 
complete victory and the weakening of France." 

Thus, just as the Crimean War was a turning-point in the 
Austro-Russian relations, the Franco-German War of 1870-71 
became a turning-point for those of Russia and Prussia. Yet it 
was owing to the German victories that Russia, at the most criti- 
cal moment of the western struggle, was enabled to free herself 
from the most humiliating condition of the Peace of Paris, viz.^ 
the inhibition against Russia's building and maintaining a naval 
fleet in the Black Sea. "The success of the Prussian arms was 
likewise a victory for us," says a Russian diplomat in a memorial 
published a few years ago.^ With the very first German victories, 
which seemed to proclaim the possibility of a powerful German 
empire at the Russian frontier, the most influential Russian pub- 
licist of all times, M. N. Katkov, began in his Moskovskiya 
Vedomosti a press campaign, aiming to arouse widespread patri- 
otic disquietude at the German victories. In this efFort he was 
successful. Although Czar Alexander II, even after the peace 
of Frankfort, continued faithful to the ideas expressed in the 
famous telegraphic exchange with his uncle. Emperor William I, 
expressions of discontent to the eifect that Russia had unre- 
servedly allowed herself to become Prussia's tool were not in- 
frequent. 

"This statement," says Saburov, "was repeated times without 
number and finally became a historical truth for the Moscow 
patriots, although there was not a grain of truth in it; if there 

"^ Rossi] a i franko-germanskaja Vojna, Zarja, 1871; reprinted in Sbornick 
politiceskich i ekonowUsceskich slate j, N. J. Danilevskago, St, Petersburg, 1890^ 
p. 29. 

^ Zapiska P. A. Saburova, Russian Archive, 19 12, p. 470. 



390 MODERN GERMANY 

were advantages, these were undoubtedly mutual. For begin- 
ning with this period, Emperor Alexander II no longer felt him- 
self politically restrained in Europe; he was freed from hamper- 
ing ties and in a position to give to Russia her previous standing 
as a World Power." ^ 

The visit of Emperor William I and Bismarck in 1873 seemed 
to strengthen this bond. 

"For us," says Saburov, "this revived the memory of our posi- 
tion at Tilsit, but without the defeats of Austerlitz and Fried- 
land. And our lord and master, the Czar, had only to em- 
phasize our political understanding with Prussia in order to 
attain a brilliant position, without drawing the sword from the 
scabbard. It is not to be wondered at, in view of so important 
a political success, that the thought of a closer and permanent 
alliance awoke in the minds of the monarchs. The system had 
brought forth rich fruits. It would have borne still more in 
the future. The indicated political course would probably have 
served to solve the difficulties in the Oriental question, which 
soon thereafter came into prominence, if Czar Alexander II 
had been an autocrat not alone by reason of his rights but also 
by personal disposition." ^ 

But while the Czar held fast to ^he alliance with Prussia, 
the anti-German sentiment grew stronger in Russian society 
and affected the leader of Russia's foreign policy. Chancellor 
Prince Gorczakov, whose most prominent characteristic was 
boundless vanity. He had sensed the anti-German wave in 
Russian society and hastened to adapt Russia's foreign poHcy 
to it. The Czar was too weak-willed to force his conviction 
upon the Chancellor, or, as would have been the most natural 
course in the case of such a difference of opinion, to dismiss 
him. And so 1875 arrived and with it the comedy of France's 
rescue from an alleged German attack, which Prince Gorczakov 
brilliantly staged. This was an unmistakable indication for 
Bismarck that doubt was beginning to be felt in Petrograd as 
to whether a mistake had not been made in 1870-71 in not 
interfering in favor of France. Czar Alexander II, to whom 
Bismarck complained about the dishonorable attitude of Gorcza- 
kov, ''admitted the state of affairs, but contented himself, while 
laughing and smoking, with remarking that Bismarck should 
not take this vanite senile seriously." ^ As Bismarck observes, 
it was a remarkable fact that Alexander II, despite his con- 

1 Zapiska P. A. Saburova, Russian Archive, 1912, p. 470. 

2 Ibid., p. 470 ff. 

^ Gedanken und Erinnerungen, Bismarck, 2, Chap. 26. 



MODERN GERMANY 391 

tempt for the minister, nevertheless intrusted him with the 
entire machinery of the foreign office. This lack of character 
manifested itself ever more clearly by his instability as regards 
the Pan-Slavic movement, which continued to grow in violence 
after the outbreak of the revolt in Herzegovina. 

Although the Czar, on July 8, 1876, at a meeting with Em- 
peror Francis Joseph in Reichstadt, had concluded an agree- 
ment concerning the Oriental question, and in August, before 
his departure for Warsaw and Livadia, had spoken to Reutern, 
the Minister of Finance, with bitterness in regard to the Pan- 
Slavic agitation, his feelings underwent a complete change in 
Livadia as the result of his surroundings. Even the Russian 
Ambassador at Constantinople, Count Nikolai Pavlovich Ig- 
natiev, the exponent of the Pan-Slavists, was astonished on the 
occasion of his visit to Livadia to see how the Czar and Chan- 
cellor had fallen under the influence of one of the members of 
the Slav Charit}^ Committee of Moscow, Porochovczikov by 
name, who had gone thither on his own authority and in flam- 
ing w^ords had pictured the warlike sentiments "of the whole 
of Orthodox Russia"; he had frightened the Czar by telling! 
him that the Russian people would make war against the will 
of the government and without awaiting its decision. Under 
the influence of this feeling and without awaiting the result of 
the mission of his Adjutant-General, Count Sumarokov-Elston, 
the Czar inquired in Berlin, through General von Werder, 
whether, in the event of an Austro-Russian war, Germany 
would remain neutral, an insinuation which Bismarck rejected 
politely, but firmly.^ 

In view of this answer, the thought of a settlement of the 
Oriental question by a war with Austria had to be temporarily 
abandoned. But this original plan continued to exert so strong 
an influence that war was begun against Turkey with insuffi- 
cient forces. For only four army corps wxre left in European 
Turkey in the event of a war with Austria. It is Prince Nikolai 
Nikolaievitch, the elder, to whom we owe this knowledge. Pub- 
lic sentiment in all camps, among the liberals as well as among 
the Pan-Slavs, was in equal degree inimical to Austria. All 
circles of society were in favor of the war, at least against 
Turkey; the radicals because, following the successful battles 
against the ''outer" Turks, they hoped for a settlement with the 
''inner" Turks, whereby they meant especially the government. 
Despite the Treaty of Of en-Pest of January, 1877, the Czar, 
who had been forced again into closer relationship with Austria- 

^ Gedanken und Erinnerungen, Bismarck, 2, Chap. 28. 



392 MODERN GERMANY 

Hungary, because of Berlin's refusal, disregarded these treaty 
obligations in the peace negotiations of San Stefano. The conse- 
quence for Russia was the Congress of Berlin, the results of 
which, naturally, did not agree with those of San Stefano. 

These results were received with bitterness by the Russian 
public. Ivan Sergeevich Aksakov made his celebrated Moscow 
speech (July 4, 1878), with its violent attacks upon Russian 
diplomacy and its unmistakable reflection on the Czar. As 
neither the Czar nor the Chancellor, Prince Gorczakov, had 
the courage to admit that Bosnia and Herzegovina had been 
surrendered to Austria-Hungary by a treaty long before the 
war — indeed, that without this concession Russia would not 
have been in a position to carry on the war — the entire weight 
of the public's anger turned against Austria-Hungary and 
Prince Bismarck, to whom Russia's discomfiture at the Con- 
gress of Berlin was unjustly ascribed. As a measure of pro- 
tection against Russia, influenced by this popular movement 
which Alexander H with his customary weakness did not dare 
oppose, Bismarck and Andrassy signed the Austro-German 
alliance, which we have seen to-day so brilliantly justified by the 
severe tests of war. The increasing movement of terrorism in 
Russia, however, to which on February 13, 1881, Alexander fell a 
victim, served somewhat to distract the attention of the coun- 
try from foreign politics. 

The new Czar, Alexander HI, whose palace on the Anitchkov 
Bridge, even before his accession, had been the center of anti- 
German intrigues and who had had no small share in bringing 
on the Turkish War, had seen on the field of battle the weak- 
nesses of the Russian army organization too clearly not to 
desire a more or less extended period of rest and military re- 
organization for the country. The nihilist movement, with 
the numerous outrages and the danger threatening the dynasty, 
also compelled him to seek support from the two Emperors 
against this internal danger. This was the reason that the 
so-called Tri-Emperor Alliance continued in force, and that in 
1 88 1 and 1884 Russia even agreed anew by treaty to the 
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this Russia, it 
is true, was still influenced by the hope of keeping Bulgaria in 
a state of absolute dependence, indeed, despite its own ruler, 
of turning the country into a sort of Russian satrapy. When 
these plans miscarried, and when, in the matter of the annex- 
ation of East Rumelia, which Russia now energetically opposed 
despite the peace of San Stefano, a definite break with Prince 
Alexander of Bulgaria occurred, leading to the abduction of 



MODERN GERMANY 393 

the Prince by Russophile officers and finally to his abdication 
against the will of the Bulgarian nation, Russia's role in Bul- 
garia was at an end. The regency under Stambulov found 
its chief support in England and Austria-Hungary, and a 
world conflagration seemed likely to result from the Bulgarian 
question. But Russia still lacked allies for a war against 
Austria-Hungary and Germany, and the danger again passed. 
It is worthy of note that the fact was established by Russians- 
that in the country's conflict with Bulgaria an important part 
was played by the Russian iron industry greedy for foreign 
markets, and by Russians interested in railroad building. It 
was on their account that the Russian government sought to 
influence Bulgaria to turn over the building of her railroads 
to Russians, in which operation it naturally strove to have 
those lines built which in the war of 1877 had shown themselves 
to be the chief lines of operation for the Russian army — that 
is to say, the lines from the Danube toward the South. It 
was construed as a betrayal of Russia on the part of Prince 
Alexander of Battenberg that he insisted on developing the 
Bulgarian railways in a westerly direction, which would con- 
nect them, not with the Russian, but with the Austrian sys- 
tem; all the more was this so regarded since the execution of 
such a plan involved but half the expenditure necessary for the 
southern lines. This railway question was the cause of the 
Prince's unpopularity in Petrograd. For according to the 
plan supported by the Russian general, Sobolev, who was the 
premier of Bulgaria, the Bulgarian railways were to be built 
not only by Russian entrepreneurs and Russian engineers, but 
even by Russian workmen, whom it was planned to bring from 
Russia for this purpose. Naturally, Russia was to receive the 
contract for the entire rolling stock.^ 

The conflict with Bulgaria gave the final impetus in bring- 
ing about the Franco-Russian Alliance. Efforts in this direc- 
tion had been made on the French side as early as the seven- 
ties. The dissolution of the Tri-Emperor Alliance (although 
it is not correct to speak of a formal alliance) opened up a 
more favorable outlook for the French government. The re- 
fusal which the French Foreign Minister, Flourens, gave to 
the Bulgarian deputation that had come to Paris in January, 
1887, to seek the assistance of the, European Cabinets against 
Russia, reconciled the Russian government with the French 
Republic, which had once refused to surrender the revolutionist 

1 See Vnesnaja PoHtika RossiJ v Konce, Pokrovskij, XIX veka, Granat, Istorija. 
Rossii V XIX veke, p. 204 ff. 



394 MODERN GERMANY 

Hartmann after he had made an attempt on the life of Alex- 
ander II. When, as a result of the alarming military prepara- 
tions of the French Minister of War, Boulanger, a conflict 
with German}^ seemed most probable, Russia ranged herself 
on the side of France and in the "Schnabele" case her action was 
inimical to Germany. This happened in April, 1887, that is 
to say, four months after the rebuff to the Bulgarian deputation 
in Paris. The decisive factor, however, in bringing about the 
Franco-Russian alliance was the offer of the Republic to 
place its capital at the disposal of Russia, especially as the 
German government, in view of the official enmity of the Rus- 
sian government and of Russian public opinion, could not pos- 
sibly continue to assist Russia financially. "From the year 
1888 on," says Pokrovskij, "French capital was closely con- 
nected with the destiny of the Russian autocracy." ^ Although 
Katkov (regarding whom a foreign diplomat stated that he 
did not know who was the Russian Foreign Minister, Katkov 
or Giers) openly declared in the columns of his Moscow news- 
paper that Russia could be the ally only of a monarchic France, 
this bitter pill was swallowed in Paris. The rejection by the 
Russian Ambassador, Baron Mohrenheim, of Floquet as French 
premier, because he had once joined in a Polish demonstration 
against Alexander II, was coolly accepted by the leading circles 
of France; and Floquet himself later renounced the portfolio 
of Foreign Affairs as the price of Russia's pardon. The arrest 
of the Russian Nihilists by the energetic Minister of the In- 
terior, Constans, in June, 1890, gave the final proof of the 
French Republic's good behavior. At the close of 1890 the 
President of the French Republic and the Ministers of War 
and of the Interior were the recipients of high Russian decora- 
tions; and in July, 1891, the alliance was publicly sealed by 
the reception of Admiral Gervais' squadron at Kronstadt, for 
which France had long ardently hoped. In August, 1891, took 
place the first formal conclusion of the defensive and offensive 
alliance. In the autumn of 1892, this was supplemented by a 
military convention signed by the Chiefs of the General Staff 
of the two armies, Boisdeffre and Obruczev. In the autumn of 
1893 the return visit was made by the Russian fleet to Toulon, 
and in the spring of 1894 the definitive treaty of alliance was 
finally signed, simultaneously in Paris and Petrograd, by the two 
Foreign Ministers, Casimir Perier and Giers. 

In the meanwhile, however, Russia's attention had been to 

1 See Vnesnaja Politika Rossij v Konce, XIX veka, Granat, Istorija Rossii v 
XIX veke, by Pokrovskij, p, 174 ff. 



MODERN GERMANY 395 

a great degree distracted from Europe and turned toward the 
East by the development of her Asiatic policy, which in the 
spring of 1891 found its symbolic expression in the laying of 
the corner stone of the great Siberian fortress in Vladivostock. 
Witte himself in the autumn of 1892 characterized the build- 
ing of the Siberian Railway as an event of world importance, 
such as mark the beginning of new epochs in the history of' 
the nations and not infrequently call forth an entire change 
in the existing economic relations of the various states to each 
other.^ The defeat of China in the Chino-Japanese War of 
1894-95 offered an opportunity to Russia of forcing on China 
her friendship and her protection against Japan. Russia's ex- 
pansion toward the Far East was bound to encounter the oppo- 
sition of England and Japan. A free hand, therefore, was 
needed in Europe. This was the reason why the ruling cir- 
cles in Russia modified their plans in the Near East. Accord- 
ing to the saying of Prince Lubanow-Rostowskij, Ambassador 
to Vienna and later Minister of Foreign Affairs under Nicholas 
II, it was necessary "to place the Balkans in cold storage until 
we have finished with other pressing affairs." ^ This purpose 
was served by the Austro-Russian agreement of 1897, which 
aimed to preserve the status quo in the Balkans and which, in 
the same manner as the Miirzsteger agreement of 1903, pro- 
tected Russia's rear in view of the threatening complications in 
the East. This object was completely attained, thanks to the 
loyalty of Austria, who, by conscientious observance of the 
treaty, even sacrificed her own interests in Bosnia and Herze- 
govina. Austria-Hungary and Germany, during the unfortu- 
nate war with Japan and the resulting internal disturbances, 
strove to uphold the tottering throne and the threatened soli- 
darity of the Russian state. Indeed, it is the opinion of Rus- 
sian radical parties, especially of the Social Democrats and the 
Social Revolutionists, that the Russian revolution was defeated 
primarily through Germany's attitude. The Russian Minister 
of War, Kuropatkin, in his final report emphasized the loyal 
attitude of Germany and Austria-Hungary in the following 
words: "The recent war has given to us the consoling convic- 
tion that our western neighbors (Germany and Austria-Hun- 
gary) entertain no plans of conquest as regards Russia, for 
the years 1905-6 would have been most favorable for a change 
in the present boundaries of the Empire in the West." ^ 

^ See Vnesnaj'a Politika Rossij v Konce, XIX veka, Granat, Istorija Rossii v 
XIX, veke. by Pokrovskij, p. 220. 

^ Balkanskij Krisis i Politika Izvolskago, P. Miljukov, p. 3 ff. 

^ Zapiski generala Kuropatkina o russko-japonskoj vojne, Berlin, 191 1, p. 555. 



396 MODERN GERMANY 

This loyalty had very unfortunate results. A great change 
was brought about in Russian politics through the defeat in 
East Asia. The Russian intellectuals had absolutely no sym- 
pathy for the East Asiatic policy of the government; Slavophile 
influences and traditions w^ere much stronger in all Russian 
parties. In order to win these sympathies, it was necessary 
only to direct the attention of the foreign office toward Europe 
and to blow into a flame the embers of Balkan hatred against 
the Porte, which were glimmering under the ashes. Conserva- 
tive and radical parties of the newly created Russian parliament 
agreed that the treaties with Austria-Hungary were harmful 
for Russia, since the maintenance of the status quo in the Bal- 
kans was not in the interests of Russia, if only because the main 
object of Russia's Oriental policy for two hundred years — 
namely the acquisition of the Dardanelles — was as little likely 
to be achieved in this manner as its secondary object, the libera- 
tion of the racially related coreligionists in the Balkans and 
their inclusion in the Russian sphere of influence. 

The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. P. Izvolskij, who 
even as a diplomatic representative had believed in the Pan- 
Slavic spirit, was able to adapt himself quickly to this dominant 
sentiment. Through the understanding with England in Au- 
gust, 1907, concerning the division of the spheres of interest in 
Central Asia and especially in Persia, the way was opened for 
joint action with England in other questions as well. The 
anti-German turn which British policy had taken since the ac- 
cession of Edward VII to the throne made a Russian alliance 
seem desirable. Conversely, it was in Russia's interest to draw 
England, the hitherto bitter enemy of her Oriental aims, to 
her side, in order, in the unavoidable conflict with Austria- 
Hungary in the Near East, to isolate the latter state and fur- 
ther to hold Austria's ally, Germany, in check by another enemy 
in addition to France. Besides, the two most influential po- 
litical parties of Russia at that time, the Octobrists and the 
Cadets, were in favor of a rapprochement with England, which 
they hoped would result in a more liberal internal policy on 
the part of the Russian government. Bo^-h parties were, more- 
over, strongly influenced by Russian, and especially Moscow 
business interests, which, on account of the dangerous competi- 
tion of the far more capable and highly trained German in- 
dustry, had long demanded that the government assume an 
anti-German attitude. 

When in January, 1908, Aehrenthal announced in the par- 
liamentary ''delegations" the plan for an active economic policy 



MODERN GERMANY 397 

by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, and the building of the 
Sandjak railway, the authorities in Petrograd considered it a 
timely moment to make public the long contemplated change 
in Russian politics. Too weak, as the result of the defeats in 
Manchuria and of the disorganization called forth by the revo- 
lution, to be able successfully to oppose the policy of Vienna, 
Petrograd sought to accomplish this in two other ways: first, 
by an agreement with England concerning questions in the Near 
East (an object which was attained through the meeting of the 
Czar with King Edward VII in Reval) ; and secondly, through 
the encouragement of the Pan-Slavic agitation among the Slavs of 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. 

The failure in the Far East and the revolution, which 
brought Russia to the verge of destruction and almost com- 
pletely put an end to her influence in European questions 
(Uabsence de la Russie) was felt especially keenly by the West 
Slavs as a strengthening of German influence and as a detri- 
ment to their political standing. As a result of this feeling, 
there began as early as 1906 a movement, the object of which 
was the establishment of Slavic solidarity. The Russo-Polish 
dififerences were felt as a hindrance to this solidarity, and hence 
to the strengthening of Russia. As a consequence, the efforts 
of the publicists were directed toward bringing about a recon- 
ciliation. A division of the Poles themselves declared the rec- 
onciliation possible under certain conditions, above all the au- 
tonomy of Congressional Poland. The Cracow monthly re- 
view, Swiat Slowianski, was the first openly to advocate this 
idea. In Russia this movement was well received. The Con- 
servatives, who had been frightened by the revolution, saw 
Russia's salvation in Pan-Slavism. The Slavophile wing of 
the Russian Liberals, however, inspired by the general disap- 
proval of the educated Russian circles of the East Asiatic policy, 
regarded this as a strengthening of Russia's position in Europe. 
The speech of Aehrenthal regarding the Sandjak railway, as 
indicated, caused the leaders of Russia's foreign policy seri- 
ously to take under consideration this movement both within and 
without the boundaries of the Empire. 

''The especially self-confident tone" (of Aehrenthal), says 
an article in the January number, 1909 (p. 386), of the in- 
fluential Petrograd review, Vestnik Evropy, which is published 
by a member of the Imperial Council, "in which this new 
Austrian program was announced caused marked anxiety in the 
Slavic states, and could not fail to make an unfavorable impres- 
sion in Russia also; all the more was this the case since diplo- 



398 MODERN GERMANY 

macy still regarded the fiction of the Austro-Russian agreement 
in the Macedonian question as existing. As a matter of fact, 
Russian policy in the Balkans had long since lost all independence 
and become transformed into a passive tool (?) of the exclu- 
sively Austrian influence. Hence, it was no longer taken into 
consideration in Aehrenthal's plans. The Austrian minister, 
who was once ambassador in Petrograd, where he maintained 
intimate relations with the most influential personages of our 
reactionary parties, made use of his observations to draw the 
corresponding practical deductions, but he failed to consider the 
fact that reliance can be placed upon the feelings of court cir- 
cles only with great caution, as they are in their very nature 
extremely changeable and subject to the influence of those familiar 
social elements which unite complacency with loudly proclaimed 
patriotism. It is not always advisable publicly to announce 
things which may without hindrance be accomplished by ac- 
tions. The gradual expansion of the Austrian sphere of in- 
terest in the Balkans called forth a protest from no one, so 
long as it was not openly formulated as an official principle 
which implied the direct denial or ignoring of foreign inter- 
ests, Slavic and Russian. This unexpected action gave a strong 
impulse to the Slavic movement, and the new Slavic cult found 
ardent adepts among us, due in part to the arrival in Russia 
of several prominent Czech and Serb politicians. The Slavic 
question in Austria herself has become extremely acute; vio- 
lent street fights between Germans and Czechs take place con- 
stantly at various places, and frequently rise to the plane of san- 
guinary battles. Perhaps the aggressive ( ?) policy against the 
Turko-Slavic provinces was undertaken in order to distract at- 
tention from these internal conflicts and to open up new per- 
spectives to the Slavs. The strengthening of the Slavic ele- 
ment, at the cost of the neighboring Balkan countries, pre- 
pares the way for the transformation of the monarchy into a 
federation, in which the Slavs will occupy their proper posi- 
tion." 

However wrong this exposition is in so far as it regards 
Russian policy, and however maliciously it misrepresents con- 
ditions in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, it nevertheless gives 
an excellent picture of the character of the congress to which 
the three Austrian parliamentarians, a Czech, a Liberal Slo- 
vene and a Russophile Ruthenian, were bound on their journey 
to Petrograd in May, 1908. That the National Democratic or 
Pan-Polish wing of the Polish Club in the Imperial Council 
favored this step, even though not openly, is subject to no 



MODERN GERMANY 399 

doubt. The Petrograd discussion took place too much as if 
by program to allow of any assumption but that a previous 
arrangement existed. It was really intended to prepare the 
way for a Pan-Slavic Congress. The tenor of the negotia- 
tions, however, was that the practical prerequisite of such a con- 
gress as well as of Pan-Slavic solidarity must be the reconcilia- 
tion of the Poles and the Russians. Suddenly during the dis- 
cussion the Polish leader in the third Duma, Roman Dmowski, 
arose and declared that this reconciliation was quite possible, 
that the Poles were ready to do their part tow^ard it, for Ger- 
man civilization was the common enemy of all Poles and Slavs, 
and that in order to resist it, all other considerations must be put 
aside. Shortly after the Petrograd meeting, Dmowski an- 
nounced this new program of the Poles in a small book, 
"ISliemcy, Rosy a i kwestya polskaf 

As a result of universal franchise, the Ruthenians, who had 
hitherto been almost completely deprived of political rights, 
were sent to the Vienna Parliament in relatively large num- 
bers. The general suffrage right, however, had also had the 
effect on the Polish side of bringing new and especially Pan- 
Polish elements into the hitherto uniform and exclusive Polish 
Club. The appearance of the Ruthenians on the political stage 
was made use of by the Pan-Polish Party for a violent agita- 
tion, under the plea that the Polish landed class in East Galicia 
was threatened. This agitation was successful. A Pan-Polish 
partisan became leader of the hitherto all-powerful Kolo Pol- 
skie in the Vienna Parliament. Their program was openly 
Russophile in three of the component states of former Poland. 
Their first duty they considered to be the crushing of the Ger- 
man Empire in order to free their brothers in Posen. Until 
the accomplishment of this task they were ready to defer their 
final aim, namely the rehabilitation of Poland with her boundaries 
of 1772, and loyally to fulfill the duties of Austrian or Rus- 
sian subjects — in which connection, Dmowski said, it must be 
a matter of indifference to the Russian or Austrian government 
what ideals they seek to realize in the future. In order to 
attain this first goal they were ready temporarily to abandon 
their claims as against Russia to Lithuania and Little Russia; they 
demanded in these countries for their compatriots only a status 
of equality; in Congressional Poland, on the other hand, they 
asked full autonomy and the use of the Polish language in the 
administration, courts and schools. 

As a compensation for this, they offered the Russian govern- 
ment the foUow^ing: Wherever the Ukrainian language was 



400 MODERN GERMANY 

recognized in administration, courts and schools, the Russian 
language was to enjoy the same standing. Frankly expressed, 
loyalty toward Austria ceased at the point where the existence 
of the state or the security of a boundary clashed with the oppor- 
tunity to gain a ruble. The Russian government, however, 
which had always checked the Ukrainian movement in the 
sharpest manner, as representing a threat to the unity of the 
Russian race and hence to the supremacy of the Great-Russians, 
was now, after its experiences with the various nationalities 
in their efforts to obtain autonomy and with the strong Ukrainian 
Club of the first and second Dumas, all the more eager to sup- 
press such a movement even beyond its own borders. This 
Ukrainian danger was thus the bond which united the Poles 
of the Pan-Polish movement and the Russian government. 
Shortly before the Petrograd meeting the weapon of a Ukrai- 
nian student had put an end to the career of the Governor of 
Galicia, Count Potoczki, who, failing to realize the essential 
interests of the state which he served, had encouraged the Russo- 
phile movement and its advocates. 

In addition to the ancient antagonism between Russia and 
Austria-Hungary in the Oriental question, there was now a 
second dangerous cause for dispute, namely that in regard to 
the Ukrainian question. As much as the Russian government 
was interested in' hindering, even beyond its own borders, the 
cultural growth of the Ukrainian people, just so much was it 
in Austria's interest to encourage the intellectual and economic 
development of those Ukrainians who were loyal to Emperor 
and state. Without scruple as to its means, as it has always 
been, the Russian government did not hesitate to carry its cam- 
paign against the Ukrainian movement into Austrian territory. 
With Russian money and supported by the Pan-Polish Podolian 
group, which was all-powerful in the Polish Club, the Russophile 
movement now took up work in Galicia with redoubled strength, 
and prepared the way, especially through a wide-spread spy sys- 
tem, for a military attack by Russia. 

The Slavic Congress in Petrograd in May, 1908, had brought 
together the radical and conservative parties in the field of Pan- 
Slavic politics. Soon after, it even came to a certain distribu- 
tion of work between the two groups. The Conservatives, 
whose center of agitation lay in the old Pan-Slavic Charity As- 
sociation and in the new Galician-Russian Society, prepared the 
way for a Russian invasion of Galicia by means of treasonable 
corruption through generously expended money and agitators 
and in the portions of M>^ravia adjoining Galicia by means 



MODERN GERMANY 401 

of Russian farmers (?) sent thither ostensibly for learning in- 
tensive agriculture. The radical parties, on the other hand, 
whose center was the Moscow Society for Slavic Civilization 
and whose mouthpiece was the Moskovskij Jezenedelnik of 
Prince Eugene Trubeczkoi, operated more discreetly. Their aim 
was, by satisfying Polish desires in Russia, to win over to the 
side of Russia, through Pan-Polish influence, the Austrian Poles, 
and especially the latter's representatives in the Austrian Par- 
liament and in the Austro-Hungarian "delegation," in order 
that these, together with those Czechish and South-Slavic par- 
liamentarians already ''bagged" by Russia, might cripple Austria- 
Hungary. It was hoped in this manner to disrupt the alliance 
between Austria-Hungary and Germany, and to render diffi- 
cult and to delay Austria's military preparations, if not, indeed, 
to defeat them. These final aims are clearly revealed in the 
controversy between Prince Eugene Trubeczkoi and the feuille- 
toniste Mensikov in the Novoje Vremja, in the course of which 
Trubeczkoi made this noteworthy remark: 

"Publicists of the stamp of Mensikov regard the rapproche- 
ment of Russia and the Poles as a sentimental dream. In re- 
ality it is the only practical policy. It is the sole means for par- 
alyzing our most dangerous enemy in Europe — namely, Austria 
— and for rendering a conflict with her impossible. To make 
friends with the Poles means for Russia to draw all the Slavic 
races of Austria over to her side and to transform them all into 
allies." 1 

The Russo-Polish reconciliation was planned to take place 
on neutral territory, in Prague, at a Pan-Slavic preliminary 
congress held in July, 1908. This result, however, was not 
achieved. Even the Pan-Polish partisans left the Prague Con- 
gress disillusioned. Austria's hospitality, however, was taken 
advantage of by one of the participants. Count Vladmir Bob- 
rinskij, a member of the Duma, to agitate in East Galicia on 
the journey home against the Monarchy and to form connec- 
tions for a system of military espionage. The first chilling frost 
soon fell upon the young Pan-Slavic movement, which its prime 
movers in the Liberal camp w^ere fond of calling the "Neo- 
Slavic" movement, since the old Pan-Slavic movement was too 
much discredited among the West and South Slavs as being 
Pan-Russian, and perhaps also because in this way it was hoped 
to mislead the Austrian government. 

The outbreak of the Young Turk revolution was hastened 
by the meeting in Reval in May, 1908. In July, 1908, the 

"^Moskovskij Jezenedelnik, 19 lo, Number 27, Column 4. 



402 MODERN GERMANY 

Young Turks obtained the revival of the Turkish Constitution 
of the year 1876. Induced by false friends, they sought also 
to renew Bosnia's relation as vassal to the Porte, by calling rep- 
resentatives of that country to the Turkish parliament. The 
result of this w^as Austria's annexation policy in the autumn of 
1908. Public opinion in Russia became greatly excited, as the fact 
had never been made known that in previous years Russia herself 
had several times given her consent to this purely formal act. 
The Serbian agitation in Russia occurred at this moment, and 
was an added cause of excitement. True to the principles of 
Neo-Slavism, the Czechs, the Pan-Poles and the Slovenes should 
have opposed this declaration of annexation in the legislative 
bodies. But some members lacked the necessary courage, and 
they contented themselves with discordant declarations, while 
others, such as the Pan-Poles, supported the Crown. This dis- 
appointment may also have been a factor in the conciliatory atti- 
tude of Russia's Foreign Minister, P. A. Izvolskij, at the end 
of the annexation crisis. 

Although Aehrenthal, on the occasion of the meeting in Buch- 
lau as early as September, 1908, had gained Izvolskij 's consent 
to the annexation, in return for which Austria was to agree to 
the opening of the Dardanelles for Russia's warships, Izvolskij 
kept this secret on account of the high tide of the Pan-Slavic 
movement, and he immediately assumed the leading part in the 
diplomatic action of England, France and Russia against the 
annexation. His ambition was painfully disappointed by Eng- 
land's refusal to agree to the opening of the Dardanelles; he 
thus saw himself robbed of the important compensation which 
Aehrenthal had promised him, while the Austro-Hungarian 
Minister threatened to make sure of his share in the deal. De- 
spite the fact that the director of the archives of his ministry, Gor- 
jainow, had published in 1907 the chief points of the Reichstadt 
Agreement (1870) and that of Ofen-Pest (1877), in his book 
''Bosphorus and Dardanelles," Izvolskij went to Buchlau without 
knowing anything of these treaties and their contents.^ Al- 
though later he learned of this obligation of Russia toward 
Austria-Hungary in connection with the possession of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, nevertheless he encouraged the defiant atti- 
tude of Serbia and Montenegro, w-hich lacked all justification, 
and demanded the surrender of certain portions of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to these two states. But since Russia was not in 
the position to back up with the sword the policy which Izvolskij 
had inaugurated against the Dual Monarchy, mainly in com- 

1 Zapiski Ignatjeva, Historischer Bote, February, 1914, p. 456. 



MODERN GERMANY 403 

mon with England but partly also with Italy, Petrograd found 
itself forced to draw in its horns following a plain hint from 
Berlin. At the end of March, 1909, the diplomatic campaign 
which Izvolskij had begun in October, 1908, ended with a 
painful defeat for Russian prestige. But since it was only a 
diplomatic defeat and the military inferiority of Russia, Serbia 
and Montenegro was not taken advantage of by the other side 
in order once and for all to render the existence of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy safe in the South, Russia gave full reign 
to her enmity toward Austria-Hungary. 

The great uproar caused in Italy by the annexation and the 
ambiguous attitude of the Italian government, which had made 
secret preparations for war against Austria-Hungary for the 
spring of 1909, drew Russia's attention to this ally. In the late 
autumn of 1909 the Czar paid his return visit in Racconigi, on 
which occasion he ostentatiously made a wide detour in order 
to avoid Austrian soil. A secret understanding seems to have 
been reached at this time between Russia and Italy against 
Austria-Hungary, which inaugurated Russia's betrayal of the 
South Slavs, whom she surrendered to Italy, and Italy's dire 
treachery toward her ally. Italy's open breach with her previ- 
ous friends, however, was not desired, for, according to the view 
of a French diplomat which Prince Trubeczkoi quotes with 
praise, "Italy, in case she openly joined the Triple Entente, 
might, without becoming more useful, make demands on her 
new associates to which at present she has no right." ^ 

Russia was angry, and was ready in any possible manner to 
make up for the blow to her prestige as the guardian power of 
the Slavs and for her failure in the Dardanelles question. The 
Pan-Slavic movement, secretly encouraged by the Russian gov- 
ernment, continued its accustomed activity. Meetings in Petro- 
grad alternated with meetings in Sofia and Prague. The Rus- 
sian government even allowed itself to be officially represented 
in the Pan-Slavic Sokol Congress in Prague, in the spring of 
19 1 2, by Sebjakov, assistant to the Minister of Public Instruc- 
tion. So certain was it of itself that on Austrian soil and in 
the presence of representatives of the Austrian government, it 
gave this support to the Sokols, who were determined to help ruin 
the Austrian Monarchy, internally and externally. Although 
warnings enough were heard even at that time, yet the world 
war of 19 1 4 first revealed the importance of these organizations 
in the plans of Russia and Serbia. For the rest, Czech, Pan- 

1 Russia a^ a Great Power, Prince S. Trubeczkoi, p. 122 ff. 



404 MODERN GERMANY 

Polish and Russophile members of the Austrian Parliament saw 
to Russia's interests in the name of Pan-Slavic brotherhood. 

In order to advance Russian aims in the Balkans, Izvolskij 
made another attempt to found a Balkan League, with Turkey 
in the lead, as the latter country at the time played a part in 
his calculations owing to the unfriendly attitude of the Young 
Turks toward Austria. This Balkan League was intended as 
a wall against the Dual Monarchy. In order to render the 
combination possible, Izvolskij demanded that Serbia and Bul- 
garia inform the Porte of their disinterestedness in Macedonia. 
As the Bulgarian government neither could nor would give such 
an assurance, the plan came to naught. But the idea, in an- 
other form, was taken up again two years later (1911) by 
Czarykov, the Russian Ambassador at the Golden Horn. In 
return for the opening of the straits to Russian men-of-war, 
Russia offered to assume, single-handed, the protection of the 
Porte against her own greedy proteges in the Balkans (Serbia 
and Bulgaria) and to guarantee the safety of the Dardanelles 
against a coup on the part of Italy. 

Encouraged by the signs of internal disintegration in Turkey, 
as manifested in the Albanian revolt and in dissensions among 
the Turkish officers, Italy had considered the moment oppor- 
tune for seizing Tripoli in time of peace, as the country was 
stripped of troops. Since the Turks could not possibly acqui- 
esce in this act of piracy, Italy declared war on the Porte at the 
end of September, 191 1. Czarykov considered the moment fa- 
vorable for putting through a new edition of the Hunkiar- 
Iskelessi treaty of 1833, the acceptance of which would have 
been tantamount to the setting up of a Russian protectorate 
over Turkey. The resistance of Turkey and the disapproval 
manifested in Bulgaria brought about the failure of Czary- 
kov's plans and caused their disavowal by Petrograd. 

Russian politicians, however, were in no way embarrassed. 
The opportunity was all too favorable for Turkey's enemies 
to profit by the Turko-Italian War for their own purposes. 
Thanks to the war, Russian diplomacy was at last successful in 
bringing about a union of the previous rivals and enemies, 
Serbia and Bulgaria, which was directed equally against Austria- 
Hungary, Turkey and Rumania, and which was soon joined 
by Montenegro and Greece. The 13th of March, 19 12, was 
for Russian diplomacy a day full of promise, as it was then 
successful, against all the efforts of its enemies, in creating a 
weapon which permitted its politicians and army leaders to 
await in the background the moment favorable for interfer- 



MODERN GERMANY 405 

ence. It was, perhaps, not the Intention of Russian diplomacy 
to turn this weapon in the first instance against the Porte. But 
the fear on the part of the Balkan states, lusting for the 
Turkish possessions, lest the favorable moment pass without 
being utilized, drove them to declare war against Turkey in 
the autumn of 1912. The Russian diplomats were most skill- 
ful in denying all responsibility for this war and in protecting 
the Balkan League in the rear, on the pretext of maintaining 
the status quo and the territorial disinterestedness of the Great 
Powers — that is to say, primarily Austria-Hungary. The main 
object, of course, was to secure freedom of movement for Rus- 
sia's vassal, Serbia, so as to enable her to expand freely and 
strengthen herself for her future task: participation in the de- 
struction of Austria-Hungary. This part of the Russo-Serb 
program suffered defeat, it is true, owing to the determination 
of Austria-Hungary not to grant to Serbia access to the Ad- 
riatic by annexing Albania, in which determination she was 
upheld not alone by her loyal ally, Germany, but also by Italy, 
who had long had her eyes fixed on Valona and South Albania. 

As Serbia now looked for compensation in Macedonia, quar- 
rels arose between the allies in regard to the booty which they 
had taken from the Porte. The task of Russian diplomacy was 
like that of squaring the circle. It was a question of satisfy- 
ing Bulgaria and Serbia at the same time. The Russian min- 
ister in Belgrade, Hartwig, knowing that thus only could he 
hold Serbia to her allegiance to Russia, had made promises to 
her a long time before which Sassonov was forced to ratify, willy- 
nilly. The Czar strove to preserve the Balkan League through 
the exercise of his personal influence, and on May 26, 19 13 (O. 
S.), he sent a telegram proclaiming Russia as the only court 
of last resort for the whole of Slavdom. Austria-Hungary 
saw herself compelled to announce through the Hungarian 
Premier, Count Tisza, that she was not prepared to recognize 
this protectorate. Neither was this appeal of the Czar well 
received in Sofia or in Belgrade. At the end of June, 191 3, 
war broke out between Bulgaria and her previous allies, Serbia 
and Montenegro, putting a final end to the Balkan League. 
This was an even worse defeat for Russia than her failure in 
the Albanian and Scutari questions, and one which deprived her 
of a weapon that she had prepared primarily only against 
Austria-Hungary. The effect was most evident in the violent 
attack which Pan-Slavic circles in Russia made on Russian 
diplomacy. 

Right at the start of the Balkan War, in the autumn of 



4o6 MODERN GERMANY 

19 1 2, the Pan-Slavic movement had begun in Russia w^ith re- 
newed force. The peculiar attitude of the parliamentarian rep- 
resentatives of the Czechs and Slovenes in the Austrian and fed- 
eral administrative bodies — not to speak of the South Slavs — 
appeared to these circles as a sign that the moment had ar- 
rived to destroy Austria-Hungary. At this very time treatises 
were published by Russian military writers which sought to 
prove that half the Austro-Hungarian army might be regarded 
as negligible, since it consisted of Slavs who had no interest in 
fighting against Russia. Austria-Hungary, they said, was the 
most helpless state next to Turkey. Russian diplomacy, there- 
fore, need not show the least consideration for Austria-Hun- 
gary.^ Even before this the Russian senator, Grigorij Evreinov, 
had prophesied in a brochure the early disintegration of the 
Dual Monarchy as an anti-national state, and had demanded 
that Russia announce, in addition to her unshakable solidarity 
with the great Slavic world, her intention to utilize every op- 
portunity of an international nature to unite Bosnia, Herze- 
govina and the Sandjak with Serbia and Montenegro.^ 

"For the removal of the anti-national state, Austria-Hun- 
gary," says Evreinov obscurely, ''there are at work for Russia 
the providential forces of the progressive evolution toward a 
union of racially related people." 

He becomes clearer when he says that he cannot enter into 
details as to how Russia can hasten this process by clever 
policy. Evreinov seeks also to prove that the Triple Entente 
is from a material standpoint stronger than the Dreibundj quite 
irrespective of the position of Italy, which in case of armed 
conflict intends to play the part of a tertius gaudens. The 
most violent instigation against Austria-Hungary was indulged 
in at the Slavish banquets in Petrograd, which were presided 
over in person by General Skugarevskij and at which the editor 
of the Government Messenger, Basmakov, an official personage, 
played a prominent part. The government, however, did not 
lose sight of its own interest on account of this Pan-Slavic 
movement, which outwardly pretended to be so altruistic. The 
Galician Russian Society, with Count Vladimir Bobrinskij, one 
of the most prominent nationalist leaders of the Duma, at its 
head, with the assistance of certain dignitaries of the Russian 
church, such as Archbishop Antonij of Volhynia, who were 

1 "The Military-Political Position of Russia," by General Parensov, in 
Slavanskija Isvestija, No. 8, of January 6-19, 1910; "The Austro-Hungarian 
Army," by Colonel Potocldj, in Okrainy Rossij, No. 45, November 10-23, 1912, 
p. 640. 

^ Ideologija bliznevostocnego voprosa, Petrograd, 191 1. 



MODERN GERMANY 407 

eager to proselyte, began to speak of the oppressed condition of 
"Russian Macedonia" — that is to say, Galicia — in which the 
non-existent Russians were alleged to be exposed to the greatest 
maltreatment. 

The real reason was, as a matter of fact, that the Rus- 
sian government and nationalistic circles had for years noted 
with disapproval the Ukrainian population of Austria making 
notable advance and the Austrian government aiding its ef- 
forts, although not adequately or consistently. If the unity of 
the Russian race in Russia, which w^as outwardly maintained 
only through the most ruthless oppression of the White Rus- 
sians and the Little Russians (Ukrainians) as regards their na- 
tional characteristics, was threatened with destruction through 
the upgrowth of a powerful cultural Ukrainian nucleus on 
Austrian soil, there was only one way in w^hich to stamp out 
this danger, and that w^as through the annexation of this ter- 
ritory by Russia. More than once during the course of the 
Balkan crisis it appeared as if Russia was about to declare war 
on Austria under the pressure of this movement. But, although 
Russia, before the outbreak of the Balkan War, under the pre- 
tense of a trial mobilization, had drawn together large masses 
of troops on the Galician frontier, she nevertheless did not feel 
herself well enough prepared for this difficult task. Moreover, 
France and England did not yet seem ready to cooperate in the 
task. Russian preparation for so serious an undertaking was 
probably not considered sufficient in Paris and London. In 
Pan-Slavic circles, however, this abstention of Russia was re- 
garded as cowardice on the part of Russian diplomacy. 

Under these circumstances, it is explicable that the peace 
which came to Europe late in the summer of 19 13 through 
the Treaty of Bucharest, proved only a preparation for war. 
Although Russian diplomacy — that is to say, Sassonov — had 
sought as early as 19 10 in the Potsdam agreement to renew 
the friendly relations with Berlin which Izvolskij had scorned, 
the efforts were soon abandoned. Perhaps this was only a hint 
to London and Berlin, and at the same time a paying out of 
France for her attitude during the annexation crisis, which may 
not have sufficiently met Russia's expectations of what was 
incumbent on an ally. Sassonov changed his attitude toward 
Germany, however, when the latter country called a halt on 
Russian diplomacy, which, with its customary willful inter- 
pretation of the Peace of San Stefano and of the Congress of 
Berlin, sought to secure a firm footing in Armenia, or at least 



4o8 MODERN GERMANY 

to make use of the Armenian question as an excuse for Inter- 
ference at any time, as In Macedonia. 

The mission of LIman von Sanders, late In the autumn of 
19 1 3? gave Russia the opportunity to let loose all the latent 
anti-German animosity of the Russian press. Any strength- 
ening of the Porte, and especially of the defenses of the Straits, 
ran counter to the plans of Russian statesmen. It was well 
known that the English Naval Commission would take no 
measures to Improve the Turkish fleet, but on the contrary was 
expected to serve as a check and procrastinating force as re- 
gards Turkish naval preparedness. Therefore, the recall of 
von Sanders and the German oflScers was demanded, and as 
Russia's wishes did not meet with the proper response, the de- 
cision was taken, probably before the completion of the strategic 
railways, to attack Austria-Hungary and Germany. At all 
events, the preparations for mobilization In Russia began very 
early in the year 191 4. Time was an Important question, also, 
as France was not In condition and did not intend long to bear 
the burden of the three-year service. The most important 
consideration, however, was that England — that is to say, pri- 
marily Sir Edward Grey — expressed a readiness to fight on the 
side of Russia and France. One of the chief promoters of the 
present World War, the Russian ex-diplomat, Branczaninov, 
who encouraged the war sentiment in Russia through a daily 
newspaper and who belonged to the Liberal wing of the Pan- 
Slavlst party. Intimated In his weekly paper, after a visit to Grey, 
that England was ready to fight by Russia's side. 

War, he said, offered for England (that is for the British 
government) a way of escape from the Internal difficulties of 
the Home Rule question ; a victory of the fleet under the Lib- 
eral government would secure its position for a long time to 
come. 

''They know this, but with the peculiar hypocrisy of English- 
men they mention It only in friendly Intercourse, secretly as it 
were, and not as naive people like M. Sassonov might desire, 
officially in black and white, with their signatures and seals at- 
tached. Is It not strange to think that, on account of the Irish 
question, within a month and a half to two months Europe 
will be involved in a general way?" ^ 

This was written on March 18, 19 14 — three months before 
the outrage in Serajevo. It is explicable that Russia, follow- 
ing this assurance of English assistance, hastened to bring on 
the conflict, if for no other reason than on account of her own 

^ Novoye Zveno, 1914, No. 13, p, 407. 



MODERN GERMANY 409 

Internal complications that threatened a revolution, as Miljukov 
informs us. That the projected attack on the Austrian Crown 
Prince was known in Russia's official circles cannot be 
absolutely proved. But there are many indications that this 
occurrence did not find Russia's leading men entirely unpre- 
pared. In this manner it was intended to bring Austria-Hun- 
gary into a critical position, and either force her into war 
against Serbia, or, if she drew back, to cause her to be crushed 
by universal contempt. The attitude of the Serbian govern- 
ment and of the Serbian press immediately following the out- 
rage showed that Russia had quieted Serbia's fears as to the 
results of the awful crime. When Austria-Hungary finally de- 
cided, after a display of too great patience, energetically to put 
an end w^th armed force to the Serbian intrigues on her soil, 
Russia had the excuse for war which she had so long sought. 
Her aim was, to be sure, not the protection of Serbia, but 
the destruction of the Dual Monarchy and the weakening and 
humiliating of Germany. But it was important to act quickly 
so as not again to miss the favorable opportunity. 

England and France must not be given too long a time for 
consideration, nor must there be a possibility of localizing the 
struggle and of diplomatic settlement. This is to be read in 
every line of the Russian Orange Book, despite its falsity. The 
English, too, jealous of Germany's growing commercial and 
naval power, believed that the moment had come to crush Ger- 
many and Austria-Hungary. Instead of checking the Russian 
desire for w^ar, as they had done before. Sir Edward Grey and 
his immediate cooperator stimulated it, not only in Petrograd 
directly but also by way of Paris. Encouraged in this manner, 
Russia proceeded to general mobilization, without awaiting the 
result of the Austro-Russian negotiations in Petrograd, and 
although Austria-Hungary had only eight corps mobilized 
against Serbia. 

That this meant war with Germany had long been clearly 
known in Petrograd. The British Ambassador, Buchanan, had 
so informed Sassonov at the beginning of the crisis. But war 
was desired in Petrograd, because success was thought to be 
certain. And so the war came about. The Russian govern- 
ment will before long have to answer for this to its ow^n people, 
beyond the circle of the Pan-Slavist fanatics, when it fails to 
accomplish the destruction of Austria-Hungary and Turkey. 
But in the consciousness of the justice of their cause, Germany, 
Austria-Hungary and Turkey will emerge with increased 
strength from the conflict forced upon them. 



CHAPTER V 
SERBIA'S ROLE 

PROFESSOR HANS UEBERSBERGER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 

VIENNA 

WHEN in 1690 the Patriarch, Arsenije HI, Crnojevich of 
Ipek, with 100,000 Serbs, placed himself under the 
protection of Emperor Leopold I, it might reasonably have been 
expected that the destiny of the whole Serbian nation was for- 
ever united with Austria. That this did not prove to be the 
case was due in part to mistakes made by the Vienna govern- 
ment in the religious field, but the principal reason was that 
before many years had passed Russia had begun her undermin- 
ing work among the Austrian Serbs. Vienna drove the Serbs 
into the arms of Peter the Great, and the Czar immediately 
seized the opportunity of creating a firm basis for Russian influ- 
ence in the interior of Austria. Since the use of the Cyrillic, or 
Slavic, alphabet in printing was forbidden, as constituting a 
dangerous threat to the Catholic Church, the Serbian bishops 
turned to Russia for teachers and books, and during the last 
years of his reign Peter the Great sought to satisfy their de- 
mands. Russian teachers began to w^ork among the popula- 
tion in the Hungarian-Slavonian borderland. Aside from the 
fact that previous to Lomonosov, the Slavonian-Russian lan- 
guage which now began to spread by books and teachers among 
the Serbs, was adapted to its task neither from a linguistic nor 
literary point of view, this influence was deleterious in other 
ways to the spiritual development of the Serbs. There arose 
that Slavonic-Serbian literary language which, under Russian 
influence, became further and further separated from the living 
speech of the people and which created a chasm betu^een the 
educated and the uneducated classes of the Serbian population. 
As permission for founding a Serbian printing establishment 
in Austria was not to be obtained, one was set up in Venice 
in 1758, thanks to Russian assistance. Unfortunately, the dis- 
approval with which Vienna regarded the sending of books 
from Russia did not lead it to draw the proper conclusions re- 
garding its own acts. It continued to consider the furnish- 
ing of intellectual nourishment to its Serbian subjects as be- 
yond the province of the state, and not until the end of the 

410 



MODERN GERMANY 411 

eighteenth century was a printing establishment founded in 
Vienna for "Illyrian" books. 

A further factor was the peculiar position of the Serb immi- 
grants. The rest of the population assumed toward them the 
unfriendly attitude of a privileged, exclusive class. Previous 
to the Peace of Belgrade (1739), when the Pashalik of Bel- 
grade belonged to Austria, a systematic policy in the highest 
court circles regarding the Serbs was altogether lacking. As a 
consequence, the Serbs generally succeeded only through cunning 
and tenacity in obtaining their desires. When, however, under 
Maria Theresa, as the result of political developments, Hun- 
garian influence gained in strength, dissatisfaction increased 
among the Serbian population, especially among the officers of 
the frontier regiments formed from Serbs. 

Russia, which since the accession of the Czarina Elizabeth 
had been notably active in the role of protector of the Greek 
Oriental peoples, and especially of the Serbs, made an effort in 
the early fifties — through discontented officers of the border 
regiments to whom the most enticing promises w^ere held out 
— to induce the Serbs in Hungary to emigrate into Russia. 
They were to settle between the Bug and the Dnieper, in so- 
called New Serbia, as an advance guard against Turkey. This 
plan w^as partly successful. But as the Vienna government put 
a prompt stop to the emigration in the interest of the Empire's 
protection and as furthermore the settlers in Russia suffered 
bitterly, the movement came to a sudden end. 

Of great importance, however, was the affection felt by the 
Austrian Serbs for Russia, and the strong influence of Russian 
teachers, Russian literature and the Slavonic-Serbian literary 
language. And yet to Austrian weapons alone was due Serbian 
freedom and the creation of a national center. The foundation 
of present-day Serbia was laid by the Austrian administration 
of the Pashalik of Belgrade from 171 8 to 1739, without which 
the revolt of 1804 would have been impossible. When Kara- 
george and the other leaders of the revolt sought to place them- 
selves under Austria's protection, only to find the door closed 
against them owing to Vienna's attitude on the question of Tur- 
key's sovereign rights, the spiritual head of the Austrian Serbs, 
the Metropolitan Stratmirovich, turned to Czar Alexander in his 
celebrated appeal, in which he proposed the formation of a 
Serbian Turkish vassal state under a Russian Grand Duke, 
Austria to surrender her Serbian possessions against indemnifica- 
tion at some other point. 

In Petrograd, despite the friendly relations with the Porte 



412 MODERN GERMANY 

and the treaty which was still in force, less consideration was 
shown for the Sultan's government than was the case in Vienna. 
The revolutionists received encouragement in the form of money, 
and when, two years later, a breach occurred with Constanti- 
nople, a military convention was entered into with them which 
demanded greater sacrifices from the Serbs than was consonant 
with the aid which they received from Russia. In addition, 
the Imperial Councilor, Rodofinikin, appeared in Belgrade as 
chief Russian agent, and soon revealed to the leaders of the 
Serbians, as well as to the people themselves, the most unpleas- 
ant side of the Russian protectorate. In a short time he had 
gained universal hatred for himself, through his ruthless ad- 
vancement of Russian interests, without regard for the suffer- 
ings and dangers of the Serbian nation. Rodofinikin was the 
type of the majority of Russian agents in Serbia. He also was 
the first, in his memorial of November, 1808, to lay down the 
lines of Russian policy for the future. 

Russia, he said, must strengthen her position as sole domi- 
nant power in Serbia for all time to come, in order, in case of 
attack by Austria, to strike the Dual Monarchy in the flank 
through Serbia and through the revolutionary element in the 
adjoining South Slavic Austrian districts. The representatives 
of Russian policy in Serbia, from Rodofinikin to Hartwig, have 
held true to this principle, quite independently of the relations 
between Austria and Russia at any given moment. 

Serbia, however, was betrayed and sacrificed by Russia when- 
ever Russian interests demanded it. This happened in the Peace 
of Bukharest in 1812, when Karageorge was forced to flee from 
Turkish vengeance. When two years later (181 5) Milos Ob- 
renovich again unfurled the standard of revolt and national 
defense that Karageorge had been forced to abandon, he turned 
for help to Vienna. The Congress was then in session, and 
Czar Alexander present. Emperor Francis received the depu- 
tation, and one of the Serbian delegates, the High Priest Mat- 
thias Nenadovich, relates in his memoirs the following charac- 
teristic dialogue: 

"Have you seen the Czar?" suddenly demanded Emperor 
Francis. 

"We have requested an audience, but have not yet been re- 
ceived." replied Nenadovich. 

"Ah, that diabolic policy!" sighed the Emperor. "He be- 
lieves that no one knows the Russian government's activity 
among the Serbs! And why will the Czar not receive you? 



MODERN GERMANY 413 

Perhaps because he is a guest in my castle? That would make 
no difference to me." ^ 

When Milos Obrenovich, by his own strength and without 
foreign help, defeated the Turks, and the grateful nation pro- 
claimed him hereditary Prince of Serbia, the Russian Minister 
at the Porte, Baron Stroganov, immediately protested. Russia 
was decidedly opposed to the creation of a hereditary princi- 
pality in Serbia, since such a form of government might more 
easily escape from Russian influence. Indeed, Russia, the proto- 
type of autocratic power, after the principle of hereditary sov- 
ereignty had become an accomplished fact in Serbia, aimed 
through the creation of a senate to limit the ruler's power. At 
the request of Russia, the Porte agreed in the Constitution of 
1830 that the members of this senate could not be removed 
from their office by the Prince unless it was proved that they 
were involved in guilty actions against the Turkish govern- 
ment. Russia had calculated cleverly; it w^as clear from the 
beginning that a senate whose members enjoyed such rights 
could not fail to live in constant conflict with the Prince. With 
the help of the senate, Russia has always been able to enforce 
her w^ill in Serbia. As Petrograd never forgave Milos for ac- 
quiring the hereditary princely power, everything was done to 
destroy his standing with the Serbian people. Russia created 
her own party by means of gold, and constantly sought, through 
intrigues and force, to have the senate made up of men who 
were her unquestioning tools. She did not even hestiate to 
stir up the Serbian people against their ruler by means of a Rus- 
sian Consul, Vasczenko, who traveled throughout the country, 
carrying on his work of instigation. The new Constitution of 
1839, which deprived the Prince of all power and gave it into 
the hands of the seventeen senators, was Russia's work. There 
was no other course for Milos Obrenovich than to abdicate in 
favor of his eldest son, Michail (June 13, 1839), and to leave 
the country. Nor did Russia rest content until the Obrenovich 
dynasty had been entirely driven out. 

When the Serbian senate elected Alexander Karageorgevich, 
Russia did not recognize the election because it had not taken 
place in the presence of the Russian representative, and it had, 
therefore, to be repeated in the presence of this representative. 
The new dynasty, however, could not meet Russia's constant 
demands and soon lost the Czar's favor. When through the 
Treaty of Paris (Article 28) Serbia, as a vassal state of Turkey, 
was placed under the collective protection of the European 

^ The Serbian Question, by Vladan Georgevitch, p. 19. 



414 MODERN GERMANY 

Powers, Russia's reply was to expel Prince Alexander Kara- 
georgevich. The Serbian National Assembly again placed the 
dynasty of the Obrenovichi on the Serbian throne, and Prince 
Milos returned from exile. After his death, which soon oc- 
curred, his son Michail succeeded him. But Michall, like- 
wise, did not long enjoy Russia's favor. On June 3, 1868, 
the Petrograd newspaper Golos said: 

"The Obrenovichi dynasty is Incapable of carrying out the 
plans for a Slavic future in the peninsula. There is only one 
candidate who Is worthy of mounting Serbia's throne, namely 
Peter Karageorgevich, the son of Alexander Karageorgevlch. 
He must be elevated to the throne of Serbia for the sake of the 
Serbs and of the unhappy Inhabitants of Bosnia, Herzegovina 
and Montenegro." 

A week later, on June 10, 1868, Prince Michall was mur- 
dered in the park of Topchlder. 

Thanks to the presence of mind of the ex-President of the 
Council of Ministers, Ilja Garasanin, and the other Serbian 
officials, Russia this time did not enjoy the fruits of the murder. 
Michail's nephew, Milan, not yet of age, was proclaimed Prince 
by the Serbian National Assembly. From the very beginning 
of his reign he had to reckon on Russia's 111 will. The memoirs 
of General Georji Ivanovich Bobrikov, who as Russian mili- 
tary plenipotentiary was active at Milan's side In 1877, give a 
clear impression of the manner in which Russia ventured to use 
Milan, when, as a result of the disasters at Plevna, Serbian 
assistance against Turkey was badly needed. At this time Rus- 
sia formed her connection with the Serbian Radical party, which 
since Milan's time has remained the representative of Russian 
Interests. Only on Andrassy's intercession did Serbia receive 
Nish and the district of PIrot from the Congress of Berlin, 
Russia not concerning herself either about her Serbian or her 
Montenegrin ally. 

Petrograd's tactics, however, soon after led to directing Ser- 
bia's attention toward Bosnia and Herzegovina, which since 
1876 had so often been offered to Austria-Hungary by Russia 
and with the occupation of which, on the basis of the Congress 
of Berlin, Russia had been thoroughly satisfied. As Milan 
sought support from Austria-Hungary, Russia incited against 
him the politicians of his own party, and they brought about 
a series of revolts. Like his uncle, Michall, Milan up to 1878 
was In favor of the Idea of a Serbian Piedmont, but his experi- 
ences with Russia forced him to abandon this Idea, as only 
Austria-Hungary supported him and his house. When King 



MODERN GERMANY 415 

Milan, after the unfortunate day of Sllvnitza, saw himself 
forced to abdicate in favor of his minor son Alexander, Russia 
had reached the goal for which she had so long striven. King 
Alexander lost favor with his people through his marriage with 
Draga Mashin, which was engineered by Russia. The Rus- 
sian legation was undoubtedly not without responsibility for 
those terrible murders during the night of June 11, 1903. The 
bloodstained throne was now occupied by that Peter Kara- 
georgevich, who had been Russia's candidate in the year 1868. 
With him the Radical party, which was the Russian party, 
gained full power. The chief aim of Serbian politics since that 
June day has been the national liberation of the "unredeemed" 
Serbs in Austria-Hungary and Turkey. 

*'To quiet the unattainable demands of social freedom pro- 
claimed by Serbian Radicalism and in the interest of order in 
the course of internal politics, the government saw itself prac- 
tically forced to make use of the national liberation of the 
^unredeemed' Serbs as a political narcotic." ^ 

In a memorial which the Minister of Foreign Affairs caused 
to be written for King Peter after his accession in March, 1904, 
by the then head of the Propaganda Section of the Ministry, 
Sveta Simich, the program of the immediate future was outlined 
in the following manner: 

1. Alliance with Montenegro. The Prince must undertake 
to carry out a common foreign policy directed by Belgrade. 

2. Agreement with Bulgaria in regard to reforms in Mace- 
donia and Old Serbia. Formation of a customs union for the 
purpose of extending the Serbian economic area. 

3. Economic emancipation from Austro-Hungarian markets; 
definite advancement of the commercial-political interests of 
the Western powers, Russia and Italy, as the best means for 
rendering the Greater Serbian idea popular in Europe. 

4. Advancement of the coalition idea of the small Serbian 
and pro-Serbian parties in Croatia, for the purpose of support- 
ing the Hungarian party of independence in its battle against 
the Throne and Dualism. 

5. Agitation in Bosnia for a union with Serbia. Discredit- 
ing the Austro-Hungarian administration through systematic 
propaganda and encouragement of the discontent of the Ortho- 
dox and Mohammedan population of Bosnia and Herzegovina.^ 

This program meant open warfare with Austria-Hungary. 
The fact that at the moment Russia was involved in the Far 

"^ Oesterreich-Ungarn und Serhien, by Leopold Mandl, Vienna, 1912, p. 12. 
2 Ibid., p. 15 ff. 



4i6 MODERN GERMANY 

East was a cause of serious disquietude. As the result of the 
loyal attitude of Austria-Hungary, however, that which Peter's 
Prime Minister, General Savva Gruich, had feared before the 
outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War did not come to pass. 

"The relations between Russia and Japan have grown so 
strained recently," he wrote on December 27, 1903, "that war 
is now inevitable. I hope, nevertheless, that the Czar, in his 
love of peace, will avoid war, for it would be a disaster not 
only for Russia but also for us Slavs of the Balkans, whose sole 
hope is in Russia's help. There is something disastrous in your 
foreign policy! We fear that Austria, as soon as Russia is 
seriously engaged in the Far East, will finally annex Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and proceed to absorb Old Serbia — beyond the 
Mitrovitze." 

Meanwhile, especially after the tariff war with Austria-Hun- 
gary, an active campaign had been started from Belgrade to stir 
up dissatisfaction in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the other South 
Slavic territories. The Young Turk Revolution (1908) seemed 
to simplify the problem. On the ground of its transformation 
into a constitutional state, the Porte might demand the return 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina; that would later offer the possi- 
bility of taking these states more easily from Turkey than they 
could be taken from Austria-Hungary. This was the opinion in 
Belgrade circles. But when Emperor Francis Joseph announced 
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbian hopes suf- 
fered a collapse, and indignation ran high. Not for an in- 
stant was it admitted either by Serbia or by Russia, the lat- 
ter's protector, that Serbia had no right to interfere in this act, 
and that in any event only the Porte and the signatory powers 
of the Treaty of Berlin were in a position to protest. Through 
his reception of the Serbian Crown Prince George, the Czar 
gave the Serbians plainly to understand that he was on their 
side and that they might rely on him. Only in the light of this 
encouragement can one understand the following speech in the 
Skupshtina by Stojan Protich : 

"As long as Austria-Hungary remains what she is to-day, it 
will be impossible to entertain friendly relations with her. Au- 
stria-Hungary desires to remain a Great Power, but her compo- 
sition renders her the fatherland of a whole series of different 
nationalities with pronounced individuality. Peace and neigh- 
borly relations can exist between us and Austria-Hungary only 
if Austria-Hungary gives up her claim to be a Great Power and 
resigns herself to the role of an Eastern Switzerland." ^ 

1 Oesterreich-Ungarn und Serbien, by Leopold Mandl, Vienna, 1912, p. 15. 



MODERN GERMANY 417 

The Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, Milovanovich, 
indulged in no less unsuitable language in regard to the Dual 
Monarchy : 

"The freedom which the Balkan peoples gained from 18 12 to 
1876 was achieved through Russia, while Austria-Hungary's first 
act in the Balkans was to make slaves of the people of two 
Serbian countries. Danger for the Balkan countries is to be 
apprehended only from Austria-Hungary, and the balance must 
be maintained against Austria-Hungary. The road to the ^gean 
Sea must be blocked for Austria-Hungary. She must cease to 
be a Balkan state. "^ 

The tone which the Serbian press permitted itself toward the 
Monarchy may be guessed after these attacks by responsible 
men. 

Since Russia was not in a position to protect her protege 
against well-deserved punishment, Serbia was forced to beat a 
retreat and to admit in an official declaration, first, that her 
rights were not affected by the annexation, and second, that she 
pledged herself to change the course of her present policy to- 
ward Austria-Hungary, and that in the future she would main- 
tain a friendly attitude. This was on March 13, 1909. But 
this act of penitence was forced and purely outward. As 
Serbia was sure of the support of Russia, who, as Rodofinikin 
had often said, stood in need of her for the destruction of 
Austria-Hungary, she was able quietly to carry out her former 
plans. The Serbian Prime Minister, Stojan Novakovich, dur- 
ing the last weeks of the annexation crisis did not hesitate to 
say in a brochure that the Serbian state "must reach from 
Timok to the Adriatic Sea and from Vardar to Grain among 
the Alps." ^ Russia was the godfather of the Balkan League, 
the foundation of which was laid on March 13, 19 12, in the 
Serbo-Bulgarian treaty. According to Russian plans, this Balkan 
League was to give proof of its efficacy in the struggle against 
Austria-Hungary and by severing the South Slavic districts 
from the Monarchy. It happened otherwise, however. Bul- 
garian interests demanded war against the Porte on account of 
Macedonia, out of which she was later so disgracefully cheated 
by her allies. 

The conflict was still raging; the first disillusionment had 
been experienced through the refusal of Austria-Hungary and 
Italy to grant Serbia access to the Adriatic Sea, in which act 
Russia acquiesced. P. Miljukov, certainly an unimpeachable 

^ Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns seit 1866, by Sosnovsky, 2, p. 205. 
^ Najnovija Balkanska Kriza i Srpsko Pitanje, by Stojan Novakovich, 19 10. 



41 8 MODERN GERMANY 

witness, after a visit to Serbia, wrote that there was no need 
to fear that Serbia w^ould turn to Austria-Hungary as the result 
of Russian acquiescence in the question of the Adriatic harbor. 
The Serbian peasants, who controlled seventy-three seats in 
the Skupshtina, were all Russophile, since the love of Russia 
had not been tested so severely among the Serbian people as in 
Bulgaria. Serbian intellectuals realized that they could do 
nothing but remain Russophile, largely because of their inerad- 
icable hatred of Austria. Logically and politically, Serbian pol- 
iticians regarded a rapprochement with Austria as possible, but, 
psychologically, for the Serbian democracy to side with Austria 
was quite out of the question. No one was afraid of a war 
against Austria, as the Serbs were conscious of their own 
strength. War was not desired at the moment only because 
time was wished for in which to complete the preparations which 
had been successfully begun after 1909. Encouraged by success, 
the Serbs would proceed to even bolder schemes. No one could 
tell when this struggle with Austria would come, whether in 
five or fifteen years, but that it would come every one was con- 
vinced. The question of "war or peace" was answered for 
Serbia by "Peace for a new war." ^ 

The restive forces of Belgrade gathered around the Crown 
Prince and in the "Narodna Obrana" precipitated this war. 
The outrage of June 28, 19 14, against the Austrian heir ap- 
parent and his consort was intended to furnish the prerequisite 
for the favorable outcome of the struggle, toward which Rus- 
sia, well prepared for war, lent her influence. In 19 10 the 
Russian ex-Minister of War, Kuropatkin, in his work, "Tasks 
for the Russian Army," had written the prophetic words: 

"On the basis of the estimate of Austria's interests in the 
Balkan Peninsula, in Chapter XV the conclusion was reached 
that, as early as the second half of the eighteenth century, it 
became apparent as regards Russia's plans in the Balkans that 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Russian 
sphere of action and influence must be limited to the eastern 
half of the Peninsula; this was tantamount to an acknowl- 
edgment that the western half of the Peninsula, which is in- 
habited by the Serbian race, belonged to the Austrian sphere 
of influence. 

"These lessons of history, however, were quickly forgotten 
ty the Russian government, and in the early years of the 
nineteenth century Russia's interference began in the affairs of 
the Serbian inhabitants of Turkey, which has not ceased even 

'^Retschj, No. 5, January 6-19, 1913. 



MODERN GERMANY 419 

to-day. This interference in the course of the nineteenth and 
the first years of the twentieth century is the chief cause of the 
distrustful and at times inimical relations between Russia and 
Austria. If Russia does not cease this interference in a mat- 
ter foreign to her and which at the same time touches Austria's 
vital interests, a war may be expected between Russia and 
Austria in the twentieth century on account of the Serbian 
question." ^ 

Kuropatkin has been proved to be right. Since the Czar did 
not think it necessary to condemn the infamous outrage, re- 
sponsibility for which in Belgrade was laid by the judicial in- 
vestigation on circles near Crown Prince Alexander, it cannot be 
surprising, in view of this attitude, that he considered the repara- 
tion "disgraceful" which Austria-Hungary found herself forced 
to demand, sword in hand. He held his protecting hand over 
the Belgrade ruling classes, who were implicated in the royal 
murders, and prepared for the attack on the Dual Monarchy. 

^ Zadacsi russkoj armij, Vol. 2, p. 334 ff. 



CHAPTER VI 
THE GREAT POWERS IN EAST ASIA 

PROFESSOR OTTO FRANKE, OF THE COLONIAL INSTITUTE 
OF HAMBURG 

IN order to understand rightly the position of the Great Pow- 
ers in East Asia before and during the war, it is necessary to 
study them in connection with the developments of the last 
twenty years. The year 1894, the beginning of the Japanese- 
Chinese War, is the natural starting-point, for this date marks 
the opening of the latest period in the history of the Interna- 
tional relations of the countries of the Far East among them- 
selves and of other countries to them. Up to that time the 
interests of the Occidental Powers in China had been regarded 
as directed toward one identical aim of commercial policy and 
had consequently been handled in common. But from that 
period on, there is a parting of the ways by which the Powers, 
singly or In groups, tried to attain their goals. These goals 
were as divergent as were the nature and extent of the posses- 
sions of the various Powers from which they had resulted. 
England's sole colonial possession on the East Asiatic coast was 
the island of Hongkong, which she had acquired, together with 
the desired control of the opium trade, by the Peace of Nan- 
king in 1842, but In addition she possessed in all the more im- 
portant cities of China, national settlements in which her offi- 
cials not only conducted the administration but exercised, in a 
limited degree, legal jurisdiction over the Chinese. Further, 
thanks to her dominant position, she avowedly regarded herself 
In East Asia, more even than elsewhere, as the real arbiter of 
nations.^ Although in China proper up to that time England 
had given no hint of other plans than such as concerned her 
commercial interests, in the Chinese vassal states toward the 
west she had operated all the more energetically from India as a 
base. 

In the year 1885, the Viceroy of India sent a military force 
to Burmah, which was under Chinese suzerainty. In reply to 
her protest, China received the customary answer that her rights 
would be fully respected ; yet at the same time the King of Bur- 

1 See The Far Western Question, Valentine Chirol, p. 3 ff. 

420 



MODERN GERMANY 421 

mah was sent as a prisoner to Calcutta and the country de- 
clared by the Viceroy as "incorporated into the possessions of 
Her Britannic Majesty." In the Agreement of Peking, 1886, 
England undertook to see that the embassy bearing tribute due 
to China every ten years be regularly sent. The members of the 
embassy were all to be Burmese! Yet a considerable time pre- 
viously the Anglo-Indian government had stretched out its feel- 
ers toward the north, in order to bring the border states of the 
Himalayas under its control and thus gain possession of the 
Thibet plateau, which, as Lord Curzon later characterized ft, 
is "the glacis of the Indian fortress." Every step here was an 
encroachment on the undeniable sovereign rights of China; this 
was done with less hesitation, as China's military weakness pre- 
vented her from defending her possessions. 

Nepal — the home of the Gurkhas — had become a dependency 
of India since the war of 1814, although, in order to preserve 
a semblance of China's suzerainty, embassies were still allowed 
to proceed thence to Peking to pay tribute — the last of these 
embassies from Nepal appeared in China in 1887. In the year 
1835 the Indian government had taken over the district of Dar- 
jeeling, east of Nepal, by pensioning the prince; and in 1861, 
Sikkim, which adjoined it on the east, was incorporated, partly 
at first, into the Indian possessions, since "the fact of British 
ascendency and the situation of Sikkim in a direct line between 
Calcutta and Lhassa could not but suggest its adaptability as a 
highway for trade between the two regions." ^ Not until the Cal- 
cutta Agreement of 1890 was the British protectorate over Sik- 
kim recognized, but the regulation of the Indo-Thibetan "trade" 
— and this was the important point for the Indian government in 
the development of its further designs on Thibet — was reserved 
for later negotiation. For the time being Bhutan, a depend- 
ency of Thibet and hence of China, and which adjoins Sikkim 
and controls the passes to the highlands, was left undisturbed. 

In the manner of England in the southwestern borderlands of 
China, France, in the course of the nineteenth century, had 
formed in the southern districts on the peninsula of Farther 
India a broad foundation for her policy of force. As early as 
1787, under the stimulus and with the assistance of the Catholic 
Mission at Versailles, a treaty had been made with Annam, ac- 
cording to which certain strongholds in Cochin-China were to 
be ceded to France for assistance given. From this point as a 
basis, although seventy years later, the expansion of the French 
power toward the north was made, "in the interest" of the king- 

1 China and Her Neighbours, R. S. Gundry, p. 395. 



422 MODERN GERMANY 

dom of Annam and of its "rights" — after the territory of Saigon 
had been conquered in 1862 and Annam thereby reduced to the 
position of a helpless tool. In 1867 Cambodia, ostensibly a vas- 
sal state of Annam, was "protected" against the claims of Slam 
and placed under French protection; in 1874 a treaty was made 
with Annam itself in which the French protectorate was not yet 
clearly announced, it is true, but at least foreshadowed. These 
measures called forth energetic protests, not only from China, 
to which country Annam stood in a tributary relation, but they 
also caused a great outcry in England, who then as now con- 
sidered the disregard of the rights of others as her exclusive 
privilege.^ The relations with China became more critical in 
the year 1882, when France proceeded with military force 
against Tonkin, in the extreme north of Annam, and took pos- 
session of the country. The following year the entire kingdom 
of Annam was declared under the protection of France. In 
order to put an end once and for all to China's resistance to 
these infringements of her rights, France decided on military 
measures: in 1884 war resulted, and in the peace of 1885 China 
gave the assurance that she would withdraw her troops from 
Tonkin and recognize all French treaties with Annam. France 
in return promised "to respect the southern boundaries between 
China and Tonkin and to protect them against the attack of any 
other nation and under all conditions." ^ 

Therewith France had created for herself the desired great 
colonial empire, which left Slam as the only independent state 
on the peninsula of Farther India. But at the same time 
France had become the immediate neighbor of China proper, 
and this fact may not have been without influence on the deci- 
sion which the Indian government reached at this time In regard 
to Burmah. Both European Powers had now a Chinese fron- 
tier. In each case in the Province of Yunnan, and they were 
neighbors; both saw the possibility of advancing their interest at 
this point. In the same direction toward the rich district of the 
upper Yangtse, and thence farther east; and both were aware 
that their ambitions might lead to dangerous clashes. 

The American minister. Colonel Denby, who in 1889, soon 
after these events, undertook a journey through southern Man- 
churia, declared after his return that "the extensive borderlands 
in the north and west of the Chinese Empire would some day 

1 Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales, H. 
Cordier, Vol. II, p. 299: "Les criailleries du gouvernement anglais." 

2 Ibid., pp. 435 and 523. 



MODERN GERMANY 423 

In all likelihood suffer the same fate as Burmah and Tonkin." 
Russia was at that time the cause of such fears. 

Russia's desire for expansion Into Chinese territory was also 
of ancient date. The conqueror of Siberia had pressed forward 
in the seventeenth century Into the Amur regions and northern 
Manchuria, till through the treaty of Nerchinsk, in the year 
1689, ar» end was put to further conquests. Not until one hun- 
dred and seventy years later did a new active policy begin at 
this point. In 1858 advantage was taken of the Franco-English 
war against China to bring the northern bank of the Amur 
River, and in i860 the entire coast district as far as the Tumen 
River and to the borders of Corea, Into Russian possession; thus 
entire northern and middle Manchuria was surrounded by the 
territory of the Czar. In 1872 the Russian naval port was 
transferred from Nicolalevsk to the more southerly Vladivostock. 
But Russian activity w^as not limited to the Amur territories. 
The great Mohammedan revolt under Yakub Beg In Turkestan 
at the middle of the nineteenth century induced Russia In 1871 
to occupy the so-called III district, together with Kuldja. In 
the treaty of Livadia In 1879 Russia took advantage of the in- 
capacity of the Chinese negotiators In order to gain possession, 
not alone of the entire III Basin, but In addition to obtain extraor- 
dinary commercial privileges, such as absolutely free trade In the 
whole of Mongolia. The treaty was, in fact, a monstrosity, and 
was rejected by Peking, as was to be expected; In 1881 It was re- 
placed by another treaty, by which the greater part of Turkestan, 
inclusive of Kuldja, was given back to China, but extensive rights 
of a commercial nature were nevertheless left to Russia, such as 
free trade in Mongolia and certain parts of East Turkestan, 
consular representation in a great number of cities In this terri- 
tory, which were otherwise closed to trade, etc. By this treaty 
Russia obtained a highly favored and unique position In the 
northern and northwestern outlying districts of China, from 
which she was In a position at any time to make her influence 
felt In the adjoining provinces of Kansu and Shensi. 

While thus in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
France, England and Russia had laid a foundation in the 
southern, western and northern outlying districts of the Chinese 
Empire for their political power, reaching as far as the border 
of China proper, and which at any suitable time might be ex- 
tended beyond these limits, Japan, the only other Asiatic 
state concerned beside supine China, w^as forced for the moment 
to remain without a share In this development, as she was en- 
tirely occupied in strengthening herself Internally and did not 



424 MODERN GERMANY 

yet understand the far-reaching ambitions of the European Pow- 
ers. In Japan, too, however, the impulse toward expansion was 
soon felt in the interest of strengthening her internal condition. 
In order to give occupation to the Samurai (the noble warrior 
class), who were in a state of unrest, the government undertook 
in the year 1874 a military expedition against the Island of 
Formosa, whose savage inhabitants, it was claimed, had murdered 
Japanese merchants in the previous year. The island belonged 
to China, and had been settled by Chinese in the seventeenth 
century. The government at Peking, therefore, protested, and 
the result was that the families of those murdered received an 
indemnity from China, and Japan's occupation of the island was 
not carried out. Japan then turned to the Liu-Kiu Islands, of 
which she took possession in 1879, on the basis of a pretended 
tributary understanding dating from the year 1609, although the 
islands acknowledged themselves to be vassals of China. China's 
protest remained unnoticed. The real object, however, of Japan's 
desires was now, as it had been for centuries, Corea, a tributary 
state of China by its own acknowledgment. The Chinese govern- 
ment, it is true, had acted in a degree contrary to its own con- 
struction of the situation by allowing Corea to conclude commer- 
cial treaties with several foreign Powers, among others in 1876 
with Japan, who had obtained this end by military pressure. 

According to occidental legal principles, the inevitable logical 
conclusion was that Corea was an independent state and that 
it had been tacitly recognized as such by China; the latter coun- 
try, however, persistently refused to allow such an inference to 
be drawn from these treaties. At all events, in the treaty of 
1876, Japan succeeded in having Corea designated as an "inde- 
pendent state" which "enjoys the same sovereign rights as does 
Japan." As the result of Japanese intrigues, a series of murders 
and disturbances took place in the Corean capital in 1884, so 
that iinally Chinese and Japanese troops had to interfere. In 
tile following year, in a special treaty of Japan with Corea, nor- 
mal relations were reestablished, and a few months later (1885) 
an agreement was reached with China, according to which in 
future disturbances neither China nor Japan was to send 
troops to Corea without a previous mutual understanding. The 
question of China's legal relationship to Corea was not dis- 
cussed and remained open to dispute as before. Japan's plans, 
however, in regard to the Asiatic Continent, which were an in- 
heritance from the past, became more ambitious as the empire 
grew stronger and more conscious of its position in the political 
development of the East. 



i 



MODERN GERMANY 425 

Matters stood thus in the year 1894, when Japan, in further- 
ance of these plans, took advantage of the outbreak of new dis- 
orders in Corea, and of the sending thither of Chinese troops, in 
order to declare war on China. The entire question of the 
division of power and the aspirations of the foreign states in 
East Asia was hereby opened up; the revelation by the war of 
China's absolute helplessness hastened the march of events. 
England, w^ho at first underestimated Japan's strength, openly 
took the side of assaulted China, and her aversion to the vic- 
torious Island Empire led her at the beginning of October, 1894, 
to make an appeal to the European Great Powers to unite in a 
protest and to check Japan's victorious course. The proposal 
was refused as untimely. But when, in the further course of 
the war, it became clear that in the peace negotiations Japan 
intended to make extensive territorial acquisitions in China 
proper, and thereby to go far beyond her original goal, which 
was the recognition of Corea's independence, the European Pow- 
ers became seriously disturbed, lest in this manner the seed of 
permanent disturbance be planted in East Asia. That these 
fears were only too well founded was proved by the results — 
one needs only to ask British merchants in East Asia. When, 
therefore, in the spring of 1895 Russia revived the English 
proposition, France and Germany this time showed themselves 
to be receptive; whereas England at first hesitated, and finally, 
to every one's surprise, declared that she saw no cause for ob- 
jection to the Japanese conquests. The French historian, H. 
Cordier, says in regard to England's action: "The attitude of 
the British Cabinet led to the belief that it was bound by a 
secret treaty with the Tokio Cabinet. This, however, was a 
mistake, as events later showed; but it is certain that Albion at 
that time was already seeking to win the gratitude of the con- 
queror, who, however, did not allow himself to be at all deceived 
by England's change of front." ^ 

Germany, who regretted this first serious breach in the Euro- 
pean solidarity of action in East Asia, made an effort, after 
Russia and France had decided upon a protest against Japan's 
peace conditions, to make use of her participation in the inter- 
ests of restraint and moderation. Almost two months before the 
protest was made, in March, 1895, she confidentially informed 
the Japanese Foreign Minister, Count Mutsu, of what was about 
to occur, and advised him, since opposition to the three Powers 
W£LS out of the question, to forestall the whole proceeding by a 

1 Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec des Puissances Occidentales, Vol. 
Ill, p. 289. 



426 MODERN GERMANY 

voluntary modification of Japan's conditions of peace and thus 
to avoid even the semblance of any humiliation of the victorious 
country. Unfortunately, Count Mutsu did not follow this 
friendly advice — indeed, it even appeared as if he had not brought 
it to the knowledge of his colleagues in the cabinet; at 
all events, it has remained unknown to the Japanese down to 
the present day. When in May, following the Peace of Shi- 
monoseki, protest was actually made, it was again Germany who 
(at the request of Japan) insisted that China should first of all 
ratify the treaty as had been originally agreed ; afterward, the 
Chinese government was given to understand, China might make 
the proposition to Japan of substituting an increase in the war 
indemnity in place of territorial cessions on the Asiatic conti- 
nent. China was assured that Japan would be ready to accept 
the proposal. In this course Germany's sole aim was to save 
Japan from all appearance of submitting to force. It is evident 
that, when once the protest had become unavoidable, Japan had 
every cause to be thankful that Germany took part in the inter- 
vention in the interest of moderation. Unfortunately, the 
malevolent British press, systematically copied by that of Japan, 
kept the Japanese nation from understanding the real situation. 

In the Peace of Shimonoseki, Japan obtained the final recogni- 
tion by China of Corea's independence and the surrender of the 
Island of Formosa, as well as of the Pescadores Islands, lying 
between Formosa and the continent, while the Peninsula of Liao- 
tung, which had also been ceded, was given back to China, to- 
gether with Port Arthur, according to agreement, in return for 
a money indemnity. If Europe had believed that through this 
restitution the dangers which might result from the Japanese 
conquests in China proper were obviated, such a supposition could 
not fail even at this time to be recognized as unjustified by any 
one familiar with political conditions in Corea and with the 
history of Japan's relations to that country. For centuries Co- 
rea had enjoyed no independent existence, and under the politi- 
cal conditions of the nineteenth century she was less capable 
than ever of attaining such a poskion. The "independence" of 
this entirely unorganized state which Japan had fought for, 
could have no other meaning for the initiated than as being the 
first step toward the incorporation into the empire of the victor. 
This aim was thenceforth systematically pursued by Japan and 
quickly achieved. 

The whole political development in East Asia, however, now 
struck into paths which in no wise suited German aims. In 
view of Germany's European position, it was self-evident that 



MODERN GERMANY 427 

she could never hope to obtain territorial acquisitions in the 
Far East, such as England, France, Russia and Japan possessed. 
She was, however, determined to develop to the limit of her 
ability her already important commercial interests in China, 
which clearly offered great possibilities for the future. Such 
aims required that Chinese territory remain open to free com- 
petition in trade and that a strong, enlightened native govern- 
ment preserve order and repel illegitimate interference from out- 
side. The German manufacturer and merchant need never fear 
an honest competitor, although they do fear the political oppressor 
and conqueror. The inviolability of China's territory, the open 
door for trade and the firm establishment of the Chinese govern- 
ment have therefore formed the guiding principles of Germany's 
policy during the last twenty years — not from disinterested mo- 
tives, but from proper appreciation of her own interests. If 
there was a time when doubts were entertained in Germany as 
to the practicability of this policy, this was due primarily to 
the greed for power of the four other Great Powers, in contrast 
to whose gigantic plans the German aims sank into utter insig- 
nificance. The following exposition will make this clearer; it 
will also show that this greed for power, despite vociferations to 
the contrary, was irreconcilable with the principle of the open 
door and with China's inviolability; in addition, it will furnish 
proof that England, France and Japan, as the result of a com- 
mon plan, sought to prevent all further development of Ger- 
many's position in the Far East and to exclude German compe- 
tition. 

Immediately following the Peace of Shimonoseki, Russia and 
France began to advance their broad front in the north and 
south on China's borders in such a manner that Germany (and 
England in even more marked manner) was filled with increas- 
ing apprehension. In June, 1895, France, despite her promise 
of 1885, succeeded in securing from China, not alone the advance- 
ment of her Annam boundary into Yunnan, but also the opening 
up to French trade of several places in Yunnan and Kuangsi. 
But especially valuable was China's agreement to the extension 
of the Annam railways into Chinese territory, and the exclusive 
privilege of mining undertakings in the provinces of Yunnan, 
Kuangsi and Kuangtung; as a result of this, these three provinces 
were practically transformed into an exclusive sphere of French 
influence. These agreements were extended in 1897 ^"d 1898 
by concessions for the building of certain railway lines through 
Yunnan and Kuangsi. 

Similar steps were taken in the north by Russia. In the year 



428 MODERN GERMANY 

1 89 1 the building of the great Siberian Railway had been begun. 
It was originally planned to pass exclusively through Russian 
territory. For this reason it would have been forced to make a 
wide detour in order to reach Vladivostock, and would have had 
to traverse the wild, uninhabited mountain districts on the north- 
ern shore of the Amur River, instead of tapping the fruitful 
plains and prosperous cities of Manchuria. A way out of the dif- 
ficulty, however, was gained by an agreement with China in the 
year 1896. According to this, Russia obtained the right to build 
the road from a point in southern Transbaikalia, through northern 
and middle Manchuria in a straight line toward Vladivostock. In 
addition, another line was to be built with Russian capital from a 
point on the Manchurian line in a southerly direction, reaching 
the sea at the harbors of Ta-lien-wan (Dalni, Dairen), Port 
Arthur and Newchwang, and connecting with a further line to 
Tientsin and Peking. For general purposes of safety, Russia 
was to be allowed to protect her railways by military guards; 
further, she acquired the right to adopt certain military measures 
in Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan, the conditional surrender of the 
Bay of Kiaochow, on the coast of Shantung, as a base for the 
Russian fleet, and concessions for the exploitation of mines in 
Manchuria. Russia thus obtained an important extension of her 
northern sphere of power throughout the whole of Manchuria, 
and if we regard the Bay of Kiaochow as marking the southern 
boundary, far into the territory of China proper as well. In this 
manner Russia acquired the much-coveted possession of ice-free 
harbors on the Pacific Ocean. There remained only the inclu- 
sion of ''independent" Corea to round out the immense territory. 
Here, however, Russia's plans came into conflict with Japan's 
well-advanced interests. 

It was self-evident that such concessions on the part of China 
had been obtained by Russia and France only through the exer- 
cise of strong political pressure, and the helplessness exhibited 
by the Chinese government filled Germany with anxiety con- 
cerning her own interests. It was no longer possible to count 
on protection against the encircling and constricting efforts of the 
politically more favorably placed oppressors of China; the divi- 
sion of China into "spheres of influence" seemed on the point of 
becoming an actuality, and whoever did not undertake to pro- 
tect his own position ran the risk of being smothered. It was 
these considerations which decided Germany, in the year 1897, 
after having repeatedly called China's attention to the situa- 
tion and after an especially marked slight by the officials of 
Shantung, to occupy the Kiaochow Bay district, in order to 



MODERN GERMANY 429 

make it a base for her fleet and trade, without regard for the 
pretended Russian claims, of which she had not been notified. 
England, who, as we have remarked, w^as much more disturbed 
than Germany, compensated herself for the French increase of 
territory by a corresponding frontier adjustment between Bur- 
mah and Yunnan, which she obtained from China in the year 

1897. The acquisition of Kiaochow by Germany was not re- 
garded by England at the moment with unfriendly eyes; for one 
reason, because, as Lord Salisbury remarked to the German 
Ambassador in London, on January 12, 1898, he "thought it 
probable that no great injury had been inflicted upon England," ^ 
and further because Russian interests were seemingly impaired, 
and the probability was thus increased of gaining Germany's 
help against Russia. There was still another consideration. Af- 
ter Germany had acquired certain rights to particular railway 
lines and mining undertakings, and was thus, in the English 
view, definitely indemnified in China, England determined to 
carve out for herself the ''spheres of interests" which she thought 
were due to her. 

On February 9, 1898, the British Minister in Peking handed 
a note to the Chinese government, in which he demanded the 
assurance that "China would never alienate any territories of 
the provinces adjoining the Yang-tsze to any other Power." 
The government, which was doubtless somewhat astonished by 
this strange demand, of course gave the desired assurance with- 
out delay, especially as the expression "any other Power" natu- 
rally included England also.^ In this remarkably simple manner, 
England brought the "Yang-tsze valley" into her sphere of in- 
fluence, and a telegram from Lord Salisbury, of September 24, 

1898, to the British Ambassador in Petrograd, shows what we 
must understand by this somewhat indefinite expression. Ac- 
cording to this, it includes "the provinces adjoining the Yang- 
tsze River, as well as Honan and Chekiang" ^ — that is to say, 
not less than nine of the eighteen provinces of China, precisely the 
largest and most fertile, a territory which extends from the fron- 
tiers of Burmah and Thibet to the Pacific Ocean. This action 
is characteristic of the way in which England acquires "inter- 
ests." It is self-evident that a claim of this kind to the "Yang- 
tsze valley," which rests purely on a one-sided declaration by 
England, has been recognized neither by Germany nor, so far 
as known, by any other Power, nor can it be recognized. An 

1 British Blue Bock, 1898, China, I, No. 49. 

2 Ibid., China II, Nos. i and 2. 

s British Blue Book, 1899, China II, No. 46. 



430 MODERN GERMANY 

explanation to that effect by the German Ambassador to Lord 
Salisbury, on May 13, 1898, leaves no doubt on this point.^ 

Through this advancement of their political interests by the 
Great Powers in the territory of China, the points of possible 
conflict were naturally multiplied in the south and the south- 
west between England and France, in the north and northeast 
between Russia and Japan, in a slight degree also between Russia 
and Germany. Even America, who had hitherto held quite 
aloof, but who after the war with Spain in 1898 had acquired 
the Philippines (in which consideration for the developments in 
East Asia had doubtless not been the least important factor), 
was thereby drawn into the larger Japanese sphere of interest 
in the western half of the Pacific Ocean. Germany and Russia 
soon came to an understanding, as the claims of the latter state 
did not extend beyond Manchuria. This was a disappointment 
to England, who felt, despite her vast sphere of interest, that she 
was interfered with on all sides, as she was unable to free herself 
of the delusion that any overseas success of another Power is a 
derogation of her rights. She seemed temporarily uncertain as 
to her plans, but considerations of general policy were finally 
decisive for her attitude in East Asia. Russia appeared for the 
moment the most annoying opponent, first because she cut off 
from England's exploitation long stretches of territory running 
to the sea, and second because her activity in the East precluded 
her from similar activity in the West, where it was more desired 
by England. The latter country's uneasiness had been increased 
following the leasing by Russia, in the spring of 1898, of the har- 
bors of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan (Dalni) from China, 
When England decided to occupy the harbor of Wei-hai-wei, 
lying opposite on the coast of Shantung, for so long a time as 
Port Arthur should remain Russian, the British government ex- 
plained that the sole object of this action was to maintain the 
balance of power in the Gulf of Pechili, menaced by Russia's 
occupation of Port Arthur.^ Immediately thereafter France took 
possession of the Bay of Kuang-chow wan on the south coast of 
the Province of Kuangtung. 

Once more, during the Boxer troubles (1900-01), the com- 
mon danger drove the Powers to concerted action, but their 
rival interests quickly brought them again into opposition. Al- 
most does it appear as if the critical state of affairs in 1900 had 
temporarily moved England to accept the condition of things in 
China as they had shaped themselves, and earnestly to devote 

1 British Blue Book, 1899, China I, No. 96. 

2 Ibid., No. 2. 



MODERN GERMANY 431 

her strength to preserving the further inviolability of Chinese 
territory and to securing the open door for trade. Only thus 
can the fact be explained that on October 16, 1900, she made 
an agreement in London with Germany, the Power most inter- 
ested in both of these principles, whereby the two states pro- 
claimed their firm intention to uphold the above maxims "for all 
Chinese territory, in so far as their influence extended." All 
the Powers w^ere to be invited to join in the agreement, and as 
a matter of fact, all of them — including Russia, France and 
Japan — did so, with the proviso that the status quo should re- 
main unchanged in the future. 

But the hope proved to be vain; the decisive factors in Eng- 
land's European policy soon crowded all consideration of indi- 
vidual East Asiatic questions into the background. The most 
important among these factors w^as the conviction that the Ger- 
man sea trade and the German fleet were increasing in an undue 
manner, and should therefore be suppressed. The oft-quoted 
articles in the English newspapers and magazines, such as The 
Spectator, The Saturday Review, The National Review, etc., 
in many cases written by naval officers, and dating back to the 
year 1896, reveal this growing enmity toward Germany, which 
finally overshadowed all else. The gradually developing idea of 
encircling and isolating Germany made it necessary that Russia's 
energy be turned back toward the West, especially, as she was 
beginning to become dangerous in the East. While down to 
1898 it had been thought necessary to weaken Russia, on ac- 
count of her Asiatic policy, and that to this end German assist- 
ance might be enlisted, the ultimate aim now changed, and with 
it the method of procedure. Russia was to be forced out of East 
Asia, but without thereby having her usefulness against Ger- 
many permanently decreased — that is to say, her strength must 
not be unduly weakened, and her expectations in West Asia, 
in Turkey and in the Balkans were to be increased. 

For the solution of this new problem England made use of 
the Russo-Japanese antagonism which, as explained above, had 
grown up in Corea. At the beginning of the year 1902 she 
concluded for five years the alliance with Japan, regarding which 
negotiations had been carried on since 1898, and which had 
been first conceived of as a triple alliance to Include Germany. 
In the treaty the contracting parties mutually recognized "the 
Independence of China and of Corea," and furthermore the spe- 
cial interest of Japan in Corea was acknowledged, and pro- 
tection against "the aggressive action of any other Power" agreed 
upon. The casus foederis w^as not to arise in case of war with 



432 MODERN GERMANY 

a single Power. By unduly extending her undertakings, which 
included not only the whole of Manchuria but had also en- 
croached on Corea, by contemptuously repelling the Japanese 
efforts toward compromise, and by overestimating her own ca- 
pacity, Russia substantially aided England in promoting her 
plans. 

In the year 1904 war broke out with the well-known results: 
Japan obtained a free hand in Corea; Russian rights in South 
Manchuria, especially as regards the harbors of Port Arthur 
and Dalni (Dairen), as well as the corresponding portion of the 
Manchurian Railway, were transferred to Japan. But — and 
this was important in its results for Japan's internal economy 
and hence for the independence of her policy — she received no 
indemnity for the cost of the war. England's first goal had been 
attained ; Russia was excluded from the sea coast south of Vladivo- 
stock, while her possibilities of development remained untouched 
at other points, and ample room was provided for them in the 
West by England's Persian and Turkish policy. In addition, 
Japan, owing to her need of money, remained chained to Eng- 
land for further undertakings. 

But this was not all which the year 1904-5 brought to British 
politics in the way of success. Advantage was taken of Rus- 
sia's war — perhaps more in response to the pressure of the *'go 
ahead" Indian party than from the voluntary decision of the 
government at London — to carry the plans for the acquisition 
of the "Indian glacis," namely Thibet, a step nearer to develop- 
ment; especially as there was reason for fearing that Russia 
might forestall England by putting herself in possession. On 
the plea that the Lama authorities had failed to carry out the 
agreement of 1890 in regard to the India-Thibet trade, a mili- 
tary expedition was undertaken in the autumn of 1904 to 
Lhassa, and a treaty extorted which made the position of Thibet, 
to say the least, very like that of a British protectorate. This 
treaty, moreover, entirely put an end to China's sovereign rights, 
since it dealt with Thibet as an "independent" state. The case 
of Corea had shown the advantage of recognizing the "inde- 
pendence" of such states for purposes of more ambitious under- 
takings. 

The aroused Chinese government, however, brought about the 
repudiation of the treaty of Lhassa, and in 1906 on its own 
initiative entered into a new one with England. The provisions 
of this latter treaty, however, are so elastic and ambiguous that 
England is in a position at any time to open up the Thibet 
question when conditions seem favorable for so doing. Later 



MODERN GERMANY 433 

developments — the action of China against Thibet, the flight of 
the Dalai Lama to India, the fall of the Chinese dynasty, and 
the effort of the Lama hierarchy to obtain independence — would 
repeatedly have been taken advantage of by England as an 
excuse for interference, had not once more considerations of gen- 
eral policy (above all in regard to Russia) dictated "watchful 
waiting." In the great settlement with Russia in 1907, in re- 
gard to Persia, Afghanistan and Thibet, both Powers pledged 
themselves for the present to withhold their hands from the 
Thibetan booty, to acknowledge China's sovereign rights, and, 
further, to respect her interests. But in order to hold the door 
open for the future, in any event, England declared in Peking 
in 1 9 10 that she found herself compelled to insist upon the 
maintenance of an effective Thibetan government, since the 
fact of Thibet having its own government was a prerequisite for 
the security of future English plans.^ 

For the same purpose, in the year 19 10, England bought from 
the little Himalaya state, Bhutan, for a yearly payment of loo,- 
000 rupees, the right to direct its external relations.- Bhutan 
has "external relations" only with Thibet, whose vassal state 
it is, and with China, under whose mediate suzerainty it stands.^ 
The following is from the pen of an English authority on East 
Asiatic affairs: " ^Devant ces suzerainetes-lal wrote a witty 
Frenchman, speaking of Chinese pretensions In Annam ; 'on salue 
et on passe/ (One salutes and passes on in the presence of 
such rights of suzerainty.) Before contradictions such as these, 
one might exclaim, we can only hold our peace dumbfounded." * 
In place of Annam, Thibet may be substituted. 

In tracing this particular course of England's struggle for 
power, we have meanwhile anticipated developments in China, 
and we must again retrace our steps to the year 1905. From 
this period on British politics had no further need of primary or 
secondary aims, there was but one task for the World Empire: 
the destruction of Germany, of her fleet, of her colonies and of 
her overseas commerce. The accomplishment of this task drove 
England to that feverish activity in East Asia by which she 
sought to influence the course of events to her own advantage. 
Patiently, she laid all her usual interests aside in order to press 
into her service all the Great Powers for her great European 
stroke; they follow the promptings of the strings which she ma- 

1 British Blue Book, 1910, "Further Papers Relating to Thibet," Nos. 315 
and 347. 

2 Ibid., No. 346. 

3 See China and Her Neighbours, R. S. Gundry, p. 350. 
* Ibid., p. 95. 



434 MODERN GERMANY 

nipulates, in part without being conscious of what they are do- 
ing. A criss-cross of agreements extending in all directions, 
binds the different Powers; they have all been entered into at 
England's instigation, or at least under English supervision, and 
are intended to eliminate the possibility of clashes in the East, 
in order that the collective strength may remain unimpaired and 
free to be used in the West. China has to bear the costs of this 
policy, for the wishes of each one of the states concerned must 
find fulfilment in the great empire in order to prevent its defec- 
tion. Each such fulfilment, however, costs China a part of her 
possessions, either in land or in sovereign rights. And while 
each of those interested grabs all that is within reach, each agree- 
ment proclaims its aim to be the ^'inviolability of China" and 
the "open door for the trade of the world." There is scarcely a 
chapter in the history of international relations which bears so 
plainly the stamp of untruth. 

In order to understand in the following discussion the lengths 
to which the English plans against the German Empire had gone 
in Europe, it Is well to recall the agreements which were made 
in 1906 betW'een the British military attache in Brussels and the 
Belgian Chief of the General Staff, in regard to the landing of 
British troops in case of conflict with Germany. In the year 1912 
these were further developed. 

Even before the signing of the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth, 
In August, 1905, England and Japan substituted for their treaty 
of alliance that w^ould not have expired until 1907 a new one 
for ten years; by this, Japan gained an absolutely free hand in 
Corea to secure her Interests, while a like privilege was granted 
to England "in the proximity of the Indian frontier for safe- 
guarding her Indian possessions." The first of these points was 
a concession to Japan, in return for which the alliance was to 
be extended to India, and If necessary, to Thibet and Afghanistan 
— an extension which in the year 1902, according to a statement 
of Count Hayashi, had been denied by Japan. This protective 
measure was necessary, as it was not yet certain how Russia 
would act in the unsettled Thibetan question. In 1907, when 
the provisional Asiatic understanding with Russia had been ef- 
fected, and Russia had thereby become a link in the chain which 
was being forged about Germany, the alliance with Japan had 
become superfluous also in the revised form. A substitute for it 
could be only a question of time. 

The agreement with Russia, which was perhaps the hardest to 
bring about, was an Important step forward in the preliminary 
work of eliminating delicate points of friction and possibilities of 



MODERN GERMANY 435 

conflict, at least for a number of years. A scarcely less Impor- 
tant factor in this connection was the proper conduct of the 
restless and uncertain Japanese policy. Through the "Pan- Asi- 
atic" movement in Japan, which began with the year 1899, and 
whose fantastic aim was the freeing of the Asiatic peoples from 
the yoke of Europe, especially the elimination of Western influ- 
ence in East Asia, it was realized that the new Great Power 
might become a very disturbing element in the British plans, if 
that movement were to achieve serious influence on the attitude 
and decisions of the Japanese government. This danger un- 
doubtedly existed after the war with Russia, and not only Eng- 
land but even France was uneasy regarding her East Asiatic 
possessions. It was, therefore, a not unimportant result of Eng- 
land's efforts that at the time (1907) the Russo-English treaty 
was made, agreements were brought about between Japan and 
France, as well as between Japan and Russia, in which the con- 
tracting parties pledged the preservation of the status quo and 
mutually guaranteed each other's possessions, together with all 
the rights thereto appertaining. This, truly, was in strange 
agreement with the maintenance of the "inviolability" of China 
and of the "open door," which both treaties solemnly guaranteed 
in the preamble! 

A treaty between England and France was not necessary in 
1907 — they had long been in agreement as to the ultimate end 
of all their actions. This is clearly shown by a remark of Paul 
Deschanel, President of the French Chamber, when on January 
22, 1909, after eulogizing the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 
in the course of a speech on "Asia in International Politics," he 
said : "This treaty is of more value in its European results than 
its Asiatic, as it permits both Powers to concentrate their main 
strength in Europe and thereby to w^ork more effectively for the 
maintenance of the European balance of power and of peace." 

The expression "peace" in the secret language of English- 
French-Russian-Japanese diplomacy is a catch-word of import 
similar to that of the "inviolability of China" — the initiated ut- 
ters neither of them without a knowing smile. For the sake 
of more important interests, England conveniently turned her 
eyes away from the danger point in the southwest, of which 
mention has several times been made, while the French built 
their great Tonkinese railway Haiphong-Laokai into the Prov- 
ince of Yunnan, In 19 10 they reached the capital city as a 
temporary terminus. They made great efforts to obtain a fur- 
ther concession toward the north to the Upper Yangtsze, in 
order to gain the rich western territory in Ssechuan; they ap- 



436 MODERN GERMANY 

peared to be deciding in their own favor the oft-discussed ques- 
tion whether trade w^ith these promising districts and with those 
beyond w^ould follow the route down the Yangtsze through the 
British sphere of influence, through English-controlled Burmah, 
or toward the south through the French colonial empire. But 
England noticed nothing. The previous bickerings had ceased, 
in spite of the warnings from British mercantile circles; there 
was no more talk of the much-discussed railway from Burmah 
to Yunnan, and thence to Yangtsze. 

The unasked-for assurances of her ''inviolability" and of her 
"independence" — which was threatened by no one except the 
Powers pledging it — was a source of serious anxiety to China; 
she saw that Japan and Russia acted in Manchuria more and 
more in the manner of rulers; she had before her eyes the un- 
mistakable fate of "independent" Corea with a Japanese Resident 
General in control, and in consequence she drew her own deduc- 
tions as to the meaning of the expression "inviolability" in the 
language of the treaty Powers. A further factor was that in the 
agreements of 1907, treating of China's inviolability, strange to 
say, precisely those two Powers had abstained from joining for 
which the inviolability of China and the open door were an 
absolutely vital necessity — namely, Germany and the United 
States. China may, therefore, have felt a certain relief when 
the United States, too, in November, 1908, signed an agreement 
with Japan in which both contracting parties pledged themselves 
to maintain the independence and inviolability of China, the 
open door and the status quo. The aim of this agreement is 
apparent. The question, however, may remain unanswered 
whether America, fearing for the safety of the Philippines, had 
suggested the treaty, or whether — and this is more likely — Eng- 
land and Japan, or both, desired it in order to preclude the 
possibility of a clash between the two rivals in the Pacific Ocean 
(at this time regarded as highly undesirable) and in order to be 
able all the more effectively to make Germany appear in the 
eyes of the Chinese as the sole enemy of their independence. 

It was soon to be made plain to the United States that it 
ascribed an undeserved importance to that part of the treaties 
meant for advertising purposes, in which the words "inviola- 
bility of China" and the "open door" played such a prominent 
part. Toward the end of 1909 the American Secretary of State, 
Knox, proposed to the Powers the "neutralization" of the rail- 
ways in Manchuria, especially of the great north and south 
line, which had been divided between Russia and Japan in the 
Peace of Portsmouth; this meant the formation of an Interna- 



MODERN GERMANY 437 

tional syndicate for the purchase of the Russian and Japanese 
railway interests in order to maintain Manchuria as Chinese 
territory open to the trade of all. The result was, as might 
have been expected, the reverse of what had been aimed at. 
Russia and Japan repelled this interference with their proceed- 
ings in the most emphatic manner; the common danger, more- 
over, induced them to a union which otherwise could scarcely 
have come about. Again 'inviolate" China footed the bill. 

In July, 1 9 10, the two Powers entered into a treaty whereby 
they mutually guaranteed the status quo in Manchuria against 
the attacks of all third parties. At the same time, according to 
French newspaper dispatches, it was agreed in a supplementary 
clause that Japan should have a free hand in Corea and that 
Russia should be equally free in Mongolia, which belonged to 
China. Events proved the correctness of the statements. A 
few weeks after the signing of the treaty, "independent" Corea 
was annexed by Japan. In the spring of 191 1, quite independ- 
ently of China, Russia, through an ultimatum, forced an im- 
portant extension of her special political and commercial privi- 
leges in East Turkestan and Northern Mongolia as compared 
to those granted by the treaty of 1881. Japan and Russia entered 
a joint protest, and with success, against the projected loan to 
China by an international syndicate for the reorganization of the 
administration in Manchuria. It is doubtful whether this under- 
standing between the two Powers "operating" in the North, with 
its surprising results — especially the resumption of Russian activ- 
ity in the East — was according to the English programme; but 
official England, unswerving in its aims, abstained from all pro- 
test, and in 191 1, Sir Edward Grey declared in Parliament that 
the British government must recognize the fact that "Russia and 
Japan have special interests in Mongolia and Manchuria." Thus, 
as far as England was concerned, the fate of China's Mongolian 
territory had been sealed. 

Toward the end of 191 1, in the midst of the Chinese revolu- 
tionary disturbances, the northern part of Mongolia announced its 
independence — scarcely to the surprise of Russia — under the 
Lama High Priest of Urga, and at the beginning of 19 12 Rus- 
sia informed Peking that she recognized this "independence" 
and desired to render "assistance" to the new state; that she 
was going to build a railway from the Baikal Lake on 
the Siberian line to Urga, which would later be continued 
toward the south as far as Kalgan and connect there for 
Peking. The system of "independence" in the manner of Corea 
and Thibet had brought forth imitators. The projected railway 



438 MODERN GERMANY 

line, Kiachta-Urga-Kalgan, is of such importance for Russian 
politics and trade that negotiations in regard to it have not been 
allowed to come to a standstill even during the w^ar. According 
to newspaper dispatches, on September 17, 19 14, Russia entered 
into a treaty with the Mongolian "government" in regard to the 
building of railways, granting of a non-interest-bearing loan and 
carrying through of administrative reforms, which transformed 
Mongolia practically into a Russian protectorate. In the sitting 
of the Duma, at the beginning of February, 191 5, Minister Sas- 
sonov gave promise of the early announcement of "the signinftc of 
the three-cornered Russian-Chinese-Mongolian treaty." 

As a result of this development, which had grown ever more 
pronounced since 1910 and which from year to year excluded 
greater portions of the Chinese Empire from general trade, Ger- 
many turned to America, at the beginning of 19 12, with the 
request for an expression of the views of that government. The 
reply of Secretary of State Knox, with an optimism scarcely to 
be understood even to-day, expressed the opinion that all the 
Powers had hitherto acted in accordance wnth their mutual 
pledges to respect the inviolability and sovereignty of China. On 
the motion of Germany, the document was printed in the news- 
papers in February, 1912. It is easy to imagine the impression 
which it must have produced in the circle of the "knowing ones." 

Even more emphatic than in the case of Russia was the oppo- 
sition which the American plan of neutralization of 1909 aroused 
in Japan. It served to sharpen the already existing animosity 
against America, due to the attitude of the Western States re- 
garding Asiatic emigration. At times, the relations between the 
two Powers became so strained that England was seriously con- 
cerned, not only regarding the general effect on her alliance 
plans in Europe, but especially as to the possibility of herself 
being drawn into a conflict between Japan and America through 
her treaty obligations. There w^as pressing need of a correspond- 
ing change in the treaty of alliance of 1905. In 191 1, the same 
year in which the Belgian Minister to Berlin called the atten- 
tion of his government to the danger of its understanding with 
England, Sir Edward Grey and Baron Kato, at that time Japa- 
nese Ambassador to London and now Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs, agreed upon a new treaty, four years before the termina- 
tion of the old one; it was to run to 1921. The paragraph in 
regard to safeguarding English rights "in the neighborhood of 
the frontiers of India" was omitted — the treaty with Russia of 
1907 had rendered this superfluous. In its place was substituted 
a new paragraph, according to which neither of the two Powers 



MODERN GERMANY 439 

was required to aid its ally in a war against a third Power with 
which the state not fighting had signed a treaty of arbitration. 
There existed such a treaty between England and America — 
England was therefore relieved of her duty to Japan as regards 
America. 

Naturally, this new treaty, that had apparently become quite 
meaningless, called forth extremely sharp criticism in Japan; 
and in fact the question calls for an answer: By means of what 
other concessions did England gain relief from the obligation of 
aiding against America, a relief which was especially important 
at that time? There can be no further doubt to-day, after 
Minister Kato's speech on September 5, 1914, in the Japanese 
Diet and in view of the whole conduct of Japan since the out- 
break of war, that these concessions were made at Germany's cost. 
Japan had received carte blanche as regards the German protec- 
torate at Kiaochow, German commercial privileges in Shantung, 
probably also the German possessions in the South Seas, and as 
regards China proper — in the last case to an extent of which 
wx have no knowledge. Immediately after the outbreak of the 
war, Japan seized upon the more or less unprotected German 
possessions; moreover, according to a Peking dispatch to The 
Times (London), in the middle of February, 191 5, she de- 
manded from China, in addition to various other far-reaching 
concessions, special rights in Eastern Mongolia, in Southern 
Manchuria, in the provinces of Shantung and Fukien (opposite 
Japanized Formosa), as well as in certain parts of the district 
of the Middle Yangtzse — demands, the granting of which by 
China would bring her into a relation with Japan similar to 
that which existed in Corea before the annexation in 19 10, 
These demands, it is explained, were brought to the knowledge 
of England, France, Russia and America, although in modified 
form, in January, 19 15, and The Times found them, according to 
agreement, ''quite justified." Whether the rest of the world 
will join in this view will be shown in the future. 

The preceding exposition gives an incomplete idea of the far- 
reaching policy of force of England, France, Russia and Japan, 
in East Asia, as well as of the systematic effort of England, even 
with considerable sacrifices and denial of precisely those princi- 
ples the upholder of which she otherwise claims to be, to isolate 
Germany in these regions also and to destroy her politically as 
well as commercially. To this end she brought about a chain 
of agreements, the pretext for which was the inviolability of 
China and the open door, and from which Germany alone was 
excluded on principle. By this means it was intended to create 



440 MODERN GERMANY 

the impression in China that Germany alone entertained designs 
against the territory and the political independence of China, 
and was therefore to be regarded as dangerous for the latter state, 
an enemy of the Allied Powers, and a menace to peace. The 
press of England, as well as that of China, Japan, France and 
Russia, to which it supplied material, prostituted itself to this 
end uninterruptedly for years by insults, slanders and suspicions 
of Germany and the Germans, of Germany's official representa- 
tives and of her merchants, in order to rob the modest but all- 
too-successful commercial rival of reputation and standing. 

As a matter of fact, Germany and America were the only 
ones who honorably upheld the principle of China's inviolability 
and of the open door, and who never strove for territorial gains 
at the cost of China; they desired nothing but freedom for their 
trade under peaceful conditions. In view of these facts, the 
speech of the Japanese Minister, Kato, of September 5, quoted 
above, sounds strangely grotesque. According to this, it was not 
in revenge for the protest against the Treaty of Shimonoseki that 
Japan declared war on Germany, as the European w^orld had 
been taught to believe, but "in response to England's request for 
Japan's assistance," because "the trade with East Asia, which 
Japan and England regard as among their particular interests, 
is subject to continual menace (from Germany) ; because fur- 
thermore, according to the view of the (Japanese) government, 
it constitutes a serious obstacle to the maintenance of permanent 
peace in East Asia for Germany, whose interests run counter to 
those of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, to possess in a corner of 
the Far East a basis for her powerful activity, and, finally, be- 
cause this is opposed to the more mediate interests of our own 
(Japanese) Empire." 

Even Minister Kato would scarcely dare seriously to assert 
that Japan's participation was rendered obligatory, under the 
Anglo-Japanese Treaty, by England's attack on Germany. In 
Article II of this Treaty occur the words, "unprovoked attack or 
agressive action" against one of the signatory Powers. No 
answer was given by Japan to Germany's offer to exclude the 
East Asiatic territory from the field of war operations, nor did 
she reply to a similar motion by China. For the rest, Kato's 
speech contains its own refutation. 



BOOK IV 

THE CAUSES AND THE OUT- 
BREAK OF THE WAR 



CHAPTER I 
THE EVENTS THAT LED UP TO THE WORLD WAR 

PROFESSOR HERMANN ONCKEN, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
HEIDELBERG 

IN the vast mass of controversial literature regarding the 
World War, chief place is usually given to those causes 
w^hich are close at hand and easily apprehended. Even among 
those authorities who desire to give more than an ex parte ex- 
position there are many who confuse discussion of the final causes 
w^ith an understanding of the more deep-lying ones; especially 
among neutrals is the superficial belief encountered that through 
diligent study of the Blue Books alone may the question be satis- 
factorily answered: What is the truth? As a matter of fact, 
the sequence of events leading up to the beginning of the World 
War stretches far back into the past, and the deeper one delves 
in this tangled mass the more convinced does one become that 
great w^orld-historical forces must long since have been set in 
motion to bring about this outcome as it were in the nature of 
an inexorable fate. Only he who appreciates them to their full 
extent is able to perceive at what points those forces destructive 
of peace have prevailed, and, operating together, have led to 
such terrible results. During the years previous to the outbreak 
of the war, the plain meaning of many occurrences was not rec- 
ognized, because we desired not to disturb the maintenance of 
peace by premature alarms; but now, when all these possibilities 
have been swept aside, the chief lines of development of the last 
decades stand forth so clearly that the attempt may be made to 
outline from a comprehensive point of view a history of the 
events preliminary to the war. 

The central position of the German Empire results in bring- 
ing it into many-sided relations to all the Powers and in making 
it at all times dependent on their political grouping. 

Inter-dependence and mutual consideration as regards other 
states, its own interests and those antagonistic thereto subject it to 
constant anxieties; it is forced to maintain its position under the 
most complicated conditions of competition operative in the case 
of any state. On this account, the leaders of Germany have never 
been able to expound their aims so clearly as the statesmen of 
those countries who, thanks to a more independent position, could 

443 



444 MODERN GERMANY 

follow a more direct line of policy. One result of this is that 
serious political writing has not been developed as independently 
among us as was to be desired ; foreign countries, therefore, owing 
to the necessary reserve of responsible organs on the one hand 
and of the absolute unrestraint of unauthoritative voices on the 
other, have not always been able to gain a correct impression. 

As a matter of course, I shall seek to estimate the cross-cur- 
rents and interplay of the policies of other nations as measured 
by the standard of Germanic policies. Although surrounded by 
an army of inimical writers of pamphlets who, in blind passion, 
disdain no weapon and in their ignorance eagerly seize upon 
every argument, I shall nevertheless maintain a dignified manner 
of speech, despite the difficulty at times for a German to do so 
in these days. Above all, it is my aim to fulfill the duties of 
the objective historian and to do justice to a broad, universalistic 
grasp of the problem, as has been most notably done among all 
the historians of the world by a German, Leopold von Ranke. 
In his spirit, I shall seek to straighten out the threads of this con- 
fused tangle and to pave the way, to the best of my ability, for 
an understanding of events which, although no deduction can be 
final to-day, may at least be traced in outline as leading to the 
war. 



I. PRELIMINARY 

French Revanche. The Dual Alliance. Beginnings of Anglo-German 

Rivalry 

I The two basic facts to which the origin of the world war 
is to be traced are the formation of the German Empire 
in 1870-71, and the vengeful determination of the French some 
day to overturn by force the condition of things established at 
that time in Europe. 

The entrance of Germany into the circle of the Great Powers, 
which looked upon her advent with disfavor, was followed by 
a period of peaceful policy on her part which sternly held aloof 
from all Continental ambitions. Bismarck studiously observed 
the rule of the conqueror, not "to bend the bow too far," and 
took up a defensive attitude toward French revanche. The for- 
mation of the Dreihund, as the world has repeatedly had to ac- 
knowledge during the last generation, served exclusively this aim 
of peaceful maintenance of the existing order. Opposed to this, 
French revanche, although the result of patriotic motives and 
testifying to the inexhaustible vitality of the French aation. 



MODERN GERMANY 445 

aimed at the recovery of France's dominating position on the 
Upper Rhine and of the resulting command over South Ger- 
many — the key to France's former hegemony. This ambition, 
w^hether openly expressed or veiled in cautious and ambiguous 
diplomatic language, v^as of a distinctly offensive character. The 
sentiment of revanche w^as not always the same in its expres- 
sion — in peaceful times it resigned itself to a manifestation of 
patience, but its intensity invariably flared up w^ith the appear- 
ance anywhere in the world of a possibility of gaining assistance. 
Most significant of this spirit was the fact that death was 
threatened to any French statesman who had the courage seri- 
ously to oppose its demands. 

Revenge thus became the invisible regulator of the whole 
internal French party life, and inspired the leading men during 
these forty-four years with such an uncompromising hostility that 
all the other Powers had to reckon with it as an unalterable fact. 
Bismarck's policy, therefore, contented itself with isolating French 
ambition in Europe without provoking it, and with encouraging 
it in friendly fashion to occupy itself with colonial expansion. 
This manner of meeting the danger was successful as long as 
Germany, fully occupied with her own problems, limited herself 
to a Continental policy; the situation immediately became more 
delicate when the modest colonial acquisitions which Bismarck 
had made led to tension with England, and when soon there- 
after aggressive Pan-Slavism likewise raised its head in the 
Bulgarian question. Immediately with the mere suggestion of a 
new grouping of the Powers, Jules Ferry's effort toward a 
Franco-German rapprochement, on the basis of a colonial under- 
standing, was nullified ; in an instant and without inherent cause, 
its place was taken by General Boulanger's agitation, and many 
Frenchmen appeared unable to resist the propaganda of an ad- 
venturer who — for the first time since 1871 — seemed to hold 
out hopes for the gratifying of their desires. Although Bis- 
marck, who even then had great difficulty in holding Russia and 
France apart despite his gifts as a statesman, succeeded once 
more in checking this recrudescence of revanche, it was never- 
theless the Boulanger episode which — even in the opinion of our 
enemies — gave the deciding impulse toward an era of increased 
military preparation in the world. 

With the retirement of Bismarck, the situation, which had 
become more and more tense and which was now only arti- 
ficially maintained, became even more delicate. Despite the 
friendly advances and diplomatic efforts which Bismarck had 
made during the last years, there was a renewal of pressure 



446 MODERN GERMANY 

from Russia, whose efforts to form an alliance with Austria- 
Hungary he had once blocked. Although we succeeded, it is 
true, in improving our relations with England, and in the treaty 
of 1890 gained certain things which were for us of vital neces- 
sity (peaceful compromise in Africa, and above all the acquisi- 
tion of Heligoland), yet the unavoidable took place: our two 
Continental neighbors no longer allowed themselves to be held 
apart, but began to approach each other. That which in Bis- 
marck's time had loomed up as a possibility, the avoidance of 
which had called for one political sacrifice after the other, be- 
came soon after the accession of Emperor William H a stern re- 
ality which had to be reckoned w4th. 

Through the formation of the Franco-Russian Alliance in 1891, 
Germany's existence became subject to a permanent and heavy 
burden. The immediate revival of the French idea of revanche 
showed that any one in Paris who wished to rise politically would 
now have to make himself completely subservient to the secretly 
cherished aims of the national ambition. If in the year 1871 a man 
like Renan had declared that the only possible future programme 
for France was "to strengthen the growing hatred of the Slavs 
for the Germans, to encourage Pan-Slavism and without reserve 
to advance all Russian ambitions," it was now believed that the 
key had been obtained which would once and for all open the 
gates to the promised land of revenge. The German Empire was 
from now on permanently exposed to the possibility of a war 
on two fronts, and in view of the nature of its open borders, 
was able only through an increase of its defensive strength to- 
ward the east and west to adapt itself to a geographic and mili- 
tary situation such as no Great Power in the world has to meet. 
Even so, in the quarter of a century during which Emperor 
William H has stood at the Empire's helm, our militarism has 
consisted in the fact that, although the German nation willingly 
undertook increased burdens, our policy was, nevertheless, the 
maintenance of peace. 

The responsible leaders of this policy did not allow themselves 
to be betrayed into seeking alleviation of the pressure under 
which Germany was laboring by an appeal to arms ; they did not 
allow themselves to be tempted into war either by favorable 
opportunities, which repeatedly offered themselves, or by con- 
sideration of advantages which might be gained by a ''preven- 
tive war," against which Bismarck, too, had consistently raised 
his voice. 

The condition of coercion created by the Dual Alliance was 
bearable at the beginning, since the Russian rulers, once they had 



MODERN GERMANY 447 

the treaty safely in hand, turned their attention toward Asia 
and began to exploit the European situation for far-reaching 
plans of world conquest. During the next decade, the French 
had to admit to themselves with bitter disappointment that their 
beloved ally, instead of helping them to realize their dreams of 
revenge, had "deserted" to the Far East, with his military forces 
and their capital. A further development was that Russia en- 
tered into an agreement with Austria-Hungary in 1897 — the 
scope of which was widened in 1903 — regarding the status quo 
in the Near East; this sealed for a long time the greatest source 
of danger for Europe and eliminated the pressure to which Ger- 
many's policy had been constantly subjected. 

Although as a result Germany was able to sustain the imme- 
diate pressure of the Dual Alliance on the Continent, the Em- 
pire found itself henceforth, through the mere existence of the 
combination, in a difficult position as soon as it desired to extend 
its activity overseas. Germany was not driven into transoceanic 
enterprise, however, by arbitrary desire or in the effort to gain 
prestige, but by economic necessity and the rapid colonial expan- 
sion of the old World Powers. The last Great Power to arrive 
on the scene saw that if it desired to secure for itself even a 
modest and purely economic share in the possibilities of the fu- 
ture, before the world was divided forever, it w^ould have to 
take part in some manner in this competition. We were at times 
blamed for a too noisy and a too great zeal in our new course, but 
it must not be forgotten that this was only the outward expres- 
sion in the turning of the nation's thoughts to new tasks of 
inner, practical reality. 

Germany's position ofifered no natural sphere of expansion and 
her past no traditions on which we could build ; it was necessary 
at every point where we desired a place in the sun to lay the 
foundations on fresh ground. One need not be in all respects 
in agreement with the methods of this policy to admit that it 
remained free from the capitalistic corruption which in other 
countries has almost invariably accompanied imperialistic expan- 
sion; that it did not seek the conquest and destruction of small 
nations, and finally that it did not imperil the present peace of 
Europe for the sake of the future aims which it pursued. We 
might, it is true, have avoided all the dangers which are bound 
up with that which is called world politics, but only at the price 
of a renunciation which no virile growing people with faith in 
its own future would submit to. While this was out of the ques- 
tion, we realized that this new policy was only possible on the 
basis and within the limits of the restricted Continental position 



448 MODERN GERMANY 

of our Empire. In England this was understood — ^here from the 
start was the key to the new situation. 

English statesmen boasted during the nineties of the "splen- 
did isolation" of their Empire, and they regarded this position 
with equanimity, since a balance of the Continental Powers in 
which the Dreibund and the Dual Alliance mutually held each 
other, corresponded exactly to the traditional condition In which 
England had always endeavored to keep Europe, In order mean- 
while to carry out undisturbed the completion of the greatest 
of all colonial empires. At the beginning of the nineties, Eng- 
land had drawn a step nearer to Germany, and was united 
by treaty with the other two members of the Dreibund in regard 
to common interests in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. She 
had even gone so far as to proclaim In a protocol ''the identity 
of the interests of the Dreibund and those of England." But 
on that account there was no inclination to make the least sac- 
rifice for the sake of pleasant relations with Germany. On the 
contrary, she considered Germany to be too securely held in 
check for England to see any necessity for showing great con- 
sideration for our interests; Germany's power was valued only 
to the extent that it was serviceable as a check to the Dual Al- 
liance and only so long as it was subservient to England's Insular 
policy. British statesmanship of this decade aimed, therefore, 
at the exploitation of Germany's hemmed-In position In the in- 
terest of England's world aims. As a Continental Power, we 
found ourselves called upon to avoid deadly quarrels with the 
members of the Dual Alliance for what were, after all, secondary 
colonial interests ; as the latest comer among the Colonial Powers, 
it was to our Interest to see that Independent and promising 
trade territory was neither divided up politically nor shut off 
commercially, but that it remained an independent unit with an 
open door. England's policy, however, was the reverse in both 
respects. 

Thus, the course of England and Germany in the world began 
to diverge more and more, not as regards actual claims, which 
at no point seriously clashed, but in the matter of future possi- 
bilities and of considerations of policy on a broad scale. We 
were frequently forced to oppose England's actions and to refuse 
our cooperation in cases of projected Intervention. A difference 
of views became constantly more pronounced. Opportunities 
were welcomed by German statesmen to demonstrate the possi- 
bility of cooperation with the Dual Alliance. Thus it was 
chiefly from this European point of view that Germany joined 
in the Franco-Russian protest against the Treaty of Shimonosekl, 



MODERN GERMANY 449 

in order to preserve China's integrity. This step seemed to be 
evidence of a certain emancipation of German policies from those 
of England. Moreover, the Germans carried through their part 
in this intervention (which was later much criticized) in a man- 
ner especially mild and considerate for Japan; it remained for 
the English, who originally had desired the same thing, later 
to place upon Germany (in the eyes of the Japanese) all the 
odium of being the originators of this movement. 

At this time the British Liberal cabinet resigned, and Lord 
Salisbury, the leader of the Conservatives, undertook the direc- 
tion of affairs. In view of the friendly words with which in 
1879 he greeted the formation of the Austro-German Alliance, 
it seems to have been forgotten that in the year 1864, while he 
was still Sir Robert Cecil, he had opposed the mere possibility 
of a strong Germany more violently than any one of his com- 
patriots; as regards his attitude in later years, one may venture 
to say that the beginnings of a German world policy met only 
with opposition or misunderstanding from him. His principal 
object now w^as to prevent joint action of Germany and the 
Dual Alliance in world politics. With this in mind, soon after 
his accession to office (the occurrence did not at that time be- 
come public) he personally made to Emperor William II, con- 
trar\^ to all English traditions, the proposal to divide Turkey. 
The Emperor, however, resisted the temptation to make our policy 
subservient to that of England. It was to Germany's interest 
to uphold the political and commercial preservation of Turkey 
as one of the few open fields of promising actfvity — in other 
words, to carry out the program which a few years later we 
officially announced and which to-day we are defending as far 
as this is still possible, w4th our weapons against the greed of 
the Great Powers. Any pronounced cooperation of Germany in 
such a scheme of division would have caused Russia's interfer- 
ence and have thrown on us all the burdens of a resulting war. 
Such an endangering of world peace on the Continent was, no 
doubt, highly welcome to Salisbury's policy, which a German 
statesman of those days was fond of describing as *'the chestnut 
policy," but it was in no sense in the interest of a Power such as 
Germany, which first of all had to consider its Continental posi- 
tion. If from this failure of Salisbury's attempt to lead Ger- 
many on, there remained a personal feeling of pique, the follow- 
ing year was destined to bring about a further increase in the 
tension. Unmistakable antagonism became apparent in respect 
to the future of the non-English portions of South Africa. 

In South Africa, as elsewhere, the guiding principle of Ger- 



450 MODERN GERMANY 

man policy was not to allow a further portion of the globe to 
be swallowed whole by the giants. For this reason, even before 
the Jameson raid, Germany had declared that she would not 
permit a departure from the treaties of 1884 which formed the 
basis for the Boer Republics at that time. Several days before- 
hand the German Ambassador had warned the Foreign Office 
of the projected filibustering expedition, but a pretense had been 
made of absolute ignorance and, instead of taking timely pre- 
cautions, there was an evident desire to profit by the accomplished 
fact. Hence, the congratulatory telegram of the Emperor to 
President Kruger was not so much a world-political act of of- 
fense from the German Empire as a world-political act of de- 
fense, for the sake of the status quo and of the rights of small 
nations. Moreover, the step was not taken against official Eng- 
land, which repudiated all share in Jameson's undertaking and 
was compelled to place the ring-leaders on trial, but against a 
predatory attack in connection with which English statesmen 
were later proved to be connected in a compromising manner. 
That the outraged sense of right throughout the civilized world 
found expression through the authority of the German Emperor 
was resented all the more strongly in London. As early as 1894 
The Saturday Review, which was closely connected with South 
African interests, had taken an emphatic stand against the Ger- 
man Empire and had dismissed with disdain all thought of an 
alliance ; ^ now for the first time its columns gave voice to the 
indignant cry: ''Ger mania est delenda." ^ It was at this same 
time that we came to realize that in no question of world 
politics should we be able to count even on France's formal ob- 
servation of neutrality toward us, while England knew from this 
moment that she could have an alliance with France at any time 
she seriously desired it. 

Disputes and differences in the field of colonial politics alone 
would not have been sufficient to disturb the relation between two 
nations which had been bound for centuries by a comradeship 
in arms and by tradition, and which had never met as enemies. 

^ The Saturday Review of August 8, 1895, while acknowledging the con- 
venience offered by an alliance with Germany, objects to it for the following 
reason, which has its root in the century-old tradition of British policy: "First 
of all, we English have always made war hitherto upon our rivals in trade and 
commerce; and our chief rival in trade and commerce to-day is not France, but 
Germany. In case of a war with Germany, we should stand to win much and 
to lose nothing; whereas, in case of a war with France, no matter what the 
issue might be, we stand to lose heavily." 

^ The Saturday Review of February 1, 1896: "The biological view of foreign 
policy is plain. First, federate our colonies and prevent geographical isolation 
turning the Anglo-Saxon race against itself. Second, be ready to fight Ger- 
many, as Germania est delenda. Third, be ready to fight America when the 
time comes. Lastly, engage in no wasting wars against peoples from whom 
we have nothing to fear." 



MODERN GERMANY 451 

But for a number of years a new cause for antagonism had 
come into existence, a trade rivalry, which in England was at 
first regarded with astonishment, then with growing anxiety, and 
finally with resentment. This rivalry was felt all the more 
keenly, as precisely at this time there began a series of unfavor- 
able years for England economically. The per capita figures of 
the English export trade, which for some time had been on the 
decrease, began to fall more noticeably, in the period following 
1895, while the German figures advanced strikingly. From year 
to year German competition was regarded more suspiciously in 
England, from year to year comparative statistics became more 
unfavorable, until finally in 1903 German production of pig iron 
for the first time exceeded that of England, and the value of 
German exports to England was higher than the value of Eng- 
lish exports to Germany. 

The anxiety caused by these events, which doubtless was a 
factor in the above-mentioned reserve of the English govern- 
ment, furnished from the year 1895 on a constantly stronger 
reason for diplomatic coolness. Under the first sting of the 
new trade rivalry, the provocative articles of The Satur- 
day Review were not without effect; in circles naturally 
by no means anti-German they fostered the thought that Eng- 
land's general policy called for "a new taking of bearings." Ar- 
guments were ready to hand which were familiar to the mind 
and the interest of every Englishman, and which the history of 
centuries had shown to be the basis of all political calculation. 
Once launched upon such a line of argument, with English con- 
sistency, there was no drawing back from the most extreme de- 
ductions. In an article in the issue of September 11, 1897, 
which has become celebrated. The Saturday Review said re- 
garding the two irreconcilably opposed nations who had taken 
the whole world for their province and who demanded commer- 
cial tribute from it: 

"England, with her long history of successful aggression, with 
her marvellous conviction that in pursuing her own interests she 
is spreading light amongst nations dwelling in darkness, and Ger- 
many, bone of the same bone, blood of the same blood, with a 
lesser will-force but, perhaps, with a keener intelligence, com- 
pete in every corner of the globe. In the Transvaal, at the 
Cape, in Central Africa, in India, and the East, in the islands 
of the Southern Seas, and in the far North-West, wherever — 
and where has it not? — the flag has followed the Bible and trade 
has followed the flag, the German bagman is struggling with the 
English pedlar. Is there a mine to exploit, a railway to build, 



452 MODERN GERMANY 

a native to convert from breadfruit to tinned meat, from tem- 
perance to trade gin — there the German and the Englishman are 
struggling to be the first. A million petty disputes build up the 
greatest cause of war the w^orld has ever seen. If Germany 
were to be extinguished to-morrow, there is not an Englishman 
in the w^orld who would not be the richer the day after to- 
morrow. Nations have fought for years over a city or a right 
of succession — must they not fight for two hundred and fifty 
million pounds of yearly commerce?" 

This calm toying with a war of prevention is carried on all 
the more cold-bloodedly since the mad idea is believed to be not 
only practicable but even easily so and without danger. 

''England is the only Great Power who could fight Germany 
without tremendous risk and without doubt of the issue — the 
growth of Germany's fleet has had no other result than to bring 
down England's hand on her all the more heavily. The German 
ships would soon be at the bottom of the sea or in convoy toward 
English ports; Hamburg and Bremen, the Kiel Canal and the 
Baltic ports would lie under the guns of England, waiting until 
the war indemnity was paid. Our work over, we should not 
even need to take the trouble to alter Bismarck's words to Ferry, 
and to say to France and Russia: 'Seek your compensation. 
Take from German land whatever you like ! You can have it.' '* 

One link after the other is forged, until the chain is complete 
which, as the result of shop-keepers' considerations, leads to the 
world war; it is the first conception of the Triple Entente, in 
the overheated brain of a journalist. With such unspeakable 
logic and frivolity did they dare to speak before the German 
fleet had become important and before political instinct had taught 
the necessity of modifying the language of passion and preserv- 
ing appearances before the world. It was, to be sure, only an 
individual voice, unauthoritative and without immediate in- 
fluence, but the chorus of similar voices was increased in these 
years by The National Review and The Spectator, and it re- 
vealed a growing sentiment, calculated to become irresistible to 
the "man in the street" and in the counting-house if some day, 
for reasons of a general political nature, England's world policy 
would have to be settled anew. It represented a rising wave in 
the country where public opinion rules which might easily be- 
come unpleasant for those statesmen who sought to oppose it, 
but which would quickly bear aloft the one who knew how to 
take advantage of it. 

We touch here, it is true, on something which cannot without 
more ado be called an immediate cause of war. Such considera- 



MODERN GERMANY 453 

tions are subject to the general political aim of a government — 
that aim is decisive and still unweakened. It must even be 
admitted that the argument as regards trade rivalry had lost 
weight in the course of the last decade before the war, and had 
given way at many places to a clearer insight. It w^as not pos- 
sible to advance it in the same sweeping manner as in the early 
years, since the bases for such an argument had again shifted 
considerably. Above all, the notable rise in English export 
statistics following the period of stagnation could not fail to 
calm the most timid spirits, and the wiser heads with time rec- 
ognized the fact that in the relations of the two countries com- 
mercial interdependence held too important a place for them to 
bend their energies on mutual destruction. It may perhaps be 
stated that trade rivalry leading to the verge of war could no 
longer be used as an argument with such evident success by Eng- 
lish publicists as at the start. When, however, the war broke 
out, the elemental forces of this abyss were perceived to be of an 
extent and provocative violence which was surprising. 

In the latter half of the nineties, however, the forces which 
were gradually gathering momentum were as yet by no means 
strong enough to determine the attitude of the leading statesmen. 
Even had they desired to listen to such promptings, they would 
not yet have been able to accede to them, in view of the marked 
opposition which England faced at all points. The actual an- 
tagonism, then existing, of Russia in Asia and France in North 
Africa represented far greater dangers than the anxious suspi- 
cions regarding Germany. 

II. THE PRELUDE 

English Offers of Alliance. Boer War, The German Fleet 

The impression is created that England, before definitely lay- 
ing down her policy along lines opposed to Germany, had made 
certain attempts to solve the many-sided world problems with 
which she was confronted by means of more friendly relations 
with Germany. The further course of events and the political 
development of the men who took part in the pourparlers seem 
to-day to speak with unmistakable clearness as regards the mean- 
ing which was at the bottom of this tentative sounding by Eng- 
land. In any event, one must admit that the determination of 
the English to abandon their position of ''splendid isolation" be- 
tween the Dual Alliance and the Dreibund was not destined 
inevitably and at once and by a single possible path to lead to a 



454 MODERN GERMANY 

clearly recognized goal. While the great British world interests 
of the past and present were opposed only by the Powers of the 
Dual Alliance, anxiety as to the future pointed to Germany. At 
the period of Fashoda, of the Chinese Revolution and of the Boer 
War, there was doubtless, in the interplay and complexity of 
political interests, more than one possibility in case it was de- 
sired to exchange the unstable political condition for that of a 
firmer union. 

Although Lord Salisbury had always replied evasively to the 
German tentative questionings of the eighties and nineties, it ap- 
peared as if in the later years of his leadership he was inclined 
to a different view. It was the opposition to Russia in East Asia 
(early in 1898) and the threatened conflict with France in Africa 
which first gave rise in the British Cabinet to the thought of a 
more intimate connection with Germany, or, more correctly ex- 
pressed, of a treaty acting as a counterpoise to the far-reaching 
political influence of the Dual Alliance. At the end of March, 
1898, the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, for the first 
time sounded the German Ambassador. The tendency of his 
question was revealed by his speech on May 13, 1898, in which, 
in the midst of a sharp attack upon Russia, he called for an alli- 
ance with England's American "cousins," and declared any war 
well worth the price which would lead to an alliance of the 
Anglo-Saxons ; he laid his cards openly on the table : 

"Great Britain might have declared war on Russia, but with- 
out an ally we are not in a position seriously to harm her." 

An ally against Russia — that was the part which Germany was 
expected to play. After the matter had been touched upon several 
times in interviews of Count Hatzfeldt with Salisbury, Balfour 
and Chamberlain, in the summer of 1898 England made a move 
in Berlin in this connection. On July 10, 1898, Major Mar- 
chand's company occupied Fashoda, and the Franco-English crisis 
seemed to be leading toward war. In the ensuing negotiations the 
fact was not concealed from the English that Russia, for her part, 
entertained no desire and felt no need of supporting the French 
revanche idea so long as Germany upheld Russia's position in 
Asia. If, however, it was urged in Berlin, an Anglo-German 
alliance directed against Russia were to be formed, reaction on 
the Russo-German relations could not be avoided. What could 
England offer in the way of protecting our rear ? By emphasizing 
the fact, moreover, that Russia had shown a more conciliatory 
spirit in Asia, the principle "to live and let live" was indicated as 
the one that would lead to a permanent improvement of the rela- 
tions. In any case, assurance would have to be given that the 



IMODERN GERMANY 455 

entire British government an3 Parliament wouI3 ratify such an 
alliance. For as soon as something of Chamberlain's plans became 
known, public opinion grew unsettled. The Saturday Review 
stormed against this worst of all madnesses and this bitterest of 
all humiliations, and repeated that as long as the economic strug- 
gle continued,^ *'a sincere understanding between the two nations 
would be impossible; if we have need for an alliance, why do we 
not make overtures to France?" Obsessed with this one idea, and 
with a cunning appreciation of the popular mind, the article at- 
tacked the Court influences which were behind this alliance, and 
even ventured to ''remind the Court and Mr. Chamberlain 
that a nation that has dethroned dynasties before w^ill deal harshly 
with the party which betrays English interests now." Even 
though German statesmen were willing to pass over outbreaks of 
this nature, they could not but ask themselves whether they were 
W'illing to lay the foundations for a new German Continental 
policy on such uncertain ground, which shifted w4th every change 
of party, and whether they could dare lightly to disregard the 
situation created by the Dual Alliance. 

There thus remained only the possibility of an agreement as to 
individual questions which might prepare the way for a general 
understanding. A great deal, it is true, w-as not to be expected 
from the British Prime Minister, who on a previous occasion had 
declared that Germany asked too much, although absolutely no 
demand had yet been made by Berlin. The sole result of all 
the negotiations, therefore, was an agreement made in October, 
1898, looking to economic exploitation of the Portuguese colonies 
by Germany and England, in case Portugal failed to meet her 
loan obligations. This was an understanding the subject of which 
lay beyond the real world political danger zone and which did 
not involve our relations with other Powers. From the English 
point of view it foreshadowed preparations for the Boer War, 
and in this respect it may have been intended to bind Germany's 
hands for the future as regards this question. In any case, it was 
for Germany a contingent agreement, in which the question 
whether the contingency was to arise or not, in the nature of 
things, depended on the good will and loyalty of the other side — 
that is to say, on assumptions which proved to have been unjus- 
tified. 

Was this to be the prelude to a closer union? If Germany had 
no intention of being drawn into an alliance without a quid pro 

"^ The Saturday Review of September lo, 1898: "We do not love Emperor 
William, neither do we love the German people. And the reason is that we 
have to fight the German trader, with his cheap and nasty merchandise, ia 
every market of every country of the world." 



456 MODERN GERMANY 

quo, she had even less desire for a return which would have 
involved her, not in an understanding, but in a war with a third 
nation. After the outbreak of the Boer War, England continued 
to act according to her customary methods, which position and 
traditional experience had necessarily developed. We, however, 
were called upon to realize that we were expected simply to play 
the part of a Continental sentry in the Boer War, and that if we 
consented to assume this part at England's command, we should 
find ourselves threatened by the war on two fronts, which we had 
hitherto avoided. At this time, less than ever, could we afford 
frivolously to extend the antagonism with France to the colonial 
field (from which Bismarck had always managed to exclude it), 
in order, in the words of Frederick the Great, to play the Don 
Quixote to English trade. 

In the Boer War, Germany could not have taken any other 
course than she did. Compelled before the war to limit herself 
to advising President Kruger most earnestly to yield, after the 
outbreak of hostilities neutrality was imperative. Public opin- 
ion in Germany, as in France and America, was in the main pas- 
sionately with the Boers; for sentimental reasons, it took sides 
in this most heroic of struggles which a small and free people 
has ever carried on against a giant World Powder, nor did it hesi- 
tate to call by their right name such things as the horrors of 
the concentration camps, which aroused indignation in all civi- 
lized countries and which brought the blush of shame to the 
cheek of many Englishmen. That in England this German at- 
titude produced a painful impression is explicable; that the re- 
sulting resentment was directed solely against the Germans was 
due to the later basic change in the country's policy. The Ger- 
man Empire, despite the efforts of the Pan-Germans, main- 
tained neutrality. Chamberlain's siren calls during the disas- 
trous week of the Boer War, and the bait of a new triple alli- 
ance between the German race and the two great branches of 
the Anglo-Saxons were taken only at their real worth ; emphatic 
protest was successfully made against the excesses and violence 
of the British maritime policy, and the sale of weapons to Eng- 
land by Germans was prohibited as contrary to the spirit of 
neutrality. But just as Germany wished to avoid becoming an 
accomplice in the strangling of the Boer Republics, she was also 
careful not to let herself be made use of by England's old ene- 
mies. At the most intense period of the war, perhaps with the 
desire to disrupt the Anglo-German tentative understanding, 
France and Russia approached Germany with the proposal to 
bring about in connection with them the end of the war, in 



MODERN GERMANY 457 

order to save the Boers and to humiliate England. Emperor 
William II, however, who was not guided by Machiavellian 
considerations as regards England, rejected the proposal, since 
Germany, as he said, must always abstain from a policy which 
might bring her into conflict with a sea power like England. 
In order to appreciate this action, one needs only to ask him- 
self whether, after the experiences of January, 1896, Germany 
could seriously have counted on fighting shoulder to shoulder 
with the nation of the revanche against England. The Em- 
peror more than once took steps to modify the strong current of 
German public opinion. 

Meanwhile German statesmen profited to the full by the les- 
sons of the Boer War. These were the years during which 
the outbreak of the Chinese Revolution placed the fate of the 
greatest empires in question, when old Powers broke like rotten 
reeds, and the world seemed about to be divided up among a 
few states ; we were still under the fresh impression of what the 
absolute rule of the seas meant and what military capacity Eng- 
land, together with her great colonial white territories, was 
able to develop overseas by means of her fleet, in defiance of all 
other Powers. Germany could not close her eyes to the fact 
that the previous policy of freedom of action, of the open door, 
and of peaceful development, could not be carried through with- 
out the possession of a fleet — indeed, that even a neutral position 
in great crises could not be maintained save with loss; that our 
colonial and trade interests, which were increasing in value, 
were without defense in the world; that in view of our con- 
stricted Continental position, without a fleet we were exposed 
to being forced weakly to trim our sails to every w^ind and to 
yield unquestioningly. Moved by the course of events of the 
Spanish-American War, Prince Hohenlohe, the Imperial Chan- 
cellor, emphasized the fact that we must not risk exposing our- 
selves to the danger of suffering at the hands of England the fate 
imposed by the United States on Spain — for the British press 
evermore haughtily threatened against the youngest Colonial 
Power a fate such as had for good and all excluded the oldest 
Colonial Power from the field of competition. And during the 
Boer War we also learned through the stopping of Imperial 
German mail ships that in a naval war there is for Eng- 
land no limit to aggressions against neutrals, that in critical 
moments the lacunee in maritime law are filled out by naval 
power — that is, to say, by England's dominance of the sea. The 
policy of the free hand was practicable in future only in case 
this hand was not powerless on the seas. The German Empire, 



458 MODERN GERMANY 

therefore, determined upon a new far-seeing program for the 
development of the fleet, which had already been strengthened 
in 1898, in order to gain the same undisputed guarantee of 
peace in the world in general that we were able to uphold on 
land toward the East and West — not for the sake of a future 
offensive, but in order to deter an enemy from deliberately as- 
suming such an offensive by precipitating a war of prevention at 
a moment devoid of danger. The Secretary of the Navy, von 
Tirpitz, proclaimed the object of the fleet thus: The stronger 
it is, the more difficult and the more dangerous will it be for an 
enemy to defeat it. 

"An enemy will find himself faced by the question, in begin- 
ning a war against Germany, whether such an undertaking will 
pay for the costs — that is to say, whether it is worth the risk. 
He will probably make a compromise with us, if we possess a 
strong battle fleet. Therein lies the strong guarantee of peace 
which is given by a powerful fleet, and this is the best protec- 
tion which we can provide for our commerce." 

Immediately thereafter, the outbreak of the troubles in China 
(the murder of the German Minister, in July, 1904) led to 
renewed cooperation with England, whereby we obtained a clear 
and illuminating perception of the limitation of possible united 
action with this Power. As soon as the Anglo-German Yangtsze 
Agreement no longer seemed capable of being used for the pur- 
pose of disrupting the German-Russian relations, London lost 
all interest in it and sought to becloud its meaning with a 
mass of misunderstanding, a proceeding which brought w^ith it 
a clear interpretation in the German Reichstag and correspond- 
ing disclosures in Petrograd. The wind soon veered around 
so sharply — presumably as the result of the change of rulers 
— that the Under-Secretary of State, Cranbourne, in March, 
1901, ventured openly to deny any curtailment of the treaty, 
while the new Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord Lansdowne, 
officially asserted the correctness of the interpretation by the Ger- 
man Ambassador. The Daily News, however, admitted with 
refreshing frankness that the agreement was worthless to Eng- 
land, since Germany could not be counted on against Russia — 
this was and remained for London the crucial consideration if it 
was to act in concert with Berlin. 

• The uncertainty as regards Anglo-German relations was still 
pending when the change of rulers finally prepared the way 
for the new aims of England's foreign policy. The personal 
influence of King Edward on the policy of his country has been 
variously estimated; the French, who really knew, enthusiastical- 



MODERN GERMANY 459 

ly praised him to the skies, while the English, in keeping with 
their manner of political thought, preferred to attribute to him a 
much smaller influence in their parliamentary life. At all 
events, a new factor of extraordinary energ}^ and individuality 
made itself felt in the control of England's destinies: a man 
who was determined personally to become the sponsor for the 
unbroken course of foreign policy, independent of changes in 
party rule and beyond the limits fixed by tradition. Whether 
in the determination of his course, personal rivalry and sensi- 
tiveness on one side or sympathies on the other were a factor, is 
perhaps not so important as the repressed ambition of a per- 
sonality which had so long stood in the shadow of power; now, 
when the close of the Boer War had prepared the way, this 
personality was all eagerness to assume the lead in the change 
that had long been seen to be gathering, and he was confident 
of being able to direct it into new lines. 

Though King Edward may have been determined from the 
start to make an end of England's splendid isolation in another 
direction than that of Germany, the previous negotiations with 
the latter country were not yet on that account discontinued. 
The English statesmen who held the real power in their hands 
were not prepared for or inclined to a sudden change of atti- 
tude. But the last episode of the Anglo-German discussion re- 
garding an alliance which began with the obsequies of Queen 
Victoria, revealed at the start a different atmosphere. The ne- 
gotiations demonstrated anew that England was most ready to 
bind us with heavy obligations, and in addition to handicap us 
with the odium of these obligations in Russian eyes, but that for 
her own part she intended to maintain the understanding with 
Russia touching world-political questions, which had now be- 
come less difficult, and at the same time to make use of the Ger- 
man sword on the Continent, where more strongly marked an- 
tagonisms w^ere again rampant. That, even in this position, we 
should not have been able to expect much from the British states- 
men is clear — they were the same politicians who shortly after- 
wards decided upon the policy of isolation against Germany. We 
were, after the experiences of the previous years, all the less in 
doubt regarding England's secret intentions, as at this very time 
Germany's Bagdad Railway plans encountered more strongly 
marked opposition in London, as soon as the change of this 
project from a purely German into an international German- 
French-Russian undertaking seemed to render impossible the out- 
break of Continental disputes. 

If the pourparlers were still kept up for some time after the 



46o MODERN GERMANY 

close of the Boer War, this was only the shield which England 
used to cover her defection for the purpose of forming another 
alliance. The definiteness of the change which began at this 
time rendered it improbable that this last move toward a rap- 
prochement was at all seriously meant. An indication of the 
coming shift was seen in Chamberlain's speech in October, in 
which, by way of justifying the concentration camps for the 
Boers, he called attention deliberately to the German conduct of 
war in the year 1870. This speech called forth a well-merited 
and sharp reply by the Imperial Chancellor. During the next 
months England admitted that, in view of the feeling of the 
Lower House, it would be hard to put the projected treaty with 
Germany into acceptable form. Immediately after this formal 
withdrawal, on January 30, 1902, the alliance with Japan was 
consummated, and soon thereafter the way was open for negotia- 
tions with France. The weapon against Russia which it had 
not been possible to gain from Germany's policy of peace had 
been found in East Asia. 

Following this prelude of Anglo-German negotiations for an 
alliance, was developed the main drama of an alliance directed 
against Germany, the course of which did not permit of im- 
mediate determination in detail, but which could not fail soon 
to reveal its final aim. There began one of those great diplo- 
matic actions which only a state of the far-reaching world con- 
nections of Great Britain can undertake, and even such a state 
only for the sake of a positive and dominant ultimate purpose. 
Unswervingly, England carried out her policy In clear percep- 
tion of the goal to be attained and without scruple as to her 
methods. 

III. PREPARATION 

Steps in the British Policy of Isolation from igo2 to 1908 

The Anglo-Japanese alliance of January, 1902 — an unheard- 
of step by a European Power — did not yet form according to its 
wording and meaning part of the program of Isolating Ger- 
many, but was directed solely against Russia's East Asiatic posi- 
tion. But In its effects, and especially in Its extension through 
the negotiations with France which were entered into immedi- 
ately afterwards. It was a step leading toward the conception of 
the "encircling" policy. Whoever with the eye of an historian 
views the causal connections of these twelve years Is Impelled to 
regard the decision of the British Cabinet of August, I9i4) as 
the unavoidable outcome of a long and logical development. As 



MODERN GERMANY 461 

compared to the German Empire, which in Its constricted Con- 
tinental position must reach its decisions as each case presents 
itself, England enjoys the tremendous advantage of being able 
to operate according to a uniform and far-seeing plan prepared 
long in advance. This does not mean that every single step is 
henceforward to be explained as consciously taken as the result 
of a single motive and with a single end in view; such cannot 
be the case, since, owing to the uncertainty of many factors and 
to the multiplicity of the commingling interests, things do not 
develop in the manner in which human calculation would fain 
have them develop. But the new course is entered upon, and the 
underlying tendencies become more and more dominant at each 
forward step. 

It is meet at this moment, before the fundamental change in 
the grouping of the states is discussed, to analyze the inner- 
European situation and the feeling of the nations toward each 
other. The Dual Alliance, it is true, existed in full strength, 
but it lacked an offensive character against the Dreibund. 
Undoubtedly, In France there was still the undercurrent of 
revanche, but In the years following Fashoda it seemed more 
than ever under the control of reason, and even leading men in 
Paris dared to dream of the possibility of permanent European 
peace. In the sitting of the Chamber of Deputies of January 
23, 1903, Jaures openly declared that the Dreibund had been 
called Into being without a distinctly offensive character as re- 
gards France, and that it was only intended to render Irrevoca- 
ble the results of the war of 1870, which were so painful for 
France; he no longer believed, he said, that any plan of attack 
against France had been entertained by Germany for thirty-one 
years. There existed on the Continent, even In the minds of 
those who had once been defeated, a state of relaxation; to 
this state England, with a single definite purpose in view, 
aimed to put an end. That her motive for doing so — namely, 
German growth and German ambition — held in fact at this 
time no menace for England, was later openly admitted by a 
leading publicist, who said: "Indeed, during the fifteen years, 
1 890- 1 904, we added to our own colonial dominions more than 
twice the whole area of Germany's colonies." ^ But the fact was 
that this new policy was not dictated by the realities of the 
present, but aimed to free itself in advance from future anxieties 
by preventive measures, for which its own past offered more 
than one example. 

1 Robert Crozier Long, "Germany and the Entente," Fortnightly Review, 
October, 1909. 



462 MODERN GERMANY 

As soon as Great Britain was safely in possession of the 
Japanese alliance, her ultimate aims were more clearly revealed. 
Characteristic was the course of the last joint action of England 
and Germany, which was undertaken for enforcing the German 
and English claims for debt against Venezuela and which cul- 
minated in the blockade of December, 1902. Accompanying 
developments threw an illuminating light on the seriousness of 
the last alliance offer in 1901, for as if at a pre-arranged signal 
there burst forth a storm of disapproval from leading politicians 
at the cooperation of the two countries. This disapproval was 
voiced most strongly by the opposition, who were already eagerly 
expectant of the Conservative inheritance and who, moreover, 
were close to the King, All sensitiveness dating from the time 
of the Boer War, which had long since vanished as regards 
Frenchmen and Americans, was industriously nourished as re- 
gards Germany, and the mere thought of having to bear in 
Washington in common with this Power the odium of an inter- 
vention made even the most sensible men completely lose their 
heads. 

After this prelude, the official policy of England was more 
clearly revealed with the opening of the battle against the Bag- 
dad Railway, a project which, although it was encouraged by 
German statesmen, was intended to serve purely commercial 
ends. At the time of the Boer War and the efforts toward an 
alliance, even The Times paid us the grudging compliment of 
saying that there was no Power to which England would more 
willingly entrust such an undertaking. Public opinion, which 
had been carefully manipulated, now burst forth against the 
plan without a dissenting voice, incited by practical interests and 
vague instincts. According to trustworthy information, Balfour 
and Lansdowne had been ready to come to an understanding 
with Germany in regard to the last section of the railway in 
Mesopotamia, and as late as April 8, 1903, Balfour advocated, 
although meeting with general disapproval, the cooperation of 
English capital in this international undertaking under German 
leadership. On April 23, however, he had changed his mind, 
and he asserted that in no event would England join in the 
work, as she had no guarantee that she would stand on a footing 
of equality in the management. With the demonstrative ap- 
proval of the whole country, the volteface was made — a week 
before King Edward undertook his memorable trip to Paris. 
After the King's return, Lansdowne declared even more em- 
phatically that the creation of a maritime base or of a fortified 
harbor on the Persian Gulf, as the terminus of the railway, 



MODERN GERMANY 463 

must be regarded as a serious menace to British Interests, and 
would be opposed In every possible way. This put a temporary 
end to the continuation of the line beyond the first section, and 
from this undertaking, which had been started not even as a 
purely German commercial scheme, we learned what we must 
be prepared for in the world henceforward from the other side 
of the Channel. 

At the same time the new policy was put Into play on the 
Continent for the first time. The more unavoidable the war 
desired by England between Russia and Japan became, the more 
important was it to seek an understanding with Russia's ally, In 
order to avoid possible bad counter-effects. It was King Ed- 
ward who, letting his hand be more plainly seen, In the spring 
of 1903 sought new connections in the familiar atmosphere of 
Paris. There is no question from which side the initiative came. 
The Daily Graphic later denied the "legend" that the minister, 
Delcasse, was the main originator of the Entente Cordiale. 
"The truth is that Delcasse became a convert to the idea of the 
Entente with hesitation and against his will. The credit for it 
belongs exclusively to King Edward and Lord Lansdowne." 
And on the other side, Le Temps proclaimed the truth by rap- 
turously exclaiming: "For he (King Edward) acted alone. 
The trip to Paris In 1903, which started the Anglo-French 
movement, was his Individual w^ork. It was announced to Mon- 
sieur Loubet before the two Governments were Informed." In 
his toast on May 3 to the ties of friendship which were to be 
drawn still closer, the King assumed the fervent tone which 
was still further intensified on the occasion of President Loubet's 
return visit to London ; while at the time a German-Canadian 
tariff dispute Increased in intensity, in October, 1903, a Franco- 
English arbitration treaty smoothed the way for the extremely 
complicated negotiations — the course of the Russian-Japanese 
War more than anything else made France desire to grasp the 
hand which was extended to her from across the Channel. 

From the purely German standpoint, our policy has been 
blamed for not taking advantage of Russia being fully occupied 
with Japan in order to deal with Russia's ally at our door, who 
would never 'peacefully reconcile herself to the loss of Alsace- 
Lorraine. The Emperor's deep feeling of responsibility led him 
rightly, as In the Boer War, In the interest of the world's peace, 
to reject a war of prevention (such as England Is waging against 
us to-day), and in this he acted In keeping with Bismarck's 
testament. While England permitted the humiliation by Japan 
of France's ally (and openly admitted that she would not 



464 MODERN GERMANY 

quietly acquiesce in a Japanese defeat), she earned as the result 
of Russia's discomfiture the unconditional readiness of the 
French nation to accept the English proposals. The legend 
which soon made its appearance that Russia had been driven by 
Germany into the East Asiatic undertaking was nowhere so 
lovingly nursed as in that country whose statesmen had been the 
sole instigators of the war. 

The result of one year's negotiations was the Anglo-French 
agreement of April 8, 1904, which put a definite end to the 
previous differences between the two Powers in all parts of the 
world. The agreement is undoubtedly not to be judged ex- 
clusively as an offensive measure against Germany ; its realization 
was made easier through the need of the two Powers to re-in- 
sure themselves, as it were, while the struggle in East Asia was 
still in the balance; nor was it less to the interest of England's 
imperial policy to remove all causes for possible friction in New 
Foundland and Senegambia, in Siam, Madagascar, and the New 
Hebrides, and above all to bring about the ultimate acknowledg- 
ment by France of England's position in Egypt — this meant the 
breaking of the last tie which had bound England to the Drei- 
bund for tu^enty years. The unique feature of the agreement, 
however, was to be seen in the return made by England to her 
partner for recognizing the British position in Egypt — namely, 
the surrender of Morocco, and even more so in the double deal- 
ing with which she sought to cover up the future indemnifica- 
tion of France. 

While France acquiesced on the Nile in the inevitable, she 
received in compensation an object of future value which in 
every respect accorded with England's world-political schemes. 
England had certain interests in Morocco, it is true, which she 
might sacrifice, but she possessed no definite rights; she had 
hitherto rather stood out against France for the principle of the 
independence and integrity of the Sultanate. France, who un- 
der Delcasse had sought to approach her prey for a number of 
years through treaties with Spain and Italy, had repeatedly in 
official manner recognized this principle; she had known as 
early as 1901 that Germany also was determined to uphold it, 
for the sake of her important trade interests, if for no other 
reason. Morocco could thus develop into an object of Franco- 
German dispute only if the ultimate object of the policy in view 
was carefully concealed. As a matter of fact, there was in addi- 
tion to the public agreement of April 8, which ostensibly pro- 
claimed Morocco's independence, a secret understanding which 



MODERN GERMANY 465 

provided under certain conditions for the division of the Sultanate 
between France and Spain. ^ 

Thus, the two Powers, quite without authority, took steps not 
only for shutting off a further portion of the earth commercially 
for an indefinite period, but for bringing it into a relation of 
absolute dependence. Delcasse, who dared not reveal the secret 
game, neither formally consulted German diplomats nor asked 
for Germany's approval or even for her opinion of the public 
agreement. It w^as a double-faced treaty, a dishonest game — for 
this very reason its intellectual instigators in England were mor- 
ally bound, in view of the obligations which they had under- 
taken, to guarantee the fulfilment of French hopes at any price, 
even in the event of a clash with Germany; they were, indeed, 
called upon to make the inviolability of France the chief con- 
sideration in their calculation. This they were determined to 
do. Precisely for the sake of such possibilities had these states- 
men, who had failed in their attempt to impress Germany's 
sword into their service, made use of the French desire for 
revenge; for the same reason they made the North Sea instead 
of the Mediterranean the chief seat of naval power. The ball 
had been set rolling. 

For the time being Germany maintained an attitude of watch- 
ful waiting. As Delcasse, however, continued to avoid all dis- 
cussion of the Morocco question with Germany, it became clear 
that there w^as more at stake than merely Morocco. Unless we 
were ready to surrender unconditionally to the new combination, 
it was imperative to seek from the start to prevent the strength- 
ening of England's world policy by the additional element of 
French desire for revanche. As soon, however, as we made a 
motion to protest in the matter of Morocco, England, unscrupu- 
lously taking advantage of every incident, assumed the haughti- 
est tone in order to strengthen the knees of her hesitating part- 
ner. With this end in view, no doubt, the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, Lee, made the oft-cited speech which, as regards 
words at least, was one of the most arrogant cases of playing 
with the idea of a war of prevention which the world has ever 
seen. England, he said, must forbid the further growth of the 

1 The secret clauses of the Anglo-French agreement were revealed by the 
Temps of November ii, 191 1, and subsequently in Parliament admitted by Sir 
Edward Grey. Of their meaning E. D. Morel, in his Morocco in Diplomacy 
(London, 1912), says that they "tend to involve this country in approval and 
diplomatic support of a partition of Morocco between France and Spain, and 
thereby to inevitable conflict with Germany." The French Baron d'Estournelles 
de Constant admits, in his speech in the Senate on February 6, 19 12, that 
France was pursuing two irreconcilable policies, a public policy of integrity 
which was not the true one, and a policy of secret agreements which was aiming 
at a protectorate and at the partition of Morocco. {Debats Parlementaires, 
Seance du 6 fevrier, 1912, p. 161.) 



466 MODERN GERMANY 

German fleet; following the declaration of the naval war the 
British fleet would have destroyed the German before the 
enemy would have had time to read of the declaration of war 
in the newspapers (February 3, 1905). This was a well-calcu- 
lated outburst in the genuine English manner, which the govern- 
ment did not repudiate and which was intended as encourage- 
ment for Paris, in order to make capital of Gallic excitability 
by means of tempting pictures at the time of the Russian defeats. 
If this was intended at the same time as an intimidation of 
Germany, it did not, of course, cause us to swerve from our 
course. The protest against the fate intended for Morocco, 
which found expression in the Emperor's trip to Tangiers, may 
to outsiders have had the appearance of a move of diplomatic 
offensive: as a matter of fact, the provocation was to be sought 
in the camp of the opponents, who, while ready to spring, con- 
cealed the secret treaty even from the parliaments of their own 
countries and thereby completely confused public opinion. The 
object of our tactics was to manoeuvre our opponents, who had 
silently disregarded our rights, out of their position and to find 
out whether Delcasse's aim of turning the suppressed revanche 
idea into an element of offense had already taken hold of the 
whole French nation. 

As soon as the seriousness and the justice of our procedure 
was recognized in Paris, the majority of Rouvier's ministry be- 
came filled with anxiety, and despite the efforts of the British 
press to stiffen their resistance, they seemed on the point of 
yielding. England then went a step further. Toward the end 
of May, 1905, she made an oral promise to place the British 
forces in the field beside those of the French, to mobilize her 
fleet in case of a German attack, seize the Kaiser-Wilhelm Ca- 
nal, and to land one hundred thousand men in Schleswig-Hol- 
stein; in addition, she declared her readiness at an early date to 
draw up a treaty in regard to these military obligations.^ The 
motive which had led to the treaty of 1904 was here revealed 
in its true significance, and Delcasse was so enchanted by this 
possibility that he was ready to agree to any condition. But 
common sense did not entirely desert the French statesmen at 
the decisive moment. A wave of dismay swept over the country 
when it learned that Germany was prepared to consider the 
formation of this alliance, the offer of which had not remained 
concealed from her, as a cause for war. The cabinet meeting of 
June 4, 1905, forced Delcasse, who had placed his cards on the 

1 See the revelations by the Matin, October, 1904; De la paix de Francfort 
6 la conference d'Algesiras, by Andre Mevil, Paris, 1909. 



MODERN GERMANY 467 

table, to resign. It was not Germany alone who had brought 
about the downfall of this most uncompromising advocate of 
revanche since Boulanger; in even greater degree it was the 
indignation of all conscientious Frenchmen. "This is not how we 
understood the agreement with England," wrote Jaures. "Del- 
casse gave the British government the impression that he was 
ready for any step, and the British government played the part 
of tempter to this vain man." The question was whether 
this newly revived spirit of revanche would sink to rest after 
the fall of its propagandist, as in the case of the Boulanger epi- 
sode, or whether the government, which now declared its readi- 
ness to bring the Morocco question before an international con- 
ference, would nevertheless continue along the same dangerous 
path. 

England now proceeded with more caution in her policy of 
encircling Germany by a concentric attack, after the shipwreck 
of this first indiscreet attempt. It is characteristic of Eng- 
land's tenacity in this connection that King Edward, immedi- 
ately following the conclusion of peace between Russia and 
Japan, ventured to sound Russia, who had been rendered harm- 
less in the Far East, on the proposition for a rapprochement, 
which the London press had approvingly discussed even during 
the war. When Count Witte, in September, 1904, returned 
from the peace negotiations in Portsmouth, he found waiting for 
him in Paris an invitation from King Edward, together with 
the written draft of a treaty between the two Powers drawn up 
by the King and Count Benckendorff, of somewhat the same 
nature as that which two years later formed the basis of the 
Anglo-Russian agreement regarding Central Asia.^ The Rus- 
sian was without authority (and personally would scarcely have 
been inclined) to respond in any manner to this offer, but 
the first attempt to provide defeated Russia with a new footing 
for an attack against Europe had been made by London; well- 
informed Russian papers received the suggestion with favor, with 
the reservation that some years of peace w^ould be required for 
recuperation and preparation; but they already began indus- 
triously to spread the doctrine of Pan-Slavism. The hour, how- 
ever, had not yet struck; they contented themselves with a 
promissory note for the future, with the redemption of which 
Sir Arthur Nicolson, the new Ambassador to Petrograd and one 
of the most active diplomats in the school of King Edward, was 
intrusted. 

1 Disclosed by Count Witte in the Petrograd Rjetsch, the organ of the Cadet 
party. 



468 MODERN GERMANY 

Meanwhile the nearer the time came for the Conference of 
Algeciras, the closer touch France sought with the Power upon 
whose diplomatic and, in the last analysis, military support as 
well (in view of the continuation of Russian weakness) she 
had been dependent since April, 1904. In the autumn of 1905, 
Rouvier, upon whom the disclosure in the press of the alliance 
offer exercised a certain moral pressure, sounded London, in 
his turn. Whether the Balfour-Lansdowne Cabinet ever an- 
swered the inquiry cannot be positively stated. Its retirement 
was imminent, but with an eye to the future, it took pains 
openly to announce as a new principle the necessary continuity 
of the whole foreign policy. The essence of this new continuity 
was the program of King Edward, which both parties had now 
adopted as their own. The Liberal Cabinet, therefore, which 
was formed on December 10, 1905, entered upon the unre- 
stricted inheritance of its predecessor, especially as regards all 
the consequences of the agreement of 1904. But the attitude 
is characteristic which the new incumbent of the Foreign Office, 
Sir Edward Grey, took toward the French offer. He wished 
to avoid binding himself by a formal promise, and therefore 
did not renew the alliance offer of the Conservatives. Instead, 
he approved the French suggestion to hold confidential pour- 
parlers of military and naval specialists. What importance he 
attributed to them is shown by the fact that he did not let the 
whole Cabinet into the secret, but only a small inner coterie. 
Thus, before the conference of Algeciras, the "conversations 
d'ordre militaire'' were started, which, periodically repeated, 
gradually became a fixed institution of increasing secrecy and 
of more binding effect than political treaties. They grew into 
a military convention with a view to a certain definite eventual- 
ity, which could any day be brought about by continuing the 
policy of encircling Germany. From the first moment. Grey 
entered upon the course which in July, 19 14, morally involved 
the policy and, as he said, the honor of his country — this policy 
of the seemingly free hand, which, while pretending always to 
require ratification by Cabinet and Parliament and the appeal to 
public opinion, was in reality prostituted to the secret ambitions 
of a small circle and to the accompanying military influences. 
It may be that the instigator of this step, who was at that time 
still unknown to the Continent, was himself deceived as to the 
freedom of his decision and that he believed himself to be oper- 
ating more cautiously than the Conservatives; but, as a matter 
of fact, the Liberals now entered upon the downward course, on 
which it is difficult to turn back, and the French were well 



MODERN GERMANY 469 

aware why they owed "eternal gratitude" to the new Premier. 

In addition to all this, the military result of the first conver- 
sations (in the last days of 1905 or the first of 1906) gave to 
the French more valuable guarantees than contained in the offer 
in May. The plan of a landing In Schleswig-Holstein, which 
was exclusively in England's interest, was abandoned, and for It 
was substituted the landing in Northern France, which was 
more Important for the French. As a necessary corollary of a 
joint Anglo-French action, the cooperation of the Belgian army 
was forthwith Included In the plan of campaign by the two 
General Staffs. Immediately thereafter, at the moment when 
the Conference of Algeciras met (the middle of January, 1906) 
and when there was no immediate danger of war, the British 
military attache, Barnardiston, began In Brussels (in conjunction 
with diplomatic overtures in the same city) those confidential 
discussions with the Belgian General Staff, on the basis of the 
Anglo-French conversations authorized by his government, 
which his responsible superiors now falsely describe as "academic 
discussions"; the Belgian diplomat, Baron Greindl, has more 
appropriately characterized them as "equally naive and per- 
fidious." It Is In keeping with Grey's guiding principle, that 
these negotiations, too, were declared not to be formally binding. 
While discussing the sending of English troops in the event of 
a German attack on Belgium — for the probability of which he 
offered absolutely no proofs — the military attache went deeply 
into the question of the closest cooperation with Belgium's mili- 
tary forces; and the Belgian military authorities unconditionally 
entered into his plans, although they could have been as little 
In doubt as their government in regard to the unacademic char- 
acter of these discussions. Thus the encircling policy of the 
"free hand" began from the very start to Involve In its mili- 
tary and political snares a neutralized state whose Inviolability 
the English had hitherto upheld as a dogma. 

The Conference of Algeciras began its labors following this 
new grouping of the Powers. As events showed, the German 
Emperor and his advisors contented themselves with upholding 
the principle of the Integrity of Morocco and of the open door, 
and decided to wait and see whether the formal, rather than 
practically valuable paper Inhibition would prevent the "Tunifi- 
catlon" of Morocco by France. Certain German critics have 
later regretted that we missed our opportunity, since In view 
of the openly revealed policy of isolation against us, a settlement 
by arms would have been the proper course, the result of which, 
at a moment when Russia was Incapable of fighting and France 



470 MODERN GERMANY 

was unprepared, could scarcely have been doubtful, despite the 
undeveloped state of the German fleet. But it is explicable 
that a conscientious government nevertheless answered in the 
negative the question whether Morocco was worth a war, which 
means something else to the German nation than to Brit- 
ish diplomats; and if one disregarded the special, to contemplate 
the general situation, from which the former had resulted, there 
was always the possibility that after the temporary solution of 
the Morocco question — through which she had purchased 
France's recognition of her position in Egypt — England would 
again return to more peaceful paths. 

In the future, therefore, it was a question not so much as to 
the fate of Morocco and the results of the Conference, but 
rather as to whether England intended to persist in her plan of 
isolating Germany and to develop the forces which had been 
set in motion into a regular machine that would finally close 
about its prey. If such an intention really existed, Germany 
had cause to fear the worst from the unavoidable power of at' 
traction of the new grouping of Powers and from the reaction 
on French revanche, as soon as Russia's eagerness for the of- 
fensive should have revived again. For in such a case it was a 
question of whether in an open or disguised system of isolation 
there would be room for more or less friendly Anglo-German 
relations. With this in mind, a German statesman, in July, 
1906, frankly asked Sir Edward Grey whether he believed that 
openly admitted friendly relations to Germany would be com- 
patible with England's new friendship for France. The Eng- 
lishman coolly avoided the question by saying: 

"That depends on German politics." 

The German thereupon replied, hitting the nail on the head: 

*'No, it rather seems to depend on French interpretation of 
German politics." 

From that time on England considered the unconditional up- 
holding of France to be the best guarantee for the existence of 
her own world empire, and left Germany to think as she might 
of the fact that the Anglo-German relations in future were to 
be determined by the revanche idea. That was the new basis 
of the policy which, in July, 1914, was put into practice. This 
kind of a political community of interest inevitably creates mu- 
tual dependence, which in the long run increases in intensity 
and finally gets beyond control. 

It became apparent that it was a question of one of the most 
fundamental changes of front in English history. This is seen 
from the answer which King Edward, in August, 1906, gave 



MODERN GERMANY 471 

to another German statesman who broached the question of 
eliminating any possible causes of friction : "There are no fric- 
tions between us; there exists only rivalry." The father of 
the encircling policy herewith avowed the fundamental thought 
which he had absorbed from the obscure instincts and the public 
opinion of his people and which he had made the guide of his 
whole policy. Causes of friction and disagreement may be over- 
come; rivalry has its permanent source in the nature of things 
themselves. It would disappear only in case Germany were 
voluntarily to withdraw and quietly watch England's future 
game, or else bring the question to a decision in open conflict. 

England was prepared for either alternative. The first dread- 
naught was launched during the Algeciras Conference, and 
England triumphed in the thought that she had checkmated 
Germany with this new type of vessel. But the exultation 
changed to depression when Germany, as she could not avoid 
doing, began to build the new type of ships and when it was 
seen that England had really dealt herself a serious blow. This 
competition on which the German fleet entered under almost 
even conditions, served markedly to increase the sense of rivalry. 
England pressed her preparations on land with equal energy. 
In July, 1906, Minister of War Haldane brought in a plan for 
the reorganization of the army, which was the result of the new 
military situation and which called for the creation of an expe- 
ditionary force of 160,000 men. In keeping with the purpose 
for which this force was intended, the Belgian "vassals" were 
immediately informed of the increased eflSciency. The ultimate 
aims of this policy became so clear that the German Im- 
perial Chancellor found himself, on November 15, 1906, called 
upon openly to say that the Entente Cordiale would be a men- 
ace to the peace of Europe unless its relations to Germany were 
friendly. 

"A policy which aimed to encircle Germany — to .form a ring 
of Powers around us, in order to isolate and paralyze us — this 
would be a dangerous policy for European peace. The forma- 
tion of such a ring is not possible without the exercise of a cer- 
tain pressure. Action creates reaction. From action and reac- 
tion there may finally result an explosion." 

Despite this prophetic warning, England proceeded to an un- 
derstanding with Russia along the lines which King Edward 
had long since marked out. New elements for the moral isolation 
of Germany were gathering. While the British Prime Minister 
greeted the Duma with well-calculated homage, the British 
press began a campaign of provocative attacks against German 



472 MODERN GERMANY 

Kultur, which were intended to create sentiment and to call 
forth echoes throughout the world. They seem like an anticipa- 
tion of the tone of the present-day war literature. And when 
Russia, who required time for recuperation after the defeat in 
the East, proceeded to call the Hague Conference, the air was 
filled in all countries with projects of disarmament. This was 
followed by unctuous denunciations of Germany for refusing to 
meet an offensive policy of isolation with her own disarmament, 
and the odium of endangering peace was thus placed on the one 
who was in reality the threatened party. The German Imperial 
Chancellor replied at that time with truth that w^e had never 
misused our military strength, and that we should not do so in 
the future: ^'Germany cannot be placed under compulsion, not 
even under moral compulsion." (April 30, 1907.) 

Under such auspices, the negotiations came to a close in 
Petrograd, where, following the death of Count Lamsdorff, Is- 
volski had assumed direction of the Foreign Office. The Anglo- 
Russian agreement, of August 31, 1907, which applied to Persia, 
the Persian Gulf, Thibet and Afghanistan, resembled the agree- 
ment of 1904 in that it swept aside, for the sake of a higher object, 
the world-political differences betw^een the two Powers ; it did not, 
however, represent an adjustment of all questions in dispute, 
but rather a truce in the future spheres of influence. Even if the 
agreement was not aimed directly at Germany, nevertheless the 
decision as to Persia's fate one-sidedly and arbitrarily closed up 
a further portion of the world. While the press of the two 
countries painted in the darkest colors the dangers of German 
imperialism, the countries themselves proceeded on their course 
of boundless conquest. This treaty also is undeniably to be 
understood as part of England's imperial policy, especially from 
the point of view of the military security of India and of the 
Indian "glacis." It was also from anxiety as to its own future 
that this statesmanship, capable as it is, thanks to its positions 
of strength scattered throughout the world, of far more ambi- 
tious undertakings than the German Continental Power, deter- 
mined to satisfy its much-feared rival, Russia. That such great 
sacrifices were made, however, is only to be explained, as in the 
occurrences of 1904, by the recent shift in the world policy of 
England, which proceeded to act without, and if necessary 
against Germany. To this extent, in this agreement also, in 
which there is no mention of Germany, the indirect effects which 
no doubt had been calculated are more important than its actual 
content. In the year 1865 Palmerston had considered a strong 
Germany as desirable, in order to act as a check upon France 



MODERN GERMANY 473 

and Russia; at the present moment Earl Percy, Under-Secretary 
of State, interpreted the meaning of the understandings with 
France and Russia from the contrary point of view: "To sup- 
port these two states against a union of the two Central Powers, 
Germany and Austria-Hungary." Soon thereafter a leading 
publication openly revealed the ultimate design: 

''The Persian understanding, valuable in itself as it was and 
remains, was less important as an achievement than as a basis 
for other efforts of constructive diplomacy." 

The meaning of this "constructive diplomacy" was self-evi- 
dent. After rendering the Russian rival innocuous in the Far 
East and after temporarily satisfying him in the Middle East, 
the aim was to guide Russian ambition, which had long desired 
to wipe out the Japanese disgrace and to divert internal revolu- 
tionary forces, back to the Near East, which was the most nat- 
ural historical field for the newly revealed tendencies of all of 
Russia's political parties. That the increasingly pronounced 
world-political differences w^ere transferred to this dangerous 
theatre, where the rivalries of the Great Powers had for so 
long lain dormant, produced incalculable consequences. As a 
result of King Edward's strategic move, the differences between 
Austria and Russia in the Balkans, which had slumbered for a 
decade, flared up anew; and since they naturally reacted upon 
Germany, the Franco-Russian Alliance could not fail to take 
on a more offensive character than it had possessed for sixteen 
years. Whoever seeks to fathom the causes of the World War 
finds himself here at the point where the decisive involution of 
the relentless forces of destiny begins. 

Russia's new policy became apparent when she interpreted as 
a political violation of the Miirzsteg programme the purely eco- 
nomic project of a Sandjak railway, for which Austria drew her 
authority from the Berlin Act, and entered a sharp protest. 
This meant the opposing of all economic activity by Austria be- 
yond her own boundaries, just as England had undertaken to 
thwart Germany's plans throughout the world. In the question 
of the Macedonian reforms, which had always represented a field 
of conflict for the rival influences of the Great Powers, Austria- 
Hungary and Russia found themselves progressively at odds, 
while in this connection England sought to institute an extension 
of the agreements of 1907. The meeting of King Edward and 
the Czar at Reval, in June, 1908, indicated, under the cloak of 
a far-reaching programme of Macedonian reforms, in reality the 
coming partition of European Turkey. In this case also Eng- 
land was inspired by the thought that that which she had not 



474 MODERN GERMANY 

been able to carry through with Germany she might accomplish 
despite her — that is to say, cold-bloodedly to start an era of Euro- 
pean struggles for power, which in the language of the Island 
Kingdom is styled the maintenance of the European balance of 
power. It was seen from the start that there could not fail 
to be a reaction on the large and small states of the Balkans, and 
although for the time being the Young Turk Revolution re- 
sulted in a complete check for the original program, neverthe- 
less the stone had been set rolling. 

At the same time the effort was made to undermine the Drei- 
bund from within. The position of Italy in the Dreibund 
had been growing weaker for several years. This was due to a 
series of agreements with the different Powers providing mutual 
guarantees in regard to the Balkan and Mediterranean questions 
— agreements that were in effect "re-insurance" against all pos- 
sible contingencies. After the Anglo-German antagonism became 
manifest, at the conference of Algeciras, Italy's position suffered 
a severe blow; it was apparent that the opening up of all the 
Balkan questions for the future might prove a serious menace 
to her. And from the English standpoint the hope was perhaps 
entertained that under such auspices Austria-Hungary herself 
might be won over to the plans of the new Entente. Before a 
definite course was finally taken against the Dual Monarchy, the 
attempt was made to gain its friendship. And once more it was 
King Edward, who personally, at a meeting with Emperor Francis 
Joseph in Ischl (August, 1908), endeavored to entice the Haps- 
burger away from his German allies. He met with an uncom- 
promising refusal. All the more determinedly did England, 
since Austria-Hungary would not become her tool, proceed to 
carry out against her the scheme of isolation, for which the 
foundations had been laid more than a year before. 

The Imperial German Government understood thoroughly the 
new situation, as the result of which it was at every point forced 
onto the defensive and with each counterstroke laid itself open 
to the suspicion of taking the offensive. In an illuminating state- 
ment addressed to the Federal Governments, the Imperial Chan- 
cellor, in June, 1908, drew the following picture of the Euro- 
pean situation: 

"We must reckon with the fact that if we or Austria-Hun- 
gary should become involved with one of the Entente Powers in 
a serious conflict of interests, the understandings and agreements 
would crystallize into concrete alliances, so that together with 
Austria we might find ourselves face to face with a strong coali- 
tion. We cannot eliminate the fundamental causes of the politi- 



MODERN GERMANY 475 

cal dangers that surround us without stultifying ourselves. As 
far as Germany is concerned, they are due to the continued 
growth of her economic strength since the founding of the 
Empire. It is the groundless fear of a possible misuse of the 
economic, and hence also of the political, power of Germany and 
of her closest ally that drives other states to form alliances 
against us, and that would perhaps overcome their hesitation to 
attack and crush us, if they felt that they were strong enough 
to do so." 

A period now began which was to test the strength of the 
opposing groups of Powers ; a period which was to show whether 
the aim of the unprecedented diplomatic preparations, which 
were the work of England, was to be war or peace. 

IV. THE FIRST TESTS OF STRENGTH OF THE TRIPLE 

ALLIANCE 

Bosnia, igo8-og. Isolation Through the Efforts of Publicists and 
Pacificists. Death of King Edward. The Morocco-Congo Treaty 
of igii. 

After the preparation for the encircling policy in the years 
1909 to 19 14, there follows its practical application, a series of 
strength tests which, arising at first from questions of petty 
local importance, are seen to develop each time into a European 
crisis leading to the verge of war. These result in some cases 
frotn the after-effects of the Morocco question, w^hile later on 
the scene shifts to the East, filled with inflammable material by 
the reopening of the Oriental question. These crises seem to 
the observer like the breathing of the new^ Europe created by the 
policy of Edward VII. At the start, the manifestations of life 
shown by the new group of Powers do not reveal the functioning 
of a machine whose parts easily and unfailingly cooperate; but 
with the lapse of time, despite, or rather because, of an occasional 
failure or dislocation, the unity becomes more marked. As the 
complicated machine begins to work harmoniously, its activity 
is steadily increased, and the stronger its effects are felt the 
stronger becomes the resistance of the threatened states, as the 
German Chancellor had predicted. Even when, after a crisis, 
a temporary relaxation sets in betw^een individual members of 
the two camps, the result is merely a heightening of the accumu- 
lated tension at other points. On this account, these episodes, 
despite the hopeful reception given their momentary solution 
each time, appear in retrospect like the hasty catching of breath 
in the midst of a silent and desperate test of strength, each time 
leading only to a still fiercer struggle. 



476 MODERN GERMANY 

The first of these tests — the Bosnian crisis of 1908-09 — came 
unexpectedly, and showed by its course that it was as yet too 
early to speak of a concerted movement in the policy of isola- 
tion. 

Immediately after the meeting in Reval, the active imagina- 
tion of Minister Isvolski began to work. In a letter dated June 
18, 1908, which he would gladly have repudiated later, he pro- 
posed to the leader of Austria-Hungary's policy the annexation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and even of the Sandjak, in return 
for which Russia planned to obtain passage through the Darda- 
nelles. A generation previously Russia had pointed the way for 
the Dual Monarchy into Bosnia, and thereafter repeatedly — 
for the last time through Kuropatkin — had suggested to Vienna 
to change the administration of the provinces entrusted to her by 
the Treaty of Berlin into an actual annexation corresponding 
to existing conditions. Isvolski was thus only continuing the 
course of Russia's policy for the previous thirty years, which, 
without the slightest regard for the little Serbian brother, rec- 
ognized this territory as within the undisputed sphere of interest 
of Austria-Hungary. According to the bitter words of King 
Milan, Russia had hitherto ''always made use of the Serbian 
nation in the nature of convenient small change for the settle- 
ment of her indebtedness to Austria." ^ The Russian minister, 
even after the outbreak of the Young Turk Revolution, held 
fast to his program, and at a meeting with Count Aehrenthal 
in Buchlau reached an agreement without difficulty as to the 
means for carrying it through. 

It is not surprising that Austria, in view of this promised 
support, quickly proceeded to act. For the transformation of 
Turkey into a constitutional national state could not fail to 
endanger the hitherto passable condition of affairs in Bosnia, not 
alone on account of the possibility of a nationalistic Turkish 
demand for the country's return, but also because of the danger 
of Serbian propaganda, which counted on the temporary nature of 
the Austro-Hungarian mandate. Further, it was imperative to 
take timely precautions at the most vulnerable spot against the 
danger of an opening up of the whole Balkan question through 
the policy of isolation, which had now become more imminent. 
The annexation decree of October, 1908, merely served to 
strengthen Vienna in several directions. This represented in 
nowise a policy of conquest in the style of the World Powers, 
which were insatiably seeking what they could devour; on the 
contrary, it was simply a change in the legal form of a title 

^Die serbische Frage, Dr. Wladau Georgewitsch, p. 6i, 



MODERN GERMANY 477 

which had long been recognized by Europe. Indeed, so thor- 
oughly did Austria renounce any policy of force that she sur- 
rendered at the same time to Turkey the garrison rights in the 
Sandjak granted to her by treaty, and publicly abandoned the 
ambitious plans which no doubt had taken form at times in the 
imagination of her statesmen. 

The effect of the decree of annexation was most unexpected. 
The reason for this was that Isvolski was unable to obtain Lon- 
don's agreement to the Russian part of the program — the open- 
ing of the Dardanelles. For in England the Reval program 
was no longer considered practicable, owing to the Young Turk 
Revolution. Following the fall of Abdul Hamid, the hated 
protagonist of German influence, the more ambitious hope awoke 
in the minds of British statesmen of again becoming the pro- 
tector and councillor of a youthful and constitutional Turkey, 
and, thanks to this position, which carried with it consequences 
so important for England's world policy (Arabia and the 
Persian Gulf), the further hope of finally making an end of the 
German competitor. Thus, as a result of the changed situa- 
tion, British statesmen found themselves in the painful posi- 
tion, to the astonishment of Isvolski, of being forced to oppose 
the opening of the Dardanelles, to which in Reval they had 
been favorable. The effect of the decree of annexation, there- 
fore, was seen not alone in the formally justified protest of 
Turkey, the anger of Serbia, who saw her secret hopes demol- 
ished, and the disappointment of Isvolski, who found himself 
diplomatically out-manoeuvred, but above all in the outburst of 
English bitterness, which was quite unexpected in Vienna. The 
London Foreign Office received the notice of the annexation 
in the most unfriendly manner, and the irresponsible organs of 
the press let loose the vials of their wrath against the unpardon- 
able wrong inflicted on humanity and international law by this 
immoral act — all of this with the moral bathos which is always 
in evidence in England when they dare not mention the 
real motives. The English Balkan Committee, which had been 
in touch with all the national revolutionary elements of the 
Balkans, now incited the Turks to a trade boycott and to 
demands for compensation; especially did they stir up the Serbs. 
It was a cause of astonishment that London was even more 
Pan-Slavic than Petrograd itself — had it not been England her- 
self, who at the Congress of Berlin made the motion for the 
Bosnian mandate to Austria (analogous to her own acquisition of 
Cyprus), and had she not a short while previously turned with 
ill-concealed horror from the blood-stained dynasty in Bel- 



478 MODERN GERMANY 

grade? It is known that on the very day of the reception of 
the Austrian ultimatum, in July, 19 14, the British representative 
in Petrograd said: "Direct British interests in Serbia are nil, 
and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned 
by British public opinion." 

The secret of this violent opposition of England in the autumn 
of 1908 was to be sought neither in Serbia nor in any anxiety 
for the formalities of international law, but in a system of gen- 
eral policy which, seeing defeat for certain of Its expectations, 
set up with cunning calculation aims that gave even greater 
promise for the future. 

This was an opportunity to show Austria-Hungary, who a 
short while before had refused to be drawn into the British 
plans of isolating Germany, what a state faithful to the Drei- 
bund would have to expect from across the Channel. It was 
an opportunity to pour balm upon the wounds of the new 
Russian Entente ally, to whom, contrary to desire, it had been 
necessary to refuse the promised compensation, and at the same 
time to deflect the anger of this ally (in view of Isvolski's char- 
acter this was not difficult) against Austria-Hungary, who had 
been the winner in the game. By offering generous diplomatic 
help to Russia, it was possible to prevent the new friend from 
entertaining doubts as to the power of the Entente. By making 
the proposal for an international conference and by inciting in 
the most violent manner the press of the friendly countries, the 
British Foreign Office could not fail either to frighten Austria- 
Hungary into yielding or at least to prove to Russia the indis- 
pensability of the Entente. Finally, by arousing a strong Pan- 
Slavic movement from Moscow to Belgrade there was prospect 
of confining Russia henceforth to her ''proper field of labor," 
a consummation which London had sought for some time. In 
this manner it was possible, in any event, for England to turn 
Isvolski's unfortunate little game into a remunerative specula- 
tion along big lines. 

For a moment it appeared as if the action would be a suc- 
cess. Soon the whole Slavic world was in flames. For a long 
time French publicists had sought to arouse the slumbering 
forces in this region, but it was England who provided the 
latter with the opportunity for their first political demonstration 
before the eyes of the world. The Serbians, to w^hom King 
Edward's ambitious policy suddenly gave a foothold such as 
they had never had in all their history, challenged their neigh- 
bor in the most provocative manner; they quickly accustomed 
themselves to the idea that the historical role of an Eastern 



MODERN GERMANY 479 

Piedmont was reserved for them, and eagerly took up the catch- 
word coined by France that Austria-Hungary must suffer the 
fate of an "Eastern Switzerland." Indeed, for the first time 
the political lines of attack of Austria-Hungary's enemies were 
seen to extend into the heart of the Dual Monarchy, where 
individual politicians whose stock in trade was "nationality" 
stood ready to cooperate. At all points, in the diplomatic strug- 
gle of the winter 1908-09, forces were for the first time aroused 
which in the years preceding the World War constantly grew 
more threatening and finally became a factor in its outbreak. 

The fact that England's portentous policy at this time failed 
of its aim was primarily due to the much greater strength of 
the bond between Germany and Austria-Hungary than of that 
holding the Entente together. The German Imperial Chan- 
cellor after the decree of annexation, the date of which had not 
been known to him beforehand, immediately informed Vienna 
that it might feel absolute security as to Germany's attitude,. 
in which connection he said: "This is for us a matter of self- 
evident loyalty." Whoever criticizes the unconditional nature 
of this approval as being in opposition to the Bismarck tradition 
in questions of Austria's Balkan policy, forgets that it was no 
longer a matter of the special local interests of an ally which 
might be supported or not according to wish, but that vital in- 
terests were at stake w^hich, in the new world situation as cre- 
ated by the encircling policy, concerned both parties equally. 
In a speech in the Reichstag in March, 1909, Prince Biilow 
therefore very properly recalled Bismarck's saying: "A state 
like Austria-Hungary, if left in the lurch, will be alienated and 
will feel inclined to offer its hand to the Power which has 
been the enemy of its untrustworthy friend." An abandonment 
of Austria-Hungary at this moment would merely have played 
into the hands of King Edward and completed the isolation of 
the German Empire. 

The fact that Germany w^as successful in defeating the action 
of England and Russia through her firm support of Austria 
was due in part to two considerations. She succeeded tem- 
porarily in relieving the Morocco crisis, which had continued 
after the Algeciras Conference, and in persuading the French, 
who were no doubt fully informed of Russia's lack of military 
preparation, to maintain an attitude of more or less reserve in 
the Bosnian crisis. The Franco-German Declaration of Feb- 
ruary 8, 1909, had as its formal basis the Algeciras agreement 
and the renewed French recognition of the independence and 
integrity of the Sultanate. France merely promised to place 



48o MODERN GERMANY 

no obstacle in the way ot Gernian> *s eonimerclal and industrial 
interests in Morocco, while Germany acktunvledized that France, 
as Morocco's neighbor, was called upon to uphold peace and 
order for the sake of special political interiors. The inequality 
of the respective promises is self-evident. Nevertheless, the at- 
tempt was more or less successful in this crisis to brinii about a 
lessening of the tension with France, without the sacrifice of our 
rcval interests. Russia, as we have said, despite all her brave 
words, which were blindly swallowed in Belixrade, was not 
ready in a military way. German diplomacy, by the declara- 
tion of Its unconditional support of Austria- Huniiary. made the 
retreat easy for Russia: at the same time it discovered the man- 
ner in which the Great Powers might fonnally check the wild 
eagerness of Serbia's preparations — for which several of them 
were responsible. On March 31, ioch'), Serbia, who was forced 
to acquiesce in Europe's decision, on the ad\ ice of the Great 
Powers, pledged herself by a formal declaration to abandon her 
unfriendly attitude toward Austria-Hungary and to live once 
more on the footing of neighborliness with that state. It was 
reserved for the future to show whether the spirits of evil could 
be exorcized in this manner. 

The first test of strength of the Entente resulted, therefore, 
in a defeat, since uniform and coherent diplomatic and military 
leadership was lacking. For those who staged the game this 
may have served merely as a warning to make good that which 
was lacking. In England it was decided to await an oppor- 
tunity with an ot^cially smiling face. In a speech on March 
30, 1909. Grey laid down the guiding lines for the future. 
Two causes for conflict, he said, between England and Germany 
must be avoided. One was England's attempt to isolate Ger- 
many ; this would never be submitted to by a nation of the 
strength and power of Germany. The other was the attempt 
of any one Power to dictate the policy of the Continent: this 
England would never permit. The first of the alternatives 
directly admitted the existence of something which the Eng- 
lish newspapers had hitherto characterized as a German idee 
fixe, and placed a check on the diplomatic measure of isolation. 
The second alternative, on which the emphasis was placed, ex- 
pressed in cautious form a denunciation of that which it was 
customary- to style, plainly enough for the ears of Paris and 
Petrograd. the danger of a Gemian hegemon\-. It was a ques- 
tion only of selecting a new formula, not a new policy. 

In England the conclusion was reached that the Entente 
a^rreements did not furnish a satisfactory weapon of defense. 



MODERN GERMANY 481 

and the question arose whether England's own nnllitary strength 
should not be strengthened. There began a period of those 
paroxysms of panic which occasionally sweep over the island, 
or, rather, which are artificially created for the sake of a polit- 
ical purpose. Although the panic outwardly found expression 
in ridiculous outbursts of fear of Zeppelins, German spies and 
waiters, there was behind it a more serious movement. The 
French had constantly called attention to England's lack of mil- 
itary preparations. The agitation for universal military serv- 
ice, long carried on by Lord Roberts, now began to find a 
stronger response. The spectre of a German invasion was 
used to make the unfamiliar idea palatable. The French jingoes 
admitted to each other, with tongue in cheek, that the leaders 
of the agitation themselves did not believe in the possibility of 
such an invasion, and calmed the French nation by the informa- 
tion that as a matter of fact something more important was 
at stake — namely, an expeditionary army, which, in a certain 
eventuality, was to fight by the side of the French on the Con- 
tinent.^ The British press took up the French argument that 
England's military weakness robbed the Entente of its value, 
and that in case of war an auxiliary army must be sent to Bel- 
gium.^ A strong Continental army was already regarded merely 
as the logical consequence of England's new Continental policy, 
and unhesitatingly on each side of the Channel Belgium was 
fixed on as the scene of its activity! 

At the same time there began an active naval propaganda. 
The Cabinet itself went so far as to make the assertion (later 
acknowledged to be wrong) that the German fleet, despite offi- 
cial German figures, was being more rapidly developed than 
was provided for and publicly proclaimed in its program; 
if the government indulged in a juggling with figures, the op- 
position went to the length of shrieking that the German fleet of 
dreadnaughts was on the point of outstripping the British. The 
anxiety in England was, to a certain degree, even communicated 
to the Americans. After an authority such as Admiral Mahan 
gave expression, in the summer of 1909, to the fear that some 
day the German fleet would disregard the Monroe Doctrine, 
numberless British writers encouraged this distrust and saw 

1 See De la paix de Francfort a la conference d'Algesiras, Mevil, p. 314. 

2 "Germany and the Entente: A Letter from Berlin,' by Robert Crozicr Lonsf, 
Fortnightly Rezievj, October, 1909, p. 747: "The logical complement of our new 
Continental policy is a numerous conscript army. That this is no arbitrary 
deduction is shown by the remarks of a writer in the Temps some month? ago 
that England's military weakness deprived the Entente of meaning, and by the 
statement lately made by General Hippolyte Langlois that in case of war it 
would be necessary for England to land troops in Belgium to assist France." 



482 MODERN GERMANY 

with satisfaction that with the beginning of the twentieth cen- 
tury in American eyes Germany, not Great Britain, was "the 
enemy." They were perfectly well aware that a German men- 
ace to the Monroe Doctrine belonged to the same class of friv- 
olous inventions as the statement of the British press in Japan 
that the Calif ornian land laws (which exclude Japanese from 
acquiring land) were due to the intrigues of German-Amer- 
icans ! 

As far as the influence of the British press extended in the 
world, a beginning was now made, with finely organized skill, 
to sow the seed which in the summer of 19 14 sprang up to 
such a bloody harvest. The more widely spread international 
cultural connections of England and France were everywhere 
systematically utilized for an unscrupulous campaign against 
Germany. It will be one of the future problems of history 
to determine the role played by this press, by the group of 
newspapers owned by Lord Northcliffe, with its train of de- 
pendent organs throughout the provinces and the whole Eng- 
lish colonial empire, by the Reuter Bureau and by the Asso- 
ciated Press, by the Temps and the Matin, in preparing anti- 
German sentiment. In the following years this machine func- 
tioned so regularly and unfailingly that it is incorrect to speak of 
statesmanship being stampeded by public opinion ; rather a de- 
liberate political design is obvious which, operating from above 
downward, grows with a latent energy of immeasurable effect. 
The exaggerations of the German press have been described as 
counterbalancing those of the foreign press, and the admission 
has been made by us that sins have been committed by both 
sides — who can check the political passions of irresponsible per- 
sons! In this comparison, however, it must never be forgotten 
that the thoroughly decentralized German press, as every one 
knows who is familiar with international press conditions, is 
not to be likened to the corresponding forces of our enemies; 
its lack of territorial, capitalistic and party unity precludes a 
like uniformity and cooperation; it does not give the keynote 
to the orchestra but represents merely a many-voiced chorus 
that accompanies and interprets the events; its anti-English rep- 
resentatives up to the time of war were without influence either 
on the government or on wide circles of the population. And 
finally, one of its pronounced peculiarities is that, thanks to its 
structure, it has remained free of those capitalistic influences that 
have played a shocking part in the imperialistic propaganda of 
other countries. 

Even temporary agitation may produce lasting impressions. 



MODERN GERMANY 483 

The psychological effects of the English panic on the French 
mind increased from year to year, and even the agreement with 
Germany in 1909 did not serve as a check to this tendency. The 
Franco-Russian alliance had formerly perhaps caused greater 
outbursts of joy on the occasion of fraternal banquets, but in 
the nature of things this had been confined in the main to 
the upper stratum of the ruling classes, and had not brought 
the two nations into closer touch. Now, however, regardless 
of the formally loose bond of the Entente, two civilized peoples 
had been drawn close together, and public opinion on both sides 
was brought into mutual and intensifying contact. The spirit 
of revanche, which for the last ten or fifteen years had played 
only a diplomatic role in the Russian alliance, saw now, with 
deep satisfaction, on the other side of the Channel an entire 
nation the victim of similar elemental feelings of hatred and 
of fear. 

Furthermore, the military agreements of the two countries, 
despite the elastic character of the Entente, in the nature of 
things led to a spirit of closer cooperation than was the case 
with the Russian alliance: after agreeing in regard to the essen- 
tials, the theater and the plan of war, the military representa- 
tives drew into constantly closer touch. General French began 
his studies on the Belgian terrain as early as 19 10. The secret 
English war hand-books of Belgium ^ — which are the most sys- 
tematic work of the General Staff of a Great Power regarding 
a neighboring neutral country of which we know and which 
were printed in the years 191 2-19 13 — are the result of his ex- 
haustive preparatory studies, of which the Belgian government 
could not possibly have remained in ignorance. How far the 
cooperation between England and France in working out a 
common Belgian plan of campaign had gone was shown shortly 
afterward when the press of the two countries most bitterly at- 
tacked a Dutch bill (at the beginning of 191 1) for coast de- 
fense, proposing the fortification of Flushing. The English took 
the position that such a fortification — which was fully within 
the right of Dutch sovereignty — was entirely unpermissible, 
since it might hinder the English from efficiently protecting Bel- 
gian neutrality against possible German aggression; they would 
fain have forbidden the Dutch, in protecting their neutrality, 
from making use of those means by which they might keep 
foreign armies and fleets away from their territory. The press 
heightened the comedy by denouncing German pressure as the 

^Belgium, Road and River Reports, prepared by the General Staff, Londor, 
Vol. I (1912), Vol. II (1913), Vol. Ill (1914). 



484 MODERN GERMANY 

cause of this fortification and then denouncing the alleged Ger- 
man desire to conquer Holland as a danger for the future. So 
strong was this indignation that the conclusion was inevitable 
that the fortifying of Flushing interfered with the military 
plans of the two nations.^ The combinations worked out by the 
General Staffs were apt in the end, through mutual incitement, 
to become a menace to peace; the military factors, left quite 
free of parliamentary control, contrary to all English tradi- 
tions, were at liberty to develop, until finally they could not fail 
to react with determining force on the plans of the statesmen. 

Whoever follows this encircling scheme of diplomacy and 
press, accompanied by military and naval preparation, finds him- 
self at the moment of the death of King Edward, its spir- 
itual originator (May, 19 10), face to face w^ith the question: 
Does all this not simply mean preparation for the great war, 
and was that which the world is to-day experiencing not delib- 
erately planned long ago? Despite the temptation to answer 
this question affirmatively, it must not be forgotten that at 
least the English aim of isolating Germany might have been at- 
tained by peaceful methods. According to the opinion of well- 
informed men as regards the intentions of the King, it is possi- 
ble that he himself would have preferred such a solution. His 
object would have been attained if Germany had been crippled 
by bloodless means, if her slightest action had been frustrated 
and her treaties disrupted or weakened, her chances for the 
future ruined, and Germany herself, through constant pressure, 
forced to discontinue the increase of her navy and to become 
such an unimportant member of the world system of states as 
the English calculations demanded. King Edward's aim would 
have been reached had the German Empire, at the same time 
that the distribution of the world among the giant states went 
triumphantly forward, encountered protest and ill-will at every 
step beyond its narrowest bounds; had its efforts at self-expres- 
sion, which, in view of the increase of its population and of its 
sources of energy urged toward outward activity, been consis- 
tently denounced as unpermissible or as an inexcusable menace 
to the world, while another state that had become innocuouSj 
with a stationary population, was left free to expand at will. 

1 The Belgian Minister, Baron Greindl, in his report of November 23, 1911, 
says: "The idea of a flanking movement from the North undoubtedly forms part 
of the combinations of the Entente cordiale. If that were not the case, the 
plan of fortifying Flushing would not have caused such an outcry in Paris 
and London. It was not even concealed there why it was desired that the 
Scheldt should remain without protection. The purpose was to be able with- 
out hindrance to throw an English garrison into Antwerp, that is to say, in 
our territory to create a base of operation for an offensive, in which we were 
to be compelled to partake, in the direction of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia." 



MODERN GERMANY 485 

Such a world-political restriction might attain an apparent suc- 
cess, but it carried with it the danger of driving the encircled 
state to desperate reaction. For such an event England had 
planned as a last resort, if necessary, to visit as a preventive 
measure on the German Empire the fate once prepared for the 
Spanish, Dutch and French commercial Powers. This method 
does not lead to war as the only solution, but it may finally 
render it inevitable — especially when the forces of which it 
makes use (French revanche and Russian offensive) get out of 
hand and blindly pursue their own ends. Such was the fateful 
inheritance left behind by King Edward. It cannot be stated 
that he desired the World War, but without his interference this 
war w^ould never have come about. 

The dangers were not to be obviated by relaxation of the 
tension at one point. German statesmen, who in February, 

1909, had sought an understanding with France, now tried to 
follow up this idea of removing causes of friction throughout 
the w^orld, by a similar move towards Russia. They returned 
to the policy which in the eighties had avoided a break with 
Petrograd, had rendered possible in the nineties a friendly re- 
lationship w^ith the Dual Alliance, and had maintained during 
the Japanese War a benevolent neutrality. The new Imperial 
Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, and the head of the Rus- 
sian government, Sassonov, reached an agreement in November, 

1910, to the effect **that neither of the two governments would 
enter into an alliance which might be aimed against the other." 
Especially did they declare their mutual interest in the main- 
tenance of the status quo in the Balkans and in the Near East, 
and reached an understanding in regard to the Persian ques- 
tion, which had been settled in 1907 only on a one-sided basis. 
In return for Germany's recognition of Russia's position in Per- 
sia, Russia definitely abandoned her opposition to the Bagdad 
Railway, to which, it was agreed, certain connections should be 
made. 

These events which, from the standpoint of the peace of the 
world, might have indicated a desirable alleviation, were re- 
garded in the camp of the Triple Entente with mixed feelings. 
Although nothing was further from Russia's thoughts than a 
**re-insurance agreement," and although an official declaration 
to this effect was immediately made, London and Paris felt that 
the Entente had been weakened. It may be that all the Rus- 
sian statesmen were aiming at was, by concessions on a minor 
point, to purchase Germany's moral support in other cases of 
dispute, or merely to gain time temporarily until ready for 



486 MODERN GERMANY 

war. It may also be that Russia wished to give warning that 
another course was open to her, both to her old ally (who in 
the previous year had not satisfied all her demands but had made 
an independent agreement with Germany) and to her new 
partner in the Entente, following the re-formation of the Cabi- 
net and the demise of King Edward. At all events, the prac- 
tical indirect result of the Potsdam Agreement was, both in 
England and in France, to create, after the first dissatisfaction', 
a greater desire to advance Russia's policies or to take the lead 
themselves wherever possible at other points. Matters had al- 
ready gone so far that every diminution in the effort to isolate 
Germany at one point resulted in an increased activity at others, 
the final effect being an intensifying of the whole situation. 
While certain Englishmen began to consider an analogous Anglo- 
German agreement, the old advocates of Germany's isolation 
were puzzled what to think of Sir Edward Grey, who no longer 
had the clever King behind him.^ A well-informed critic such 
as Garvin declared that in matters like the Bagdad Railway, 
which was a vital question for England more than for any 
other Great Power, the Triple Entente had ceased to exist. 
Even less did the French hide their disappointment, and they 
mourned with even sharper grief the English King, whom they 
missed; they were disturbed by the withdrawal of the Russian 
troops from the Polish border, and they wondered reproach- 
fully whether for the sake of revanche they should not have 
placed themselves much more unreservedly at the disposal of 
their Russian ally. 

Instead of its disorganization, a firmer consolidation of the 
Entente was therefore demanded, energetic action abroad in- 
stead of restraint — regardless of the danger that the incipient 
relaxation of the world situation might again yield to an im- 
perilling of peace. "It is high time," wrote the Temps in 
March, 191 1, "that an end be put to the unsatisfactory con- 
dition of the Entente by actual cooperation." At this very time, 
after an interregnum of six years, the energetic Delcasse had re- 
turned to the Cabinet as Minister of Marine, and before long 
he had again imposed his views on the weaker characters in the 
ministry. The group formed by the Temps and the Comite 
du Maroc began to promulgate a new Morocco program, which 
promised a marked diversion towards foreign questions. Eng- 

1 Thus H. H. Johnston, in the Nineteenth Century and After, December, 1910, 
remarks with regard to what he considers the necessary "adjustment of the 
political relations between the British and German Empires": "If such an end 
could be attained without too great a sacrifice of vital British interests, it is 
the end above all others which should be immediately and unflaggingly pur- 
sued by British statesmen." 



i 



MODERN GERMANY 487 

lish cooperation was certain from the start, and for the pur- 
pose of mutual encouragement, the press again began the popu- 
lar game of question and answer in regard to the nature of the 
Franco-English agreements, resulting on both sides in unwitting- 
revelations and in the creation of a spirit of recklessness. 

The manner in w^hich England bolstered up France's ex- 
pected action in Morocco by an enthusiastic speech of Sir Ed- 
ward Grey on March 13, 191 1, on world peace and by an un- 
restricted treaty of arbitration with America, will always be a 
source of wonder. To be sure, there were reasons of a world- 
political and domestic-political nature for this speech, but the 
theatric reception which was given to it proved that an un- 
mistakable application in the field of foreign politics outweighed 
all other considerations. Grey's journalistic confidant. Spender, 
felt that he might venture to revive the meaningless saying of 
Napoleon in an up-to-date form: "The British Empire is 
Peace." Impetuously he stretched both hands toward America, 
and quieted the French, who were somewhat disturbed by this 
"world peace," by saying that the German military spirit had 
in reality received a body blow by this speech and that the life 
of the nations was to be governed by a new principle which was 
to replace the old "blood-and-iron" policy. The culmination 
lay in the question: "Now that England has held out the olive 
branch to the nations, is there any justification for an addition 
to the present German naval program?" The statesman whom 
Spender praised for never having been a sentimentalist thought 
thus to solve all problems with a peace speech; even at the last 
minute before the World War he once more produced arguments 
of this kind, which are probably a peculiarity of his mentality. 

The immediate effect of the speech, after the German Im- 
perial Chancellor had replied with a manly declaration of our 
point of view, was to give the signal for the renewal of the 
publicity campaign for the encircling of Germany, in which, 
by the cooperation of harmless friends of peace in all countries, 
the cannons of pacifism were turned against us. While the 
giant states prepared anew for the partition of the world, they 
sought to persuade the Germans to adopt, as the English Oppo- 
sition sarcastically remarked, a "change in the rules of the 
game," and because the state which had been systematically 
isolated for seven years did not begin to disarm, it was out- 
lawed as the disturber of the peace of the world. It thus be- 
came steadily clearer that a threat against Germany was con- 
cealed in Grey's confused dreams of peace, and the absolute 
dependence of the political and non-political brains in America 



488 MODERN GERMANY 

on English arguments was revealed, although not for the last 
time. Even he who does not regard the policy of the Liberal 
Cabinet as pure Machiavellism but takes into consideration its 
traditional mode of expression and the restrictions that regard 
for others imposes upon it, cannot escape the suspicions that 
Grey desired under all circumstances to uphold the action of 
France in Morocco against the expected German protest and 
to denounce this, when it should come, as a disturbance of the 
peace of the world. For precisely during these weeks (April ii, 
191 1 ), the British minister secretly gave his consent to the ad- 
vance of the French on Fez. 

The situation in the Morocco question had long since become 
untenable. In the course of the last five years the Algeciras 
Act had been more and more nullified, as the result of internal 
anarchy and even more through France's ''readiness to help." ^ 
That which was proclaimed as the "peaceful penetration" of 
Morocco proved to be, even in English opinion, a system of 
financial strangling, of brutal reprisals, of continuous intrigues 
and provocations, which increased until the idlest excuses were 
regarded as justifying the French advance on Fez. On the 
other hand, the Franco-German negotiations of 1909, which had 
at least provided security for Germany's trade interests and an 
economic cooperation in Africa, had resulted in failure in De- 
cember, 1 9 10, and had altogether ceased. This was entirely 
owing to France, as well-known French writers afterward ad- 
mitted.^ This failure was due in great part to the frequent 
cabinet changes and the alliance of politicians with capitalistic 
interests in Paris; a decisive factor, however, was the feeling 
of self-confidence, carefully nursed in London, that the French 
aims might be realized, if need be, without regard for Germany 
and without offering compensation. Since Delcasse's return to 
power, there was a determination to risk the march on Fez with 
British support; once safely in Fez,, the French would see to 
it that military necessity and the well-seasoned game of creating 
"incidents" should make it impossible for them to leave; a 
complete occupation of the capital was, of course, the natural 
prelude to the declaration of the protectorate. This was an 
attempt to rob the German Empire of the remnant of the com- 
pensation agreed upon, through the pressure brought to bear by 
the general political situation and by means of a political method 
in which one seemingly innocent step necessitated the next. 

'^Morocco in Diplomccy, Morel (London, 1912), p. 40: "Torn . . . across and 
reduced to waste paper." 

2 E.g., Le coup d'Agadir, Albin. 



MODERN GERMANY 489 

That was the culminating act of the policy begun in April, 
1904 — a policy which, according to the opinion of an English- 
man, aimed to make the state which was in reality threatened 
appear in the light of the warlike aggressor, unless it submitted 
to humiliating exclusion.^ 

German diplomats had given warning after warning, w^ith 
increasing earnestness, of the results which would follow if the 
Algeciras Act were to be nullified in this manner and if the 
signatory Powers should again obtain freedom of action. As a 
deaf ear continued to be turned to these warnings, Germany de- 
cided to speak more plainly. On July i, 191 1, the gunboat 
Panther was sent to Agadir, for the protection of German in- 
terests in South Morocco, which were threatened by disturb- 
ances. According to the intention of Secretary of State von 
Kiderlen-Wachter, the measure was for no other purpose than 
to show our unwillingness to leave our well-established inter- 
ests unprotected; it was, as later characterized by the French- 
man, Marcel Sembat, also an indication of the desire "for a 
chat," for the purpose of carrying to a conclusion the inter- 
rupted negotiations — naturally with but two participants, as 
they had been started in the year 1909. Germany's object in 
the negotiations, as the French were officially informed by von 
Kiderlen at the very start, was not the occupation of South 
Morocco, since recognition of the French position had now be- 
come unavoidable, but the acquisition of a compensation else- 
where. Only in case this was not to be obtained, would it 
become necessary in the nature of things to revive Germany's 
claims in Morocco. 

It is worthy of note that resentment at the demonstration at 
Agadir was not so strong in Paris, where they were doubtless 
conscious of their own sins of omission, as it was in London. 
While Sir Edward Grey had never been willing to admit that 
the march on Fez, which he had approved, had created a "new 
situation," he now proclaimed, filled as he was with distrust 
of the German explanations, that a "new situation" had been 
created. On July 4, before France had yet spoken, he took a 
definite stand, declaring that England would recognize no agree- 
ment brought about without her cooperation. Hastily, France's 
second sprang between the principals, before the duel had begun, 
in order to bring about a result in accordance with her own 

^Morocco in Diplomacy, Morel, p. 127: "Had Germany wanted war, her 
course was clearly indicated, and it has been one of the most shameful features 
of the persistent misleading of the British public in favor of a diplomacy 
immoral from its inception, that Germany, the provoked party, has been repre- 
sented, both in the crisis of 1905 and in the crisis of 1911 — crises entirely 
brought about by that diplomacy — as working for war." 



490 MODERN GERMANY 

wishes. The point of danger during the succeeding negotia- 
tions was from the start neither Berlin nor Paris, but London. 

Grey's act became more peremptory at the very moment 
when, in the Franco-German negotiations, the question was 
taken up as to the extent of compensation in the French Congo. 
Begun by an article in The Times of July 20 of unusual im- 
portance and from an unusual source, it culminated in the speech 
of Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer, on July 21. 
The Times accused Germany of demanding a compensation 
such as England had received in Egypt, and went to the length 
of saying that no British government could agree to this, even 
if a French government should be found ready to accept it. 
While the discussion was concerned with the extent of boundary 
changes in the French Congo, The Times poured oil on the 
flames by making the charge that Germany was making *'a claim 
for absolute European predominance." This well-calculated 
catchword, which we shall encounter up to the moment of the 
outbreak of the war, revealed the fundamental political antag- 
onism which had determined all of England's actions for a 
decade. In his next measures, however. Grey, according to his 
English critic,^ adopted the arguments of The Times in a man- 
ner which would have been befitting a French minister. Even 
in England curiosity was expressed as to the motive of his 
action. 

Contrary to the agreement, he was constantly kept Informed 
from Paris regarding the progress of the negotiations between 
the two countries; if he received false information from Paris 
(through the underground channels which connected the 
French party of action with the British Embassy), this was the 
fault of the French; but if he gave more credence to this in- 
formation than to the official German declarations, that was his 
own fault. Even without this, he was, however, quite clear 
as to what he wanted. He desired, even without formal ad- 
mission of England to the negotiations, to force Germany's 
compensation to be made as small as possible, in the interest 
of France, and to bring about such a balance of the scales that 
in any event Germany would be worsted. If the Entente was 
to issue with greater strength from this final settlement in 
regard to Morocco, he would have to stand by its uncompromis- 
ing partisans in Paris and prevent at any price the party advo- 
cating relaxation of the strain between France and Germany 
from gaining political power. This could be brought about 

'^Morocco in Diplomacy, Morel, p. 170: "He could not surely have been more 
jemphatic in defense of a purely French interest, had he been_ the servant of 
the French Republic, instead of a servant of the British Empire." 



MODERN GERMANY 491 

only by provoking Germany and encouraging France — creating 
at the same time, it is true, war possibilities which could hardly 
have arisen from the Franco-German negotiations alone. 

Stripped of all the accretions of diplomatic misunderstandings 
and dissensions, this was the significance of the speech which 
Grey caused the Radical member of the Cabinet, Lloyd George, 
to make on July 22; the Foreign Minister went so far in his 
autocratic policy as to inform only the Premier, Asquith, re- 
garding the import of this step. The speech was an undis- 
guised threat to Germany of English readiness for war, a sound- 
ing of the alarm which quickly brought the Franco-German 
negotiations to a critical stage. At the same time England 
made ready, in the effort further to strengthen France morally, 
to take those military and naval measures necessary in emer- 
gencies. It is interesting in this connection to see from some 
of the existing documents to what point the long-standing plans 
for the inclusion of Belgium in the sphere of military action 
had been developed. In August the English planned, in case 
of the outbreak of war, a landing in the Belgian town of Zee- 
briigge, even in the event that Belgium did not previously ask 
for help; when the Belgian general, later informed of this plan, 
modestly called attention to the necessity of an agreement on 
the part of his government, he received the cool reply that in 
any case {en tout etat de cause) the English would have entered 
the country. Lord Roberts, who spoke from knowledge if any 
one was in the position to do so, likewise admitted with mili- 
tary frankness that the British expeditionary army was held 
ready "to embark for Flanders to do its share in maintaining 
the balance of power in Europe." England was prepared to 
march, even without an appeal for her help and without for- 
mally taking notice of Belgian neutrality, not for the sake of 
protecting the latter or on account of possible international obli« 
gations, but solely and alone for the "European balance of 
power." This meant, in the language which she had used for 
seven years, that she desired to turn the scale under all condi- 
tions in France's favor and against Germany, for the sake of her 
own political aims. She desired thus, from a military stand- 
point, to do precisely the same thing for which in the year 19 14, 
w^ith her customary moral abhorrence, she publicly blamed the 
threatened state which forestalled her. 

The result of this sword-rattling policy was that the field 
of negotiations was much narrowed and the extent of the Ger- 
man compensation greatly limited. The peaceful restraint of 
Germany alcne made this solution possible. 



492 MODERN GERMANY 

English interference had a double after-effect, even after the 
final settlement on the basis of the Morocco-Congo Agreement 
had been reached. From this time on in the French nation the 
conviction took root that England's armed support might be 
counted upon unconditionally in case of necessity, even beyond 
the measure of her obligation. Although persons of independent 
thought may have recognized with dismay the fact that for a 
decade France had become absolutely subservient to England's 
political ambitions, the revanche instinct had become irresistible 
in ever-widening circles of the population. Even the modest 
compensation which Germany had enforced caused furious in- 
dignation; the legend of the German plans of attack, which had 
not even existed against France when isolated after 1871, was 
the basis for widespread excitement, and the nation began to 
concern itself with the fate of Alsace-Lorraine in ever more 
provocative manner. The boasted esprit nouveau, sustained by 
a feeling of superiority on account of the possession of the new 
weapon, the aeroplane, and excited by constantly occurring inci- 
dents, began to speak openly of the ''hour" which was at last 
approaching. A French writer expressed the ''new feeling" by 
saying: "The agreement of 191 1 is either the prelude to a 
genuine understanding between Germany and France, or the 
prelude to a war." 

It may have appeared to many at this time that the tension 
would relieve itself in an immediate threat of war. The great 
lines of historical development, however, are never straight, but 
cross and recross each other in unaccountable manner. Thus 
the last phase before the World War saw a relaxation of tension 
at precisely the most dangerous point. But at the same time 
forces which had been loosed by the policy of England as here 
exposed, steered independently and brutally toward objects 
which were to be attained only by war, and these forces suc- 
ceeded in surpressing all the elements working for peace, and 
finally in uniting new and old antagonisms to bring on the 
World War against the Central Powers. 



V. THE LAST PHASE 

Anglo-German Attempts at Disarmament. Offensive of Pan-Slavism 
and Revanche. IQ12-IQ14. 

Just as an abatement of tension with Russia had followed 
the crisis of 1908-09, there now followed on the diplomatic 
struggle of the summer and autumn of 191 1, which had caused 



MODERN GERMANY 493 

an upheaval of the deeps, the attempt or the "bluff" at an Anglo- 
German relaxation. The impulse for the movement came from 
England. A doubt had arisen in the minds of the English 
as to whether they had not perhaps bent the bow too far in 
the last crisis and avoided the danger by the narrowest margin. 
An independent politician like Lord Rosebery openly attacked 
a political system which, with its ententes, assumed obligations 
that, under certain and by no means unlikely conditions, might 
compel England to enter upon a gigantic war. Such a system, 
he said, was in its uncertainty even more dangerous than one 
of open alliances, which possessed the advantage of limiting and 
defining. Among publicists and journalists the number of those 
increased who attacked the dangerous development which the 
agreement of 1904 had undergone and demanded parliamentary 
control of its increasingly offensive character.^ 

It was openly admitted that England had not acted loyally 
toward Germany in the Morocco question, and the warning was 
given that the continuation of this policy meant lending Eng- 
land's support to French revanche.^ There was an increase in 
the number of such protestants in the Liberal Party, which was 
at the helm, and in financial and industrial circles, with their 
influential organs, The Manchester Guardian and The Econ- 
omist, and among the Radicals, the Irish and workers. Even 
the Novoye Vremya on occasion during the following years 
spoke with petulance of the majority of the ministerial party, 
which, it said, had come under the influence of the pacifists and 
the Germano-philes. The Cabinet therefore saw itself com- 
pelled to do something in order to satisfy its own followers. It 
was all the more ready to do this since, after the settlement of 
its Morocco obligations, it possessed a freer hand as to France. 
Perhaps in the inner circles of the party the course of events in 
the last crisis had shaken faith in the mistaken belief as to Ger- 
many's unconditional desire for war. 

The government, therefore, sent one of its most noted mem- 
bers to negotiate with German statesmen. Lord Haldane, who 

"^Morocco in Diplomacy, Morel, p. 198: "There was unwarrantable, unsanc- 
tioned transmutation of a strictly limited agreement with France into an in- 
strument of aggression against the Power which challenged France's infringe- 
ment both of that Power's interests and rights under its own treaty with 
Morocco, and under the Algeciras Act. Parliament should place beyond doubt 
or question that this nationally unauthorized transmutation must cease." — The 
Daily Neivs says the Treaty of 1904 had gradually developed into an "agree- 
ment by England in the interest of France to oppose Germany diplomatically 
at all times and in all places, and should the event arise, by force of arms." 

"Morocco in Diplomacy. Morel, p. 196: "We have not treated Germany fairly, 
and Germany has a legitimate grievance against us on that score." On page 199 
he warns the English against a situation "whereby it might become to-morrow 
the agent of some ephemeral French Government or other bent upon war with 
Germany for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine." 



i^94 MODERN GERMANY 

was in Berlin from the 8th to the nth of February, 191 2, was 
one of those in the inner circle who was informed from the 
start of the secret obligations toward France. In the last crisis 
he had advocated energetic action. But at the same time, less 
insular in his outlook, he possessed a sympathetic understanding 
for German philosophy and for all that which beyond the Chan- 
nel is to-day trodden under foot as German Kultur. Had he 
not even, although himself the creator of the unfortunate terri- 
torial army, striven to make his compatriots see that Scharn- 
horst and Clausewitz, Moltke and Roon would not have been 
possible without the great thinkers of Germany? His person- 
ality was admirably adapted either to mediation or to double- 
dealing. He discussed with the leaders of Germany all those 
points where the interests of the two countries met, in order 
to discover a basis for rapprochement. As the Englishman 
made no secret of the fact that his country would not quietly 
acquiesce in an attack by Germany on France (the ancient legend 
carefully nourished by the French revanche politicians), the Im- 
perial Chancellor gave the most solemn assurance that Germany 
would never wage an offensive war against France, but would 
draw the sword only under provocation. On the contrary, he 
emphasized the fact that a loyal understanding between Germany 
and England would in all probability obviate the danger of a 
European war. All causes for possible conflict, he said, would 
be smothered in the seed by the weight of such a union. 

On the English side there had been partial abandonment of 
King Edward's position that there were no frictions, that only 
rivalry existed. Certain frictions of this kind were acknowledged, 
and England declared herself ready to remove them. With sin- 
cerity and genuine desire for peace, the German government 
seized the hand held out to it. Time alone could show whether 
a relaxation of the tension at one point would produce a general 
effect. 

That Russia had already taken advantage of the Anglo-Ger- 
man tension in order secretly to prepare a new offensive in the 
Balkans did not promise well. On February 29, 191 2, soon 
after Haldane's visit to Berlin, there was formed, under Rus- 
sian auspices, the Balkan League, which had been in the making 
since the beginning of the Turco-Italian War and which aimed 
at the dismemberment of European Turkey. It undertook to 
regard the attempt of any Great Power (Austria- Hungary or 
Italy) to interfere, even provisionally, as a casus belli. It has 
never been disputed that the League was aimed at Austria- 
Hungary from the start. The Pan-Slavic tendencies, which 



MODERN GERMANY 495 

had been merely an ideologic disguising of Russia's unbridled 
policy of force, now took possession of the whole press, of the 
intellectuals and the various parties in the Duma, and finally of 
the representatives of the ofificial government. Seeking to clear 
the way toward Constantinople of all obstacles — the traditional 
goal of Russia's ambition — the upholders of these ideas no longer 
shrank from accepting the destruction of Austria-Hungary as 
the indispensable preliminary to their program. 

A policy of offense, however, which aimed at the destruction 
of a Great Power, indicated the most fateful overturning of all 
genuine political balance, a revolutionizing of the status quo 
in Europe, compared to which all other peace-destroying aims, 
even that of the revanche, were only child's play. And yet 
publicists, w^ho had long accustomed themselves to understand by 
the '^maintenance of the balance of power" the isolation of Ger- 
many, do not hesitate to justify this Pan-Slavic ambition in the 
name of European balance of power, which would otherwise 
have fallen a victim to German hegemony! 

If one surveys from these two points of view the ensuing 
development of the whole European situation, the impression is 
gained of two main currents crossing each other; it seems as 
if the tangle of action and reaction could no longer as hitherto 
be grouped under a simple exclusive formula. The policy of 
the Imperial government was to seek in every manner possible 
a relaxation of the tension at the one point where this appeared 
possible, and where in the last analysis the decision would come; 
on this account it avoided to the degree of self-sacrifice giving 
at any point cause for distrust, but it was impossible longer to 
remain blind to the fact that the fateful tendencies of the new of- 
fensive were spreading faster than those making for an abate- 
ment of the tension, and that they threatened our vital interests 
with destruction. Germany found herself forced to oppose 
Russia's threatening attitude tow^ard Austria-Hungary, unless 
she desired to lose her one faithful ally and to see the Dual 
Monarchy suffer internal disruption. If she permitted this, 
her own isolation would be complete and courage given to all 
her enemies for a final crushing blow. In this last stage of the 
policy of isolation, in which the German Empire was forced defi- 
nitely on the defensive, it was characteristic that the English 
statesmen were no longer openly at the helm as previously. 
Rather had Russian Pan-Slavism, as the real heir of King Ed- 
ward, for the sake of other aims than the world policy of Eng- 
land, taken over his activities in the making of world history. 
Hence, even if London did not approve of all the methods and 



49B MODERN GERMANY 

plans of her Entente ally, it could afford to await the development 
of affairs with reserve — indeed it could at the same time lend its 
support to the experiment of a military abatement. After hav- 
ing regulated the clock of the universe anew, there was no 
longer cause for concern as to the striking of the hours. 

It can cause no astonishment that the German government had 
not allowed itself to be caught by the formula of an under- 
standing which Grey had conceived and Haldane brought to 
Germany, but which had no practical meaning.^ It need not, 
however, be assumed that the negotiations which were carried 
on in London during the ensuing years were from the start 
only a blind to conceal a contrary policy. Events showed that 
as regards the future delimitation of the spheres in Central 
Africa, as well as in the questions which were bound up with 
the continuation of the Bagdad Railway, an understanding was 
by no means impossible. Even the more delicate question of a 
possible reduction of naval preparations was discussed now with 
more success than in 1909. The British public was quieter in 
thought than in previous years, and certain perspicacious pub- 
licists even recognized the fact that a strong German fleet need 
not of necessity possess an offensive character, since the vital 
need of maintaining great open markets in the world made the 
possession of a corresponding naval power indispensable for the 
German Empire.^ Distrust, it is true, was more pronounced in 
the official head of the navy; neither the personality nor the 
manner of expression of Mr. Churchill was calculated, in view 
of his mocking reference to the ''German luxury fleet," to ren- 
der easy for the Imperial government renunciation of so vital 
a sovereign right as the autonomous determination of its neces- 
sary armament. Nevertheless, there was a certain gain even 
in this field, as on both sides the maintenance of a relative 
strength of the two fleets in a ratio of 16 to 10 was declared 
to be possible and satisfactory. 

If, meanwhile, France had been crowded somewhat into the 
background by the two principal opponents of the Central Pow- 
ers, it was nevertheless of tremendous importance what form 
her obligations toward the two members of the Entente would 
take. It was a prelude to the Balkan War pregnant with con- 

^ The formula reads: "The two Powers being mutually desirous of securing 
peace and friendship between themselves, England declares that she will neither 
make nor join in any unprovoked attack on Germany. Aggression upon Ger- 
many forms no part of any treaty, understanding or combination to which 
England now is a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such 
an object." 

^Morocco in Diplomacy, Morel, p. 212: "This she can attain only by the 
possession of a fleet which will make the strongest Power hesitate either to 
attack her or to ignore her." 



MODERN GERMANY 497) 

sequences that the Premier, Poincare, on the occasion of his 
visit to Petrograd in August, 19 12, obligated himself to advo- 
cate the renewal of the three-year military service period. The 
Russian statesmen had based their demand for this on the like- 
lihood of serious complications in the "Austrian question" ; the 
fact was recalled that at the time of the formation of the 
Dual Alliance the three-year period of service had been in effect, 
and the final argument was used that otherwise a pro-German 
party would gain powder and endanger the Alliance. The Pan- 
Slavic offensive, clear as to the course which It desired to pur- 
sue, imposed upon Its ally an almost Intolerable increase of 
military burdens. Only for the sake of the hopes which had 
from the start bound the French revanche to the Dual Alli- 
ance, did the French politicians, under the continuous pressure 
of diplomatic and military extortion, submit to the inevitable.^ 
Poincare, who shortly afterward was elected to the presidency 
of the Republic, lent his name to this program; and even if the 
French were successful in gaining in return certain military con- 
cessions from Russia, nevertheless this system of mutual obli- 
gations could not fail in the end still further to increase the 
tension in the atmosphere in France and Russia. At all events, 
it was this obligation of France, undertaken before the Balkan 
War, and the outcome of the war itself which forced the Ger- 
man government in the spring of 191 3 to draw up an extensive 
military program. Such was the causal and chronological se- 
quence of events. 

At the same time England drew closer the bond with France. 
The fact that she had another iron in the fire made it all the 
more impossible for her to dispense with her Entente ally, who 
followed the negotiations with Germany with unconcealed dis- 
trust. In the summer of 19 12 Britain sought, at first by harsh 
■compulsory measures, to prevent Italy from renewing the Drei- 
bund in order to render that country subservient to her own 
interests in the Mediterranean. As the attempt proved a fail- 
ure, the concentration of the entire French fleet in the Med- 
iterranean was provided for by a naval convention in Septem- 
ber, 1912, England, for her part, logically undertaking the pro- 
tection of the northern coast of France. With justice, a French 
senator, Chautemps, remarked in regard to this agreement that 
it was based on the principle of the division of labor: "We 
surrender to England and to Russia the responsibility for the 

1 See the revelations in Gil Bias of May 25, 1913, and the confession of the 
Minister of Finance, Dumont, in the French Chamber. Of this confession the 
Manchester Guardian of May 31, 1913, said: "The French Government has 
been blackmailed by Russia." 



498 MODERN GERMANY 

safety of our west coast, as well as the protection of our colo- 
nies against an enemy occupation." And although England 
resisted the continuous efforts of the chauvinist press to induce 
her also to adopt the system of universal military service, never- 
theless with this naval convention she assumed an increased 
moral responsibility on land as well as on the sea. It was strictly 
logical that, following the outbreak of the Balkan War, the 
extent of the general political obligations should, at France's in- 
stigation, be finally set down in writing. 

This was done in the exchange of letters between Sir Ed- 
ward Grey and Ambassador Cambon on November 22, 1912. 
These documents, which were evidently formulated by Grey, 
proceeded on the assumption that the previous ''consultations" 
between the naval and military experts of the two countries did 
not restrict the freedom of decision of the two governments in 
question. But as it might become essential, in certain eventu- 
alities, for each government to know whether it could depend 
upon the armed assistance of the other, the proper course to be 
pursued was formulated by Grey in the following words : 

"I agree that in case either Government has grave reason 
to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or any move 
that threatens the general peace, it shall immediately discuss 
with the other whether both Governments are acting together 
to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what 
measures they are prepared to take in common. If these measures 
involve participation in the action, the plans of the General Staffs 
should at once be taken into consideration and the Government 
is then to decide what effect is to be given to them." 

The exchange of notes sounds harmless and without binding 
force; it was from the start designed as an ostensible document 
for consumption by the British public and by the world in 
general. It was an agreement which contained the obligation 
for action in certain eventualities, but it was so worded that 
Grey could deny in Parliament its binding force, and even at 
the last moment declare himself *'to be free from engagement." 
In this document it was not so much a question of the word- 
ing as of the permanence of feeling of its originators, who were 
able at will to bring about the eventualities in question, or to 
prevent them. As a matter of fact, the government of par- 
liamentary England had surrendered the power of decision into 
the hands of its foreign minister and of its military and naval 
experts in a manner never done in monarchical Germany. It 
was from that time just as much bound morally as if it had 
signed a formal treaty, for, to quote Grey's words, it had 



MODERN GERMANY 499 

pledged "England's honor." On July 30, 19 14, the French am- 
bassador demanded the redemption of the pledge by recalling this 
exchange of letters. 

Even in time of peace, the agreement, knowledge of which 
had quickly spread beyond the inner circle, could not fail to 
have a most encouraging effect on French sentiment; its mere 
existence was a menace to peace. The worst feature of all was 
that the far-reaching pledge viewed the essentially general con- 
dition of an "unprovoked attack." For if Russia were one day 
to assume the offensive against Austria-Hungary, thereby giving 
effect to Germany's obligations as an ally of the latter country, 
France also would be drawn into the war. Russia was thus 
placed at the point of control, and was able to set in motion 
this whole series of mutually interdependent obligations. Fur- 
ther, she was from now on sure of England's moral support, 
which was the final factor in the situation; the moment she saw 
fit to press the button, the agreements of the general staffs of 
France, England and Belgium came into force. 

Thus the Balkan War began at a time when the tendencies 
aiming at the isolation of the Central Powers were increasing 
in strength, and the course of the struggle served still further to 
heighten them. The weakening of European Turkey, the in- 
citing of Pan-Slavic greed, the overweening outburst of Serbian 
megalomania, and especially the preparation for a future attack 
on Austria-Hungary — these were the results of that which the 
Triple Entente triumphantly proclaimed as its victory. It was 
found, to be sure, that the Russian offensive had not realized all 
its ambitions. The mad drive of the Slavs toward the Ad- 
riatic had for the last time brought Austria-Hungary and Italy 
together in united action in Albania, after the renewal of the 
Dreibund during the war. The Czar had set himself up as 
chief advocate of the Slavic cause and spoken to the Slavic 
peoples in so commanding, and for Austria-Hungary, with half 
her population Slavic, so inadmissible, a manner that Napoleon 
himself, as protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, could 
not have spoken more authoritatively; but he had been able 
neither to prevent the war between the Serbs and Bulgars nor to 
force his way to the Adriatic. Although the decision in March, 
191 3, in the Winter Palace in Petrograd, was for peace, the 
world owed this not to a real desire for peace, but solely to 
the realization by those in power in Russia that they were not 
yet ready. Therefore the war against Austria-Hungary was 
postponed, but most unwillingly and with bitterness. The un- 
bridled recrudescence of the Pan-Slavic propaganda was due to 



500 MODERN GERMANY 

this disappointment, as were also the unheard-of provocations 
of Austria-Hungary by the press. It became constantly more 
unlikely that the Czar and Sassonov would be able again to 
stem so powerful a current. 

Louder than had been the case for a generation, came the 
echo from France, where the burden of the three-year period of 
service, which had been forced on the country by the Russian 
ally, was creating an intolerable situation, for which, how- 
ever, the wicked German neighbor was made responsible. Every 
incident on the border line (as the landing of the Zeppelin in 
Luneville and the insults offered to Germans in Nancy) brought 
clearly to view that there slumbered in the French national soul 
an elementary hatred of all that which, in impotent longing for 
revenge, was styled German barbarism. There was now at last 
no hesitancy shown in unrestrainedly proclaiming this and in 
treating in the more serious newspapers the "Alsace-Lorraine 
question" in a more provocative manner than at anv time since 
1871. 

The primary cause of the encircling policy, however — the an- 
tagonism between Germany and France — had during the Balkan 
War been crowded into the background more than at any time 
in a decade. The influence toward compromise exercised by 
Germany during this crisis had not remained unnoticed among 
the leaders of England; and while they for their part urged 
moderation in Petrograd, the world beheld the astonishing spec- 
tacle of the two rivals working together in the same field as 
guardians of the world peace. British statesmen assured every 
one who would listen that they were now convinced of the peace- 
ful character of Germany's policy. In the summer of 191 3, the 
celebration of the twenty-fifth year of the reign of Emperor 
William gave an opportunity to the German nation and to wide 
circles throughout the world gratefully to recall the services of 
the German Kaiser in preserving the world's peace in more than 
one crisis. The commentaries of the British press at that time 
were couched in a tone which had nothing in common with the 
spiteful utterance of the French and which gave no hint of the 
outbreaks of which it proved itself capable a year later. The 
colonial negotiations, therefore, from the summer of 191 3 on 
followed a course constantly more promising. It must not, how- 
ever, on that account be thought that German statesmen shut 
their eyes to the unchanging fundamental tendency of British 
policies. When at the height of the Balkan crisis the secret 
Franco-English agreement of November, 19 12, became known, 
it was declared with evident anxiety in an official German re- 



MODERN GERMANY 501 

port: "The net is constantly being drawn closer in which 
French diplomacy has succeeded in entrapping England." It was 
herein prophetically remarked of the dangerous game played by 
the British government that: "The constant encouragement 
which it gives directly and indirectly to French chauvinism may 
one day lead to a catastrophe, in which British and French sol- 
diers will pay with their blood on French battlefields for Eng- 
land's policy of isolation. The seed which King Edward sowed 
is bearing fruit." 

This was made certain by Russia's offensive policy, which 
after a short pause was more energetically renewed. Viewed 
from the outside, it seemed almost to have crowded into the 
background the antagonism between England and Germany, and 
Russian statesmen now^ turned their attention with equal force 
to the two Central Powers, which they recognized as an 
inseparable obstacle in their path. The plan for the renewal of 
the Balkan League, for which the Russian Ambassador in Bel- 
grade was the most ardent worker, was based on the assump- 
tion of the annihilation of one Great Power. The Pan-Slavic 
press even declared that it was true that the Balkan question was 
not yet settled, but that the Austrian question had become more 
important: "A catastrophic liquidation of Austria's crimes, 
which have piled up for centuries, is imminent." ^ 

After the fall of European Turkey had been brought about^ 
attention began to be turned to Asiatic Turkey and to the un- 
dermining of German influence there, although it was realized 
in Petrograd that this action likewise was bound to lead to 
war. The Russian protest against the sw^eeping powers of Gen- 
eral Liman von Sanders in Constantinople in January, 19 14, was. 
the crucial point of the final diplomatic test of strength, and 
cast illuminating light on the whole European situation. The 
fate of Asiatic Turkey, which the German Empire desired to 
maintain intact, was the real question at issue. That the Ger- 
man commission was not without precedent is proved by the 
corresponding British naval commission, whose labors, assum- 
ing that they were sincere, were bound to contribute to in- 
suring Turkey's possession of Constantinople and of the key 
to the Dardanelles. Nevertheless, Russia, urged on by French 
influence, attacked only the German commission ; and if she was 
partially successful in her effort, this was due to the support 
which she unexpectedly received from England. The solution 
of the riddle can only be that from the start England considered 
the naval commission as a mere blind. 

'^ Novoye Vremya, February 13, 1914. 



502 MODERN GERMANY 

In Petrograd these discussions led to still more violent threats 
of war: "Russia desires peace, but is prepared for war," wrote 
the Bourse Gazette on March 13, 1914. ''The Russian army, 
which has always been victorious, will entirely forget the de- 
fensive idea to which it has had to resign itself m the most recent 
period of our history." ^ 

The military and financial cooperation with France had en- 
tered since the autumn on a stage more and more inimical to 
peace. After Joffre in August, 191 3, had come to the fore as 
the future generalissimo, arrangements had been made during the 
succeeding months for a new billion-franc loan, the purpose of 
which was the building of a network of strategic railways in 
Poland that were to render possible a Russian offensive against 
Germany. We saw a little while ago how tempting was the pros- 
pect for the French money lenders; the assurance was constantly 
given that the building of the railroad and the payment by in- 
stallment would go hand in hand. The alliance of French cap- 
ital and Russian politics for better or for worse which had come 
about of recent years, had for a long time been an instrument 
in the policy of isolation; it had now become a weapon for an 
attack in the immediate future, and every one knew what was 
really meant when the Temps revealed the purpose of this 
last loan with the mysterious words: "All parties must unite 
harmoniously in preparing for ultimate success." It was openly 
admitted even in official Russian publications that the country 
was preparing against Germany, and although the completion 
of the railways was not to be expected under two or three years, 
the outbreak of war was destined to show how far the imme- 
diate preparations for war had advanced since the beginning of 
the year. 

In addition, other motives increased more and more the mili- 
tary impetus in wider circles of society. The antagonism of 
the nations was increased by the economic rivalry, which had 
been the basic cause of enmity between Germany and Great 
Britain. The belief, which was shared by such men as Prince 
Trubetzkoi and Prince Kotchubey, that the Germans had driven 
Russia into the war with Japan and then made use of 
their neighbor's necessity to extort a favorable commercial treaty 
for themselves, had spread gradually throughout the circles of 
'Russian politicians and economists. When economic writers be- 
gan now to urge timely preparation, in view of these experi- 
ences, for the renewal of the commercial treaties in 191 7, this 

^ Petersburger Boersenzeitung, March 13, 1914- The article is said to have 
been inspired by the Minister of War, Suchomlinov. 



MODERN GERMANY 503 

was understood by leading men to mean that Russia must as- 
sume so powerful a military and diplomatic position for this 
event (which coincided in point of time with the completion of 
the Russian measures of military preparation) that the country 
would be able to free itself from the humiliating condition of a 
commercial tributary. When Sassonov ventured in the Duma 
to make use of this historical and economic argument, it was 
clear to the whole world that he had unconditionally capitulated 
to the anti-German elements. The commercial argument was 
brought into connection with the general tendencies of Russia's 
Balkan policy. A man like the historian, P. von Mitrofanoff, 
who by no means belonged to the Pan-Slavists, declared openly: 

''The impetus toward the South is a historical, political and 
economic necessity, and any state which opposes this movement 
is by that very fact an enemy. ... It has become clear to 
the Russians that if conditions remain as they now are, the 
way to Constantinople leads through Berlin. Vienna is in re- 
ality a secondary question." 

The insatiable desire for expansion of the vast eastern em- 
pire created a willingness to sweep aside all of the opposing 
Great Powers. Although England's diplomatic game had orig- 
inally aimed to turn the thoughts only of Russia's ruling class 
into this new channel, the antipathy to the Germans, which is 
historically and psychologically explicable and which makes the 
Slav more deeply conscious of racial antagonisms than ourselves, 
gained uninterruptedly in strength in all strata of the popula- 
tion. A nationalistic feeling which was increasing in self-con- 
sciousness, a species of new-fashioned Russian patriotism which 
shaped its far-reaching plans by antagonism toward Germany, 
expressed and sated itself through this antipathy. "The dislike 
of the Germans," remarked the same objective observer, "is in 
everybody's mind and on everybody's tongue, and seldom has 
public opinion been so uniform." Every competent judge proph- 
esied that in case of war Russia would not have to reckon with 
the outbreak of a revolution, as at the time of the unpopular 
Japanese War, but that a war against Germany would be ex- 
ceedingly popular in the army and in the Duma, in society and 
among intellectuals — indeed, even among the masses of the 
people. 

If one seeks to apportion responsibility as regards public opin- 
ion in these last months before the World War, in which, as 
in a final taking of the breath for a coming struggle, there was 
an extreme mental tension, one is astonished by the growing 
similarity in the threatening language of the leading organs of 



504 MODERN GERMANY 

the Triple Entente; they had adapted their varied roles to each 
other for this purpose in a remarkable manner; and they were, 
moreover, bound together by invisible golden cords (not tc^ 
speak of the lower forms of financial dependence), from The 
Times, which received for its Russian edition a disproportion- 
ate subvention, down to Le Temps, which another Parisian pa- 
per characterized as the "authoritative organ of passive obedi- 
ence to all the demands of Monsieur Isvolski." All of the al- 
lies now made use of the same language, which each one un- 
derstood even though it added its own individual interpreta- 
tion. We have seen how for years England concealed her gen- 
eral policy aimed throughout the world at Germany under the 
formula of ''the European balance of power" ; when Le Temps 
spoke of the necessity of ''reestablishing the European equilib- 
rium," every one understood that this was a question of Alsace- 
Lorraine; for Russia, however, the European balance of power 
meant nothing less than liberty to destroy Austria-Hungary and 
Asiatic Turkey, and to clear away every important obstacle 
which stood in her path. Thus, even before the war, by a sim- 
ilar political terminology, it was customary to accuse the inher- 
ently powerful German Empire of being destructive of peace; 
while waxing strong without war, it had no desire to change the 
status quo of the world at any point. The finishing touch in the 
hemming in of Germany was furnished by the accusation brought 
against the state which was encircled and thrown upon the 
defensive, of striving for an intolerable hegemony in Europe. 

In this situation, which was constantly becoming more por- 
tentous, the effort was made in Petrograd and Paris to change 
the various ententes into a definite alliance; if only in view of 
the possibility of a successful outcome of the Anglo-German ne- 
gotiations, a closer and more regular union by treaty was thought 
preferable to the previous elastic bond. Following the custom- 
ary prelude from irresponsible sources, advantage was taken of 
the holiday spirit called forth by the visit of King George in 
Paris on April 21, 19 14, to urge the formation of an Anglo- 
French alliance. Grey, who for the first time visited the Con- 
tinent, resisted the insistent urging of Minister Delcasse and 
Ambassador Isvolski. He still remained an advocate of the 
"free hand," since by binding his country in this manner he 
would have encountered opposition in the Cabinet and especially 
in his own party. But he was experienced enough in the art 
of arousing hopes to be able to console the disappointed French 
with the possibility of a Cabinet change (since the Unionists 
were not bound by precedents) and with the suggestion that in 



MODERN GERMANY 505 

the methodical cooperation of the members of the Entente they 
already possessed what was tantamount to a formal alliance. 
He promised to develop this cooperation into a kind of. organic 
institution under his presidency in London. 

Grey went even a step further. When the proposition was 
made for an Anglo-Russian naval convention, he announced his 
approval and obtained the decision of the Cabinet to enter into 
the necessary negotiations. More interesting than the custom- 
ary technical discussions of the naval staffs, which were to fol- 
low the model of the Franco-Russian naval convention, is the 
political view, according to which the Russian originators of 
the plan demanded that England neutralize as great a portion of 
the German fleet as possible in the Baltic. By this means the 
overwhelming superiority of the German fleet over the Russian 
would be nullified, and perhaps a Russian landing in Pomerania 
rendered possible. In this field, the British government could 
perform an important service by sending, before the commence- 
ment of actual war operations, a great number of merchant ships 
to the Baltic ports, in order that the lack of Russian transport 
ships might be made good. The negotiations, the basis of which 
soon became known to the German government, were carried 
forward so successfully that as early as the end of May the 
nations concerned let as much regarding them filter through as 
was needed for putting the public into the right state of mind. 
The general political importance of these plans cannot be too 
highly estimated. They show the logical and deliberate course 
of offensive diplomacy in Petrograd, which at this very time 
led the press to discuss with ever new variation "Russia's undis- 
puted claim to Asiatic Turkey," as well as the subject of Aus- 
tria-Hungary's approaching catastrophe. It seemed nearer than 
ever before to its goal of enlisting the naval power of England 
in its service against the powerful ally of the Dual Monarchy 
and of Turkey. 

The negotiations prove further the essentially offensive char- 
acter of Grey's policy. He may perhaps still have maintained 
a "free hand," as in December, 1905, and not consciously have 
pursued a course inevitably leading to war, as was the case with 
Russia; but by consistently enlarging the system of "peace guar- 
antees" — that is to say of constricting Germany by close con- 
nections with states entertaining offensive intentions, with whose 
aims he was familiar — he was tying the hands of his own coun- 
try ever more tightly. He thus clung to the course which he 
had followed since the beginning of his ministry, and his con- 
duct in Parliament on June 11, 19 14, continued to be consistent, 



5o6 MODERN GERMANY 

when he was forced to meet the questioning:s of his thoroughly 
alanned party colleagues. He referred to a ministerial declara- 
tion of the previous year that no secret understandings existed 
which might restrict or hinder the govejnment and Parliament 
in their freedom to decide whether England should take part 
in a future war; nor were there, he said, at this time any 
negotiations either under way or in prospect which made this 
declaration less true. This statement was as true formally as it 
/ was essentially based upon a shameless falsehood. Grey and his 
nearest friends in the Cabinet were fully aware of the signifi- 
cance oi allying the first Naval Power in the world with the un- 
controllable desire for war of its political partners. 

It was England alone who was now able at will to open or 
close the gates of the Temple of Janus. So well informed an 
observer as Theodor Schiemann constantly gave utterance to the 
warning in these weeks that as soon as Paris and Petrograd 
should have made sure of England's support an early European 
war was to be expected as a most probable result. The decision 
of Grey and Asquith undoubtedly was due in part to the fact 
that their political party, which had long been fundamentally 
disrupted, was in the Ulster question driving the country to- 
ward the verge of ci\'il war and the army toward mutiny. The 
consideration that the Liberal Cabinet was likely soon to be 
displaced by that of the much more resolute opposition party 
could not fail to act as an encouragement on Grey, who had 
long been following the foreign policy of the Conservatives, 
much more than that of the Liberals. On the other hand, the 
government had become so dependent on the opposition that it 
strove to avoid giving it cause to criticize the country's foreign 
policy. French internal politics, with their bitterly uncompromis- 
ing struggles of cliques, in which no one dared to give voice to the 
unexpressed thought of all : ''War or peace with Germany ?" had 
iong since reacted in a fateful manner on the foreign policy ; it 
became apparent at this time that in England, too. the diffi- 
culties resulting from internal diiterences tended to turn the 
scale against peace. 

Grey's policy appears in a light all the more ambiguous when, 
with the greatest possible increase of the obligations which he had 
undertaken against Germany, the probability had become stronger 
of an agreement aith Germany. As the result of tireless nego- 
tiations, the Anglo-German agreement came formally into ex- 
istence in the course of the summer. It regulated the com- 
mercial future of the Portuguese colonies in East and West 
Africa, bv dividing them into an Enelish and a German sphere 



MODERN GERMANY 507 

of Interest; at the same time it brought about a settlement sat- 
isfactory to both parties, concerning the final configuration of 
the Bagdad Railway, and a compromise as to conflicting in- 
terests which had hitherto been the cause of estrangement. If 
Sir Edward Grey's ultimate aim had really been an under- 
standing with Germany, the above agreement would have given 
proof that such an agreement was possible if sincerely desired; 
but if the agreement was — as soon proved to be the case — only 
a make-believe concession to that part of the English public 
which desired peace w^ith Germany, It was sure to give way 
under a general and heavy strain. At all events, It was the 
will of destiny that the British Empire be brought face to face 
in its full significance with the question of its future relation 
to Germany, undisturbed by local differences. When the gov- 
ernment followed up the naval visit to Kronstadt by that to 
Kiel, it apparently continued symbolically to keep both Irons in 
the fire. In truth, however, Grey proceeded till the end along 
the course of those of whom Lady Macbeth says: 

"They would not play false, and yet would wrongly win." 

At this moment Russia's Balkan policy, which von Hartwig 
directed in Belgrade, produced its bloody harvest. On June 28, 
19 1 4, the heir to the crowns of Austria and Hungary was mur- 
dered in Sarajevo. 



CHAPTER II 
THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 

PROFESSOR HERMANN OXCKEN. OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
HEIDELBERG 

ONLY he who is thoroughly familiar with events prelimi- 
nary to and leading up to the war is in a position to form 
an objective picture of the outbreak of hostilities. Without this 
insight into these preliminar}- events, no one, approaching the 
happenings of the final week, would be able under any circum- 
stances to open the door that leads to understanding. 

The real questions at the root of this desperate struggle are 
not touched upon in the official blue and white books, and the 
superiicial observer might easily gain the impression that a tech- 
nical discussion between a few individual diplomats had led, 
in a single week, through misunderstanding, awkwardness and 
malevolence, to the greatest war in the world's history. Among 
diplomats one now hears ad nauseam such harmless expressions 
as ''European balance of power," "national honor," ''human 
civilization" and "anxiety for the peace of the world," with 
which we had become familiar enough before the war; but they 
are merely blinds intended to conceal the great motive forces 
of history and a movement which had long been consciously 
under way. 

The blue books, too, though not without value as historical 
sources, are at the same time political briefs of the various 
governments. The apparently so copious material is, in reality, 
very incomplete. Each state has selected those documents which 
seem to it useful in sustaining its special pleading; hence, a com- 
paratively greater unrestraint in making public her papers is 
shown by England, who was for a relatively long time not 
directly concerned in the questions at issue and who would seem 
to have occupied toward them the position of watchful mediator. 

The material of the blue books is not alone incomplete as a 
whole, but the individual documents are frequently abbreviated, 
and at times even demonstrably falsified.^ English history since 

1 The English falsification is easily recognized even by the ordinary reader. 
No. 105 of the Blue Book contains a letter written by Sir Edward Grey to 
Ambassador Bertie at Paris, dated July 30th. Added are three annexes, the 
correspondence _ between Grey and Cambon of November 22-23, 19 12, and a 
report concerning military preparations and boundary violations by Germany, 
which the French Minister of Foreign Affairs sent to Ambassador Cambon at 

508 



MODKRX GFRMAXY 509 

the time of Lord I^aJrnerston offers many examplr-s of unscru- 
pulous castration and twistinj/ of official df^spatches. Jn the 
present hlue book, also, one falsification can be proved with 'd\y- 
solute certainty, despite later futile efforts to suppress the dam- 
aging evidence. An important fact is that this falsification a>n- 
cerns the reasons v^hv England was obliged to, and why even- 
tually she did, render assistance — precisely in this ajnnection 
did Grey have need of supplementary feats of editorial leger- 
demain. 'J'his forgery led in turn to the futile attempt in the 
French yellow book (which at more than one point reveals for 
those familiar v.ith previous centuries the well-known sprightly 
unreliability of French diplomatic rep^jrts' ) to bring about agree- 
ment with the Knglish statements, by means of an equally awk- 
ward falsification.^ 

London- The third annex, which is of importance in this connection, in the 
first edition of the iJlue Book is dated "Ju'v 3^. ip»i4-" ^n the second edition 
this date, v,hich cannot be reconciled with that of Grey's letter, is omitted I But 
that is not all. In the first edition this rcjxjTt — in the English translation of 
the lilue Hook— btKins with the words: "The German army had its advance 
I>ost9 on our frontiers yesterday (Frula.y)." But since Fri'Jay was the 3i8t 
of July, the date of the document oujsjht to have been the first of August, 
Consequently the word "Friday," which gave things away, was likewise elimi- 
nated in the second edition. If, however, annex three is of July 31st, or 
even of August ist Cwhich would Ix; more consonant with its military con- 
tents), it is imoossible that it should have \>ten enclosed in a letter of Grey's 
of July 30th. But since the letter refers to annex three ("he gave me a paper 
of which a copy is also endosed, shov/ing that the German military j>repara- 
tions were more advanced and more on the offensive upon the frontier than 
anything I'Vance had yet done"), it must have been falsified either as regards 
the flate or as regards the contents, at least to the extent of the quoted sen- 
tence, which was probably interpolated later on. That calls all the events 
recited in No. 10 , into question, and since we have now become thoroughly 
suspicious, we begin to understand why the British Minister should have done 
something so unu-,ual in diplomatic routine and at the same time so superfluous 
as to pick out and send by special messenger to his representative in Paris 
the correspondence of November, 19 12, which was long since known there, and 
the military report which he asserted he had just received from Paris through 
Ambassador Cambon. The reason for this falsification is that the government 
felt a belated need of presenting somewhere in the Blue Book the obligations 
undertaken in November, 19 12, in neat juxtaposition with a military docu- 
ment which proved the actuality of the "menaces^' which the former docu- 
ments had foreseen. 

1 The most typical example is a compilation from diplomatic and consular 
reports, dated July 30, 1913, which aims to prove that recently sentiment in 
Germany had taken a turn op{x>sed to peace justifying Prance's r>olicy to a 
large degree. In this collective refXjrt, which can hardly lay claim to being 
considered as an authentic source of historical evidence, we find the fol- 
lowing sentences: "If it is true that the Emperor is discussed, and that the 
Chancellor is unpopular, Mr. von Kiderlen was the most hated man in Ger- 
many. But he is beginning to be less badly thought of, for he is making 
people understand that he is going to have his revenge." Mr. von Kiderlen- 
Wachter died December, 1912 1 Thus the collective report was compiled, not 
on July 30, 19 13. but precipitately and with consequent lack of truthfulness 
in the autumn of 1914- Further incongruities in Mr. Cambon's reports have beea 
laid bare in the North German Gazette of December 21, 1914. 

2 The letter addressed to Mr. Cambon by Mr. X'iviani, dated July 30th CYellow 
Book No. 106), gives part of the information, contained in annex three, of 
No, 105, of the Blue Book, and which consequently cannot have come into 
being before July 31st, or rather August ist. It can be proved that this letter, 
too, is a fabrication, made up from various reports dating from different 
periods. The purpose was to secure credence for annex three, No. 105, of the 
British Blue Book. 



5IO MODERN GERMANY 

Finally, it must not be forgotten that in the blue books one 
is able to follow from day to day only the visible course of 
the negotiations, conferences and efforts at mediation, as these 
were undertaken, continued and again interrupted. The invisi- 
ble impulses in the course of affairs find expression only in iso- 
lated instances in this mass of diplomatic documents — a word or 
a hint which assures a friend of readiness to help in case of 
need, encouraging him to action, which may be far more deci- 
sive than any official effort at mediation. The reader must not,, 
therefore, allow himself to be diverted by occurrences in the 
foreground, but must endeavor to penetrate beneath the surface 
and to interpret the various events in the spirit of the war's en- 
tire preliminary history and of the personages engaged. Only 
in that case do the decisive turning-points and the controlling 
features of this vast game stand out in clear perspective. 

The authors, accomplices and abettors in the murder of the 
Arch-Ducal heir apparent intended the deed as a decisive event, 
which was to result in the desired disruption of Austria-Hun- 
gary and in changing the face of Europe. The date deliber- 
ately chosen for the crime was the five hundred and twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the Battle of the Amsel Field, following which 
a Serbian, Milos Obilicz, had stabbed the victorious Sultan 
Murad. It was planned that the new "hereditary enemy'* 
should receive a mortal wound on this day, which was cele- 
brated as the "independence day" of the Serbian nation for the 
first time in 19 14, with provocative speeches in favor of the "en- 
slaved brothers." The more the strong personality of Franz 
Ferdinand appeared to guarantee the future of the Dual Mon- 
archy, the more important did it seem to Servian jingoes to re- 
move this future obstacle by murderous means. Employment 
of such means is constantly met with in the history of the Ser- 
bian nation and crown throughout the nineteenth century. The 
outbursts of joy following the deed showed what Serbia believed 
to have been accomplished. The criminally exaggerated na- 
tionalistic feeling of the Serbs, among the official and military 
circles of whom knowledge of and cooperation in the crime was 
widespread, is to be held mainly responsible, not the subordinate 
tools in its commission. It was the plan of the murderers to 
take advantage of the dangerous tension of the political at- 
mosphere of the summer of 19 14, intensified as it was by the 
clamor regarding Russian preparedness, in order to make sure, 
in the general confusion, of reaping the fruits of their deed. The 
important question now was as to what lengths in protecting the 



MODERN GERMANY Sll 

culprits and the Serbian state the Russian abettors, who had 
been directly concerned in creating this chauvinistic sentiment, 
were ready to go, as well as those European politicians who for 
years, through their trifling with the possible dismemberment of 
-Austria-Hungary, had been indirectly concerned in bringing 
about the situation. 

The moral guilt of the Serbian government was increased by 
its behavior after the deed. No spontaneous effort was made 
by It to proceed against the conspirators on Serbian soil by 
means of its own agents, although so many signs pointed to- 
ward Belgrade; even less did it attempt at the last moment in 
Vienna to free itself from connection with the movement which 
it had brought about. The solemn obligations undertaken by 
it on March 31, 1909, had been entirely forgotten. On the con- 
trary, so certain did the government feel of the continuation of 
the backing it had hitherto enjoyed that it permitted the press 
of the country to discuss day by day the impotence and the dis- 
solution of the neighboring Monarchy; the oflScial governmental 
publication even went so far as to declare that the internal 
conditions in Austria-Hungary had been the sole cause of the 
crime. So hopelessly obsessed was Serbia by her delusion of the 
disintegration of Austria-Hungary that she either thought that 
country incapable of any vigorous action or else saw no reason 
for fear in braving it. 

It was inevitable that the deeply injured state, which had so 
long patiently borne Serbia's threats, should at last be aroused. 
To countenance this aggression meant to endanger not alone its 
prestige, but its very existence. One needs only to ask how long 
Russia would have quietly submitted to a similar agitation In 
Sweden or Rumania, looking to the separation of Finland or 
Bessarabia; or how long the United States would have suffered 
a continued deliberate disturbance of the peace by Mexico. 
Would not both of these states. If a similar agitation, backed up 
by a third Great Power, had led to an attack on their official 
liead, have sought satisfaction and security by armed force and 
without asking permission of any one? In self-defense, Austria- 
Hungary saw herself compelled, now or never, to put a check 
upon these forces which were aiming at her destruction, even at 
the risk of arousing Russia to bring to bear the full weight of 
her offensive strength. 

The German Imperial Government, which before the 23rd 
of July was Informed only In a general way of Austria-Hungary's 
views and Intentions, had expressed its entire agreement. ''With 
all our heart," says the White Book in this connection, "we 



512 MODERN GERMANY 

were able to agree with our ally's estimate of the situation, and 
assure him that any action considered necessary to end the move- 
ment in Serbia directed against the existence of the Monarchy 
would meet with our approval." We did not close our eyes to 
the fact that the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy, and the 
bringing of the whole of Slavdom under the Russian scepter, 
would render the position of the German race in Middle Europe 
untenable, and that in this crisis an isolated and morally weak- 
ened Austria would lose for us her full value as an ally. Hence, 
Germany left an entirely free hand to her ally in proceeding 
against Serbia, without taking part in the preparations or know- 
ing beforehand the details of the ultimatum. As had previously 
been the case more than once, the Central Powers, which were 
the ones really threatened, saw themselves, in view of the con- 
stantly increasing number of their enemies, forced to action, 
though it is wrong to represent the steps they took as a diplo- 
matic offensive. Only a superficial reader of the Blue Books 
will allow himself to be misled by the impression that, as far 
as appearances go, it was Austria-Hungary, who in the week 
from July 23 to August i, by making demands, took the diplo- 
matic offensive, and that the German Empire became her accom- 
plice through its approval of Austria-Hungary's procedure; it 
must not be forgotten for a moment that the offensive character 
of the Triple Entente and of the Pan-Slavic movement, whichi 
aimed at the destruction of Austria-Hungary, had long since 
forced the Central Powers into a defensive position. 

The demands which Austria-Hungary made on Serbia on 
July 23, with the setting of a time limit, were characterized by 
our enemies as excessive, and intolerable for a sovereign state 
— especially was the demand that Austrian judges participate in 
the investigation of the crime said to be without precedent. 
As a matter of fact, there is no lack of precedent in modern 
history in cases which the nature of the provocation and the 
stage of civilization of the offending state made such a step 
necessary. No doubt Austria-Hungary intended it as a les- 
son for Serbia when she sought to enforce the fulfilment of 
the disgracefully disregarded promises which this state had made 
in 1909. From the start, however, she gave definite guarantees 
to the Great Powers in regard to the scope of her contemplated 
action by declaring that she would not violate Serbia's terri- 
torial rights, but would recognize the integrity and independ- 
ence of the country; there was no question of a "permanent" 
impairment of Serbia's sovereignty. Austria-Hungary did not 
aim at a shifting of the balance of power in the Balkans, but 



MODERN GERMANY 513 

claimed merely the right of taking, in her discretion, the neces- 
sary preventative measures for the protection of her vital inter- 
ests, which were seriously threatened by the undermining ac- 
tivity of the Serbian agitators. Accordingly, Germany took 
the stand that this purely Austro-Serbian conflict must re- 
main localized; following the declaration of the Central Pow- 
ers that they were striving for such a localization of the quar- 
rel, the French and British governments promised their good 
offices in the same effort. As long as the conflict remained lo- 
calized, the peace of the world was assured. But as soon as 
Russia or any other Power seized on an incident of such char- 
acter in order to interfere, there could be no doubt as to what 
action was to be expected from the Triple Entente in the im- 
mediate future. 

Events immediately proved that the leaders of Russian Pan- 
Slavism were not to be deterred even by the murder of the 
Archduke, but were ready to deny all the monarchic traditions 
of their ow^n history rather than to surrender the criminals and 
abandon their hopes of Serbia. This state, as the nucleus of 
their Balkan policy, was indispensable to their offensive. A 
word from Petrograd would have sufficed to bring the Serbs to 
reason before the ultimatum — this word was not spoken by the 
state which, in the summer of 19 13, had assumed to be the 
arbiter of the Slavic world. The offensive tendencies of a 
policy of force, which was not to be turned aside from its aims 
by the danger of the most serious complications, continued to 
gain in strength. When, a fortnight after the murder in 
Sarajevo, further disclosures regarding the Anglo-Russian naval 
convention percolated through to the public, a Russian news- 
paper cried triumphantly: "We are now able, thanks to the 
support of the British fleet and to our now completely prepared 
army, to demand that Berlin put an end to that political system 
which is in keeping neither w^ith our dignity nor with our in- 
ternational position." The word of 1 870, "archipret," uttered 
at this moment could not fail to act as an incitement to Bel- 
grade. Russia was determined from the start to permit the 
enforcement of Austria's demands under no circumstances. 
The same minister who found nothing to say publicly in con- 
demnation of the Serbian crime characterized Austria's de- 
mands as "provocative and immoral," and attributed to them, 
despite the Monarchy's positive promises, the intention to devour 
and crush Serbia; later the Czar also could see nothing but a 
"disgraceful" war against a small country. Thus, like Ger- 
many's wish to localize the conflict, Russia's determination to 



514 MODERN GERMANY 

intervene at any price against Austria's punitive procedure was 
beyond question. With this intention, Russia continued quietly 
her military preparations. 

A decisive factor in such a policy was from the start the ques- 
tion as to how far Russia could reckon on her Entente asso- 
ciates. Only in case of the latter's unreserved support would 
there be no further obstacles to overcome. Sassonov would have 
preferred immediately to mobilize the Triple Entente and ta 
have had the mutual obligations of the contracting states become 
operative at once ; he therefore proposed to the French and Brit- 
ish Ambassadors a declaration of solidarity, with hypocritical 
justification that only a common attitude of firmness could pre- 
vent a war. While the French Ambassador unreservedly adopted 
the Russian proposal, the British representative showed himself 
at first much more reserved, in which position he was later sus- 
tained by Grey, and he let it be understood that his country did 
not desire war on account of the Serbian question. All the more 
emphatically did Sassonov declare that "the general European 
question" was involved in this Serbian question, and that on this 
account England could not efface herself ; he admitted at this 
early date (July 24) that Russian mobilization would at any 
rate have to be carried out, and that an Imperial Council would 
decide the question the following day.^ From this first moment 
on, with full realization of her action, Russia used the question 
of the European balance of power as a goad, and ofiFered her 
military resources in solving it. 

Everything depended upon whether England would follow 
along this path. For, although France had apparently already 
taken up her position, it was nevertheless to be expected that she 
would make her final decision dependent on England's attitude. 
The country in which the policy of isolating Germany had origi- 
nated was now to speak the decisive word. 

In England's later official statement credit was claimed for the 
earnestness of the country's efforts for peace. It is not to be 
denied that Grey undertook a series of efforts at mediation, but 
it is not merely a question as to good intentions, but rather as to 
what practical value these efforts had and what was their real 
aim: the preservation of the world's peace under conditions which 
would have been honorable for all concerned, or a one-sided dip- 
lomatic success for the Entente, which would have been decisive 
for the whole future. His point of departure was shown by the 
fact that he characterized the Austrian demands as intolerable 
and the German position as to localizing the conflict as a mere 

1 British Blue Book No. 6. 



MODERN GERMANY 515 

phrase ^ ; by unreservedly refusing to advise moderation in Petro- 
grad,^ he betrayed a growing sympathy with all the arguments of 
the Russian interpretation. On July 15, Sassonov, disappointed 
at England's reserve, telegraphed to London: "In the event of 
the situation becoming more critical, possibly leading to concerted 
action by the Great Powers, we count upon England's readiness 
to place herself unreservedly by the side of Russia and France 
for the purpose of upholding the European balance of power, 
for the preservation of which she has always stood and which in 
the event of an Austrian triumph would undoubtedly be dis- 
turbed." ^ By means of this catchword, calculated to appeal to 
the English mind, he sought to befog the issue in dispute, which 
England found an awkward one. Grey, however, allowed the 
Russian appeal concerning the European balance of power to 
influence him with increasing weight. The British Ambassador 
in Petrograd, who personally did not belong to the extremists, 
ventured, without doubt in agreement with his instructions, on 
the same day to formulate the views of his government as re- 
gards the real nature of its mediation, to the effect that "England 
could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better 
purpose as a friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disre- 
garded, might one day be converted into an ally than if she were 
to declare herself Russia's ally at once." * These words should 
be placed as the motto at the head of all later efforts at media- 
tion by British statesmanship. They show that Grey differed 
only as to method from the Russian advocates of extreme action, 
but that he did not shrink from the end to be obtained. 

His proposal to increase the twenty-four hour time limit of the 
ultimatum was of importance only as a demonstration ; in case of 
success, Russia, who w^as ready for intervention, would merely 
have gained a further start in her military preparations. 

Events moved too fast for the proposal. Serbia's reply on the 
afternoon of July 25th indicated only an apparent readiness to 
meet Austria half-way: in reality, she rejected all those demands 
of Austria the carrying out of which would have meant energetic 
action by the government against the intrigues of Serbian sub- 
jects aimed at Austria. Hence Austria was compelled to reject 
such an answer ^ from a state which, five years before, had vainly 
promised to mend its ways, and to break off diplomatic relations, 
according to her threat. That Serbia was in no doubt as to the 

1 Introduction to Blue Book, p. V. 

' Blue Book No. 1 1 ; Orange Book No. 20. 

8 Orange Book No. 17. 

* Blue Book No. 17. 

^ Italy also disapproved of the Serbian note. See Yellow Book No. 72. 



5i6 MODERN GERMANY 

reception of her reply is shown by the fact that she had started 
to mobilize even before sending the note. On the same date 
(July 25th) Russia ordered the mobilization of the military dis- 
tricts adjoining Austria-Hungary. The conflict thereby entered 
on its second stage. 

Grey now considered it advisable to formulate a proposal for 
mediation. On the evening of July 26th, after receiving Russia's 
approval, he suggested to the French, German and Italian gov- 
ernments to authorize their ambassadors in London to meet in 
conference for the purpose of considering a peaceful solution. 
This suggestion was unacceptable to Austria-Hungary for the 
reason that it indirectly recognized Russia as a Power interested 
in the Serbo-Austrian conflict, and that it would have brought 
before the ''areopagus of the Powers" this affair of a state which 
from every point of view had been most severely provoked. Only 
he who is familiar with the extent of the mutual obligations of 
the Entente Powers and with the thorough-going organization of 
their London headquarters in the summer of 191 4 is in a posi- 
tion to realize what role would have been played at this confer- 
ence by Russia's two confederates — not to speak of Italy. Dur- 
ing its course Russia might have continued her preparations, 
while Germany would have been forced to promise not to mobi- 
lize. Finally, no unprejudiced person will claim that the man 
who was ready at the favorable moment to metamorphose him- 
self into an ally of Russia was the ideal neutral leader of nego- 
tiations, conducted under the pressure of Russian mobilization.^ 
The longer one considers the proposal for mediation, the clearer 
does it become that it was calculated to gain at least a diplo- 
matic victory for the Entente Powers. It is, therefore, not sur- 
prising that the German government, while declaring itself 
ready, in the event of an Austro-Russian conflict, to undertake 
mediation jointly with the other Great Powers, pronounced it to 
be impossible "to call her ally in the latter's dispute with Serbia 
before a European tribunal." ^ Instead of this, in order to com- 
pose the misunderstanding between Austria-Hungary and Rus- 
sia, Germany assumed the initiative by suggesting direct negotia- 
tions between these two Powers, as the most hopeful measure for a 
peaceful solution, and succeeded in gaining England's adherence 
to the idea of direct negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd, 
in place of the conference plan.^ 

The efforts of German diplomacy were directed toward pre- 

1 Orange Book No. 2.2. 

2 White Book. 3, No. 14; Blue Book No. 46. 

3 Blue Book No. 67. 



MODERN GERMANY 517 

venting a tragic outcome through simultaneous warning and 
peaceful explanations. On July 26th, Germany had called atten- 
tion in Petrograd to the inevitable results of the first step on 
the path of mobilization: "Preparatory military measures by 
Russia will force us to counter-measures, which must consist in 
mobilizing the army. But mobilization means war. As we 
know the obligations of France towards Russia, our mobilization 
w^ould be directed against both Russia and France. We cannot 
assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war." ^ 
Consonant with this, Paris was informed that only the localizing 
of the conflict would prevent untold dangers, but at the same 
time that Germany's intentions in regard to France were purely 
peaceful. Every suggestion, however, for united efforts toward 
peace w^as rejected by Paris with deep distrust. France could 
not make up her mind to undertake in Petrograd a step similar 
to that of Germany in Vienna; the slightest move in this direc- 
tion, it was feared, would prove compromising in the eyes of 
Russia, and it was considered necessary by intentionally colorless 
newspaper declarations to avoid even the faintest suspicion of a 
"solidarity with Germany which might be wrongfully inter- 
preted." ^ Paris preferred, with folded arms and without initia- 
tive, to watch the fateful course of events. 

Meanwhile, the Russian government strove to convince the 
leading British statesmen that the Central Powers' apparent un- 
willingness to yield was due only to the widespread delusion in 
Germany and Austria that England would remain neutral under 
all circumstances. Only by destroying this delusion — that is to 
say, by an unmistakable rapprochement w^ith the Dual Alliance 
— could England exorcise this danger, it was claimed. The 
readiness with which Grey adopted this suggestion is worthy of 
notice. While on the one hand, in disregard of the suggestions 
of his own ambassador in Petrograd, he made no effort to exer- 
cise a moderating influence on Russia and thereby to contribute 
to the success of the negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd, 
on the other hand he made a series of moves which according 
to his belief were, perhaps, calculated to moderate an assumed 
desire for war on Germany's part, but the practical significance 
of which was a one-sided pressure on Germany and Austria and 
which by unmistakable statements regarding England's possible 
attitude encouraged both Petrograd and Paris to more energetic 
action. Whether his movements were directed by deliberate cal- 
culation or were due to mental astigmatism, united with insu- 

1 White Book. 

2 Yellow Book No. 62. 



5i8 MODERN GERMANY 

perable prejudices, Is a question that will be answered differently 
according to one's psychology. 

The very first step showed that Russia's suggestion had been 
heeded — that England must definitely Indicate her position. 
Grey declared to the German Ambassador on July 27th that If 
Germany assisted Austria, because she could not afford calmly 
to see her ally crushed, other Issues might bring other Powers In, 
and the war would be the greatest ever known. ^ This meant 
nothing less than that England would oppose the defeat of France 
or (as this had never been Germany's object) that she would 
conceivably under this pretext enter Into a European war. This 
comforting information was Immediately communicated to the 
French.^ At the same time military measures were announced. 
To Russia's plaint that a false Impression existed In the minds 
of German statesmen as to England's future attitude. Grey 
made answer: "This impression will be dispelled by the orders 
we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it 
happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave." In 
this underhanded manner, he wished it to be understood that his 
reference must not be taken to mean that anything more than 
diplomatic action was promised,^ but he told the Russians clearly 
what they wished to know. For, as a matter of fact, this mili- 
tary measure was ordered on July 23rd by Churchill, secretly 
and on his own initiative; the new feature was that the Cabinet' 
decided on the evening of July 27th to publish it. If the desire 
was thereby to intimidate Germany the inevitable result was still 
further to stiffen the resistance of France and Russia. This was 
the sense In which the measure was regarded and discussed by 
the French. "Great Britain's attitude Is becoming firmer," a 
French diplomat Informs Paris with satisfaction. The Reuter 
Bureau was even more frank than Grey desired, when it in- 
formed the world that the British decision ''greatly encouraged 
Russia." 

It may be that Grey's step was meant as a bluff, was intended 
to create the impression of readiness to strike, but was not an 
indication of a real intention to do so. As has been justly re- 
marked, there is a dangerous element In such a step; by the use 
of bluff a government may venture too far and then no longer 
be able to find a justifiable excuse for retreat. The danger is 
greatly Increased when this bluffing is carried on by more than 
one, and each word of encouragement is eagerly seized upon by 

iBIue Book No. 46. 

2 Yellow Book No. 63. 

3 Blue Book No. 47 ; Yellow Book No. 66. 



MODERN GERMANY 519 

the other party to the game and passed along in exaggerated form. 
Therein lay Grey's tremendous responsibility. A method which, 
with such measures and with such coadjutors, aimed at a decisive 
success for the Entente could not fail, despite all fair-sounding 
efForts at mediation, to aid in bringing about the war, instead of 
preventing it. 

On the afternoon of July 29th, after Austria had declared war 
on Serbia, Grey once more made use of his method, in a more 
emphatic manner. He informed Prince Lichnowsky, the Ger- 
man Ambassador, that as long as the crisis was restricted to the 
issues at present actually in question, England had no thought 
of interfering. But if Germany became involved, and then 
France, the conflict might take on such proportions that all 
European interests would be at stake. The Ambassador, he said, 
must not be misled by the friendly tone of the conversation into 
thinking that England, In such an event, would stand aside. In 
case British interests required England to intervene, she would 
do so at once, and the decision would be speedily taken.^ At first 
blush it might be held that even this warning, which was really 
tantamount to a threat, was only meant to act as a damper on 
Germany's dreaded thirst for war. But a few hours before, 
Grey had informed the French Ambassador, Cambon, that he in- 
tended to speak thus to Prince Lichnowsky. He had thereby in 
advance transformed the peaceful effect of his words in the 
minds of the Entente allies into an action tending toward a war- 
like solution and increasing the warlike sentiment. 

In this notable conversation with Cambon, Grey had empha- 
sized the fact that England did not wish to be drawn into an 
Austro-Serbian, nor even into an Austro-Russian conflict. Eng- 
land did not want to take a hand, he said, in a struggle between 
Teutons and Slavs for the supremacy in the Balkans. But if Ger- 
many, and in turn France, became involved, they had not yet 
made up their minds what they would do. France would then 
have been drawn into a quarrel which was not her ow^n, but in 
which, in keeping with her alliance, honor and interest obliged her 
to engage. England would then be free from engagements, and 
would have to decide what action British interests required of 
her. Cambon understood the conversation so well that in re- 
peating it he summed up the train of thought somew^hat more 
definitely in this way: should other issues be raised, and Ger- 
many and France become involved so that the question came to 
concern the hegemony of Europe, England would then decide 

1 Blue Book No. 86. 



520 MODERN GERMANY 

what It was necessary for her to do.^ The cue had been uttered 
which was understood b)^ the two men who had so often made 
use of it. Only apparently was it a question of two separate 
contingencies — of one in which England would abstain, and of a 
second in which she would intervene. Grey was fully aware that 
the first case, as the result of the Austro-German and of the 
Franco-Russian treaty obligations, would with automatic swift- 
ness bring the second in its train. But he deliberately set in 
motion the machinery of the Triple Entente, in order to force 
Germany and Austria-Hungary to retreat along the whole line. 
He still avoided definitely binding himself, but he foresaw that the 
immediate result would be, if Germany did not retreat, to bring 
about a situation by means of which he hoped to be able to stam- 
pede the whole Cabinet to the most extreme measures. 

The die had been cast. The very next day Cambon demanded 
that the bill of the provisional agreement contained in the letters 
of November, 19 12, be honored; and when certain of English 
support, the French government, on the 30th of July, gave Petro- 
grad the assurance of unconditional armed assistance, which it 
had hitherto withheld. The result was the removal from Russia's 
path of the final obstacles in the way of a definite decision for 
war. 

While England unmistakably drew closer in this manner to 
the Dual Alliance, and while the Russian preparations were no 
longer limited to mobilization on the Austrian boundary, but 
were already extending into the military districts bordering on 
Germany, the latter country, despite the more difficult conditions, 
was with increased energy pursuing its efforts for peace. Im- 
mediately following the return from his northern voyage, the 
Emperor threw the whole weight of his personal authority and 
of his well-known love of peace into the balance. He recognized, 
of course, the difficult position of the Czar, but nevertheless he 
appealed to him, in a telegram on the evening of July 28th, in 
the name of their common interests and their long-standing 
friendship. Above all, however, did he assure the Czar that he 
would use his entire influence **to induce Austria-Hungary to seek 
a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia." ^ Accord- 
ingly, the Imperial Chancellor informed the British Ambassador 
on the same evening that he was making every effort, both at 
Vienna and Petrograd, to persuade the two governments to dis- 
cuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way ^ 

iBlue Book No. 87. 

2 White Book, Exhibit 20. 

3 Blue Book No. 71. 



MODERN GERMANY 521 

— that is to say, to bring about a renewal of the direct negotiations, 
which had been suspended since Austria's declaration of war on 
Serbia. 

The course was difficult, but not without prospect of success. 
The reply of the Czar spoke, it is true, of his indignation at the 
declaration of war by Austria and of the improbability of his 
being able to continue to resist the pressure, but he nevertheless 
accepted the offer of the German Emperor: "At this solemn 
moment I beg you earnestly to help me." On the other side, 
likew^ise, the efiFort to induce the Austrian ally to renew the nego- 
tiations w^as successful. 

The measures subsequently taken by the Imperial German 
government showed that for the sake of preserving the peace of 
the world Berlin was ready to go even beyond the position taken 
on July 23rd regarding the Austro-Serbian conflict. In a note 
sent to Vienna, on July 29th, it was admitted that Austria-Hun- 
gary, in view of her previous experiences, could not be satisfied, 
despite a certain readiness on Serbia's part, without receiving 
positive guarantees for the fulfilment of her demands; but the 
attempt was made to suggest, in the event of war, a limit to 
Austria's action, which should have quieted all uneasiness on the 
part of Russia. Since Austria, according to her previous decla- 
ration, sought no territorial increase in Serbia, the note argued, 
presumably the sole aim of the future military operation would 
be to obtain such guarantees. If this was correct, Germany ad- 
vised Austria to issue a public declaration to this effect, in order 
to avoid all misunderstanding. The Imperial Chancellor w^as 
justified in saying to the British Ambassador, Goschen, that the 
fact that he had gone so far must be regarded in England as 
proof of his earnest desire for peace.^ As he remarked on another 
occasion, he was sparing no energy in the effort to urge Vienna 
to moderation.^ During the same twenty-four hours, while Grey 
was giving uninterrupted and dangerous encouragement to his 
allies, the Imperial German government was continuing in Vi- 
enna its efforts toward mediation ; in such a manner, indeed, that 
the Imperial Chancellor could characterize it in his speech of 
August 4th as ''going to the limit consonant with our relation 
as an ally." ^ 

After Austria-Hungary had decided, on the evening of July 
30th, to take Germany's advice, the negotiations between Vienna 
and Petrograd were resumed. The possibility of maintaining 

1 Blue Book, No. 75. 

~ Blue Book, No. 107, 

3 Blue Book, No. 103, 104. 



522 



MODERN GERMANY 



peace was thus again opened up at the eleventh hour, through the 
intervention of the German Emperor and the compliance of our 
ally. We know from these last negotiations that Austria-Hun- 
gary declared her readiness to respect the sovereignty of Serbia 
and the integrity of her territory, and further that Germany 
was prepared to become surety for this pledge. We know, too, 
of a renewed suggestion by Grey that Austria-Hungary should 
cease her military advance after the occupation of Belgrade and 
the surrounding territory, and should accept the mediation of the 
four Powers between herself and Russia; this proposal also was 
supported in Vienna by the German government. 

But all hopes of peace were shattered by Russia with a single 
blow. Sassonov, in the negotiations with Austria-Hungary, re- 
sumed on the evening of July 30, increased his demands — work- 
ing hand in hand with England ! — in such a manner that it would 
have meant the complete surrender of the Monarchy.^ Nor was 
this all: a few hours later, while Vienna was still considering 
her reply, Russia suddenly, with a fateful decision, burned all her 
bridges behind her. The certainty gained from a series of actions 
on the part of British diplomacy that in case of war the aid of 
France and England might be reckoned on, caused Russia to 
decide against peace. That this consideration was a decisive fac- 
tor in the change of front is shown by the report of the Belgian 
Minister in Petrograd, an acceptable witness, even in the eyes 
of our enemies; this report, written on July 31, pitilessly exposed 
the chain of cause and effect so carefully concealed by Grey. It 
acknowledges that "Germany has striven here, as she has in 
Vienna, to find a way to avoid a general conflict." It offers this 
revelation: "England let it be understood at first that she would 



^ It is remarkable that the tone of the formula originally chosen by Sassonov 
(Orange Book No. 60) was, "at the demand of the British Ambassador" (Yellow 
Book No. 113), made considerably sharper, as may be seen here: 



YELLOW BOOK 

"If Austria agrees to stay the ad- 
vance of her troops on Serbian ter- 
ritory, and if, recognizing that the 
Austro-Serbian dispute has assumed 
the character of a question of Euro- 
pean interest, she admits that the 
Great Powers shall examine the sat- 
isfaction which Serbia might give to 
the Austro - Hungarian Government 
without affecting her sovereign rights 
and independence, Russia undertakes 
to maintain her waiting attitude." 

This interference on the part of England with the formula is bound to 
arouse grave doubts as to the love of peace of the British policy. Sassonov 
had every reason to thank Grey "for the friendly and firm tone" which he has 
adopted in the pourparlers with Germany and Austria (Orange Book No. 69). 



ORANGE BOOK 

"If Austria, recognizing that the 
Austro-Serbian Question has assumed 
the character of a European question, 
declares her willingness to exclude 
from her ultimatum the poiiits which 
threaten the sovereign rights of 
Serbia, Russia binds herself to cease 
her military preparations." 



MODERN GERMANY 523 

not permit herself to be drawn into a conflict. To-day, however, 
Petrograd is convinced — indeed, assurance has been given — that 
England will uphold France. This support is a very strong fac- 
tor in the problem, and has served in great measure to help the 
war party obtain the upper hand." 

The Russian war party, therefore, decreed complete mobiliza- 
tion, which was to set the world afire. Without being threat- 
ened in a military way, either by Austria-Hungary^ or by the 
German Empire,^ it took the step the unavoidable consequences 
of which on the German side were as clear to the Czar's govern- 
ment as they must have been to the other members of the En- 
tente,^ who claimed to be so greatly concerned for peace. The 
insatiable Asiatic lust for war herewith broke bounds, the lust 
which in recent years had been strengthened by the secret and 
open encouragement of the Western Powers, and which now, 
without asking its promoters, brutally throttled the final efforts 
at diplomatic mediation. The responsibility for the plot rests 
with more than one state in the camp of our enemies; the re- 
sponsibility for the deed must be borne by Russia alone, who, 
in the words of Helfferich, at this moment became the incendiary 
in a peaceful world.* 

What followed were merely inevitable consequences, which 
developed with automatic speed and which at only one point were 
subjected to what seemed a voluntary decision. 

Through Russia's general mobilization, the moment had come 
for Germany when she saw herself forced to meet with the 
greatest possible promptness the probability of a war on two 
fronts; every hour in which she passively permitted the concen- 

1 Russia could not possibly have seen a threat in Austria's partial mobiliza- 
tion against Serbia. The Russian assertion in the communique of August 2nd 
(Orange Book No. 77), that at the same time (July 31st) reports had been 
received of a general mobilization by Austria, does not accord with the facts. 

* That the alleged German preparations, which are said to have necessitated 
the Russian mobilization, are contrary to facts, is evident, as that argument 
was used only in relation to other Powers, but was not used by the Czar or 
his advisors in their negotiations with the German Emperor or the German 
diplomats. In connection with the Russian mobilization, see the German White 
Book, and the report of July 31st of Baron De I'Escaille, the Belgian Minister 
at Petrograd. 

3 On July 27th, Secretary of State von Jagow informed the British Ambassador 
that "if Russia mobilized only in the south, Germany would not mobilize, but 
if she mobilized in the north, Germany would have to do so, too, and the 
Russian system of mobilization was so complicated that it might be difficult 
exactly to locate her mobilization" (Blue Book No. 43). Similarly the French 
Ambassador reported that Mr. von Jagow had "pointed out that if Russia 
mobilized, Germany would be obliged to mobilize as well, that we also would 
be forced to do so, and that the struggle would be almost inevitable" (Yellow 
Book No. 67). 

* It is significant that the introduction to the British Blue Book suppresses 
the fact of the Russian general mobilization, and then says in the last para- 
graph: "At this moment, on Friday the 31st, Germany suddenly dispatched an 
ultimatum to Russia demanding that she should countermand her mobilizatioa 
within twelve hours." 



524 MODERN GERMANY 

tration of millions of men on her unprotected eastern border 
would have been an inexcusable imperilling of the Empire. 
Hence, on July 31st, at midnight, the Russian government was 
informed that, on account of Russia's general mobilization of her 
army and navy, Germany had proclaimed a state of impending 
w^ar, which would be followed by mobilization if Russia did not 
stop her military measures against Germany and Austria-Hun- 
gary within twelve hours and notify Germany to that effect. As 
the time limit set in this ultimatum passed without a reply from 
Russia, on the afternoon of August ist, at 5 o'clock, the Emperor 
ordered mobilization of the entire German army and of the 
Imperial fleet; on the same afternoon, before the formal decla- 
ration of war had been received in Petrograd, Russian troops 
had already passed the border and begun hostilities. 

Simultaneously with the ultimatum to Russia, the demand was 
made on the French government to declare within eighteen hours 
whether it would remain neutral. As we have seen, France from 
the very beginning had taken sides in the secret diplomatic game, 
but as regards the outside world had hitherto held herself in 
reserve. That under all circumstances she would stand by her 
Russian ally was known in Berlin, even without the malicious 
words attributed to Ambassador Jules Cambon: *'We are not 
Italians." And not less clearly had it been made manifest that 
all political initiative and decision in Paris was limited to wait- 
ing for the cue to be given by Petrograd, and especially by Lon- 
don. Hence, the evasive reply from Paris, which meant war 
but was so couched as to force the German government to make 
the declaration, was not unexpected. 

While war was started by Russia on the Continent, it re- 
mained still a question whether England would immediately take 
part. The apparent uncertainty could not last long. In this 
last diplomatic game Grey's only anxiety was to find a suitable 
cause for war which would act so irresistibly on the decision in 
the Cabinet and afterward in Parliament and in the public mind 
that no protest of the peace elements could make way against it. 
On the other hand, it was the task of German diplomacy to de- 
prive this enemy set on war of every excuse which might justify 
the war before the country; nay, more, it had to make every 
effort to render the decision of the Cabinet difficult, if not in- 
deed impossible, and if everything else failed, to force the enemy 
at least to confess the true reason for the war. 

With this thought in mind, the Imperial Chancellor had al- 
ready, on July 29th, before the final crisis, started to sound Eng- 
land in the event that Russia's ruthless desire for war should ren- 



MODERN GERMANY 525 

der a Continental conflict unavoidable. Since he was clearly 
aware, from England's policy during recent years and from 
Grey's most recent asseverations, that at the root of England's 
political calculation was the determination to prevent at any cost 
a diminution of France's power, he informed the British Ambas- 
sador that Germany was prepared, provided English neutrality 
was certain, to give every assurance to the British government 
that even In the event of a victory she aimed at no territorial 
acquisition at the expense of France.^ Reviewing the negotiations 
for disarmament during recent years, he was able to give expres- 
sion to the conviction that, as the aim of his policy during his 
chancellorship had constantly been the relaxation of tension be- 
tween Germany and England, he now had In mind an agreement 
of neutrality between the two Powers. To such an extent, then, 
was the German Empire ready to tie its hands in the final unde- 
sired struggle against French revanche that It renounced In ad- 
vance all possible gain from the conflict — the same German 
Empire of which the French Prime Minister had declared in 
the sitting of the Chamber of December 23, 19 14, that It had 
for more than forty years tirelessly pursued the aim of destroy- 
ing France in order to subjugate the world. Thus far were we 
ready to go In meeting that Power of whose share In the out- 
break of the threatening world conflagration we were fully cog- 
nizant. 

On the next day the offer was rejected unconditionally. 
Grey's reply characterized any such stipulation as that proposed 
as unacceptable. France, he said, even without loss of territory 
in Europe, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great 
Power and become subordinate to German policy. The proposal 
was evidently so unwelcome to Grey that he characterized such 
a "bargain" with Germany, at the expense of France, as a dis- 
grace from which the good name of England would never re- 
cover. With justice, Helfferich declares that Grey considered 
himself merely as the ally of France whom Germany sought to 
seduce. The fact that he expressly reserved freedom to act as 
circumstances might require blinded no one ; this was the formula 
which, in the case of France and Russia, Indicated probable 
assistance, but as regards Germany, hostile Intervention. It Is 
with this In mind that the close of his reply Is to be interpreted, 
if It is to be properly appreciated. He says that if the peace 
of Europe could be preserved and the present crisis safely passed, 
his own endeavor would be to promote some arrangement by 
M^hich Germany could be assured that no aggressive or hostile 

iBlue Book No. 85. 



526 MODERN GERMANY 

policy would be pursued against her by the Triple Entente. 
This final verbal arabesque was the ultimate achievement which 
the leader for ten years in the policy of isolating Germany was 
able to produce in the cause of the world's peace. The fact that 
he declared the idea of a general rapprochement as practicable 
only after the passing of the crisis — an idea hitherto rejected as 
"Utopian" — showed how vitally important he considered this 
crisis to be. Only the diplomatic defeat, as striven for by him, 
of the Central Powers, resulting in their permanent disability 
for an independent policy, would have represented for him the 
crowning of the work and would have opened up for the world 
the outlook into a hitherto impossible new era. 

Meanwhile, following the start of the Russian mobilization 
and the German ultimatum, the current of events swept so 
swiftly and irresistibly onward that Grey, in his bewilderment, 
was no longer able to check it, even had he desired to lay hold 
of the possibility of peace. As soon as German mobilization, the 
consequences of which for France he naturally realized, became 
imminent, he determined to place the long-deliberated question 
before Germany and France: Did they intend to respect the 
neutrality of Belgium? The French government had already 
become anxious. Grey was forced to admit that the Cabinet 
had not yet reached a decision, and that this question of neu- 
trality would be, ''I could not say a decisive, but an important 
factor in determining our attitude." Cambon, however, was 
insistent: ''Will you help us?" Grey's reply was evasive — he 
was not yet able publicly to assume a formal obligation. Pa- 
thetically Cambon reminded him of 1870: it was not in Eng- 
land's interest, he said, that France should be humiliated by 
Germany. In that event England, he declared, would be in a 
very much weakened position in regard to Germany. In the 
year 1870 England had committed a sad mistake by permitting 
a great increase in Germany's strength — was she going to repeat 
this mistake? 

The question of Belgian neutrality gave to Grey the long- 
sought-for excuse for war which he needed to stampede the 
Cabinet, Parliament and public opinion, and which the British 
press and that of the world have since then discussed ad infini- 
tum, with appeals to international law and to humanity. 

That this excuse for war was only a subterfuge is proved by 
several indisputable facts. In anticipation of Grey's designs, on 
August 1st, before it had finally declared itself, the German 
government demanded of him whether England would obligate 
herself to remain neutral in case Germany promised not to vio- 



MODERN GERMANY 527 

late Belgium's neutrality. Grey, however, refused to give such 
a promise, by w^hich, if he had really been concerned for Bel- 
gium, he might have saved the unhappy country from its fate.^ 
Grey was thereby prevented beforehand from playing the trump 
of Belgian neutrality — he considered it permissible, however, to 
keep this inquiry from the knowledge of the Cabinet and Parlia- 
ment. Indeed, he even went further. Following Grey's re- 
fusal. Prince Lichnowsky urged him at least to formulate the 
possible conditions for England's neutrality, the Ambassador 
himself increasing the offer of July 29th by proposing a guaran- 
tee on the part of Germany of the integrity of France and of 
the French colonies. This offer also Grey withheld from the 
Cabinet, as all negotiations on this basis would have defeated 
his pre-determined action. Such conduct is to be explained only 
by a fixed determination for war. 

As a matter of fact. Grey had completely bound England's 
hands, in the interest of France, even before he was justified in 
assuming Belgian neutrality to be threatened. On the after- 
noon of the same ist of August he gave the French Ambassador, 
who had become anxiously insistent, reason to expect a promise 
which he was able formally to make to him the very next morn- 
ing. In the Cabinet meeting on the morning of August 2nd — 
that in which he withheld the German offers and inquiries! — 
he caused a resolution to be passed w^hich authorized him (with 
the customary formal reservations) to inform Cambon that if 
the German fleet were to come through the North Sea or into 
the English Channel, with the purpose of hostile attacks against 
the French coast or French shipping, the British fleet would lend 
France its full support.^ This far-reaching promise was nothing 
less than a positive undertaking to go to war against Germany,^ 
an obligation which was the inevitable result of the spirit of the 
Franco-English naval convention. The obligation, however, was 
assumed before the inquiry as regards the passage of German 
troops had been made in Brussels on the evening (at seven 
o'clock) of the 2nd of August. This offers positive proof, in 
addition to the negative proof, that the question of Belgium's 
neutrality was not the deciding factor — but that, rather, the 
British fleet, in the period from the 2nd to the 4th of August, 
independently of the question of neutrality and before a decision 
regarding it had been reached, would have forcibly prevented a 
German attack on the north coast of France, thus beginning the 

* Blue Book No. 123. 

2 Blue Book No. 148; Yellow Book No. 137. 

* Yellow Book, No. 143. 



528 MODERN GERMANY 

war on Its own account. In possession of this statement France 
gave the above-mentioned evasive reply to the German ulti- 
matum, which led to the declaration of war. 

The leading imperialistic group of the government, which was 
determined on war, needed this Belgian excuse in order to over- 
come the opposition of a strong party in the Cabinet opposed to 
the war. Nor at the crucial moment did this argument prove 
sufHcIent for a small minority represented by such men as Lord 
Morley, John Burns and Trevelyan. The majority, however, 
was determined to disregard an even stronger resistance in their 
own party, and in extreme case of need to form a coalition min- 
istry for the World War with the Conservative opposition, whose 
manner of poHtical thought was based on force alone and who 
unconditionally supported the government and urged forward 
even more violently. With this means at their disposal, says 
Shaw, ''Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith let loose the lion." 

The real impelling motive of English statesmenship, whose 
diplomatic exponent Grey was at this moment, must be sought at 
another point — in the basic conception of the whole policy of 
isolation. Whoever has followed the significance and the inter- 
connection of events in the preliminary history of the war will 
not be surprised to see that the systematic preparation and the 
tenacious clinging to an idea could have as a final result only the 
completed deed. When In the course of the war the burdens 
and sacrifices mounted, contrary to England's expectation, to a 
point where Belgian neutrality no longer seemed sufficient as a 
decisive war motive for a healthy national egoism, the political 
heads of the nation held it to be wiser to discard a fictitious mo- 
tive which was fundamentally un-English and to call things by 
their true names. In a leading article in The Tunes, of March 
9, 19 1 5, this admission was made with a ruthless frankness which 
cannot surprise the initiated: "We do not set up to be interna- 
tional Don Quixotes, ready at all times to redress wrongs which 
do us no hurt. Even had Germany not invaded Belgium, honor 
and Interest would have united us with France." Soon there- 
after Lord Haldane, the one-time pro-German decoy of the 
Cabinet, indulged in this observation: ''Belgium touched our 
honor, France our sentiment and interest. If we consider the 
theory of world conquest underlying the successful German 
movement in favor of a war of attack, it seems to me that It 
would have been madness to sit still with folded hands while 
Germany was sweeping aside the obstacles on the Continent to an 
attack on the British Empire." He also Implies the fact (of 
which Grey's declaration gives documentary proof) that Eng- 



MODERN GERMANY 529 

land would have determined to take part In the world war 
even without the passage of Germany through Belgium. 

It is not, however, the whole truth to say that England en- 
tered the war on France's account. By a promise of neutrality, 
the English might have gained Germany's assurance that France's 
territorial integrity would not be disturbed. It was not a sign 
of diplomatic weakness on the part of Germany, but a well-cal- 
culated move to force her enemies to disclose their last card, 
when, with knowledge of the naval convention and the promise 
of August 2nd, she took an additional step and declared herself 
ready to guarantee not to disturb the north coast of France, 
French shipping and French colonies. Truly the buckler which the 
ruler of the seas would have set up before her ally was strong 
and high enough to protect her colleague in the Entente against 
every danger. But this was not sufficient — there was a greater 
interest at stake. 

Concealed under the negative purpose of preventing the weak- 
ening of France at any price, there existed the positive desire of 
causing Germany's enfeeblement through a coalition of Powers 
which could never again be reproduced. There was, on the one 
hand, the well-weighed belief, which Ambassador de Bunsen in- 
cautiously admitted, that Germany and Austria-Hungary would 
probably be strong enough to defeat France and Russia, and that 
only the decided and immediate intervention of England could 
render the opposite result certain. On the other hand, there 
existed the not unfounded fear that, if this opportunity were not 
seized, the Entente allies would be permanently estranged and 
w^ould turn away from England — there would thus be nothing 
left for the English state than to be friendly with Germany 
and to resign itself to that country's claim to existence. That 
was the very situation which England had for years striven to 
prevent, and which now at the last moment she would not accept. 
This policy had been unconditionally adopted in favor of France, 
and although England was aware that she was thereby also 
electing in favor of the Russian offensive against the Central 
Powers, she had at all times sought so to play the game that at 
the moment of a great crisis Germany would have to face all 
three Powers. 

The leading men of the country which, thanks to its insular 
situation, had risen to a dominant position by taking skillful 
advantage of the conjuncture of events, could not resist the 
temptation at this apparently favorable moment to establish the 
supremacy of their own land on the ruins of Germany's world- 
embracing efforts. Only by taking full advantage of this oppor- 



530 MODERN GERMANY 

tunity could they hope to put the dangerous German rival In 
trade and industry, on the sea and in the colonies, out of the 
running for a long time, or perhaps even forever. That the 
instinct of trade rivalry had, unseen, gained in strength, was 
proved by the action of British journalism after the outbreak of 
the war, when it set out to incite the whole world to an attack 
on German markets, and indulged in dreams of leveling every 
German foundry to the ground. Thus the basic guiding idea 
of the policy of isolation finally came dominantly to the fore, 
for the first time since its conception by King Edward. It 
lies concealed behind the manner in which Grey, with less 
certain hand than usual, in the final week threw the weight of 
his state against every serious chance of peace and finally de- 
cisively in favor of war. 

The self-deception of Grey is the fundamental error of the 
policy of isolation. It was not even his most serious mistake 
when he made the cold-blooded statement in Parliament that 
participation in the war would not cost the English much more 
than would neutrality — this argumentum ad hominem, aimed to 
render calculation as regards the war plausible to the commercial 
mind of his compatriots, shows, at all events, that in this man the 
inhibitions which would have led him to prevent the war were 
but feebly developed. His fundamental weaknesses lie much 
deeper. He was haunted by the unfounded fear of the world 
supremacy of Germany, which had so long been denounced as 
Napoleonic that the world had come to believe in it. He was 
misled by the fatal undervaluation of the strength of Austria- 
Hungary and by the mistaken belief in the possibility of eco- 
nomically starving and cutting off Germany. Just as he over- 
estimated the anti-German arguments in their entirety, as these 
were circulated in the camp of the Triple Entente, so he under- 
estimated the internal powers of his enemy — the ethical and spir- 
itual, the military and technical, the economic and financial 
reserve forces of a nation which was able and determined to con- 
i^kiue its upward course without offensive and in peace. 



CHAPTER III 
BELGIUM'S NEUTRALITY 

PROFESSOR WALTHER SCHOENBORN, OF HEIDELBERG 

DURING the war, no single charge has been more effective 
in arousing public opinion against Germany than that 
which has been exploited in hostile as well as neutral countries — 
that we committed an arbitrary breach of international law in 
violating Belgium's neutrality. A glance at the war literature 
published in neutral countries shows that no accusation has had 
more lasting success, though those who have raised their voices 
the loudest have gradually been driven, through the publication by 
the German government of documents found in the Brussels ar- 
chives, from the offensive to the defensive, and this defensive 
attitude is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain.^ 

An examination of this charge and of the grounds on which it 
is based, as well as of the points which serve as a vindication for 
Germany, must be confined to an investigation of the legal 
aspect of the subject, since the accusation does not concern itself 
with the question whether Germany's action was politically wise 
or expedient, but whether it was admissible under the law of 
nations. 

The speech which the German Imperial Chancellor, Dr. von 
Bethmann-Hollweg, made before the Reichstag, on August 4, 
1 91 4, is generally selected by Germany's opponents as a con- 

1 For a characteristic example of the type referred to, see La Belgique Neutre 
et Loyale, by Professor Emil Waxweiler, Lausanne, 19 15, of which an American 
edition, entitled Belgium: Neutral and Loyal, was published in New York, 1915. 
Passages taken at random from the book go to show that Mr. Waxweiler touches 
but lightly on the dangerous points of the German publications, meeting them 
with fictitious arguments, or passing them over in silence, thus disclosing the 
inherent weakness of his position. It is regrettable that his skill in the use 
of material already well known is greater than his conscientiousness. He quotes 
(p. 91) — from No. 85 of the British Blue Book — the Imperial Chancellor's state- 
ment to Sir E. Goshen on July 29th concerning Belgium: "It will depend on 
the action of France what operations Germany may be forced to undertake in 
Belgium, but after the war Belgium will maintain her integrity, if she does 
not take sides against Germany"; and (p. 92) he says: "On July 29th, Germany 
confessed that thereafter the fate of the little nation that she has guaranteed 
would be at the mercy of military operations." Note that the statement of 
the Imperial Chancellor said clearly that France's action would decide Ger- 
many's attitude! Again (p. 154) Mr. Waxweiler states that "one date domi- 
nates all these allegations," and says: "It was on July 29th that the Imperial 
Chancellor, in his conversation with the British Ambassador at Berlin, an- 
nounced for the first time that, in the event of a conflict with France, Ger- 
many would only respect the integrity of Belgium if she did not resist the 
free passage of German troops across her territory." It is statements of this 
sort that force one to regard with the utmost caution all the new material 
adduced by Mr. Waxweiler. 



532 MODERN GERMANY 

venient starting-point for their campaign. It is true that In 
connection with the entry into Belgium the Chancellor speaks 
of a breach of international law; but before being interpreted 
against Germany, as is generally done, the words of the Imperial 
Chancellor deserve closer investigation. The pertinent sentences 
read as follows: 

"Gentlemen, we are now forced to defend ourselves; and 
necessity knows no law! Our troops have occupied Luxem- 
burg, and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory. 
Gentlemen, this is contrary to the principles of international 
law. It is true the French government declared in Brussels 
its intention to respect Belgitim's neutrality as long as its op- 
ponents would do so. We know, however, that France stood 
ready to invade the country. France could wait, but we 
could not. A French attack on our flank on the Lower Rhine 
might have had fatal consequences for us. Consequently we 
were forced to disregard the legitimate protests of the Luxem- 
burg and Belgian governments. The wrong — I speak quite 
candidly — which we are now committing we shall endeavor 
to make good as soon as we have- attained our military goal. 
He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for what he holds 
most dear, can think only as to how he can hew his way out!" 

And further: 

"We have assured the British government that as long as 
England remains neutral our fleet will not attack the* northern 
coast of France, and that we shall not encroach upon the 
territorial integrity and independence of Belgium. I repeat 
this assurance here before the whole world. . . ." 

Naturally, these words can be correctly understood and appre- 
ciated only if the general situation at the time they were uttered 
is taken into consideration. Spoken in an hour in which the 
fate of the German Empire hung in the balance, and forming 
part of a vital political statement by the government to a politi- 
cal gathering, they w^ere not intended as, nor could they be, an 
objective and carefully considered theoretical verdict regarding 
the legal aspect of Germany's procedure. They represent rather 
an integral part of a political action. The object of this action, 
and consequently the real meaning of the words so promptly and 
eagerly turned against Germany, were subsequently made 
clear in another equally important announcement of the Imperial 



MODERN GERMANY 533 

Chancellor, which must be considered In conjunction with his 
Initial speech, In order that the latter be clearly understood. 
In the second war session of the Reichstag, on December 2, 
1914, the Imperial Chancellor declared: 

"The neutrality of Belgium, which England pretended to 
protect, is a mask. At 7 o'clock on the evening of the 2nd of 
August we Informed Brussels that the French plan of cam- 
paign, which was known to us, compelled us, for reasons of 
self-preservation, to march through Belgium ; but as early as the 
afternoon of that very day — the 2nd of August — that Is to 
say, before anything was known or could be known In London 
of our action in Brussels, England had assured France of her 
unconditional support. In the event of the German fleet attack- 
ing the French coast. Not a word was said of the neutrality 
of Belgium. This fact Is established by Sir Edward Grey's 
statement, made In the House of Commons on the 3rd of 
August, but w^hich, owing to the difficulty in telegraphic com- 
munication, had not come to my knowledge in extenso on the 
4th of August. It Is furthermore confirmed by the Blue 
Book of the British government Itself. How, then, can Eng- 
land claim to have drawn her sword because we had violated 
Belgium's neutrality? And how could the British statesmen, 
who were perfectly cognizant of the past, speak about Belgian 
neutrality at all ? When, on the 4th of August, I spoke of the 
wrong we were committing by marching into Belgium, it was 
not yet certain whether the Belgian government would not 
In the hour of need decide to save the country and withdraw 
to Antwerp under protest. You remember, that at the request 
of our military administration, after the capture of Liege, I 
made a fresh proposal to the Belgian government to this ef- 
fect. For military reasons It was Imperative on August 4th 
to maintain the possibility of such a development at all costs. 
Even at that time there were many indications of the Belgian 
government's guilt, though positive written proofs were not 
then at my disposal. But the English statesmen were per- 
fectly familiar with these proofs. The documents which were 
found in Brussels, and which have been given publicity by 
me, establish how and to what extent Belgium had relin- 
quished her neutrality to England. Two facts are now made 
quite clear to the world : When our troops entered Belgian 
territory during the night of the 3rd to the 4th of August, 
they were in the confines of a state which had long since rid- 
dled Its own neutrality. The other fact is that England did 



534 MODERN GERMANY 

not declare war on us for the sake of Belgium's neutrality, 
which she had helped to undermine, but because she believed 
she would be able, with the help of two great Continental mili- 
tary powers, to crush us. . . ." 

With this, the real meaning of the Imperial Chancellor's dec- 
larations of August 4th is clearly explained. The German gov- 
ernment at that time still hoped to accomplish the march through 
Belgium without meeting serious armed resistance. In order to 
make it easy for Belgium to adopt an attitude conforming with 
these expectations, the German government did not assume the 
position that its troops were entitled to march through by virtue 
of a legal right, but admitted that it committed thereby a legal 
infringement. The German government might have spoken 
differently; but, in the first place, documentary proofs of the 
previous breaches of Belgium's neutrality were lacking at the 
time, and, in the second place, it was not only France but also 
England that was seriously compromised by them. On the 
afternoon of August 4, however, England's attitude toward Ger- 
many had not been publicly decided on; there was, perhaps, still 
hope of preventing her from participating in the war. It was 
known that England was deeply interested in the integrity of 
Belgium ; or, to express it more precisely, she was apprehensive 
of Germany establishing herself permanently on Belgium's North 
Sea coast. If now, the Imperial Chancellor, in an open session 
of the Reichstag, expressly declared the entry Into Belgium as 
wrong, the strongest guaranty conceivable was thereby given to 
the world that Belgium would later on be completely evacuated. 
On the other hand, a public reference made by Germany at this 
moment of Belgium's violation of her own neutrality, through 
secret agreements with France and England, would have com- 
pelled the German government forthwith to declare Belgium an 
enemy and opponent, thus leaving no choice to England. 

For purposes of this investigation, it follows that the words 
of the Imperial Chancellor, spoken on August 4, 1914, cannot 
be taken as an estimate of the question in its relationship to in- 
ternational law. 



The German entry into Belgium has been characterized as a 
breach of international law from two points of view: 

I. Germany is claimed to have expressly recognized by treaty 
the permanent neutrality of Belgium, and to have violated this 
treaty obligation by her invasion. 



MODERN GERMANY 535 

2. By the mere fact of being a neutral state — that is to say, 
by not being a participant in the war — Belgium, it is maintained, 
had the right to forbid any belligerent from trespassing on her 
territory; indeed, according to objective principles of interna- 
tional law, she is not supposed even to have been in a position to 
permit a belligerent either to enter or march through her terri- 
tory. On the contrary, she is assumed to have been under the 
obligation of preventing such action. 

Some have combined these two points of view by identifying the 
rights and duties of a permanently neutral state in war-time 
with those of a state which simply happens to be neutral in a 
particular war. This is correct as regards the inadmissibility 
of other states encroaching on the territory of the neutral state; 
but in other respects the rights and duties of the permanently 
neutral, or neutralized state, are more comprehensive, as is com- 
monly recognized in theory and practice (see below). 

The neutralization and the resulting permanent neutrality of 
Belgium was legally based up to the present on the treaties of 
April 19, 1839. By virtue of these, at the termination of her 
war of independence against Holland, which was incited by 
France in order to further her schemes of expansion, Belgium 
was formally recognized by Holland. The recognition of Bel- 
gium by the Great Powers, viz., France, Austria, England, Prus- 
sia and Russia, was expressly renewed, and the provisions of the 
Dutch-Belgian Treaty were placed under the guaranty of the 
Great Powers. The permanent neutrality of Belgium was ex- 
pressed in the following terms (Art. VH, of the main treaty 
between Belgium and Holland) : 

"La Belgique, dans les limites indiquees aux Articles i, 2, et 4, for- 
mera un Etat independent et perpetuellement neutre. Elle sera tenue 
d'observer cette meme neutralite envers tous les autres Etats" (Belgium, 
within the limits specified in Articles 1, 2, and 4, shall form an inde- 
pendent and perpetually neutral state. She shall be bound to observe 
such neutrality toward all other states). 

The guaranty given by the five Great Powers (Holland is not 
included here) is expressed in the following words: 

"[The five Great Powers] . . . declarent que les articles ci-annexes 
et formant la teneur du Traite conclu en ce jour entre S. M. le roi des 
Beiges et S. M. le roi des Pays Bas, grand-due de Luxembourg, sont 
consideres comme ayant la meme force et valeur que s'ils etaient tex- 
tuellement inseres dans le present Acte, et qu'ils se trouvent ainsi 
places sous la guarantie de Leurs-dites Majestes" ( [The five Great 
Powers] . . . declare that the Article hereunto annexed and forming 
the tenor of the Treaty concluded this day between His Majesty the 
King of Belgium and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand 



536 MODERN GERMANY 

Duke of Luxembourg, are considered as having the same force and va- 
lidity as if they were textually inserted in the present Act, and that 
they are thus placed under the guaranty of their said Majesties). (See 
Sec. Ill, 3.)' 

The second point — viz., the inviolability of the territory of 
any neutral state — is covered by the provisions of the fifth Con- 
vention of the Second Hague Peace Conference of October 18, 
1907, concerning the rights and duties of neutral powers and 
persons in case of w^ar on land, more particularly by Articles i, 
2, 5, par. I, and Article 10 of that Convention. The original 
French text of the same reads as follows: 



"Article i. Le territoire des Puissances neutres est inviolable. 

"Article 2. II est interdit aux belligerants de faire passer a travers 
le territoire d'une Puissance neutre des troupes ou des convois soit de 
munitions, soit d'approvisionnements. 

"Article 5. (Section i.) Une Puissance neutre ne doit tolerer sur 
son territoire aucun des actes vises par les articles 234. 

"Article 10. Ne pent etre considere comme un acte hostile le fait, 
par une Puissance neutre, de repousser, meme par la force, les atteintes 
a sa neutralite." 

["Article i. The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable. 

"Article 2. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of 
either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral 
Power. 

"Article 5. (Par. i.) A neutral Power must not allow any of the 
acts referred to in articles 2 and 4 to occur on its territory. 

"Article 10. The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force, 
attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act."] " 

The Belgians themselves, as well as the English, have based 
their charges mainly on the treaties of 1839, while the stipula- 
tions of the Hague Convention have been frequently quoted by 
the American friends of Belgium, particularly by Mr. Roosevelt. 
In this, Mr. Roosevelt and the other supporters of the same 
view labor under a misconception of the legal position. It is 
true that in principle the Hague Convention applies to every 
Treaty Power, but only in case it is actually neutral in a given 

^ Article I of the Treaty concluded by the Five Great Powers with Belgium. 
A corresponding provision is contained in Article II of the Treaty of the Great 
Powers with the Netherlands. 

2 Up to the present time, this convention has not been ratified either by 
Great Britain or Serbia. It stipulates in Article XX that "the provisions of 
the present Convention do not apply, except as between contracting Powers, and 
then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention." But Germany 
would not derive from that fact justification for declaring the Convention as 
not binding, if for no other reason than that England — until the evening of 
August 4th — was not yet a participant in the war; and for the further reason 
that the quoted stipulations are in effect nothing more than the legal customs 
existing, and held to be lawful, before the Hague Conference. 



MODERN GERMANY 537 

war. The moment such a state itself becomes a participant in 
the war it is evident that the Convention ceases to be applicable 
to it and that the laws of war come into force instead. Now, 
whether or not a state is to remain neutral in a war does not by 
any means depend exclusively on its own will ; generally speakings 
a state can wage war against another state at any time, when it 
believes that its interests demand such action. The law of na- 
tions does not in any way prohibit this, just as there are no 
international rules as to when a war is "legally permissible" and 
when not. 

The Boer Republics had no desire whatsoever for war in 
1899; they would certainly have preferred to remain "neutral" 
— viz., in this case immune from attack. A state can perhaps 
prevent its troops from going to war, and thereby avoid a san- 
guinary decision by battle, as was done by Bulgaria as regards 
Rumania in the second Balkan War; but in behalf of its own 
interests it cannot, in face of the determination of another state 
to begin hostilities, prevent the advent of a state of war, with 
all its effects as regards international law.^ Public opinion and 
general moral sentiment may or may not in a given case approve 
of involving in a war a state which wishes to remain officially 
neutral, for the time being or altogether. The legal position is 
always the same according to international law (with the excep- 
tion of one special case). The eminent Swiss professor of inter- 
national law, Max Huber, is quite right when he says, in ref- 
erence to using neutral territory for warlike operations, to com- 
pelling a neutral to participate in a war, or to the abandonment 
of his neutrality by the neutral himself: 

"The decision as to such an action — which regularly results 
in involving the neutral state in the war — is always determined 
by the compelling interest of the state, or, what amounts to the 
same thing, by military necessity. The decision as to whether 
such a necessity exists, however, can no more be determined by 
law than the necessity as to war or peace. The law connects 
certain legal effects — those of the rules of war — with the infrac- 
tion of the rules of peace, but these effects are the same whether 
such a necessity existed or not." ^ 

The Hague Convention, concerning neutrality, determines only 
the duties of belligerents towards the neutral states, and vice 
versa, consequently also the actions on the part of the one or the 
other, which constitute a breach of neutrality, and which, as long 
as the neutrality continues, are not permissible and under given 

^ See International Law, by Westlake, Vol. II, 2d edition, p. 2. 
- See Zeitschrift fiir Volkerrecht, Vol. VII, p. 357 ff. 



538 MODERN GERMANY 

circumstances not legally compatible with it. On the other hand, 
the Convention caciiuc, nor is ic intended that it should, give legal 
guarantee against the termmation — even though one-sided — of 
the neutrality of a state. Such a general guarantee w^ould not 
be possible, as international law stands to-day, because it would 
amount to a prohibition of war. 

Huber, therefore, correctly defines "the question whether neu- 
trality is to exist or not," as one "of a purely strategic and politi- 
cal nature," with the single exception of the case "that active 
and passive neutrality is from the beginning guaranteed (perma- 
nent neutrality and neutralization)." 

In the ultimatum of August 2, 191 4 (Belgian Gray Book 
No. 20), the German government in unmistakable manner 
threatened Belgium with war in case of resistance to the pas- 
sage of the German troops. By the presentation of the ulti- 
matum Belgium was already, at least conditionally, "involved 
in the war." As soon as that condition arose the fifth Hague 
Convention automatically ceased to apply to Belgium, and dis- 
regard of its provisions did not signify a breach of international 
law, provided that "involving Belgium in the war" was in itself 
legally permissible. According to the above, however, such an 
"involving" is de jure left to the free determination of each bel- 
ligerent, provided he is not bound by any special treaty, or, in 
other words, provided he has not previously recognized the per- 
manent neutrality of the state in question. The legal question 
therefore culminates in one point: Was Germany legally 
bound by the treaty of neutralization; was she in the present 
case under a legal obligation to respect the permanent neutrality 
of Belgium, or was she not? If she was not, then the Hague 
Convention was no longer a legal obstacle to the German ac- 
tion; whereas, in the former case, it would be applicable in 
determining the duties of Germany and Belgium. 

Only if Germany, in August, 19 14, was legally bound to 
respect the neutralization treaty, was her action towards Bel- 
gium a breach of international law.^ But even in such a case, 
though entitled to take up arms in self-defense, Belgium would 

1 See America and the World War, by Theodore Roosevelt, New York, 1915. 
p. 112 ff. Mr. Roosevelt's belief that the United States, after ascertaining that 
the facts were as represented, should intervene against Germany, on account 
of the violation of the Hague Convention in regard to Belgium, is therefore 
without any legal justification in so far as the fifth Hague Convention is con- 
cerned, if only for the reasons given in the text. In common with all the 
other signatory Powers, the United States only "ratified" the Hague Conven- 
tions — that is to say, they recognized the Conventions as binding in their own 
relations towards the other signatory Powers, but they did not "guarantee" 
the conventions, or bind themselves to enforce their stipulations in the rela- 
tions between other signatory Powers. "International law," therefore, does not 
support Mr. Roosevelt's attitude. 



MODERN GERMANY 539 

have had to observe the rules of international law concerning 
the conduct of war. Germany was fully justified in proceeding 
with reprisals against the lawless resistance of the Belgian popu- 
lation, which had no regard for the precepts of the laws of war.^ 



II 

The German government has always recognized the validity, 
in principle, of the neutralization agreements. Serious doubts 
have been raised, however, in scientific circles in regard to two 
points: First, was Germany even outwardly and formally bound 
by the treaties of 1839? A great number of scholars, including 
conscientious and impartial neutrals, have expressed doubts on 
this point. For, in the first place, it was not the German Em- 
pire — which has only existed as such since 1871 — nor the North 
German Confederation, which only came into being in 1867 — 
that entered into an obligation in 1839, but Prussia, which was 
in fact juridically and historically a totally different legal en- 
tity. 

Futhermore, an event that took place in 1870 makes the pre- 
vailing opinion at that time as regards the binding force of the 
treaties of 1839 seem highly doubtful. After the outbreak of 
the Franco-German War, in order to safeguard Belgium's neu- 
trality, England concluded with the North German Confeder- 
acy and with France identical treaties, which provided for a pos- 
sible alliance on the part of England with either one of the bel- 
ligerents, for the sole purpose of protecting Belgium's neutrality, 
in case the other should violate it. Why, one asks, was such a 
special treaty necessary if the binding force of the old treaties 
was beyond doubt? Nevertheless, the formal validity of the 
latter also for Germany must be acknowledged. It is quite true 
that when a federal state is founded, the treaties previously en- 
tered into by its individual members do not forthwith, ipso jure, 
apply to the federacy itself: A state can, in principle, only be 
bound in its international relations by its own free will. But, 
as far as is known, the Imperial German government never dis- 

1 In this connection Mr. Roosevelt seems to labor under a strange miscon- 
ception, according to his statement in The Outlook of September 22,, 1914. 
p, 175, and further statements in his book, America and the World War, to 
■which reference has already been made. He either gives a totally wrong 
interpretation to the term "hostile act," as used in Article X of the Fifth 
Hague Convention, and to the article itself, which cannot exclude the opening 
of hostilities against a State that has remained neutral; or else he fails ta 
recognize that the German reprisals in Belgium were not directed against the 
military resistance of Belgium as a State, but merely against the unlawful 
methods employed by the Belgian population in their resistance. 



540 MODERN GERMANY 

puted that the neutralization treaties of 1839 were binding on 
Germany; on the contrary, as late as April, 19 13, the German 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, von Jagow, referred to 
these treaties in the Budget Commission of the Reichstag as 
existing and as valid also for Germany (cf. Belgian Gray Book 
No. 12, appendix) ; nor has the German government during the 
course of the war ever denied the formal validity of the treaties. 
Belgium's history makes the material security which the neu- 
tralization of 1839 was able to give to the new state appear 
highly questionable, especially in view of France's annexation 
schemes (cf. section III, 3) ; and the conclusion by England of 
the double treaty of 1870, which was chiefly brought about 
through Bismarck's revelations concerning the like intentions of 
Napoleon III, certainly does not give proof of confidence on the 
part of Great Britain in the binding power and efficacy of the 
old treaties. Nevertheless, the double treaty does not in its> 
wording imply an annulment of the old treaties ; on the contrary, 
not only is the view perfectly plausible that the treaties of 1870 
were only to provide for effectual application of the old treaties 
in a special case, without being in any way prejudicial to their 
future efficacy, with all the resulting consequences, but the cor- 
rectness of this view is also clearly proved by the concluding 
clause of Art. 3 of the double treaty, which provides that, after 
the expiration of the new treaty: *'. . . the independence and 
neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the High Contracting 
Parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as heretofore 
on the first Article of the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th of April, 
1839." Although this article attributes to the treaties of 1839 
only the same effectiveness which they had previously possessed, 
no unbiassed judge can fail to see that we have here an express 
acknowledgment of the old treaties, also by the North German 
Confederation. 

The second point of dispute seems to have more weight. Is 
not the neutralization of a state such as Belgium, situated as it 
is in the midst of great military Powers, preposterous in itself, 
and does not permanent neutrality impose inherently contradic- 
tory duties on such a state ? Much can certainly be said in favor 
of this point of view. For example, the (armed) neutral state 
is prohibited from waging an offensive war, but it is directly 
obliged vigorously to protect its neutrality, even by means of a 
defensive war; the distinction, however, between an offensive 
and defensive war is in reality sometimes very slight. Truly, it 
is in the last analysis absurd to place a state of the second or 
third order, which is not protected by geographical conditions, 



MODERN GERMANY 541 

under the obligation to resist violation of its territory by a Great 
Power, if need be by means of war — that is to say, to endanger 
its existence as a state; whereas, every other state is legally en- 
titled to decide whether or not it will oppose such violation by 
force of arms. Guaranty treaties with third states do not offer 
any real equivalent for this. 

But juridically this argument does not seem convincing. The 
permanent neutralization of states has formed part of the recog- 
nized principles of international law in the nineteenth and twen- 
tieth centuries; and despite certain discouraging experiences in 
other cases, precisely Belgium's permanent neutrality was, until 
the present war, regularly regarded both in (official) practice 
and in theory as a reality; even in recent years it supplied the 
chief arguments in the dispute concerning the admissibility of 
fortifying Flushing; the jurist cannot very well ignore this. 
Perhaps the present war will change general conceptions as to 
the feasibility and practicability of the artificial neutralization of 
a state ; but to-day an examination of the legal position from the 
standpoint of international law must still take into account the 
conceptions which have prevailed until now. 



Ill 

Through its spokesman, the Imperial Chancellor, as well as 
through repeated pronouncements of von Jagow, the Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, the Imperial German government 
characterized at the start the German entry into Belgium as an. 
act of urgent necessity. Likewise, the ultimatum to Belgium, qj^ 
the 2nd of August, 191 4, was based on the same conception; 
The march through Belgian territory was absolutely imperative 
in the interest of self-preservation by the German Empire; only 
in this way did it seem possible to resist successfully the efforts 
of Germany's enemies to crush her. The government regretted 
the necessity of encroaching formally on the rights of a third 
state (viz., Belgium) and promised all possible indemnification. 

The legal standpoint of the German government can perhaps 
be best elucidated by a parallel taken from domestic law: A 
forester, who is attacked by a poacher, sees an armed companion 
of the latter stealthily approaching under cover of another man's 
house, and on the point of entering it for the purpose of obtain- 
ing a favorable aim ; the forester thereupon bursts open the 
door and enters the house himself, in order to take the second 
poacher by surprise and overpower him. The action of the for- 



542 MODERN GERMANY 

ester is permissible, but he must compensate the owner of the 
house for the damage he has done. 

Two questions arise in this connection: First, was the Ger- 
man Empire really in a position of urgent necessity? Second, if 
such necessity existed, was Germany thereby justified according 
to international law in violating the old neutralization treaties? 
Both contentions have been disputed by our enemies, but both 
are sound. 

For it was Germany that was attacked — the proof of this is 
to be found in the history of the events antecedent to the war. 
The annihilation of Germany, or at the very least the destruction 
of her world-position, was the undisputed object of her opponents 
at the time of and after the outbreak of war. This would have 
been known to Germany, even if the ludicrous desires and 
schemes of her opponents for the partition and mutilation of her 
territory had not been so naively disclosed in their official and 
private utterances during the first months of the war. Germany 
was in a most difficult strategic position from the very begin- 
ning: involved in a war on two fronts with two of the most 
powerful military Powers of Europe, which had in recent years 
made tremendous preparations for war; deprived of her freedom 
of action at sea owing to England's highly threatening attitude 
even in the last days of July ; and in the beginning, furthermore, 
forced to rely mainly on her own military resources because it 
was no longer possible to hope for armed assistance from Italy, 
and because her ally, Austria, also immediately involved in a war 
on two fronts, could employ only a part of her forces against 
Russia, whose army alone was estimated to be numerically equal 
to the combined forces of the Central Powers, while the French 
troops available at the very beginning of the war were undoubt- 
edly not very far inferior in number to the German army. There 
w^as but one advantage on Germany's side to counterbalance all 
this: the prospect that the great numerical superiority of her 
enemies could be effectively developed only after the lapse of 
more or less time, whereas the rapidity of the German mobiliza- 
tion was regarded as unparalleled, or at any rate as considerably 
superior to that of Russia. It was, indeed, as Mr. von Jagow 
said, a question "of life and death" for Germany, to take advan- 
tage of this superiority so as to overthrow, perhaps, one opponent 
before the other could deal a dangerous blow. A delay of only 
a few weeks meant that the danger of being crushed by superior 
numbers would become a probability. 

There was, in addition, the following decisive consideration: 
The Belgian frontier was Germany's Achilles heel, the spot 



MODERN GERMANY 543 

where she was exposed to a mortal hurt, since there were prac- 
tically no obstacles along this front in the way of an army seek- 
ing to invade the Rhenish industrial districts, which are the cen- 
tre of strength of Germany at war; there was no ring of for- 
tresses comparable, for instance, to the northern fortresses of 
France, to delay the advance of the enemy. The full significance 
of this situation was naturally appreciated by the French mili- 
tary authorities, and they were prepared to take advantage of it. 
Strong French forces — as the German government was reliably 
informed — stood ready to march along the Belgian section of the 
Meuse, that is to say, along the Givet-Namur line.^ Even with 
the best of intentions, the Belgian government could not have 
prevented France, with her superior numbers, from using Bel- 
gium as the base for her attack on Germany.^ It is true that on 
August 1st the French government had assured Belgium that it 
would respect the latter's neutrality; but at the same time it ex- 
pressly reserved full liberty of action for itself in the event that 
Belgium's neutrality should ''not be respected" by another 
Power.^ What, however, do the words, ''not be respected," sig- 
nify? They amount to reserving the right of asserting at any 
time, and of acting on the strength of such assertion, that the 
fact that a German patrol had by mistake strayed onto Belgian 
soil, or that a German aviator had flown over some projection of 
Belgian territory, constituted a breach of Belgium's neutrality by 
Germany. 

1 The correctness of the information which the German government received 
concerning this is confirmed by: i, numerous statements of reliable witnesses, 
who testified to the presence of French officers and soldiers on Belgian ter- 
ritory before the delivery of the German ultimatum to Belgium (these state- 
ments have been published in America, in Richard Grasshoff's The Tragedv of 
Belgium, New York, 1915, p. 22 ff) ; 2, the seizure of French mobilization maps 
of sections of Belgian and Dutch territories, which were tied in packets, and 
according to the inscriptions, were to be opened only in the event of mobili- 
zation; 3, the fact that the Belgian government was officially advised by 
France as early as July 31st of the massing of French troops on the Belgian 
frontier (see Gray Book, No. 9) ; 4, the fact that on August 3rd, at the very 
latest, France officially offered the Belgian government the support of five 
French army corps (see Blue Book, No. 151). 

2 According to the report of April 23, 1912, made by the English Military 
Attache in Brussels, Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges, in the crisis of 191 1 England 
had intended, with exactly the same justification, to land her troops in Befgium 
even without the consent of the Belgian government. 

3 The text of the declaration of the French Ambassador reads: "In the event 
of this neutrality not being respected by another Power, the French govern- 
ment, in order to insure its own defense, might be led to modify its attitude" 
(Gray Book, No. 15). As to the worth of this and a previous English declara- 
tion bearing on the same matter, see also "Common Sense About the War," 
by G. Bernard Shaw, in Tlie A'cn' Statesman, November 14, 1914, p. 28: 
"The apparent moral superiority of the pledge given by France and England 
to respect Belgian neutrality is illusory in face of the facts that France and 
England stood to gain enormously, and the Germans to lose correspondingly, 
by confining the attack on France to the heavily fortified Franco-Gerrhan 
frontier, and that as France and England knew they would be invited by the 
Belgians to enter Befgium if the Germans invaded it, the neutrality of Belgium 
had, as far as they were concerned, no real existence." 



544 MODERN GERMANY 

If France had really wished to adhere strictly to the neutrality 
treaties, she should have said: "We shall respect Belgian neu- 
trality, until Belgium calls on us or violates her own neutrality." 
But, as it was w^orded, the French declaration did not in fact 
offer the slightest security either to the Belgian or to the German 
government. Nevertheless, it satisfied the Belgian as well as 
the British government. The French reply was officially known 
to the German government. But the latter knew more; it 
knew that on August ist Sir Edward Grey had not only posi- 
tively refused to pledge England's neutrality in the impends 
ing war on the basis of Germany's far-reaching concessions, 
but had also refused for his part to name any definite conditions 
on which England might engage to remain neutral. In express 
terms he had declared that a German promise not to violate Bel- 
gium's neutrality was not sufficient as a condition for England 
to remain neutral.^ The fundamental difference is very striking 
between this attitude and that of England in 1870, when she 
concluded a provisional alliance with each of the belligerents 
based on the contingency that one of them violate Belgium's 
neutrality. On the present occasion the violation of Belgium's 
neutrality was to serve England only as a pretext for war. The 
German government had, therefore, to reckon with the proba- 
bility of England's intervention in the war on land and sea.^ 
That this would entail the attempt to break through into north- 
west Germany through Belgian territory was practically certain. 
The Belgian Minister at Berlin, Baron Greindl, was perfectly 
right when, in his report to his government, of December 23, 
191 1, he wrote concerning the probable development of an An- 
glo-Franco-German war: '*A British army, landed at Calais 
and Dunkirk, would not march along our frontier to Longwy in 
order to reach Germany. It would at once force its way into 
our country from the northwest; that would give it the advan- 
tage of being able to begin operations immediately. . . ." To 
guard against this contingency was of vital importance to Ger- 
many. But the strong military force requisite to cover the Ger- 
man flank on the lower Rhine would, in the opinion of our op- 
ponents, have been condemned at the start to inactivity in a 
merely defensive position along the Belgian frontier; whereas 
their absence would have at the same time considerably weakened 
the German offensive in the west. France and England could, 

1 Blue Book, No. 123. At the same time this disproves the charge that 
Germany "would have entered Belgium in any case." 

2 The correspondence of November 22 and 23, 1912, between Sir Edward 
Grey and Minister Cambon, which had long been known in Berlin, provided for 
a joint operation of the armies based on the plans of the General Staffs. 



MODERN GERMANY 545 

therefore, afford to await the deployment of the tremendous 
Russian army, and then execute a decisive thrust through Bel- 
gium. To have refrained from taking the ofFensive and making 
use of Belgian territory would in itself in all probability have 
been disastrous for Germany; in view of the added necessity of 
keeping a large force of troops in readiness on the Belgian fron- 
tier to prevent a French and English invasion from that quarter, 
such tactics would have been simply suicidal. 

After carefully considering all these points, no unbiassed 
judge will deny that Germany was in a position of extreme 
necessity. But could the violation of the neutralization treaties 
be justified by this necessity, according to the principles of inter- 
national law? Most certainly. Agreements can be binding for a 
state only so long as their observance does not jeopardize the very 
foundations of its existence. International law can never impose 
on a state the duty of committing suicide. Such, however, would 
have been the consequence here. A further observance of the 
neutralization treaties of 1839 was incompatible with the vital 
interests of Germany; consequently the treaties ceased to have 
any binding force for her. This principle has not only been 
acted upon by statesmen of all times and nations — how else 
would the breaking of "perpetual" peace treaties by new wars 
ever have been legally admissible? — but it has also been recog- 
nized by scholars in Germany, as well as by those in foreign 
countries which are to-day neutral or hostile.^ It will be neces- 
sary to quote only a few examples of the many concurrent opin- 
ions. Thus, in a verdict of the Supreme Court of the United 
State, Justice Curtis stated in 1908: ". . . while it would be 
a matter of the utmost gravity and delicacy to refuse to execute 
a treaty, the power to do so w^as a prerogative of which no 
country could be deprived without deeply affecting its inde- 
pendence." And with especial reference to the German action 
toward Belgium, even Roosevelt admits in his far from pro- 
German article in The Outlook (September 23, 1914, page 172) 
that, "When a nation feels that the issue of a contest in which, 
from whatever reason, it finds itself engaged will be national 
life or death, it is inevitable that it should act so as to save itself 
from death and to perpetuate its life." The Swiss professor of 
international law, Max Huber, has formulated the guiding prin- 
ciple in the clearest terms: 

"Just as certain legal obligations cease in common law when 

1 This recalls Gladstone's famous statement concerning the question of the 
binding force of a guarantee treaty, which Sir Edward Grey quoted in his 
speech of August 3, 19 14 (Blue Book, p. 93). 



546 MODERN GERMANY 

thej^ result in unreasonable restrictions for the contracting party 
(as, for instance, in cases of self-defense, of extreme necessity, of 
excessive civil obligations from a legal contract), just so must 
it be assumed in international law, and in this case with greater 
justification because of the peculiar nature of a state, that when 
the fulfillment of a duty is incompatible with the latter's existence, 
independence, vital interests and moral integrity, this duty becomes 
null and void, because it cannot be presumed that a state in- 
tended to bind itself for such a contingency when entering the 
obligation." ^ In conclusion, we quote the statement of Lawrence, 
the eminent English professor of international law: "Extreme 
necessity will justify a temporary violation of neutral terri- 
tory." - 

Thus the German entry into Belgium is justified in the forum 
of international law. But to justify her action Germany does 
not need to have recourse to the plea of extreme necessity, in 
recognizing the existence of which subjective factors always play 
a certain part; for long before the German ultimatum was is- 
sued, the Belgian government had already violated her own neu- 
trality obligations most seriously to Germany's disadvantage, and 
thereby herself torn down the barriers raised by the treaty and 
given Germany the right to defend herself by all means. 

IV 

It is a recognized fact that the neutralization of a state en- 
tails on it important duties. Its actions are much less free than 
those of an "accidentally neutral" state — that is to say, a state 
which does not wish to participate in a given war. What it may 
do, what it is forbidden and what it is obliged to do is disputed 
in detail. This much, however, is certain: The permanently 
neutralized state is obliged to abstain from all action which 
might possibly result in drawing it into a war waged by others. 
It may, of course, make war to protect its own neutrality, when 
this is directly threatened by a third party, but under no circum- 
stances is it at liberty to participate in an offensive campaign car- 
ried on by others. Furthermore, it must in times of peace avoid 
all actions which might possibly, in the event of war, force such 
participation upon it. No one has formulated these obligations 
more precisely than the English professor, L. Oppenheim, of 
Cambridge, in his book on Interriational Law, I, Sec. 95, p. 147: 

"A neutralized state is a state whose independence and integ- 

1 See Zeitschrift fur Volkerrecht, Vol. VII, p. 363 ff- 

2 See Principles of International Law, by Thomas Joseph Lawrence, London, 
1910, p. 609. 



MODERN GERMANY 547 

rity are for all the future guaranteed by an International con- 
vention of the Powers, under the condition that such state binds 
itself never to take up arms against any other state except for 
defense against attack, and never to enter into such international 
obligations as could indirectly drag it into ivar. The reason why 
a state asks or consents to become neutralized is that it is a weak 
state and does not want an active part in international politics, 
being exclusively devoted to peaceable developments of welfare." 

Accordingly, the permanently neutralized state of Belgium 
should not have engaged in any autonomous policy (Machtpo- 
litik) ; even the acquisition of the large Congo Colony was, from 
this point of view, open to question, because it changed the whole 
basis of the Belgian state and involved it in difficult political 
problems. In any case, it should not have become a party to an 
aggressive political combination. In doing so it grossly violated 
its special obligations and gave to all the guarantors of its perma- 
nent neutrality (including the German Empire) the right to in- 
terfere in any manner, even by war, if that should be necessary 
in view of their menaced interests. 

The Belgian government, nevertheless, did violate these obli- 
gations. Numerous discoveries, especially in the Brussels ar- 
chives, placed material in the hands of the German government 
which furnished documentary proof of an understanding between 
the Belgian and British governments, plainly not in conformity 
with Belgium's duty to preserve permanent neutrality. The 
evidence, it is true — as is easy to understand — is not yet com- 
plete. It is clear that those negotiations had to be carried on 
with the strictest secrecy, since cognizance of them would have 
called forth an immediate protest on the part of Germany. 
Therefore, even in its hurried flight from Brussels, the Belgian 
governm.ent had to find time to destroy the most compromising 
documents, or to carry them off. It is also possible that there 
was not very much written material in existence; at any rate, 
it is in conformity with English methods of recent years, when 
putting important political agreements into writing, to do so in 
the vaguest possible form. Grey was doubtless quite aware, with- 
out the example set by Napoleon III and Cavour, that an attack 
against a third state may also be arranged by word of mouth. 
In regard to the question of military cooperation, however, a 
written agreement could hardly be dispensed with, and in this 
respect the material discovered is by far the most voluminous; a 
comprehensive examination leaves no room for doubt on any 
legally important point.^ 

^ The most important documents have been collected in the publication, 



548 MODERN GERMANY 

About the middle of January, 1906, military arrangements 
were undertaken (on English initiative!) between the British 
Military Attache in Brussels, Lieut.-Colonel Barnardiston, and 
the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, Major-General Ducarne, 
which regulated in every detail a cooperation of the British and 
Belgian forces in case of war. They covered all such matters as 
the number of troops to be used by both sides; the transporta- 
tion of the British forces oversea; the places of disembarkation 
and the provisioning base; the participation of the British army 
in the advantages provided in the Belgian regulations concerning 
military requisitions in war; arrangements for the providing of 
interpreters, gendarmes, maps, illustrations of uniforms, and spe- 
cial copies of some of the Belgian army regulations which were 
to be translated into English, etc.^ Of special interest was the 
fact that the British troops, which were to be landed in Bou- 
logne, Calais and Cherbourg — that is to say, on French territory 
— were to be transported by means of Belgian rolling-stock. The 
participation of France was, therefore, provided for from the 
very first. A much later document — ^viz., a record of an inter- 
view between the British Military Attache, Lieut.-Colonel 
Bridges, and the head of the Belgian General Staff, General 
Jungbluth, on April 23, 19 12 ^ — proves the continuation of the 
military agreement; the only change made was that the number 
of men in the British landing corps had been somewhat in- 
creased. In a very extensive report, dated December 23, 191 1, 
which also fell into German hands, the Belgian Minister at 
Berlin, Baron Greindl, warned his government in vain against 
tying itself to one side of the great European combinations of 
Powers — viz., the Entente cordiale — and pointed out that it was 
placing itself practically at the mercy of this combination, al- 
though a menace to Belgian neutrality and independence was 
just as likely to come from that side as from Germany.^ He 
writes: *'The idea of an enveloping movement from the north 

Die belgische Neutralitdt, Berlin, 19 14. See also The Case of Belgium, by Dr. 
Bernard Dernburg, New York, jgiS- 

1 According to his own statement. General Ducarne "insisted as emphatically 
as possible" on certain demands, which 4isproves the English claim of the 
"academic" character of the conversations. Certainly Lieutenant-Colonel Bar- 
nardiston's statement would seem to prove that the British Ambassador and 
General Staflf must have been aware of the true nature of the "conversations." 
In further proof it is well to recall that the cover of General Ducarne's report 
bears the inscription, "Conventions anglo-belges." 

2 The correctness of the date has not been disputed by the Belgians. 

^ 3 That Baron Greindl did not refer here to a tmerely hypothetical "assump- 
tion," as M. Waxweiler apparently would fiave one believe {Belgium: Neutral 
and Loyal, American Edition, p. 191), but ^to a very^ area! danger, is proved by 
his reference to the "disclosures of Colonel Barnardiston, which are just as 
perfidious as they are naive"; to the "hue and cry in Paris and London" over 
the fortification of Flushing, and to the disclosures of Captain Faber. 



MODERN GERMANY 549 

(I.e., against Germany) is without doubt one of the combina- 
tions of the Entente cordiale/' The Belgian government con- 
tinued the military understanding with England, without at- 
tempting to make any similar overtures to Germany. It had 
simply chosen between the two groups of European Powers, 
and England took good care that Belgium should not fail her 
in the great undertaking she had in view. 

The following is of especial importance in this connection: 
In the fall of the year 19 14, German troops came into possession 
of secret military manuals concerning Belgian roads and rivers 
("Belgium Road and River Reports, prepared by the General 
Staff, War Office"), which were published by the British General 
Staff. There are four volumes, of which Volume I had been 
printed as early as 1912, Volume II in 1913, Volume III (in 
two parts) and Volume IV in 19 14. These manuals contain the 
most minute description of the country based on military inves- 
tigations. Matters of military importance are specially indicated. 
These volumes contain detailed information concerning the net- 
work of roads as regards gradients, bridges, crossings, telephone 
and telegraph offices, railway stations (giving the length of plat- 
forms, barriers, local railways, petroleum tanks, etc.). In the 
description of towns and villages the manuals always state 
whether all, or part of the inhabitants, speak French. With the 
same accuracy the whole course of the Scheldt is described, with 
all its tributaries, depths, breadths, bridges, supply of boats, etc. 
There is added: I. A survey of billeting facilities arranged ac- 
cording to communities and villages, with the number of sol- 
diers who can be quartered in each, the means of transportation 
on hand, and all the other details useful to the commandant of 
a place. 11. A collection of important hints for aviators cover- 
ing the part of Belgium south of the Charleroi-Namur-Liege 
line, and also the vicinity of Brussels. No less than 125 "possi- 
ble" landing-places are accurately described, and it is significant 
that a considerable number of these are in the immediate vicinity 
of the Liege forts.^ 

Remarks at the head of the various chapters show that the 
material for the manuals was obtained by means of special in- 
vestigations made between 1909 and July, 1914. Any one who 
carefully peruses one of these manuals will concur in the opinion 
of the German expert that "without the willing and unreserved 
support of the Belgian government and military authorities 

^ The following is an illustration from the manual, No. 91: "Five miles out 
on the east of the Aywaille road, and just north of the Fort d'Embourg, a 
very good covered landing place on grass could be prepared by the removal 
of wire fences. It is completely covered from the south by the Fort." 



550 MODERN GERMANY 

such a task could not have been accomplished. . . . The quarter- 
ing lists, which treat Belgium as if it were English soil, can only 
have been provided by the Belgian government. Without doubt, 
official Belgian material was used for this purpose. It was 
adapted for English use, or in many instances simply translated 
into English." ^ After what is known of the detailed Anglo-Bel- 
gian negotiations of 1906, this can scarcely come as a surprise. 
These secret English military manuals prove perhaps more strik- 
ingly than anything else that in military matters Belgium had 
surrendered unconditionally to the English. 

Considering how matters stood, it is not surprising that in 
the offices of the British headquarters for espionage in Brussels 
a whole packet of blank requisition forms was found, on which 
the British Embassy in Brussels had certified, with the imprint 
of its official seal, that the English spy. Dale Long, resident in 
Belgium, was a member of the British General StafiE, and was 
authorized to make requisitions in Belgium. Nor was it sur- 
prising to find in the possession of Grant-Watson, the British 
Secretary of Legation in Brussels, on his arrest, documents dated 
191 3 and 19 1 4, containing information of the most intimate 
kind concerning the Belgian mobilization, and the defense of 
Antwerp, and even a handwritten memorandum on a report of 
the Belgian Gendarmery relative to the French mobilization 
measures of July 27th. ^ Of still more peculiar interest was the 
news given by an unsuspecting English lady, in a letter dated 
July 30, 191 4, to a German acquaintance: **My son has left 
us to-day in order to join Sir John French's Staff in Belgium" 
(cf. Siiddeutsche Monatshefte, April, 1915, p. 96). 

In the face of the overwhelming amount of evidence, the exist- 
ence of the military arrangements between England and Belgium * 

1 M. Waxweiler attempts {Belgium: Neutral and Loyal, American Edition, 
p. 198) to minimize the significance of these embarrassing manuals by tracing 
them back to espionage. While it would have been possible to obtain many 
of the single points of information by successful espionage, the overwhelming 
amount of material prepared, collected and elaborated in the manuals unques- 
tionably proves the correctness of the German contentions. 

2 Among these papers were orders, issued in the form of a circular, to the 
higher Belgian commanders, with the fac simile signature of the Belgian Min- 
ister of War and of the Chief of the Belgian General Staff; and a record of 
a meeting of the "Commission for the Provisioning Base of Antwerp," held 
on May 27, 1913. 

^ Less detailed information is available at the present time in relation to 
the corresponding agreement between Belgium and France, but that there was 
an agreement is evident from the existence of the pact with England which 
is contingent on it. Besides the detailed information already given, the fol- 
lowing points are worthy of note: i, the inspection of the Belgian fortresses 
on the Meuse by the French Minister of War, General Picquart, and officers 
of the French General Staff in 19 13, which was openly mentioned in Belgian 
newspapers (see Nelte, Zeitschrift fiir Volkerrecht, Vol. VIII, p. 749) ; 2, the 
fact that several French cavalry regiments were instructed to concentrate on 
Belgian territory in case of mobilization, which was known to the Belgian 
General Staff as late as 19 13 (see Josson, Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijand van 



MODERN GERMANY 551 

has been only partly, and then but feebly, disputed by the Eng- 
lish and Belgians, some of whom ascribed to them a purely 
''academic" character. Others attempt to vindicate them by 
asserting that the arrangements were of a purely defensive na- 
ture, solely intended for the protection of Belgium against the 
anticipated German attack. This plea appears to have made an 
impression on many fair-minded people in neutral countries, 
especially in Switzerland ; and yet, in face of the above-mentioned 
facts, it seems almost grotesque, if the spirit and not merely the 
letter of the neutrality treaties is taken into consideration. 
Theoretically speaking, it is perfectly correct that a permanently 
neutral state also may enter into an alliance for the sole purpose 
of its own defense. But in the case under discussion was it in 
reality such an alliance? If a small or secondary state, on the 
basis of an agreement with a Great Power that stands in allied 
relationship to another Great Power (a neighbor of the secondary 
state), gives its ally such exact information concerning all its 
military forces, resources, places of defense — in short, concern- 
ing everything of military importance in its own territory — • 
then the first Great Power is actually placed in the position of 
military dictatorship over the secondary state. The secondary 
state is no longer in a position successfully to oppose the Great 
Power, and the far stronger Great Power can at any time 
threaten it with certain destruction and use it, with or without 
its consent, as a base of attack against its own opponents. 

The name and purpose officially given to such agreements cease 
to be of great consequence. The secondary state has practically 
surrendered its liberty of action, and the Great Power is free to 
use it for any plans of aggression it may cherish. The smaller 
state is an accurately appraised factor to be made use of in the 
military calculations of the Great Power; it is, in fact, no more 
than its 'Vassal." The Great Power may declare over and over 
again that only in the event of an "attack" on the smaller ally 
will it enter the latter's territory; in war such an attack can 
always be claimed to have been made. Besides, English history 
teaches us that when British interests are threatened, and espe- 
cially in the case of a life-and-death struggle of the country, irk- 
some treaties and stipulations of international law are for Eng- 
land worth only the paper they are written on — her action 

Vlaanderen en Wallonie (843-1913), Breda, 1913, p. 860); 3, the sworn state- 
ments of French prisoners that strong forces of French troops (among them 
the following regiments: the 5th, 21st, 28th and 30th dragoons; the 3rd and 
6th cuirassiers; the 3rd and 8th hussars; and a part of the 40th Field Artillery 
Regiment) had entered Belgium before the presentation of the Germani 
ultimatum and had been hospitably received there (see Grasshoff, The Tragedy of 
Belgium, p. 23 ff.). 



552 MODERN GERMANY 

against Malta, Denmark, Egypt and the Boer Republics, as well 
as her newest "legal" maxims of naval warfare, speak plainly- 
enough. How England had decided to proceed, especially in 
regard to Belgium, is shown by the statements made by the 
British Military Attache Bridges to the Belgian General Jung- 
bluth, in the above-mentioned interview of April 23, 1912, ac- 
cording to which the British government ''during recent events" 
(the crisis of 191 1) had resolved on landing forces in Belgium, 
even if the latter failed to call for assistance; and in reply to 
Jungbluth's objection, that to such action Belgium's consent 
would have been necessary, Bridges stated that he was aware of 
this; but that as Belgium was not in a position to prevent the 
Germans from marching through, England would have landed 
her troops in Belgium in any event.^ In reply to this, Jungbluth 
merely stated that Belgium was perfectly well able to prevent 
the passage of the Germans. The Belgian government did not 
direct any official question to London concerning this point (at 
least not according to Mr. Waxweiler's account) ; but a year 
subsequent to this. Sir Edward Grey, apparently half-spon- 
taneously, gave a reassuring explanation, which he confirmed in 
a letter dated April 7, 191 3." Asquith and Grey also declared 
in Parliament in 19 13 and 19 14 that there were, in the event of 
the outbreak of a war between European Powers, no unpub- 
lished agreements which would tie the hands of or restrict the 
government, or Parliament, in their decision whether Great 
Britain should participate in the war or not. This declaration 
may have pacified all who were ignorant of the correspondence 
between Grey and Cambon in November, 19 12, with its refer- 
ence to the plans of the General Staff of the two countries. 

The conception of a defensive alliance certainly does not re- 
quire such military Intimacy as the Anglo-Belgian : Austria and 
Italy, although united by the defensive alliance of the Dreibund, 
had not given one another such extensive military information. 
Belgium was, however, according to international law. In duty 
bound to observe an attitude of reserve toward the Entente cor- 
diale. An ordinary state may, at Its own risk, join a Great 
Power or group of Great Powers, even in the most intimate 

1 ". . . L'Angleterre aurait debarque ses troupes en Belgique en tout etat de 
cause." Whether Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges was officially authorized to make 
these statements is of no importance; of decisive importance, however, is his 
official knowledge of British intentions — intentions which were confirmed by 
the disclosures of Captain Faber and of Field Marshal Lord Roberts. 

-This letter is printed in M. Waxweiler's book, Belgium: Neutral and Loyal 
p. 196 ff. The salient point is Sir Edward Grey's statement: "I said that I 
was sure that this government would not be the first to violate the neutrality 
of Belgium and I did not believe that any British government would be the 
first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it." 



MODERN GERMANY 553 

manner; but for the permanently neutralized state to do so 
would be an abuse of its duties, according to international law. 
Would a statesman of Switzerland, which is really neutral, 
seriously contend to-day that Belgium had done her duty to- 
ward Germany before the war " d' observer cette nieme neutralite 
envers tons les autres Etatsf What would England and France 
have said to a similar Belgo-German "military intimacy"? 

It is not true that Germany "would have marched through 
Belgium in any case," and that as a result the one-sided and in 
its effect practically unconditional adherence to the Entente cor- 
diale ofFered Belgium the only possible means of salvation and 
security: the English Blue Book itself proves conclusively that 
Germany arrived at a final decision only after Grey had refused 
to give an assurance as to England's neutrality in the coming 
war, even in the event that Germany should bind herself to 
respect Belgium's neutrality.^ 

It is impossible that the Belgian government should have de- 
ceived itself as to the fact that it had joined forces with an ag- 
gressive group of Powers; for, through the Entente cordiale, 
England was drawn into the sphere of influence of the policy 
of revenge, which had never been abandoned by France; whereas, 
on the other hand, Germany was without ambitions in Europe, 
and was at the same time in the way of satisfying her require- 
ments for future colonial expansion by means of friendly agree- 
ments with England. 

The attitude (not yet known in all its details) of the Belgian 
government before the war, is perhaps politically and psycho- 
logically comprehensible, nor is this the place for moral dialec- 
tics; but what cannot be maintained is that Belgium scrupulously 
fulfilled all the obligations imposed on her by the law of nations, 
and that in the face of this the German invasion was a dis- 
graceful breach of international law. Where are the confiden- 
tial negotiations and agreements between Belgium and Germany 
which correspond to those between Belgium and England ? If this 
entire problem, which is preeminently of a political nature, is meas- 

^ A careful study of the course of the negotiations makes it difficult to avoid 
the impression that, from about July 31st on, Sir Edward Grey deliberately 
tried to provoke Germany to violate Belgium's neutrality, in order to have 
to present to the world a morally effective pretext for the war. That the 
violation of Belgium's neutrality was not the deciding factor for the leading 
men of England is proved: i, by Sir Edward Grey's promise to France on 
August 2; 2, by Mr. Bonar Law's open letter of the same date, in which he 
demanded that England go to the assistance of France and Russia, and did 
not even mention Belgium; 3, by the open statements of the English labor 
leader, J. Ramsay MacDonald, among others, that if France had similarly 
violated Belgium's neutrality, England would never have drawn the sword; 4, 
by the surprisingly frank statements of the London Times and of Lord 
Haldane. 



554 MODERN GERMANY 

ured by the standards of international law, it is clear that it was 
Belgium herself, who, from within, broke down the protecting 
rampart which treaty and international law had erected around 
her territory — leaving only a ''paper" wall standing — and re- 
placed it by military agreements with one of the two groups of 
the European Great Powers. In this way, Belgium had herself 
cleared the way for a policy of selfish interest. Belgium's atti- 
tude necessarily strengthened the position of the Entente cor- 
diale, both from a military and political point of view ; and Ger- 
many, as the enemy of the coalition, could, in the event of war, 
regard the matter only from a practical point of view, and 
ask herself whether she should leave a sure advantage in the 
hands of her enemies to make use of at their discretion, or at- 
tempt to wrest Belgium from the hostile combination by pacific 
or forcible means. 

The question, however, is asked by many: Did Germany, in 
the early part of August, 19 14, know of the secret agreements 
between Belgium and England? From a legal point of view, 
this is not the decisive point; juristically, the important consid- 
eration is rather the objective state of affairs. The crucial point 
is whether Belgium could in truth still claim consistently to have 
fulfilled her obligations of neutrality towards Germany. The 
German Imperial Chancellor meanwhile replied in the Reichs- 
tag on December 2, 1914: 

"At that time there were already many indications of the 
guilt of the Belgian government. Positive written proofs were 
not then at my disposal. . . ." 

As the remarks of the Military Attache Bridges had in part 
come to the knowledge of a number of people, and as Belgium 
was (according to Waxweiler, on p. 200) "the chosen land for 
spies of every nationality," it may be taken for granted, even 
without the statement of the Imperial Chancellor, that it was out 
of the question for the German government to have been in 
complete ignorance. The German government knew of an 
impending French advance along the Belgian frontier — the Ger- 
man ultimatum to Belgium refers to this — and it also knew, 
without doubt, that Belgium had not deemed it necessary to 
adopt adequate military precautions against such an advance; in- 
deed, this has not been seriously contended by the Belgians. 
How differently in comparison did Switzerland act after the 
outbreak of the war! 

But apparently Germany still hoped, by means of speedy ac- 
tion, to be able to prevent Belgium from taking an active part in 
the war, and did not, therefore, on account of the country*s 



MODERN GERMANY 555 

understanding with the Entente cordiale, treat it from the be- 
ginning as the ally of the latter; on the contrary, the effort was 
first made, by asking merely for free passage of German troops, 
in a sense simply to crowd Belgium aside. 

Thus the German entry into Belgium is justified from the 
point of view of international law, also for the reason that Bel- 
gium had previously violated her obligations of neutrality in a 
way menacing to Germany and favoring the Entente cordiale. 

Least of all are those entitled to inveigh against Germany for 
breaking the law of nations whose mischievous plans were 
thwarted by the rapidity of Germany's action; to them apply 
Hamlet's words: 

"For 'tis the sport, to have the engineer 
Hoist with his own petard." 



BOOK V 

THE SPIRIT OF THE WAR 



CHAPTER I 
KULTUR POLICY OF POWER AND MILITARISM 

PROFESSOR FRIEDRICH MEINECKE, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 

BERLIN 

"Nur eine auch nach aussen hin starke Nation bewahrt den 
Geist in sich, aus dem auch alle Segnungen im Innern stromen." ^ 

W. VON Humboldt. 

THE Germans are a brave people, a faithful people and a 
stupid people, so that they need harsh proofs. ... I am 
reminded of what I once heard a genial and humane Irish officer 
say concerning a proposal to treat with the leaders of a Zulu 
rebellion : 'Kill them all,' he said, 'it's the only thing they un- 
derstand.' " 

Thus writes an Oxford professor, who bears the memorable 
name of Walter Raleigh, in one of the Oxford Pamphlets en- 
titled "Might is Right." That is — so he asserts, and thousands 
of his countrymen reecho this assertion all over the world — 
the accursed motto of the Germans, as it was likewise 
the principle of the buffaloes in North America, until the hunt- 
ers came and shot them down. The Times calls us hostes generis 
humani (enemies of humankind). No pope has ever pronounced 
more terrible anathemas against heretics than England, cultured 
England, has against us. We ask indignantly why our oppo- 
nents are not content to send the huge armies and fleets of four 
Great Powers and the levies of almost all races against us and 
our allies and to fight out this war of great political and national 
interests in the manner of other similar wars in the w^orld's his- 
tory? But if England had her way, we should be outlawed by 
the whole civilized world, and every German who now helps to 
defend his home and country would see the eyes of his fellow 
creatures bent upon him in reproof and contempt, because his 
nation has committed a crime against mankind. From the depths 
of the hatred against us, from the cold cruelty, that, dagger-like, 
thrusts at our entrails, we draw the conclusion that our enemies 
wish to crush us politically to the utmost conceivable degree. 
And from that again do we draw the further conclusion that we 

^ "Only an outwardly strong nation retains that spirit from which all inner 
blessings flow." 

559 



56o MODERN GERMANY 

must exert the last remnant of our strength to maintain our 
existence as a nation. Our power of resistance will become 
stronger — a fact which our enemies seem to overlook — not 
weaker, at the sight of their hate-distorted faces. But we can 
step before the judgment-seat of mankind, to which they appeal, 
with a clear conscience. While our conscience, at all times, 
must be our chief and most severe judge, we know very well that 
there is also a verdict of history, before whose tribunal we have 
to justify our actions. It will be pronounced when the passions 
of this struggle have died away. Only future generations, not 
our contemporaries, can pronounce it. Nor do we acknowledge 
our neutral contemporaries, to whom this book is addressed, as 
our judges in the strict sense of the word, because they also are 
swayed by sympathies and antipathies, and have not as yet the 
freedom of mind necessary to pass an historical judgment. They 
are, however, before all others, fitted to prepare the way for an 
impartial verdict. We do not beg, we demand and claim as our 
due from them, a fair hearing of our cause, and the will to con- 
sider and to understand our reasons. 

There is a desire to designate this war as a war of Kultur, 
nay, even as a religious war.^ Ideas are to be combated. The 
"spirit" of our Kultur, our politics, and our militarism is con- 
jured up, and the wildest and strangest invectives are hurled 
against it. Not alone our leading statesmen are made responsi- 
ble. It is plain that the entire German nation is firm as a rock 
in their support, and from this fact the conclusion is drawn that 
the poison of a false doctrine, hostile to civilization, has spread 
through the veins of our people and infected them. Our entire 
modern history is searched for the cause of this, to prove to the 
world that amongst all the other highly respectable and innocent 
nations there is one which is a criminal and a sinner. Let us 
hear these accusations, as far as possible, in the words of the 
accusers. 

There are, or rather there were, two Germanics, a good one 
and a bad one.^ The good Germany was the Germany of Goethe 
and Kant, who was the apostle of eternal peace, and this good 
Germany had become great without the protection of might. 
The bad Germany, on the other hand, emanated from the con- 
queror state of Frederick the Great. Power was his aim, force 
and cunning were his aids, and treaties were respected by him 
only so long as they served his purposes. (How deplorable was 

* See The Prussian Hath Said in His Heart, by Cecil Chesterton, pamphlet, 
London, I9i5> P- 5- 

2 See Britain's Case Against Germany, by Ramsay Muir, Chapter III, "The 
Two Germanics." 



MODERN GERMANY 561 

it, then, must the believer in this theory immediately interpose, 
that the England of the elder Pitt made an alliance with Fred- 
erick and utilized his victories in order to conquer Canada.) 
The chasm between the two Germanics, it is said, had already 
begun to be bridged by the Prussia of 181 3, which strove for 
nobler ends than mere power. But the reactionary period after 
1 81 5 reopened it. The ideals of intellectual Germany had been 
maintained by the cosmopolitan professors, who did not regard 
the end and aim of the state as one of power, but as one of right 
and liberty. Their cultural standard, it is claimed, was higher than 
that of the state of to-day, which aims only at power, and 
which has asserted itself, thanks to Bismarck's work and Treit- 
schke's teachings. 

This present-ray state is ruled by the all-governing doctrine, 
that the state is power, that nothing is of such value in life as 
the state, that it is therefore justified in using every means to 
secure its power, and that war is a moral necessity. These teach- 
ings of Treitschke, with their "colossal immorality," ^ had poi- 
soned the soul of the German people. The other poisoner of the 
nation was Nietzsche, who had, it is true, not preached state- 
worship, but the w^orship of might." Under the influence of 
these two men, the notorious book of General von Bernhardi 
was written, which demanded the cynical war of aggression 
against England. He and his countrymen were intoxicated with 
the idea of establishing a world dominion, and at the same time 
of forcing German Kultur upon the rest of mankind by the 
sword, as Mohammed had once tried to do. But what was this 
German Kultur to-day, and what conception did the Germans 
have of civilization at all at present? Almost all Germans be- 
lieved that their civilization had reached the highest point ever 
attained by mankind, that they had nothing to learn from other 
nations, but could teach them everything.^ They had in mind 
only that exclusive Kultur which had developed in the limited 
sphere of one nation and was maintained by the sword. Kultur 
was, however, a matter of intellect; it grew by means of intel- 
lect, and was defended by it. Kultur, when associated with 
might, ceased to be Kultur, and became might, pure and simple.* 
Experience taught, so Bishop Welldon declared at a teachers' 
congress in London, that when Germans had employed the word 
Kultur during recent years, it did not signify science, education, 

1 See Treitschke and the Great War, by Joseph McCabe, p. 287. 

2 Besides the above-quoted works, see also Nietzsche and Treitschke, by 
Ernest Barker, Oxford Pamphlets. 

^Britain's Case Against Germany, by Ramsay Muir, p. 132. 

* Nietzsche and Treitschke, by Barker, Oxford Pamphlets, p. 27. 



562 MODERN GERMANY 

art, and literature — or at least only in a secondary sense.^ "Ger- 
man KultUr is organized efficiency on the largest scale." The 
immediate result was state-worship, for the state, and the state 
alone, was the organ of "national efficiency." The individual 
actually sacrificed all he had and all he was worth to the state; 
his highest duty was self-sacrifice for the state. Thus it came 
about, strangely enough, that education in Germany was valued 
not from the ethical, but from the material and physical point of 
view, not as a means of civilization, refinement and sympathy, 
but as a means of conquest. 

Without doubt, if this picture of modern politics and civiliza- 
tion were correct, the whole world ought to rise in flaming in- 
dignation, and help the English, French and Russians to quell 
the spirit of barbarism that is menacing it. But strange remi- 
niscences arise when we contemplate the various colors of this 
picture and the palette from which they were taken. "Effi- 
ciency" is a favorite word of the English; it is a product of 
English soil. The following has not been said by a German, but 
by a Swede: 

"The profound moral aphorism: 'Nothing succeeds like suc- 
cess' ... is held in reverence by the English from the peer 
down to the longshoreman. Wealth and social power are the 
objects of the success to which it refers. . . . For higher cul- 
tural attainments, such as esthetics, science, philosophy, and non- 
conventional moral talents, English democracy does not show 
the slightest appreciation. Fresh acquisitions in the sphere of 
psychic life do not, generally speaking, pertain to the success 
which succeeds in the England of to-day." ^ 

And what Bishop Welldon says of the material and physical 
character of our education must be met with a smile. "The 
simplicity of the English soul," says Steffen, "is equivalent in 
far too high a degree to a devotion to coarse, material work, 
purely physical activity, athletic feats, and recklessness." ^ We 
are of the opinion that other features of the portrait drawn fit 
us less than they fit the English. The narrow-minded and arro- 
gant belief In the unsurpassable excellence of their own Kultur, 
whose function it is to teach, not to learn, is more prevalent and 
longer established amongst the English than with us; we shall 
show that an unscrupulous policy of power has existed in Eng- 
land for centuries in practice, if not in theory. Some portraits 
by subjective painters are really self-portraits, and therefore we 

1 The London Times of January 5, iQiS- 

'England als Weltmacht und Kulturstaat, by G. F. Steffen, 1902, I, 59- 

8 Ibid.. 11, 182. 



MODERN GERMANY 563 

say also in the words of Goethe of the picture presented of us at 
this time: "Thou'rt like the spirit thou comprehendest, not like 
me I" 

We shall resist the temptation to return like for like. We 
cannot, however, refrain from pointing out some unpleasant 
traits of English character. They are manifest enough, yet the 
task of understanding the entire Kultur of a foreign people cor- 
rectly, and of classifying the profusion of forces and tendencies 
existing in it, is in itself a most difficult task — almost impossi- 
ble while enmity and passion prevail and find expression in a 
life-and-death struggle like the one raging at present. But we 
have every right to an attentive hearing when we defend our- 
selves against the distortions and misrepresentations of our opin- 
ions and ideals. We are said to have conceptions as to the rela- 
tions of Kultur, state and policy of power which are inhuman. 
Let us explain what the true state of affairs is with us. We will 
cite those opinions held by the best men of our nation and which, 
we believe, also enjoy the widest circulation among our educated 
classes. Extreme and radical views are no more lacking amongst 
us than in other nations. We do not wish to ignore them here, 
but we shall put them in their proper place and reduce their 
importance to the proper measure. 

This must be done first of all with regard to the three men 
who are alleged to be the chief teachers and representatives of 
the modern German spirit: Treitschke, Nietzsche, and Bern- 
hardi. Their influence among us is now being exaggerated 
abroad to a ludicrous degree. We do, indeed, venerate in 
Treitschke the great, pure and powerful man whose personal 
integrity even our adversaries dare not doubt, the ardent Ger- 
man patriot, the divinely inspired artist, who, with deep love and 
in glowing colors, conjures up before our eyes the men and con- 
ditions of our past. But we have never been blind to his one- 
sidedness and impetuosity. Our modern German historical writ- 
ers follow in Ranke's footsteps, not in Treitschke's. They 
share, it is true, Treitschke's strong interest in the historico- 
political problems of the recent past, but consciously strive for 
Ranke's impartiality and objectivity towards other nations, and 
they correct at every step the misrepresentations and exaggerations 
in Treitschke's historical pictures. How differently do we, for 
instance, regard to-day the Confederation of the Rhine, South 
German Liberalism, and Frederick William III of Prussia, whom 
Treitschke eulogized. It is just as great a mistake to character- 
ize his political doctrines as domineering in essence. Correctly 



564 - MODERN GERMANY 

understood, they are not in the least brutal/ They are, indeed, 
often blunt and one-sided. For the rest, they originated in a 
period which we have already outgrown. His judgment was 
moulded in the experiences attendant upon our achievement of 
national union and he sought to discover, above all, what advanced 
or hampered this union. Our political judgment of to-day is in 
many respects more liberal and milder. 

Nietzsche, who did not feel himself to be a German but a 
European, has influenced not only Germany, but the whole of 
Europe, and has been received here as well as there with both 
enthusiastic applause and pronounced opposition. The opponents 
of Nietzsche's ethics in Germany are much more numerous and 
influential than the adherents. The tree he planted has borne 
both good and evil fruit. He has seduced unstable and weak 
characters to megalomania and moral anarchy, but he has also 
strengthened the power of moral judgment by his pitiless criti- 
cism of all conventional sanctimoniousness. This may render 
him worthy of hatred by those modern Englishmen who cul- 
tivate the ideal of virtue of the outwardly correct Pharisee. 

General von Bernhardi cannot be mentioned in the same 
breath with Treitschke and Nietzsche. Neither intellectually nor 
in influence does he approach them. He is a distinguished writer 
on military matters, who thought it his duty to enlighten the 
German nation concerning its position and its task among the 
World Powers, and concerning the dangers with which Eng- 
land's envy and ill-will threatened it. He has together with this 
expounded various teachings on war of which w^e do not ap- 
prove, but which need not be taken amiss from a frank and 
straightforward soldier. We in Germ.any were highly aston- 
ished when we heard that his book, that is as yet little known 
among us, was held abroad to be the classical expression of our 
views. Just as little is it permissible to see in it the convictions 
of our leading statesmen. He shows his own dissatisfaction with 
the latter plainly enough. The tremendous edition of the Eng- 
lish translation now in circulation in America is a dishonest 
means of exciting animosity against us. We vigorously pro- 
test against the attempt to make the German government and 
the German people responsible for the opinion of this general. 
''There are militarists and jingoes in every country," says Gil- 
bert Murray, in one of the Oxford Pamphlets.^ "Our own have 
often been bad enough." We shall hear of them again. 

Let us now investigate the reproaches made against our ideals 

^ That is shown in the sober essay by Arthur T. Hadley on "The Political 
Teachings of Treitschke," in the Yale Review of January, 19 15. 
^ How Can War Ever Be Right f p. 18. 



MODERN GERMANY 565 

of Kultur and state. It is said that we overrate the importance 
for Kultur of the state, and particularly the importance of the 
great and powerful state. We overlook the fact that the civiliza- 
tion of Athens and Florence was far superior to that of the more 
powerful nations with which they were in touch politically. We do 
not overlook this fact by any means. Our science strives eagerly 
to illustrate the wonderful intellectual power and the high state 
of civilization of these municipalities, and our German travellers 
study the beauty of Greek and Florentine art perhaps with more 
earnestness and devotion than the herds of English tourists who 
are driven through the museums by their guides and who disturb 
the reverential silence. But can the Kultur of these city-states 
be understood at all without the strong political impulses that 
animated them ? Did not Athens at the time of Pericles pursue 
an imperialistic policy, and is it an accident that Machiavelli was 
a Florentine and a contemporary of Leonardo? The heads of 
Bramante in the Brera in Milan and of Castagno in Florence 
illustrate the ideal of virtu w^hich Machiavelli set up — the ideal 
of political and martial heroism. The various expressions of life 
of the cultural and the civic community must not be regarded 
separately ; they exist under a perpetual interchange of reciprocal 
influence, the full extent of which can be divined by its various 
symptoms rather than clearly recognized. It is true that the Ger- 
many of the eighteenth century is a remarkable instance of the 
development of a high national culture in a nation politically 
powerless, rent by strife and on the whole a stranger to state- 
craft. That is the example of which we are now con- 
tinually reminded by our enemies, to bring home to us that 
we would do better to seek our greatness in intellect rather 
than in power. But do they by any chance set us a good ex- 
ample? Are they ready to sacrifice even an iota of their power 
and unity to serve Kultur f They desire to retain the one just 
as much as the other, and we do not think any the worse of them 
for it, for they may be justly proud of their national Kultur, 
which has blossomed in the storms of mighty struggles. Through 
Shakespeare's historical dramas sweeps the wind that dispersed 
the Armada, and the century of Louis XIV, which brought such 
bitter misery to our people, gave to French intellect its incom- 
parable clearness, elegance, and suppleness, and moreover the 
sovereign courage to dictate to the world not only the laws of 
taste, but also the laws of the state and civic society in the 
''declaration of human and civic rights." We have, it is true, 
like England, refused to acknowledge the universal validity of 
these French laws for civilization and politics, but we are not 



566 MODERN GERMANY 

blind to the greatness of these national conceptions. And it Is 
quite clear to us that England, as well as France, by the early 
foundation of their national and political union and power, have 
created a firm basis for their civilization that has given to them, 
and furthered, their aristocratic assurance, steadiness, self-reli- 
ance and perfection of form. To-day we are painfully aware of 
these advantages of our adversaries, because they are turned as 
weapons against us. The hollow phrases, commonplaces, and 
half-truths which they hurl against us, have a mundane polish 
and style and a sovereign confidence of victory, by which they 
make a much stronger impression on the rest of the world than 
our more homely arguments. 

The defects in our Kultur have their origin in great part in 
the fact that we did not attain to political union, power and 
self-consciousness until very late. Our people were so long 
obliged to live in narrow, straitened, and poor circumstances 
that we still feel the effects to-day. But we are proud that the 
genius of our nation, relying only on its own strength, has worked 
its way up out of this constriction without the aid and support 
of a great political life. We cheerfully agree with our adver- 
saries that Kultur does not originate only in the state and does 
not have to rely exclusively on the alliance with political power. 
When Klopstock, Winckelmann, and Lessing began their careers 
they followed the innate and powerful impulses of their souls, 
Vv ithout knowing or feeling anything of state and power. It is 
inherent in the nature of true Kultur, that it springs spon- 
taneously and independently, again and again, from the vai-ious 
impulses and needs of the human mind, and that art, science and 
religion each lay down their own laws for themselves and resent 
as tyranny every law imposed by other forces. Yet they are 
independent only in what they strive for ; the strength which in- 
spires their efforts has its root in the community, and in this 
again all the faculties and institutions of the political, social, 
economic and intellectual life work together. Any one who is 
unable to grasp clearly this co-existence of dependence and inde- 
pendence in the various branches of historical life will never un- 
derstand the true relationship of Kultur and state to one another. 

The aim of genuine Kultur is not to be a single province of 
human life ; it must permeate life completely, including the state 
itself, which it must raise to be a valuable cultural factor. 
And, conversely, the true state is aware that its power is, in the 
last analysis, founded on a spiritual basis. It cannot regulate 
the working of the spirit; it cannot and should not by forcible 
means impress Kultur, which it needs for the completion of its 



MODERN GERMANY 567 

power, into its service. Kultur must help the state voluntarily, 
and it can and will do so because its own needs impel it thereto, 
and because it will receive valuable gifts in return from the state. 
Therefore it is in the long run an unnatural and unhealthy con- 
dition, if one great branch of national life flourishes while the 
other withers. Of course, we must beware of setting up hard 
and fast rules. It is absolutely false to declare that master- 
pieces of the mind can be produced only in a great and powerful 
national state, or that great military victories and triumphs of a 
nation will necessarily promote the progress of intellectual cul- 
ture. Where Kultur lacks fertile soil of its own, no sunshine of 
political power and greatness will help it. And yet even a little 
of such sunshine can be infinitely valuable to it. Nor was it 
lacking in the first beginnings of our German literature of the 
eighteenth century. 

"The first real and higher essence of life," Goethe tells us in 
his Dichtung und Wahrheit, "was infused into German poetry 
through Frederick the Great and the events of the Seven Years' 
War. All national poetry must be shallow, or become so, if it 
is not based on the most human of foundations, the deeds of the 
nations and of their leaders when both stand united for one 
man." 

And Ranke, whom Muir contrasts with Treitschke as "the 
apostle of unbiassed history," says the same thing: 

"This much, however, is certain, that no other phenomenon 
contributed so much to the self-reliance which accompanied this 
soaring of our great spirits as the life and fame of Frederick 
the Great. A nation must needs feel self-reliant and independent 
if it is to develop unhampered, and literature has never flour- 
ished without being prepared for by the great events of history." 

The unintentional and involuntary service rendered by Fred- 
erick the Great's policy of might to German intellectual life was 
not requited at the time ; the latter did not place itself at the dis- 
posal of state interests, but followed its own paths, which led 
toward the highest idealism, of mankind. In this cosmopolitan 
manner of thought of our great poets, we of to-day do not by 
any means see, as foreign nations seem to assume, any aberration 
from or infidelity to the nation, but a great historical necessity. 
With the aid of that cosmopolitan thought, the German intel- 
lect freed itself from the pettiness of the social and political con- 
ditions of the time, and gained the strength for a complete and 
unconditional solution of certain problems of life. The state 
of national disunion brought with it the one advantage, that 
jnany centers and seats of culture were formed, and the develop- 



568 MODERN GERMANY 

ment of individual diversity was furthered. Small states, like 
great ones, may be beneficial to the promotion of Kultur, but 
all such effects are indissolubly connected with time and place 
and distinct phases of development. Our adversaries of to-day 
play with the idea that it would be a service to German Kultur 
if Germany were reduced to her former state of political impo- 
tence and harmlessness. They apparently believe that the Ger- 
man bird sings best when it is imprisoned in a cage, but they 
would open their eyes wide with astonishment if the same method 
were to be prescribed for them. The cosmopolitan Kultiir of 
Goethe and Schiller, Kant and Wilhelm von Humboldt was a 
glorious but transitory flowering — and the fruit which resulted 
from it was the German Kultur of the nineteenth century, with 
its national tendency, which has helped to build up the German 
Empire. Our adversaries, who play off the good Germany 
against the bad, the unpolitical against the military Germany, 
have not the faintest idea how closely and intimately these two 
Germanics are united nor how necessary was the progress from 
one stage to the other. Toward the end of the eighteenth and 
the beginning of the nineteenth century was the period when 
German Kultur began to turn toward the state for the sake of 
its own completion. 

The fundamental ideas of German idealism had already led 
to a higher evaluation of the state and the nation in which the 
individuals were living, and German idealism laid stress on the 
worth of the individual as a unique source of human beauty and 
strength. A further step was soon taken, and it was recognized 
that states and nations were also great historical individualities. 
It was seen that one state had this, the other that, character, and 
each was found justifiable, because it had grown individually and 
according to its own laws of development. 

The Romanticist Novalis was an enthusiastic admirer of the 
Prussian military state of his time — and that, be it noted, was 
before 1806! He called the state the embodiment of all activity, 
and he made the daring statement: "All Kultur emanates, to- 
gether with the state, from the given conditions." We modern 
Germans believe that this goes too far, and exaggerates the 
value of the state for Kultur, If we were to make use of this 
ingenious sentence of the greatest dreamer among the German 
Romanticists, the venerable Bishop Welldon would lift up his 
hands in horror at our fanatical admiration of the Moloch which 
is called State. We will, however, disclose to him the secret that 
the enthusiastic veneration of the state on the part of the German 
Romanticists at that time was largely drawn from English 



MODERN GERMANY 569 

sources. The reflections of Burke, on the French Revolution, 
wherein he glorifies the state as the union of all that is beautiful, 
good and divine in man, had a deep influence on German national 
feeling. 

When this began to develop in the first decade of the nine- 
teenth century, it was not alone esthetic but also ethical motives 
that turned German idealism toward the state. The moral law 
of the categorical imperative, which the state set up, demanded 
action and work, and devotion to the common weal. Fichte, in 
sublime manner, taught a philosophy of action which was destined 
to found a new ideal state. And just at that time misfortune 
overtook Germany and the old Prussian state crumbled to dust. 
What Germany had to sufiFer under Napoleon's scourge still vi- 
brates in our hearts to-day and strengthens our will to do all in 
our power to prevent the return of such misfortune. But more 
vivid even than the memory of shame and humiliation in our 
minds, is the memory of the truly wonderful alliance of the 
German spirit with the Prussian state which was concluded for 
the salvation and regeneration of Prussia and Germany. The 
Prussian state of 181 3, rejuvenated by liberal and humanitarian 
ideals, probably still enjoys the esteem of our adversaries. They 
do not know it well, however, if they believe that it was more 
modest and unselfish in its policy of power than the Prussia 
and Germany of Bismarck. The Prussian statesmen who rep- 
resented Prussia at the Congress of Vienna were not more mod- 
est than their honorable colleagues in Europe, Metternich, Cas- 
tlereagh, and Alexander I, who were so well able to look after 
the aggrandizement of their states. Precisely those Prussian 
statesmen who were most deeply imbued with the thoughts of 
Fichte and Kant demanded most vigorously at this period the 
annexation of Saxony by Prussia, and Fichte himself, in 1813, 
wished that the King of Prussia would become the enforcer of 
German nationalism {''Zwingherr zur Deutschheif') . 

We must, therefore, establish the fact that the doctrine of 
the "two Germanics" which is at present being expounded in 
England is not correct. It is incorrect that the "tame" Germany 
of 1800 was swallowed up by the "savage" Germany of Bis- 
marck. On the contrary, the "tame" Germany very early showed 
a most serious inclination toward the "savage" Germany and 
entered into a voluntary and happy union with it. Certain rem- 
nants of the cosmopolitan idealism of the eighteenth century 
remained alive in the Kultur and the political views of the edu- 
cated classes in Germany for a long time, until they were swept 
away by the work and teachings of Bismarck. Let us regard 



570 MODERN GERMANY 

these boldly, without shrinking. Not as embittered accusers, 
but as calm and just judges, and historians, let us regard more 
closely that terrible phantom of the "policy of power" {Macht- 
politik) with which Bismarck's name has been coupled. How 
can one drag Bismarck to the prisoners' dock without at the 
same time subjecting the policy of all the other great modern 
Powers to just as severe examination? We seem to be dream- 
ing when we hear the English (of all people precisely the Eng- 
lish!) now declare that Bismarck and his successors in Germany 
pursued an especially relentless and unscrupulous policy of power. 
What else have they themselves done for centuries? By force 
and lawlessness, the commercial privileges of the Hansa were 
crushed by England during Queen Elizabeth's reign. With 
brutal force England fell upon Holland in the seventeenth cen- 
tury, violated Danish neutrality, and in 1807 captured the de- 
fenseless Danish fleet. 

"The various countries and peoples of the earth," recently said 
the Norwegian, Knut Hamsun, "have not gone to England 
and asked to be taken over by her. The connection between 
these countries and the mother-country is the result of force." ^ 
Was the England of the nineteenth century milder and more 
moderate? By what right did she keep Egypt? By what right 
did Jameson break the peace in South Africa in 1896 and start 
on his filibustering raid, to the great satisfaction of the widest 
circles of English society? And truly not love of right, but 
auri sacra fames, incited the English to suppress the liberty of the 
Boers. "No doubt," says Mr. Egerton, "in the making of the 
British Empire, as in other human transactions, things have hap- 
pened that one may wish might have happened otherwise." ^ If 
he had only honestly and conscientiously disclosed the full extent 
of these "things." Others of his Anglo-Saxon countrymen were 
more honest prior to the war. No less a person than Lord Rob- 
erts said: "How was this Empire of Britain founded? War 
founded this Empire — war and conquest." And in the book, 
"The Day of the Saxon," by the American, Homer Lea, we read : 
"The brutality of all national development is apparent, and we 
make no excuse for it. To conceal it would be a denial of 
fact. ... In just such a manner has the British Empire been 
made up from the fragments of four great maritime Powers, the 
satrapies of petty potentates and the wilderness of nameless sav- 
ages." 

1 In the newspaper Tidns Tegn, January, 1915- 

^ Is the British Empire the Result of Wholesale Robbery? 19 14 (Oxford 
Pamphlets) . 



MODERN GERMANY 571 

' In this war, in which England poses as the guardian of inter- 
national law, she tramples upon it when it suits her interest to 
do so and when she hopes to escape with impunity. She oppresses 
Egypt and violates the treaties regarding the Suez Canal; con- 
trary to the tenets of international law, she sinks a German 
auxiliary cruiser in the neutral port of Rio del Oro, on August 
29th, for which act the New York World, of January 11, 1915, 
takes her to task, saying: "To keep certain supplies out of 
Germany England has terrorized innocent neutral commerce. To 
use her great sea power against an enemy with the utmost effect, 
she has not scrupled even by caprice to bring disaster upon a 
friend. When remonstrated with, she pleads necessity, which in 
war knows neither friends nor law." The Brazilian paper, Tri- 
huna, of December 4, 1914, asks: "Are we an English protec- 
torate?" and states that a Brazilian ship sailing from one Bra- 
zilian port to another was stopped and searched by a British man- 
of-war in Brazilian waters. 

Cunning and force the English declare to be the chief features 
of the modern German policy of power. The greatest and most 
effective cunning that a policy of power can employ is to conceal 
its claws and, as Machiavelli says, ''appear all pity, all faith, all 
humanity, all honesty, all piety." And the worst and most 
disgusting form of force that an unscrupulous policy of power 
can use is that of violating the truth. In this kind of cunning 
and in this kind of force England is simply unmatched. There 
are, indeed, as we have seen, honest Englishmen who despise 
hypocrisy, but the official British policy and the British people 
will not relinquish it. England uses it with more art even than 
Machiavelli advises. Machiavelli was still naive enough to 
assume that the prince who lies and dissembles in public would 
be conscious of his lies in his heart of hearts. The average Eng- 
lishman, however, has done away with even this ethical impedi- 
ment to his hypocrisy, which now and then might cause incon- 
venient stings of conscience. He raises in his soul an air-tight par- 
tition between the sphere of his will and the sphere of his 
emotions. He believes in his humanity, whilst he acts like a 
beast of prey. He is told that this is infamous hypocrisy. He 
hears these voices, but either he ignores them totally, because he 
firmly believes in his virtue, or he meets the accusation with a 
slight concession and thus quickly salves his conscience. 

''Sometimes," says Muir, significantly, "England has played 
the hypocrite. But hypocrisy is the tribute paid to virtue, and 
except when it is the lie in the soul, it is preferable to the kind 
of truth which the Great King (Frederick H) cultivated; for at 



572 MODERN GERMANY 

least it recognizes the claims of a standard of conduct higher 
than that of the jungle." ^ These words prove that the lie has 
become indeed "the lie in the soul" with the English. 

The charge, however, that the Prusso-German policy of power 
of Frederick the Great, Bismarck and Treitschke knows no 
higher law than that of the jungle, we reject absolutely. It is a 
verdict inspired by hatred, animosity and historical short-sighted- 
ness, and not by just, humane and historical understanding. All 
three of these were men of high morality; they were grim ene- 
mies of base egotism and were animated by the high ideal to 
live and die for their country. But this ideal, we are told, was 
false, exaggerated, inhuman, because its consequences and appli- 
cation in the policy of power are inhuman. It was not inhuman, 
for it emanated from a strict, truthful and courageous concep- 
tion of life and its moral duties. Everything now depends on 
understanding this point correctly, for the most serious of the 
accusations against us revolve about it. The answer which 
German statesmen and thinkers of modern times are wont to 
give to the question of the relation between politics and morals, 
we must make clear and justify. 

The laws of morality, charity and of the sacredness of treaties 
are eternal and inviolable, but the duty of the statesman to look 
after the present and future welfare and safety of the state and 
the nation entrusted to his guidance is also sacred and inviolable. 
What, then, if a conflict between these duties should arise? Or 
are conflicts between moral duties not possible? Only shallow- 
minded people, or fanatics estranged from the world, or con- 
temptible hypocrites can deny this possibility. Every true trag- 
edy teaches us the awful fact that our moral life cannot be regu- 
lated like clockwork, that the purest striving after good may 
lead to painful issues and terrible conflicts. In the life of na- 
tions conflicts between private morality and the interest of the 
state are simply unavoidable, and are as old as history itself. His- 
torical experience, as well as our own conscience, teaches us with 
overwhelming force that the statesman can, in such a case, act 
only according to the maxim: Salus populi suprema lex esto. 
This was the idea which Bismarck meant to convey in his maxim 
that "political egotism is the only sane foundation of a great 
state." The British statesmen, who have created the great 
British World Empire by force and cunning, may also refer to 
this principle in justifying their stand. We are very well able, 
with our historical understanding, to put ourselves in their place 
and sympathize with the weight of obligations to their people 

1 Britain's Case Against Germany, Ramsay Muir, p. 76. 



MODERN GERMANY 573 

under which they acted. One glance Into our historical litera- 
ture on England, from Ranke's masterpieces to the works of 
Marcks, Michael, Stahlin and others, shows that we are able 
and willing to write the history of the formation of the British 
Empire without hate and malice, with calm understanding, even 
with admiration. We by no means maintain that the British 
Empire is solely the "result of wholesale robbery," although a 
good deal of robbery has taken place. But there are bounds to 
the policy of power and state egotism which must not be over- 
stepped, and where the justification of an unavoidable conflict of 
duties ceases to hold good. 

These bounds consist in this: that a state must not seek to 
acquire more power than is necessary for its absolute security 
and the free development of its national energies. It is clear 
that these bounds do not form a mathematical line, that the 
judgment of the actors and that of posterity may vary as to 
whether they are being overstepped in a particular case or not. 
But there are brutal and obvious transgressions as to which no 
doubt ought to exist in historical judgment. We take it to be a 
particularly brutal transgression, for instance, that the English 
put an end to the liberty of the Boer states, which presented no 
danger to them, for the sake of acquiring gold fields which were 
to increase England's vast wealth still more. And the sacro 
egoismo of the Italians became blasphemy at that moment when, 
without urgent cause, they fell upon their allies, in order to rob 
and strangle them. Bismarck's history may be searched in vain 
for similar outrages of the policy of power. He wanted to put 
an end to the unbearable misery of the Bundestag under which 
Prussia and Germany were suffering, and to found a strong 
national state secure in its existence — no more and no less. 
There can be no goal more sacred and just for a great and cul- 
tured nation to strive for. If hypocrites abroad reproach him 
for having relentlessly used force and cunning to attain this goal, 
we demand of them to investigate with equal severity the actions 
of the liberal statesman Cavour, who had to accomplish the 
same task for his people. It will be found that Cavour was 
just as high-handed and cunning, and rn some measures even 
more relentless and revolutionary than Bismarck. After his ob- 
ject was achieved, Bismarck declared Germany to be "satiated," 
and warned himself and his successors against every "abuse of 
the acquired power." He warned especially against the ways 
"in which the first and second French Empires, in a continuous 
policy of war and prestige-seeking, had brought about their own 



574 MODERN GERMANY 

downfall." ^ He differentiated most carefully between a sound 
policy of interest and an aggressive policy of prestige, and this 
diiferentiation we Germans have thoroughly assimilated. Macht- 
politik, in the German sense, has nothing in common with a 
policy of prestige, lusting for war. It wishes to be sensible and 
measured in its aims, but if it cannot be done otherwise, will 
strive for these aims with all possible energy, and will stake the 
full strength of the nation on their accomplishment. 

One of these aims for which we are now fighting, Bismarck 
bequeathed to us. It is of a thoroughly defensive nature. It is 
the maintenance of Austria-Hungary as an independent Great 
Power. For this aim, as he says, in his Gedanken und Erinnerun- 
gen, a German statesman may, if need be, draw the sword with 
a quiet conscience. We have acted accordingly, and so would 
any other state have acted in our place. It is one of the worst 
perversions of the truth of which our adversaries are guilty, to 
have misrepresented Austria's self-defense, when she was in bitter 
extremity, against the subterraneous intrigues of Pan-Slavism and 
of the Greater-Serbia agitators, as a war of wanton aggression 
against a small nation. This small nation was in truth as dan- 
gerous to Austria as a submarine is to a battleship — and Russia 
hastened to its aid, not to protect a small nation, but to cut her 
way to Constantinople with the sword. Whoever cannot appre- 
ciate the position of relentless and pressing extremity in which 
Austria and Germany were placed, is unable to judge historical 
events objectively and scientifically. 

The contention will be maintained abroad that Serbia and 
Russia had natural and justifiable interests to defend. Although 
we are of the opinion that they violently exaggerated these in- 
terests and overstepped the bounds of a sound policy of power, 
we at once admit that this question is open to discussion and 
that a Russian or Serbian may judge of it differently than we do. 
We could also imagine that a disinterested foreigner might be of 
the opinion that this M^as an unavoidable collision arising from 
the depths of the imperative national state-interests of the two 
parties concerned. Similar judgments have already been passed 
on many of the great wars in history, but even in such a case 
the question must always be asked whether a greater desire for 
expansion did not exist on the one side than on the other. We 
do not doubt that the judgment of posterity will be that Russia 
and Serbia wished to weaken, if not to ruin, Austria; and that 
Austria and Germany were forced to defend themselves. 

Perhaps future ages will say that the collision between Ger- 

^ Gedanken und Erinnerungen, Chap. 26. 



MODERN GERMANY 575 

many and England was also absolutely unavoidable, because on 
both sides ambitions were fostered which could be decided only 
by the sword. Treitschke believed in a future settlement of 
accounts between England and Germany, not because he wished 
to replace the British world-empire with a German world-empire, 
but because he foresaw that England would oppose her superior 
power to Germany's just and moderate claims.^ He was quite 
right In his opinion that England, swayed by her instincts of 
world monarchy would not like to see any Power rise, even if it 
represented no more than a potential danger to her at some 
future time. Had France and not Germany been victorious in 
1870-71, France would have become, or rather have remained, 
England's arch-enemy. 

As early as 1877 Salisbury declared Germany to be England's 
most dangerous future enemy,- and a whole school of English 
publicists have endeavored since the nineties to plant this idea 
in the heart of the British people. We mention Boulger, who 
has now with triumphant satisfaction collected his anti-German 
articles written since 1898 in the book entitled England's Arch- 
Enemy. We refer the reader to the statements of the English 
jingoes and militarists which the honest pacifist Norman Angell 
presents in an instructive chapter of his book, Prussianism and 
Its Destruction (Chapter HI, The Prussian Within Our 
Midst). We recall Professor Cramb's lectures on Germany and 
England, delivered in 191 3, in which he seeks, not without in- 
genuity, and at the same time with determined energy, to pre- 
pare the British people for the struggle against Germany. More 
bluntly than he, Emil Reich states in his book, Germany's Swelled 
Head, first published in 1907, that the antagonism between Ger- 
many and England was of exactly the same kind as that between 
Athens and Sparta, Rome and Carthage and England and France 
in former times. "The Germans," he says, "are bound to strive 
for more expansion, for imperialism. They are simply bound to 
do soj" From that he draws the conclusion: "If Germany 
wants to attack England, England ought to attack her long be- 
fore.'' He openly and unhesitatingly advocated the most ruth- 
less preventive war against Germany. 

What else has the much-reviled Bernhardi done than to main- 
tain the right of the statesman, "under certain circumstances to 
begin at an opportune moment a war which is deemed neces- 

1 "The unreasonableness which lies in every attempt at world dominion finds 
its revenge in the fact that the imperishable idea of nationality is manifested 
in the various states with a certain degree of one-sidedness" (Treitschke, 
Politik, Vol. II, p. 527). 

^England's Arch-Enemy, D. C. Boulger, London, 1914, p. 10. 



576 MODERN GERMANY 

sary" ? It does not meet with our approval that the general has 
laid down this doctrine. If it is embodied in the political cate- 
chism of a government and of a nation, it can easily lead to a 
weakening of the feeling of serious moral responsibility and to a 
frivolous breach of peace. Of course situations may arise in 
which the danger of war is so indubitable and manifest that one 
may feel forced to strike the first blow so as not to be over- 
powered. But whoever advocates preventive war in theory, 
induces in practice an abuse of the ultima ratio. The case is 
similar to that of the right of revolution. When the French 
National Assembly of 1789 included the right of resistance a 
Voppression in the general and civil rights of man, the great 
Irishman, Burke, proved with overwhelming arguments that it 
thereby destroyed the innermost foundation of political life. 
And yet he recognized at the same time that chaotic upheavals 
and elemental hurricanes might occur in the life of a state, when 
it was imperative to do what the welfare of the whole state, and 
not what formal right, demanded. 

Bismarck flatly repudiated the doctrine of a preventive war, 
and our present Imperial Chancellor has emphatically expressed 
the same opinion. The aim of our policy with respect to Eng- 
land was to avoid war with her, if this could possibly be done 
with honor. Why should the Anglo-German antagonism not 
have subsided in time, in the same way as the Anglo-Russian 
antagonism, which twenty to thirty years ago often hovered on 
the verge of war and yet invariably calmed down again ? Nego- 
tiations were being carried on between us and England shortly 
before the war, concerning an adjustment of our trans-maritime 
spheres of interest, which were near a settlement entirely satis- 
factory to us, and which awoke in us the pleasant hope that Eng- 
land no longer intended to suppress with brutal force the natural 
and legitimate growth of our industries, our commerce, our 
colonial requirements and our fleet. The wish of our govern- 
ment was also the wish of our people. This fact, indeed, is now 
recognized here and there in England: 

"Such is the German national ambition — to become a world- 
power, by peaceful methods, if possible, but to become a world- 
power! That the bulk of the German people prefers peaceful 
methods is the most obvious truism ever stated." ^ 

But — so this author continues — it is not the masses who de- 
cide, but the militarists, whose exponent is General von Bern- 
hardi. This opinion is refuted by the history of events leading 

1 The Nations of the War. Ed. by L. G. Redmond-Howard, London, 19 14. 
Vol. Ill, "Germany and the German People," p. 107 ff. 



MODERN GERMANY 577 

up to the war and by the unanimous instinctive conviction of the 
whole nation that this war has been forced upon us, that It Is a 
defensive war In the highest sense. Only with such a conviction 
was It possible for our pacifist Social Democrats to rally round 
the colors to a man. We do not deny that It Is part of our policy 
of power to carry on with the greatest energy possible a war 
that has been forced upon us. Ought we to have waited pa- 
tiently till the English and French entered Belgium, took posses- 
sion of our unprotected Rhenish provinces and our arms factories 
in Westphalia, and attacked our main armies in the flank? We 
were firmly convinced, and we have been confirmed In that con- 
viction by the documents found later, that this danger actually 
threatened us. 

It Is mere pharisaIsm to reproach us for our march into Bel- 
gium. One needs only to put one's self In our place In order 
fully to realize what adversaries were about to attack us, what 
terrible dangers were menacing our very existence and our fu- 
ture; it will be easy to understand that we preferred to violate 
a European treaty which, as was discovered later on, had already 
been violated by the Belgian government and by England and 
France. It is vile calumny to ascribe to us the brutal maxim 
that Might is Right. If we fostered It and lived up to it, we 
should act not only brutally, but also foolishly and short-sight- 
edly, for without respect for the sacredness of treaties no nation 
can prosper.^ But there Is also a sacred right of self-defense. In 
the execution of which that unavoidable conflict of duties arises 
when one must act according to the principle of salus populi su- 
prema lex. 

That is the spirit of German policy of power and of our con- 
ception of it. We do not think nor act more harshly or more 
arbitrarily than others — but we do think more straightfor- 
wardly and more truthfully than the others. Here is a differ- 
ence between our way of thinking and theirs which should long 
since have been apparent to any student of the historical and 
political literature of Germany and of other countries. It was 
Ranke who taught us to honor truth and to regard states as 
living personalities, animated by vital impulses and desire for 
power ; they are all proud, covetous of honor, and egotistical, but 
no one of them is like the other. They are individualities, each 
resting on ''special principles of existence," w^hich develop in the 
course of centuries, as the result of all the political and cultural, 

^ "A state which would on principle hold loyalty and faith in contempt would 
be constantly menaced by enemies and would, therefore, not be able to attain 
its object of becoming a physical power" (H. von Treitschke, Politik, II, p. 544)* 



578 MODERN GERMANY 

material and Intellectual forces and characteristics of the particu- 
lar nation. It Is unavoidable, he teaches us furthermore, that 
these Individualities of exuberant strength should, when they move 
and stretch, come Into conflict with each other, now in peaceful 
competition, now in trials of strength by w^ar. That Is the judg- 
ment of historical realism Avhich accepts the policies of states as 
they are, not as they might be according to humanitarian ideals. 
This truth-loving, sober realism of ours has often been taken 
much amiss in other countries; the Englishman especially, who 
is accustomed to hide his ruthless policy of power behind the 
deceptive mask of humanitarian Ideals, Is Indignant when we 
show him the true face of things. The British do not direct their 
attacks against Ranke, but against Treitschke; they overlook the 
fact that Treitschke expressed only with more passion and pathos 
what Ranke had previously said. Ranke added another thought 
that has perhaps borne more fruit on German soil than on that 
of other countries. He taught us to comprehend the meaning 
and logic of a great Machtpolitik, He said : 

''The history of the world Is not that chaotic working at cross- 
purposes, pell-mell strife and haphazard succession of nations 
which it seems to be at first sight. . . . What we see in process 
of development are forces, spiritual, life-giving, creative forces, 
individual lives themselves, moral units of energy. . . . They 
blossom forth, fill the world, manifest themselves in the most 
multifarious forms, war with one another, restrict and over- 
power one another. In their mutual Influence upon each other, 
In their sequence, In their existence, their disappearance, In their 
resuscitation to a continually increasing potency, higher signifi- 
cance and greater extent, lies the secret of the history of the 
world." 

Regarded from this lofty point of view the egotism of states 
and nations takes on a different significance. It becomes the 
means for the development of all the latent forces In mankind. 
The history of the world Is the development of* state Individuali- 
ties, and the moral energies inherent In them decide whether they 
flourish or perish. The present war exhibits tremendous moral 
energies on both sides. On both sides one ought to regard this 
spectacle of utmost exertion of power from that high viewpoint, 
which, setting aside hatred and animosity, strives to understand 
the value and result of this universal energy. This energy gives 
us the assurance that none of the adversaries will entirely crush 
the other, and that the wealth of individuality In which the 
world of to-day abounds will not be diminished. It Is the most 
stupid of all the calumnies directed against us to say that we 



MODERN GERMANY 579 

intended to found a world-dominion like that of the Romans, 
and to force our Kultur on the conquered nations. Our histori- 
cal convictions and our cultural ideals are based on the concep- 
tion of a multifarious co-existence of free, strong states, nations 
and systems of Kultur. We fully agree with that sentence in 
the declaration of the French universities which runs as follows: 
**The French Universities continue to believe that civilization is 
not the work of one single people, but of all the peoples, that 
the intellectual and moral riches of mankind are created by the 
natural variety and the necessary independence of the qualities 
and gifts of all the nations." Not the French mind, but the 
German mind, has been the first to grasp this great truth. It 
originated in the days of Herder, Fichte and the German Roman- 
ticists. "Only as each nation," says Fichte, addressing the Ger- 
man nation, "when left to itself develops and moulds itself ac- 
cording to its individual traits, does the deity appear in the 
national mirror." 

Into this mirror we of to-day look with the same faith and 
the same emotion as the Germans of a hundred years ago. The 
great artists and poets of other countries know quite well that 
nowhere outside their native countries are they received more 
joyously and more gratefully than in Germany, and that espe- 
cially the Kultur of the smaller nations, whose suppression we 
are said to plan, excites our deep interest, as our reception of the 
w^orks of Ibsen and Maeterlinck, not to mention others, amply 
proves. We have occasionally gone even somewhat too far in 
our preference for foreign literature, and this has now and again 
caused a reaction of national sentiment which has not always ex- 
pressed itself with great taste. Every great people nowadays has 
its nationalistic extravagances; arrogant and exclusive admira- 
tion of their own Kultur is not wanting either in England or in 
France. Every nation possesses the natural and justifiable wish 
to assert the worth and the ideals of its own Kultur and to dif- 
fuse them in the world, because only free competition and the 
influence of all varieties of national Kultur upon one another can 
produce that all-embracing feeling for world and humanity, 
which must lie like gossamer over the atmosphere of our struggles. 

We want to receive and give at the same time; we also want 
to think and act at the same time, and enrich the one process 
by the other, without violating any one's right of property. Kul- 
tur is certainly a servant of the state, and the state is a servant 
of Kultur, but both Kultur and the state have also an inner life 
of their own, which is not absorbed by the service of the other. 
We do not think for a moment of selling our independent cul- 



58o MODERN GERMANY 

tural needs and the Inner freedom of our mind to the state, 
when we freely devote our service to it. Our ideals embrace 
both personal liberty and devotion to the whole. This combina- 
tion is one which our enemies cannot and will not understand. 
And yet, only he who really endeavors to understand it can form 
a just opinion of what is called our "militarism," almost the 
worst charge raised against us. 

The historical origin of our army is far too little known in 
other countries. It is a far too one-sided view to trace it back 
to the old Prussian army of Frederick William I and Frederick 
the Great, with its Iron discipline and the aristocratic esprit de 
corps of its officers. The character of the Prussian army was 
greatly changed during the period of reform after 1807 by 
Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Boyen, the disciples of German 
Idealism and Kantian ethics. They made laws that breathed the 
spirit of respect for human dignity, and which were to make 
service in the army a moral duty for all and an act of the highest 
patriotism. They introduced compulsory military service In or- 
der to make Prussia — at that time the smallest and most exposed 
of all the Great Powers — strong by means of the spirit and the 
utmost exertion of all the moral energies of the nation. This 
idea has retained its full vigor and vitality up to the present 
hour. "Kant was quite right," a soldier wrote us from the 
front; "and In every private of our glorious popular army there 
is, unconsciously to himself, a good deal of Kantian ethics to be 
found." Since these ethics, which have emanated from our in- 
tellectual Kultur, have become an inner link In our national 
army, our militarism has become part and parcel of our Kultur. 

It Is comprehensible that this spirit of devoted national ideal- 
ism and personal enthusiasm of the individual stands out more 
clearly, more brilliantly, more splendidly in time of war than In 
time of peace. The barracks and drill grounds in time of peace 
give but a one-sided picture of our army. This schooling in 
peace Is severe, monotonous and dry, nor can It be otherwise 
because its purpose Is to bring discipline and technical training 
to the highest degree of perfection. It is also harsh at times, 
and it were better if many a word used on the barrack-ground 
had been left unsaid. Cases of maltreatment occur which we 
deplore. They are perhaps just as frequent In other armies, but 
the foreign press, Inspired by Information from England and 
France, has for years been in the habit of exaggerating every 
case of maltreatment that occurs in our country, and of sys- 
tematically depicting our army system as contemptible. We are 
working hard in our country to put a stop to such Isolated cases 



MODERN GERMANY 581 

of maltreatment, and our most intelligent officers have the mat- 
ter at heart. When General von Moltke recently read the letter 
of a Greek physician, in which the latter referred to cases of 
maltreatment in the German army in time of peace, he wrote: 
"Unfortunately it is not to be denied that deplorable excesses 
committed by some brutal individuals have occurred. I hope it 
will be one of the salutary consequences of the war that the Ger- 
mans will have learnt to respect the human being in every 
one whether equal or subordinate, and that such deplorable acts 
will entirely disappear from the army." 

The tendency of modern development will undoubtedly do 
away with this remnant of past ages. There is no better testi- 
mony of the spirit that animates our army, even in time of peace, 
than the love for and pride in his old regiment which lives in 
every soldier who has served. He cherishes the memory of it 
during his whole life. A vast number of veterans' societies, in 
which the former soldiers meet on a friendly social footing, are 
scattered throughout Germany. If a regiment which is garri- 
soned in a small town celebrates a jubilee, it is a popular festival 
for all the inhabitants as well. 

The popular nature of our army is by no means inconsistent 
with the peculiar esprit de corps of our officers. Some harsh 
traits may cling to the latter body which might be dispensed with 
as a remnant of by-gone times, but in its inmost nature it is sound 
and indispensable. It provides the army w^th leaders of uni- 
form moral views, strict integrity, unselfish devotion to king and 
country, and a chivalrous conception of life. It is one of those 
corporate counterpoises to the too great individualisation and 
*'atomisation" of modern Kultur. It is desirable and necessary, 
not only in the army, and has often had to be created elsewhere, 
with great difficulty, by the cooperative association of men be- 
longing to the same profession. In the army it is the immediate 
result of natural and vital development. The strict line of de- 
marcation between officers and men is adhered to for reasons of 
military expediency, not of arrogance. It is the mildest of thd con- 
ceivable and possible means of maintaining the discipline and sub- 
ordination absolutely necessary in an army. In armies where such 
a line of demarcation is wanting, punishments are more frequent 
and more severe than with us. Our soldier knows that it separates 
him from his superior only outwardly, not inwardly. On the 
battlefield and in the trenches one spirit of devotion, of mutual 
hearty confidence, and of heroism, animates leader and soldier 
in peril and death. Any one who has seen the relations be- 
tween officers and men at the front will cease to regard our 



582 MODERN GERMANY 

militarism as a mechanical drill of obedient menials. He will 
find warm human feeling, human faith, and human greatness at 
every step. 

Foreigners will perhaps reply to this: What you describe as 
the spirit of your militarism is the expression of certain national 
peculiarities, not all of which are congenial to us, but which we 
must not begrudge you, as you will not part with them. But 
your militarism has become an international danger because it 
has encroached on civil life, because it has militarized all your 
people outwardly and inwardly to such a degree that they must 
seek an outlet in foreign conquest. This view is that of enemies 
who realize they have to deal with a dangerous and strong ad- 
versary, who is not to be beaten by a levy of troops from all parts 
of the world. But were we not obliged to be prepared for such 
a levy, since England had begun to regard with hostile envy our 
growing economic prosperity and our fleet created for the pro- 
tection of this prosperity? Were we not in former times always 
in an unusually dangerous and cramped position between the 
great military Powers, France and Russia ? ^ Can we forget what 
we have suffered through our former defenselessness since the 
days of the Thirt}^ Years' War? It is nothing else but stern 
necessity that forces us to develop a maximum of military power. 
It is the only safe guarantee of our independence. 

Why is the accusation not directed against France, who exacts 
still more from her population than we, who was the first to 
begin and to cause the competition in armaments between the 
great European states by the increase of her army in 1886, and 
who has always kept it alive by her policy of revenge? Why is 
not Russia, who has created a vast army for the purposes of her 
notorious thirst for conquest, also accused? And why is Eng- 
land forgotten, England that has developed the most extreme 
form of militarism at sea, and who has, against the w^ish of all 
other nations, successfully stood for the maintenance of its most 
inhuman theory, viz., the right of capture at sea? Compared to 
the right of capture at sea, all the little harshnesses of Prussian 
militarism are insignificant. England is now reaping what she 
has sown. Our submarines, sinking her merchant vessels, are 
forced to act on the principle : A corsaire, corsaire et demi. 

We have a right to be deeply embittered by the malevolent 
calumnies of our adversaries, but we will not close this chapter, 

1 This fact is now recognized by impartial foreigners. The former Dutch 
Prime Minister, Van Houten, says: "Germany has until the present day been 
the victim of French militarism in that until 1870 France's efforts were 
always directed with success at preventing Germany from attaining complete 
development of power through tmity. France was always supported in these 
efforts by Russia" {Das Grossere Denitschland, Dresden, February, 1915)' 



MODERN GERMANY 583 

which is to assist neutral nations to understand our motives and 
opinions, with words of hatred and bitterness. Great civilized 
nations that are at war with each other, dishonor themselves 
if they regard their adversaries solely with the eye of hate, and 
do infinite harm to mankind if they seek to cut off the roots of 
freedom and independence. There is great difference in the 
aims which we pursue in the war and those of our adversaries. 
We do not for a moment think of dictating in future to our 
French, English, and Russian adversaries the extent of the arma- 
ments which they consider necessary for the maintenance of their 
honor and independence. Our own bitter experience in the days 
of Napoleon I has taught us what such an encroachment upon 
the autonomy of a Great Power means. It is the worst attack 
imaginable against national liberty. And yet our adversaries, 
who insist on liberty with such fervor, revel in the idea not 
only of depriving us of our colonies and our border-territories, 
but also of rendering us permanently impotent from a military 
point of view, just as the Philistines rendered Samson powerless. 
Such extravagant desires emanate from a spirit of policy of 
power, with which we have nothing in common. The expedient 
of rendering the adversary permanently defenseless originated in 
the armory of the world-monarchy. The Romans and Napo- 
leon I made use of it. But the trend of modern European his- 
tory, which is directly opposed to that of ancient history, does 
not lead to a world-monarchy, but to the full, rich life of strong 
nations which do not brook any attempt at world domination. 
Absolute sovereignty at sea is also a species of world domination 
which cannot be tolerated and must collapse sooner or later. 
England is fighting against the spirit of modern development 
when she attempts to uphold by force her claim to be sole mis- 
tress of the seas. The position of England as a World Power and 
as a civilized nation, which we honor and recognize, will not 
suffer if the principle of the balance of power, which she has 
hitherto sought to confine to Europe, is extended to the ocean 
and to the whole world. Then only w^ill every nation have the 
breathing space it requires. The day will come when Germany's 
decision to take up the defensive war against England and to 
fight for the freedom of the seas will be acclaimed by all. 



CHAPTER II 

THE WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 

PROFESSOR ERNST ZITELMANN, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 

BONN 

TO speak of the war and International law involves three 
questions : What has been the aim of international law 
in this war? How far has it stood the test? What is going to 
become of it? Its past, its present, its future — this we shall deal 
with briefly from the German point of view.^ 

International law, especially the law of war, which concerns 
us here, is the fruit of centuries of labor. Particularly during 
the last decade has its development been pronounced and prom- 
ising. All civilized nations, Germany as well as her present 
opponents, have helped to build it up. Czar Nicholas II, in 
his peace manifesto, suggested the First Hague Peace Confer- 
ence, and the terms ''Declaration of Paris" and "Declaration 
of London" preserve and honor the memory of the services ren- 
dered by France and England. We were proud of what had 
been accomplished. Statesmen and scholars spoke of interna- 
tional law as of one of the highest achievements of modern civ- 
ilization; we felt justified in regarding as a blessing to mankind 
the fact that the mutual relations of states were no longer to 
be determined by the arbitrary dictates of force, but by fixed 
rights and duties. We found, therefore, in the attitude of an 
individual state towards international law, in the manner in 
which it respected and observed the law's commands, an im- 
portant criterion of its civilization, of its worth as a civilized 
state. Indeed, we only regarded that state as civilized which 
adapted itself to the rules of international law. 

Herewith is by no means implied, however, that this is the 
final and most important standard by which to judge the con- 
duct of a state in its relation to the outside world. Legal pre- 
cepts are not the highest laws governing human life; they estab- 
lish merely a minimum of obligations, and within the limit thus 
drawn, other forces, above all moral forces, should be active. 
Just as an individual in his private life may keep within the 

1 The following essay was finished early in March, 1915, and makes use 
of such facts only as had by that time become known. The fundamental view 
has remained unchanged. 

584 



MODERN GERMANY 585 

bounds of the law and may yet act basely and contemptibly, so 
likewise may the state. In the life of states, too, there are moral 
obligations, obligations of honor and decency. To be lacking 
in gratitude, to break faith, even where no written alliance 
exists, to desert a friend in the hour of need or to betray him^ 
to attack the defenseless in a treacherous manner, to sacrifice 
high possessions of mankind to petty personal gains: all this 
may not be a violation of international law, but it is much 
worse — it brands the state before the highest tribunal, the tribunal 
of moral conscience. The view is sometimes encountered, it is 
true, and it is not a novel one, that for the state there are no 
moral obligations; that besides the legal tenets, a state is bound 
only by the law which its own advantage prescribes; indeed, 
the opposite view is almost scornfully derided as being out of 
touch with the world of realitj. This standpoint is justified 
only if the binding force of moral norms is denied also for 
the individual; but if it is recognized for the individual, the 
logical conclusion is inevitable that moral norms exist equally 
for the state. We need not decide here whether, and to what 
extent, the moral laws governing a state differ from those which 
concern the individual. The reproach of being out of touch 
with the world applies, in reality, to this negative doctrine. It 
is blind to the palpable existence of a public conscience. One 
example is sufficient. The question whether or not a state may 
go to war is not a question of international law. A state does 
not act against international law by going to war, even without 
the shadow of a reason, unless bound by special treaties not 
to do so. Yet perhaps nothing at the outbreak of a war occu- 
pies public opinion so much as the question which state is re- 
sponsible for the war. This question lies exclusively in the 
sphere of morals; it is asked whether a state was morally jus- 
tified in declaring war, or whether its motives were base and 
reprehensible. How heavily the weight of this moral judgment 
is felt is proved in every w^ar by the fact that each party to 
the conflict does his utmost to prove his own innocence and the 
enemy's guilt; it is moral condemnation which the state shuns, 
even though it may not have violated any tenet of law. 

A state, therefore, has by no means reached the highest point 
when it can say only that it is observing the provisions of in- 
ternational law. Yet even this we used to look upon as some- 
thing of an achievement. We thought our possession in inter- 
national law important, and we hoped to attain much through 
its medium — it was to contribute towards the realization of 



586 MODERN GERMANY 

high ideals of humanity. But finer distinctions must be made 
at this point. 

Everywhere in international law it Is a question only of the 
duties and rights of states in their relations to each other. These 
duties and rights are of twofold origin. On the one hand, they 
are laid down in abstract legal rules, based on the development 
of legal custom and treaties. Even though only a number of 
states — not all of them — may have taken part in the creation of 
these rules, they may yet be termed "general international law," 
for they arise from general considerations, applying equally to 
all individual states, and should, therefore, be universally bind- 
ing. Or else the rights and duties of states rest on a special 
regulation of Interests by treaty between certain states. These 
two kinds of law are of unequal value. The special regulation 
is the result of a concrete situation relative to the power and 
interests of these particular states ; the obligations into which the 
Individual state enters in this relation are to the interest of the 
other state only, and not to the interest of all states in general. 
Hence such treaty agreements may change, they may cease, new 
ones may originate, without affecting the interests of the world 
or universal law. Only those stipulations are within the range 
of general law, which refer, In the first place, to the genesis of 
such agreements — that is to say, to the prerequisites of their valid- 
ity; in the second, to their binding force as long as they hold 
good ; and finally, to the manner in which they may terminate. 

The general provisions of international law, however, with 
which alone we are here concerned, do not aim to serve the 
particular interest of individual states. They serve higher pur- 
poses, viz., the interests of all states, and therefore the interests 
of all mankind. The state is the legal form In which a nation 
seeks to realize Its ideals of life. It is not an end in itself but 
a means to this end. The individual state, however, Is not 
alone in the world, there are others beside it. And the Ideals 
which every individual state has to realize, harmonize fortu- 
nately to a great extent with those of other states: there are 
common state Interests, on the one hand, and there are interests 
of mankind, on the other. To serve these is the aim and pur- 
pose of general International law. 

This international law Is based primarily on the fundamental 
idea of "equality": the individual states, without regard to their 
size, their position and their resources, are supposed to be equal 
before international law, to enjoy equal rights. International 
law thus aims to be a protection for the weaker states; might is 
not to be greater than right. On this basis, international law 



MODERN GERMANY 587 

alms at assisting the states in peace time to attain peaceful ends 
common to them all, which, however, the individual state acting 
for itself could not attain at all, or only imperfectly. Inter- 
national law furnishes the rules governing the collaboration of 
the several states for the purpose of attaining these ends, it 
creates in this respect a "union of interests" {Zweckverband) 
of states. 

On war, too, international law strives to exert a regulating 
influence, though war in itself would seem to break all legal 
rules. Everlasting peace was not to be hoped for. This dream 
of noble minds was bound to be shattered by stern reality. The 
task of international law^ was, as far as possible, to prevent war, 
but if it should break out, to humanize it. The object of every 
war is the overthrow of the adversary; but without prejudice to 
this object, it can still be restricted in the interest of humanity. 
The laws of war are throughout a compromise between what is 
necessary for attaining the object of the war and what humanity 
demands. 

The first aim is to prevent an unnecessary extension of the 
war beyond the circle of the Powers directly engaged in it. 
Accordingly, rules concerning the rights and duties of neu- 
trals have been laid down. Similarly, the so-called Congo Act 
was conceived as a means of excluding a large part of the Afri- 
can colonial possessions of the belligerent states from the theater 
of war, since it could not fail to be evident to every state that 
to carry war into the colonies would be detrimental to the com- 
mon interest of the dominant white race, without in any w^ay 
affecting the issue of the war. The limitation imposed by the 
Congo Act would have benefited all European states alike. 
Germany was ready to adhere to it; but England, disregarding 
the obligation she had entered into, precipitated hostilities in 
Africa. 

Furthermore, international law aims at limiting the war in 
regard to the persons engaged. It is the supreme idea of the 
laws of war that the conflict should be waged solely between the 
states, through their armies and navies, not by and against indi- 
vidual citizens. Two principles result from this. One is, that 
individual citizens may not fight against the hostile state unless 
they belong to the army or navy. A state which tolerates or 
even encourages the mischief of the "hedge war" {franctireur 
war) grossly offends against this fundamental principle of inter- 
national law, and necessarily brings immeasurable harm down 
upon the population. No one can have any doubt whatever that 
the participation of private individuals in hostilities against a 



588 MODERN GERMANY 

modern army is without influence on the outcome of the war. 
The losses that can be inflicted on the enemy are too small to 
be of consequence, considering the huge size of modern armies; 
but their inevitable result is that they call forth frightful retri- 
bution. For the resulting sufferings and horrors no one can be 
held legally responsible save the state that tolerates or encour- 
ages the participation of its citizens. 

The second conclusion is that the state may vs^age war only 
against the foreign state itself — that is to say, against the army 
and navy, not against peaceful individuals. Through the labor 
of centuries this principle has ripened more and more into the 
noblest fruit of international law. It has already been reaHzed 
by the regulations relative to war on land, which provide that 
life, freedom, honor and property of non-participant citizens must 
be unconditionally protected, as far as military exigencies per- 
mit; plundering is forbidden, and the individual must be indem- 
nified for what is taken from him for military purposes. We 
were justified in praising this principle as one of the noblest 
victories of humane sentiment. In naval warfare, it is true, 
the inviolability of private property, even if it is not to serve for 
military purposes, has not yet been recognized. At the Hague 
Conference, Germany, with other great states, declared her readi- 
ness to recognize this principle; owing to England's opposition, 
it came to naught; and thus to the present day right of capture 
at sea is tolerated by international law. It is the last remnant 
of a barbarous viewpoint which we had hoped to be able to 
abolish in a not too-distant future. 

On war as it is carried on between the armies and navies 
international law has sought to impose restrictions. The ob- 
ject of war can be attained even if the cruelties formerly 
practised are avoided. Proceeding from this idea, the Geneva 
Convention was concluded, which purposed to ease the lot of 
the wounded and sick of the armies in the field; this was ex- 
tended to include naval warfare. Regulations were drawn up 
for the treatment of prisoners of war which were prompted by 
the clear and humane consideration that war captivity is not 
penal custody; the prisoner in serving his state has only done 
his duty, he has done what the enemy state expects its own 
citizens to do. The ends of war are sufficiently served if, by 
being kept in custody, the prisoner is prevented from aiding his 
country; more than this is not called for. 

Finally, international law has endeavored, by a number of 
separate provisions, to restrict the means of warfare. There are 
warlike actions which are doubtless injurious to the enemy, 



MODERN GERMANY 589 

but the advantages of which are out of all proportion to their 
cruelty; they are therefore forbidden. Included in this category 
is the prohibition of using bullets which cause unnecessarily cruel 
wounds (the so-called dum-dum bullets). 

This is the substance of the ideas of international law, roughly 
sketched and considered more with regard to broad outlines 
than to detailed provisions, which are as yet imperfect and but 
slowly developing. If merely that which has so far been 
built up as international law were really observed, war would 
still be terrible enough; nevertheless, without prejudice to the 
political purposes involved, it would be more humane, and an 
infinite amount of suffering would be prevented which has no 
influence on the issue of the w^ar. 

Naturally, however, there was no overlooking the fact that 
the realization of this hope was uncertain. International law 
of all existing law is the weakest. Its weakness, to begin with, 
lies in the nature of its origin. The substance of international 
law as above described is only slowly developing and growing, 
the elaboration in detail of the principles is often uncertain and 
controversial ; only in parts has the law as yet assumed definite 
form. This will be discussed more fully later on. Secondly, its 
weakness lies in the means of its realization. International law 
purports to regulate the relations of independent, sovereign 
states. There is no organized power to enforce its observance, 
there can be none. Even if an impartial court existed, competent 
to decide what is right or wrong in a dispute touching interna- 
tional law, and even if the individual states had pledged them- 
selves to appear before this court and to submit to its verdict, there 
would yet be no means of compelling them to do so. If a bellig- 
erent state does not keep within the bounds of international law, 
if it infringes the law, the injured state has no other means of 
coercion than such as it can itself enforce. This is what is 
called reprisals : in international law the principle is unchallenged 
that a breach of the law may be returned by a breach of the 
law, that wrong may be answered by wrong. On this point, 
too, we shall have more to say later on. Nowhere else in the 
legal sphere does this principle exist. It is explained by the 
fact that there is no coercion possible against a state. 

There are people, not only in Germany, but also abroad, who 
from this have drawn the conclusion that international law is 
no true law. This is a mistake. More and more modern science 
recognizes that compulsion by a superior power is no inherent 
characteristic of a legal precept. Here is not the place to en- 
large on this; it may even be regarded as superfluous, for after 



590 MODERN GERMANY 

all the question is merely theoretical. In reality no one denies 
that international law — whether it be true law, or whether it 
be unworthy of the name — has nevertheless binding force. And 
because we admit this binding force, we feel in conscience and 
honor bound to respect it. At the same time adherence to its 
precepts is a demand of practical wisdom, provided a state is not 
thinking merely of the advantage of the moment, but is pursuing 
a far-sighted policy looking towards the future. International law 
does not aim at the advantage of an individual state, but at that 
of all states ; what it gives to one, it also gives to the other ; what 
it takes from a state in limiting its free scope, it returns in the 
form of increased protection. The more keenly the moral duty of 
observing this legal order is felt and the more clearly its bene- 
fits are realized, the more secure is international law as a living 
force. 

This, however, implies at the same time a restriction of the 
validity of international law. Though it is a moral duty to 
observe international law, that duty may yet cease to exist: 
all law of nations breaks down in the case of necessity, a neces- 
sity from which there is no escape within the bounds of the law. 
International law is not an end in itself, its aim is to coordinate 
the existence of the states. The moment the very life of a state 
is threatened and its existence cannot be saved except by a breach 
of the law, the inhibitions of the law cease. To adhere to 
the law in the greatest of danger and not to seize upon the last 
means of salvation because of an obstruction of international 
law, would he to commit suicide. The law cannot demand 
suicide. The question becomes a purely moral one, transcend- 
ing all legal points of view. No state has ever regarded and 
treated, or will ever regard and treat, the matter otherwise. 
This refers in particular, but by no means alone, to treaty obli- 
gations which one state has entered into with other states. Such 
was the position of Germany in relation to Belgium at the out- 
break of the war. As is well known, Germany undertook 
scrupulously to respect the integrity of Belgium, as well as of 
the French territory on the Continent, and to spare the north 
coast of France, provided England would undertake to remain 
neutral. Not only did England reject this proposal, but Sir 
Edward Grey, in reply to the urgent request of the German 
ambassador, as to whether he could not give the terms on which 
England would remain neutral, replied he must definitely de- 
cline to make any promise of neutrality, England must keep 
her hands free. From this moment Germany could no longer 
doubt that, besides Russia and France, she would have to face 



MODERN GERMANY 591 

England in the Impending war. Thus arose the emergency in 
which deliverance could be found only in the violation of Bel- 
gium's neutrality. The action of Germany, who only demanded 
free passage through Belgium, was therefore justified, even if 
we leave out of consideration the fact that Belgium herself had 
already renounced her privilege as a neutral by grossly violating 
the duties of her position as such. Concerning this, however, it 
is unnecessary to say more. The matter is cited only by way of 
example, not for excuse or apology. 

In admitting the plea of necessity, it is true, great care must 
be exercised. A case of necessity can be pleaded only when 
the state has really no other means of helping itself than by 
the breach. If there are other means at hand, a plea of neces- 
sity cannot be put forward. That is obvious, and it is equally 
obvious that needless cruelties, needless fury, needless destruc- 
tion can never be justified by necessity. Necessity is an excuse 
only for an action which is required in order to save oneself 
from danger; the action must be necessary for the purpose of 
self-preservation. 

This effect of necessity is not peculiar to International law; 
it exists In all law. It exists in civil law, as well as in criminal 
law, it exists even in the law that regulates the constitutional 
life of a nation — it expresses the limitation of validity Inherent 
in all law. But It is of particular importance In International 
law. In the clash of interests In private life there is still the 
state, standing above the individual. Its duty is to watch over 
the general Interest; it can therefore, in the case of necessity, 
weigh the conflicting interests and, having weighed them, deny 
the individual the right of necessity in certain circumstances, just 
as it can demand the life of the individual — e. g., the life of the 
soldier in war — realizing that life is not the highest of posses- 
sions. But with states it is otherwise. Whether In this case 
the supreme and most important interests of the state are at 
stake, whether therefore the state is justified in breaking the 
law — this the state concerned must decide for Itself, since there 
is no superior court, no superior power. Here the law of neces- 
sity fully asserts itself with all Its primitive force. The well- 
known "clause of honor" of the arbitration treaties (under which 
all disputes involving the vital interests, the honor or the Inde- 
pendence of the state are excepted from arbitration) rests on 
the same idea, which is the source of the law of necessity. 

Such discussions border on the ultimate problems of thought. 
The validity of international law, in the last resort, is rooted in 



592 MODERN GERMANY 

values of a higher order, whence it derives its strength and, at 
the same time, its limitation. 

Despite all these restrictions, despite the uncertainty of its 
sources, despite the weakness of its realization, international law 
has yet one advantage over all other law. It takes precedence 
of all laws on account of its immense and unique range, ad- 
dressing, as it does, all states, that is to say the whole of man- 
kind, and striving to reconcile the most stupendous conflicts of 
interests. Further, it is entitled to precedence on account of 
the moral elevation, the pure humaneness of the aims which it 
pursues. 

How often has all this been announced at international con- 
gresses ! With what enthusiasm has it been acclaimed ! Par- 
ticularly in Germany the appreciation of the value of interna- 
tional law was steadily growing, as was only natural in view 
of the German character, which is fond of cultivating inter- 
national relations. Just as the Germans endeavor to appropri- 
ate the masterpieces of all literatures by translations, just as 
they have a liking for the study of foreign languages, and 
as they are perhaps the most travelled of all the peoples of 
the world, so they have always, often beyond the immediate 
need, expounded the idea that above the individual states there 
is a higher community, a community of civilization. The era 
of peace maintained by us for more than forty-three years, often 
with difficulty and at the sacrifice of our pride, has witnessed in 
Germany an enormous increase in the work of promoting inter- 
national relations in all spheres of life — economy, sociology, 
science, art, religion — and in particular of law, in the province 
of which, as history shows, a large part of the intellectual en- 
ergy of Germany for centuries has been occupied. The en- 
deavors to consolidate private law, to create a "world law," 
have been the subject in Germany of theoretical research and 
practical advancement; the great attempts to find by scientific 
methods uniform principles of international private law for all 
nations of the earth, have in the last century emanated chiefly 
from Germany; and Germany has joyfully assisted in the 
Hague discussions concerning a consolidation by treaty of this 
department of law, hand in hand with the other great civilized 
nations, whose merits we have gladly recognized. Above all, 
has the law of nations in a growing measure received loving care 
in Germany, as an almost endless literature on the subject shows. 

At each of the numerous universities in the German Empire 
there are one, or in some cases, several chairs of international 
law. Again and again, particularly in the last decades, the Fed- 



MODERN GERMANY 593 

eral governments have insisted that special attention be devoted 
to the study of international law. Nobody in Germany can 
be a member of the legal profession or enter the administration 
of the state without having passed an examination in this sub- 
ject. And not only with statesmen and scholars has interna- 
tional law found this consideration, but even in the minds of 
the people at large the consciousness of its value has increased. 
It is only natural that the masses are not so keenly interested 
in this branch as in other parts of the law. The greatest and 
most immediate interest is always claimed by relations of private 
law, which daily obtrude themselves on the attention; interest 
is further aroused by penal law in the repression of crime, and by 
public law through the development of the internal affairs of the 
state; comparatively seldom does the importance of international 
law, as affecting the personal relations of individuals, make itself 
felt in peace time. But unremitting informative work in this 
regard, too, has gradually awakened and strengthened the recog- 
nition by the masses of the importance of international law. 
This is of the highest value, for law is a live factor only when 
supported by the consciousness of the whole nation: the activity 
of statesmen can, in the long run, be only the expression of that 
which the nation desires. 

Such was the condition of international law up to the summer 
of last year. What a picture do we now behold in the World 
War! Is it really more than a heap of ruins that we have 
before us? A disastrous confusion seems to have taken root 
abroad in the heads of otherwise high-minded men ; one is tempted 
to feel that in certain circles the moral value of international 
law has not been grasped at all. Breaches of the most estab- 
lished principles of international law have been advocated quite 
openly in foreign newspapers and speeches. A man like Wells 
has publicly preached the "franctireur w^ar" against Germany in 
its most appalling form; Clemenceau has demanded a treat- 
ment of the wounded Germans in France which would be a 
violation of all international law. However, words are not 
deeds. Let us dismiss these overheated outbursts, and look 
only at the facts. There also a sad picture of devastation is 
revealed. It is not our task here to enumerate in detail all the 
offences against the rules of international law committed by our 
enemies, still less to defend Germany against the charges made 
against her by the foreign press, and even by foreign govern- 
ments. There would be nothing gained in doing so, unless com- 
plete evidence in support of and against the charges were given, 



594 MODERN GERMANY 

and that is not possible here; besides, it has already been suffi- 
ciently done in other works (see especially Der Welthrieg und 
das Volkerrecht, by Miiller, Berlin, 1915). We shall here 
try only to find certain leading principles by which matters 
can be judged, and we shall make use of specific cases only by 
way of example. 

All violations of international law are divisible into two great 
groups: either a rule of international law is broken by action, or 
its very validity is denied. 

To begin with actual infringements of the law, in cases 
where the validity of the law is nevertheless recognized. The 
infringement of a legal norm by no means implies in itself a 
denial of the rule's validity; it proves only that the conception 
of the binding force of the norm is not strong enough to triumph 
over the motives that prompt to its infringement. When a 
thief steals, he thereby breaks the law respecting property, but 
he does not deny its validity, he breaks it although he recog- 
nizes its validity. 

In judging the significance of actual breaches of international 
law, a distinction must be made, as to whether they are com- 
mitted by individuals or whether they emanate from the state 
itself. By breaches of international law by individuals are to 
be understood acts contrary to international law which are com- 
mitted by individual soldiers or subordinate officers, or by offi- 
cials not in a commanding position. In accepting this definition 
theoretical hair-splitting must be discarded. For, strictly speak- 
ing, there is no such thing as a violation of international law 
by an individual, for the rules make the state, not the individual, 
directly responsible for legal duties. But the state issues to its 
soldiers and officials injunctions and prohibitions in accordance 
with international law, and if the individual disobeys these in- 
junctions and prohibitions, he indirectly acts contrary to inter- 
national law. Breaches of the law by individuals happen every- 
where in private and public life; it is easy to understand that 
the laws of peace have a better chance of being observed than 
the laws of war. In war there are many circumstances condu- 
cive to infringements of the law. The soldier must act 
promptly, he is often given no time for thought, the circumstances 
are frequently obscure, and errors are possible. Adding thereto 
the power of temptation, the heat of passions unchained by war, 
and the difficulty of drawing the line between what is justified 
by the necessity of war and what is contrary to law, one will 
find it easy to understand why transgressions occur. Nor should 
too great weight be given to an individual act, considering the 



MODERN GERMANY 595 

enormous number of men employed in war — up to this time 
mankind had had no experience whatever of the consequences 
w^hich arise when armies of millions take the field. All these 
are reasons which permit of attaching minor importance to 
breaches of international law by individuals, however deplor- 
able and sometimes even atrocious they may be. 

That international law is nevertheless recognized as valid, 
despite its breach by individuals, is shown especially by the fact 
that the state to which the perpetrator belongs almost always 
endeavors to deny the breach of the law. It either denies that 
the alleged infringement happened at all — as, for instance, dis- 
claiming that the Red Cross was fired upon, that the flag of 
truce was abused, that houses were plundered, non-participant 
citizens wounded, ill treated, dragged into prison, or killed — 
or it is claimed that conditions prevailed which divested the 
deed of an unlawful character — as, again, that an open town 
which was fired on had been defended, that a truce bearer who 
was made prisoner had by espionage forfeited protection. The 
controversy thus shifts into the sphere of facts. There is no 
impartial tribunal above the states concerned that could ascer- 
tain the truth in strict justice, and passions make bad judges. 
Our government has gone out of its way to ascertain the truth 
of accusations against our enemies by taking evidence on oath, 
with absolute calmness and impartiality, in the same manner as 
crimes committed within the state are investigated, and the re- 
sult is bad enough. I refer only to the atrocious deeds perpetrated 
at Orchies, which have been proved and the proofs of which have 
been published by our Foreign Office.^ Nor has our govern- 
ment shirked trouble in investigating alleged breaches of law 
by Germans, whenever the allegations were not, as they usually 
were, merely sweeping condemnations, but statements of spe- 
cific single acts, with date and locality clearly indicated. 

Following the legal maxim ^'ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, 
non qui negaf (proof is incumbent upon the accuser, not the 
defendant), Germany might have waited till the other side had 

1 This refers to atrocities committed by French franctireurs at Orchies, in 
the Department du Nord, described in an official war telegram as follows: 
"In the village twenty Germans who had been wounded in the engagement of 
the previous day were found mutilated in a ghastly manner. Their ears and 
noses had been cut off and their mouths and the openings left after the 
removal of their noses, stuffed with sawdust. They had then been left to 
die from suft'ocation." The correctness of the report was confirmed by two 
French clergymen over their signatures, and as further substantiation there 
exists a report made to the German Emperor by the chief of the field hos- 
pital work, Sergeant-General von Schjerning. A punitive expedition was sent 
by the German forces to Orchies, which was razed to the ground. The case 
was presented in a very different light in the allied press, which said that 
the Germans, without provocation, had destroyed the village in a barbarous 
manner. This took place in the latter part of September, 19 14. 



596 MODERN GERMANY 

disclosed Its proof — the French government has not up till now 
seen fit to publish proofs of the serious charges brought by it — 
but the German government in the interest of the good repu- 
tation of our army has not rested its case there. Unquestion- 
ably on the German side, also, regrettable occurrences have 
taken place. Despite the severe discipline which has always 
prevailed in the German army and is traditional with the German 
soldier, it is impossible that among the millions of Germans in 
the field there should not be some who commit brutal acts. 
But what our soldiers have been accused of by the enemy has 
on closer investigation nearly always been found to be pure in- 
vention, and the inquiry on our part has been carried through 
by means of evidence on oath with every assurance of impar- 
tiality. Often enough the depositions of the enemy subjects 
themselves have shown the alleged facts to be pure fabrication. 
Sometimes they were creations of a fancy heated by war, an 
imagination grown hysterical; at other times exaggerations of 
insignificant little incidents passed from mouth to mouth, and 
sometimes — unfortunately very frequently — intentional malicious 
calumnies. 

For the rest, not a few of the accusations raised in the press 
against the German army collapse from the legal point of view. 
It is quite astonishing with what audacity alleged breaches of 
international law by the German army are judged by people 
who have not the least notion of international law. Absolutely 
unquestioned principles are flatly ignored. I shall give just one 
example, which is, however, a very weighty one. It is rec- 
ognized by law that an attack on private persons and private prop- 
erty by the troops is justified when committed after an unlawful 
attack from the opposing side, and when it is made in self-de- 
fense, by way of retribution, as punishment, or when impera- 
tively demanded in the interest of the safety of the military 
movements. In Belgium, German soldiers have been treacher- 
ously fired on by persons not in the army, and other treachery 
has been perpetrated. Thereupon the houses where this took 
place were burnt down, the inhabitants killed or removed. This 
has been done and held lawful by all nations in all previous 
wars. Likewise, it is not unlawful to kill wounded enemies 
who shoot at the advancing troops from behind. But to speak 
of such things is to waste one's breath. Amongst those who are 
at all familiar with international law, with the ideas laid down 
by it and with the manner in which it has been handled in 
previous wars, there can be no dispute concerning all these 
things. Against bad will no explanation, no proof is of avail. 



MODERN GERMANY 597 

The breaches of law so far mentioned are prima facie acts 
of individuals only. In this connection the Hague Convention 
respecting war on land expressly stipulates in article 3 that a 
state is responsible for all acts committed by persons forming 
part of its armed forces. But this responsibility can be taken 
only to mean that the state is liable for them, and is in particular 
liable to pay compensation (as the article referred to explicitly 
lays down) for all such acts. It cannot be construed as mean- 
ing that the state itself can be charged with every act committed 
by the individual. It is simply liability of the state for the 
fault of a third party, not for any fault of its own. Quidquid 
delirant Achivi, plcctuntur reges. The more numerous such 
acts are, and the higher the position of the perpetrators, the more 
must they be regarded as evidence of the low level of the general 
moral and legal standard in the army, or the civil service, and 
consequently in the whole nation. It is proof of a lack of cul- 
tural breeding. And in so far as the state has the duty of at- 
tending to the necessary education and instruction of the people 
— since in this respect the state and the people are inseparable — 
the reproach of an inferior civilization comes home to the state 
itself. 

But there are cases where the state can be regarded as the 
guilty party, from a legal point of view, in the event of such acts 
by individuals. What is meant when we speak of the wrong 
of the state itself as against the wrong of individuals? Acts 
committed by the state are only acts committed by individuals. 
But we consider the state itself guilty, whenever the final deci- 
sion rests with the persons who conduct the state, the highest 
leaders of its policies and its army, in short, when its masters 
in the field and in the office, in their position as such, commit 
the breach of law. For they are the "organs" of the state, their 
official action is the action of the state itself. Charges made 
against them, therefore, affect the state directly. And this 
charge is a serious one. For the grounds of excuse which in 
the case of the misdeeds of individuals allow of a milder verdict, 
fail when the wrong is done by the state itself ; we are not faced 
by deeds committed under the impulse of the moment, but by 
acts coolly preconceived and planned in cold blood. Therefore, 
they weigh much heavier than deeds of individuals. 

A state can become personally guilty in various ways. First, 
by itself ordering the breach of the law, either in a specific 
case or by a general order. The individual soldiers or subor- 
dinate officials who act in observance of such command can, in 
this event, be considered only as tools, while the state itself is 



598 MODERN GERMANY 

the really guilty one. A great number of such commands is- 
sued by our adversaries have come to our knowledge; of many 
of them, which they would certainly have wished might remain 
secret, the original documents have fallen into our hands. The 
order of the Chief in Command of the lOth Russian Army, 
dated December 5, 1914, may serve as an example: 

"The Commander in Chief has enjoined strict observance of the com- 
mand of Headquarters that in the attack all able-bodied male inhabitants 
of the age of ten years and upwards are to be driven in front of the 
troops!!" 

Oftener, indirect responsibility of the organs of the state 
must be assumed : the more frequent the excesses on the part of 
individuals, the more they cease to be mere exceptions ; the 
longer the state hesitates to punish them, the more justified is 
the inference that these transgressions are due to orders from 
those higher in authority. When a large number of Russians 
taken prisoners were found in possession of material for set- 
ting fire to houses, the inference could not fail to be that instruc- 
tions had been given from higher quarters. So, too, when dur- 
ing the retreat of the Russian army from the Mazurian dis- 
trict and Bukowina, a number of villages which did not lie in 
the war zone proper were devastated, and when trains were 
laden with stolen property. Such a train was found when 
the Russian army was surrounded in the Mazurian winter battle. 

The state is also guilty when it fails to prevent future recur- 
rence of unlawful acts of individuals — soldiers or others — by 
taking appropriate measures; when, in other words, it tolerates 
their continuance. Granting that the administration in France, 
England and Russia were taken by surprise and were therefore 
powerless against the first outbreaks of the people's passion 
against Germans abroad, it is certain that when these hideous 
outrages continued they did not prevent them but let events 
take their course, standing by with folded arms. 

Further, the state makes itself an accomplice if, instead of pro- 
ceeding against outrages committed, it neglects to punish the of- 
fenders according to criminal law. As far as we can judge 
from Germany, our enemies have been sadly remiss in this re- 
spect. In London and in Russia, for instance, members of the 
mobs which at the outbreak of the war committed the most hor- 
rible outrages against the lives and property of Germans, if 
they were brought to trial at all were nearly always acquitted 
in court. Wherever breaches of international law abroad were 
punished, public opinion has been openly opposed to it; as, fox 



MODERN GERMANY 599 

instance, the recent mild sentence passed on a mayor in the east 
of France, who, although a civilian, had fired at a German 
aviator. Germany may point with pride to the strict justice 
meted out by her courts. Misdeeds of individual soldiers in the 
field against subjects of the enemy state have been punished as 
unrelentingly as if they had been committed against Germans, 
and German public opinion entirely approves thereof. The 
proofs of all this lie open to every one. 

Finally, complicity of the state must be recognized when it 
employs troops which it must have known beforehand would 
not respect the laws and customs of war existing between civil- 
ized nations. Out of every corner of the earth our enemies 
have brought auxilian^ troops to the European seat of war; 
Germany has had to sacrifice her best blood in fighting semi- 
savages, according to whose standard of civilization every atrocity 
in war seems natural. It stands to reason that such troops 
have no conception of or respect for international law, and that 
they wnll behave differently from our popular armies in which 
the flower of the nation is fighting, and where there is hardly 
a single man who has not had a regular school training. Yet 
our enemies dare to assert that we are the barbarians! It would 
be a laughing matter, if it were not so serious. 

Still, in all these cases we have only actual breaches of the 
law on the part of the state, whereas the rule of the law itself 
remains recognized, its validity is not disputed. This is made 
evident by the attempt to dispute the facts alleged as constitut- 
ing the breach of law. Such attempts, in the absence of an 
impartial court, may be continued, at least for a certain period, 
with a chance of success, till the facts speak too loudly. In 
Lon^vy, close to the Franco-German frontier, a large supply 
of "dum-dum" bullets, together with other war material, was 
found. The fact could not be disputed. France, however, de- 
nies that these bullets were intended for use in the war, con- 
tending that they were intended for manoeuvring purposes only. 
This excuse shows that the prohibition of the use of "dum- 
dum" bullets itself is recognized as valid. It is difficult, how- 
ever, to regard this as more than a subterfuge. That England 
intended "dum-dum" bullets to be used in the war is proved 
by the sworn statements of two captured British officers on 
whom such bullets were found. 

In other instances the action of the state is admitted, but 
at the same time the appearance of right is maintained, by ad- 
vancing legal pretexts which are quite obviously such, and noth- 
ing more. The fact that Germans who happened to be abroad 



boo MODERN GERMANY 

at the outbreak of war were Imprisoned in large numbers and 
kept in concentration camps was against all international law. 
In order to cloak this, the pretext that these Germans had car- 
ried on espionage was made without any grounds for suspicion. 
Such cases are particularly revolting when judicial procedure is 
abused in order to lend a semblance of right to a measure con- 
trary to international law. We had such an experience with 
the French. German army surgeons were convicted of plun- 
dering on the most futile pretexts. Fortunately, a technical 
error in procedure led to a second hearing, which resulted in 
the acquittal of the accused. Still, the first verdict remains 
inexcusable. The shooting of distinguished Germans in jVIo- 
rocco amounts to a judicial murder of the w^orst kind; it is a 
stain on the honor of French law courts. No sensible person 
could doubt the unreliability of the native witnesses for the 
prosecution. 

Finally, many quite obvious breaches of law have taken place 
without any attempt being made to disguise the facts, while the 
validity of the legal rule which w-as broken has not been denied 
at all. Under this classification fall such deeds as the English 
destruction of the German auxiliary cruiser Kaiser H ilhelm der 
Grosse, in neutral waters, the British seizure of the hospital 
ship Ophelia, the theft and destruction of mail bound for, and 
leaving, Germany. These instances could be multiplied indefi- 
nitely, as one breach of the law has followed hard upon the 
other. But enough. We sought only to give examples. 

What is of far greater moment is the fact that in this war 
many breaches of law have occurred under the plea that the 
rules offended against had no force in international law — rules 
whose recognition up to that time had been looked upon as ab- 
solutely established. It is not a case of denying the facts, but of 
denying the binding force of the rule contravened. The dis- 
pute is confined to the legal sphere, and is therefore more dan- 
gerous. It is a greater threat to the future. For while one may 
always trust that a particular violation of law will not occur 
again, the denial of the validity of the legal rule itself amounts 
to an announcement that a similar course will be taken in the 
future. The fact that a denial of legal norms on so broad a 
scale is possible at all is due to the nature of the sources of 
international law. 

For centuries the general law of nations has, in substance, 
been developed by practical usage without conscious law-making 
— that is, as unwritten law\ In the last decades, especially in 



MODERN GERMANY 6oi 

the sphere of the law of war, conscious law-making through in- 
ternational agreements has steadily gained ground. In this con- 
nection may be mentioned the numerous agreements of the two 
Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, the new Geneva 
Convention of 1906 and the Declaration of London of 1909. 
The formulation of international law in these conventions has 
been hailed with great satisfaction and often^ enthusiastically 
praised. But it has entailed an evil consequence — an inclina- 
tion to overestimate the conventions. There is a temptation to 
consider the convention as the sole source of international law 
and the conventional law as the only existing international law. 
Both of these assumptions would be erroneous. 

Above all, it must never be forgotten that the embodiment 
of international law in state treaties is not identical with a codi- 
fication, such as civil law has undergone in France in the Code 
Civil, and in Germany in the Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch. The 
state treaties do not comprise the whole sphere of the law of 
war; some important matters are not even touched upon. And 
even where a matter is regulated, it is in no way a complete 
and exclusive codification of the recognized law. On the con- 
trary, in both respects, the unwritten law, unless modified by 
treaty, continues in force by the side of it. This is stated in 
clear terms in several of the conventions. The Hague con- 
vention with respect to war on land in its preamble explicitly 
states : 

"It has not, how^ever, been found possible at present to 
agree in regard to regulations covering all the circumstances 
which arise in practice. On the other hand, the high con- 
tracting parties do not intend that unforeseen cases should, 
in the absence of a written undertaking, be left to the arbi- 
trary judgment of military commanders. Until a more com- 
plete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high con- 
tracting parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases 
not included in the regulations adopted by them, the inhab- 
itants and the belligerents remain under the protection and 
the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result 
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the 
laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience." 

To the same effect, only more briefly and therefore more dis- 
tinctly, in the convention relative to restrictions with regard to 
the exercise of the right of capture in naval w^ar, the desire is 
expressed to frame a certain number of rules, "without affecting 



6o2 MODERN GERMANY 

the common law now in force in respect to those matters which 
that law has left unsettled" ; and in the convention concerning 
the rights and duties of neutral powers in naval war, it is 
similarly stated: "seeing that even if it is not possible at present 
to concert measures applicable to all cases which may in prac- 
tice occur and which are not covered by the present convention 
■ — it is, nevertheless, expedient to take into consideration the 
general principles of the law of nations." 

Therefore, all other international law, i. e., law not laid 
dow^n in the conventions, continues to coexist along with the 
conventional law. The first leading principle, therefore, is that 
the fact that a rule is not mentioned in the conventions does not 
permit the conclusion that it is not valid law. Or, in other 
words, if specific duties are imposed on a state by a conven- 
tion, that fact is not proof that such duties are the only ones 
it must observe. Are we to think, e. g., that a neutral state 
really satisfies the demands of international law, if it merely 
complies with the duties mentioned by the two Hague Con- 
ventions respecting neutrality? What a paltry thing neutrality 
would be if its meaning were limited to those few meagre stip- 
ulations ! The law established by agreement must needs be com- 
plemented by the law not so established. 

However, to be able to recognize this unestablished law is not 
always easy. It originates from actual practice, which is the 
expression on the part of the states of that which they hold to 
be right. This common opinion of what is right, as evidenced 
in actual practice, is binding on the individual state, because the 
latter is a member of the community of states. General inter- 
national law is common law, rooted in a community of states 
of equal rank; it is not autonomous law resulting from the sway 
of a dominant state. Precedents in international law are fre- 
quently scarce and contradictory ; interpretation may be doubtful, 
since it happens that the law as established by practice is often 
in dispute. There may even be points on which actual precedents 
are altogether lacking. Numberless questions of law which the 
present war has raised have not been settled either by written 
sources or by previous practice. In such cases we are faced by 
a gap in the law; but that does not mean that there is a lawless 
vacuum. The gap must be filled up, and that causes many new 
uncertainties and possibilities of dispute. 

The preamble referred to in the convention respecting the 
laws and customs of a war on land states very significantly: 
^'The high contracting parties have not had in mind that un- 
foreseen cases should be left to the arbitrary judgment of the 



MODERN GERMANY 603 

military commanders." That must be amplified to mean that 
they are not left at all to the will of the individual states, 
nor to its legislation. When England now attempts to justify 
the order of her Admiralty to British merchant vessels to fly 
neutral flags, on the ground that according to British law such 
misuse of flags is allowed, nothing at all is proved in reference 
to the question of international law. England cannot by means 
of a British statute acquire rights against other states. Rather 
must the gap be filled in the manner customary in the sphere 
of law, by analogy, and ultimately by falling back on broad 
legal ideas — in this case on the ultimate basic principles of in- 
ternational law, as they have gradually taken shape in common 
opinion. Only from these broad principles can the decision in 
the individual case be derived. 

This, too, has found expression in the preamble referred to 
in the convention concerning war on land. With a view to 
supplementing the written law, it refers, first, to the established 
customs, and in the second instance, when such established custom 
is lacking, to the ''principles of the law of nations, as they result 
from . . . the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public 
conscience." The expression is perhaps not above criticism, but 
in substance it amounts to what we have said. For instance, 
the necessary supplement of stipulations concerning the duties of 
neutrals must be sought in the essential meaning of neutrality 
itself. To be neutral means to remain impartial, not to favor 
any of the belligerents. The neutral state is, therefore, in duty 
bound, in eventualities not expressly mentioned in the conven- 
tions, to refrain from doing anything which would amount to 
taking sides with one of the parties to the war, and not to tol- 
erate anything on the part of the population that would favor 
the one or the other war-party. Nothing short of this is true 
neutrality. It is instructive to observe in this war to what vary- 
ing extent the various neutral states recognize and adhere to 
these unwritten duties as neutrals. 

The unwritten international law has, however, an even 
greater import. Considered formally, the validity of the written 
sources of the law can be disputed in the present w^ar. A treaty 
binds a state only when "ratified" by it. England has not rati- 
fied either the London Declaration or the Hague Conventions 
numbers 5 and 13, which concern the duties of neutrals in naval 
war or in war on land, nor convention number 10 concerning 
the adaptation to naval war of the Geneva Convention ; while 
Russia has not ratified convention number 8 relative to con- 
tact mines nor number 11 relative to restrictions with regard to 



6o4 MODERN GERMANY 

the exercise of the right of capture in naval war. Serbia, Mon- 
tenegro and Turkey have not ratified any of the conventions 
of the Second Hague Conference, and Montenegro has even re- 
fused to recognize the new Geneva Convention. Formally, there- 
fore, all these conventions are not binding on the state that has 
not ratified them. Indeed, this non-validity extends even fur- 
ther. All the conventions just cited contain a clause that might 
be termed the ''general participation clause" and which provides 
that these conventions shall bind the states that have ratified 
them only in case all belligerent Powers have ratified them. The 
participation in the war of one state that is not a party to the 
conventions excludes their binding force as regards all the Pow- 
ers. Only when a convention is nothing but a new formulation 
of a former one (as, for instance, the convention of 1907 con- 
cerning war on land compared to that of 1899, and the new 
Geneva Convention compared to the old one), is the new conven- 
tion to be valid, at least between those Powers which have rati- 
fied it, even though there may be a Power participating in the 
war which has only ratified the old and not the new conven- 
tion. In respect to such a Power, the old convention remains 
in force. Apart from this important exception, there is no bind- 
ing force, formally speaking, for any of the belligerents, in any 
of the above-mentioned conventions, in consequence of the par- 
ticipation in the war by Serbia, Montenegro and Turkey. But 
in so far as the conventions are to be considered as not valid, the 
unwritten international law retains its force; it is applicable in- 
stead of the written law. 

In determining this unwritten law, however, the written 
sources play a prominent part. In fact their formal non-validity 
is scarcely of importance. For, in large measure, it was not in- 
tended by the conventions to make new law, but rather to 
formulate the existing law, deciding at the same time ques- 
tions in dispute and adding improvements and completions. This, 
too, is directly expressed in the preamble to various conventions 
(The Hague Convention numbers 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, the new 
Geneva Convention, the Declaration of London). The formal 
non-validity of a convention is, therefore, no proof that its con- 
tents are not valid law, just the same; we may, therefore, add to 
our first principle this second one: A rule is not to be con- 
sidered invalid because it is formulated in a convention which 
itself is not formally recognized as in force. 

Conversely, it may be said, the various conventions, notwith- 
standing their formal non-validity, when cautiously employed, 
lend themselves as sources for determining the law that had ex- 



MODERN GERMANY 605 

isted apart from them. More than this. The laying down of 
certain principles of law in the conventions has, even though it 
may not have imparted formal, binding force, nevertheless gained 
a dedsive influence on, and confirmed public opinion regarding the 
legal points involved. The written word, even when formally 
invalid, is nevertheless not without force. The form which has 
been given in the conventions to legal principles has become part 
and parcel of the public's legal views and given shape to them. 
This is evident from the fact that some belligerents have, at 
least partly, acknowledged the binding force of the conventions. 
Typical in this respect is the reply of the German government 
in answer to the protests by the British government concerning 
alleged breaches by Germany of the convention concerning 
mines. The reply, while acknowledging that since Rus- 
sia had not ratified the convention, it was not valid, owing to 
the "general participation clause," even as between Germany and 
England, goes on to say: "Nevertheless, the German govern- 
ment of its own free will considers itself as bound by it." In 
like manner, Germany has observed all the conventions; in par- 
ticular has she recognized the Declaration of London concern- 
ing the laws of naval war as binding through her incorpora- 
tion of its stipulations in the German "Prize Regulations" 
{Prisenordnung) . 

In lamentable contrast to this attitude of Germany is that of 
England, particularly in regard to the Declaration of London, 
which she has practically demolished. This has been forcibly 
and clearly set forth in the memorandum of February 4, 191 5, 
which the German government issued, together with her decla- 
ration of British waters as a war zone. England announced her 
readiness to recognize the Declaration of London as a whole, but 
subsequently, by a number of additional orders, modified the 
Declaration to such an extent in all essential details that hardly 
anything of it has been left. Let us now read the "Introduc- 
tory Stipulation" w^ith which this convention, signed though not 
ratified by England, opens. It is as follows: "The Signatory 
Powers are agreed that the rules contained in the following 
chapters correspond in substance with the generally recognized 
principles of international law." England has herself thereby 
acknowledged that the law contained in the convention was valid 
before the war. Moreover: England herself has previously 
claimed (in her favor) as valid law a number of the principles 
laid down in the Declaration of London — that is to say, she has 
actually applied them as law. For her now to disclaim them is 
sheer arbitrariness. There have always been disputes as to the 



6o6 MODERN GERMANY 

meaning of the term contraband, but the broad interpretation 
which England gives to it, the elimination of the long recognized 
distinction between relative and absolute contraband, and the 
disavowal of the principles concerning blockade by the closing 
of the North Sea, are, all of them, breaches of law which can- 
not be excused on the plea of the formal non-validity of the Dec- 
laration of London. These are measures undertaken solely with 
the desire to ruin Germany economically, without considering 
whether the methods adopted are in harmony with international 
law or not. That such harmony does not exist, there cannot 
really be the slightest doubt from a legal point of view. 

Finally, even within the law written and recognized as valid, 
it is indispensable to fall back on general legal principles. The 
written word, after all, never can be more than a guide toward 
a correct decision in legal questions. Its bearing must first be 
ascertained by scientific method, a task which has to be solved in 
international law in the same manner as in all other branches. 

In the first place, the words have to be interpreted, their mean- 
ing has to be ascertained. Interpretation of law is governed 
by settled principles recognized by the jurisprudence of all na- 
tions. The letter of the law may not be slavishly adhered to, but 
at the same time it may not be brushed aside in an arbitrary 
manner — as is, unfortunately, too often done. If every state 
were at liberty to read white where black is set down, the writ- 
ten law would be altogether divested of meaning. Its signifi- 
cance would cease. An interpretation that lends another mean- 
ing to a clause than the only one which its phraseology renders 
possible, must be justified by the law in question itself, other- 
wise it is merely arbitrary. Under the Hague conventions, the 
bombarding of undefended towns is forbidden. Now, German 
war vessels have bombarded the town of Libau. Libau is a 
fortified port. Projectiles which were thrown did not fall within 
the fortifications, but hit the commercial quarter of the city. 
In Russia it was said that the rule forbidding the bombardment 
of undefended towns was thereby violated. Obviously the phrase 
"undefended town" in this case is given a sense no one had 
previously contemplated, or could have contemplated. The for- 
tified part and the commercial quarter together constitute the 
"town," and a town is defended if any part of it is defended. 

A particularly remarkable example of the high-handed man- 
ner in which England, with France and Russia in her wake, 
circumvents obvious law by tricks of interpretation, is offered by 
her treatment of Article 23 (h) of the regulations concerning 
war on land. Here it is expressly stated that it is forbidden "to 



MODERN GERMANY 607 

^declare abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law 
'•the rights and actions of the hostile part)^" The text is abso- 
lutely clear. Nevertheless, England at the outbreak of war 
issued an order forbidding payments to be made to Germany 
or Austria-Hungary, and France — here, too, England's docile 
pupil — has made this prohibition of payment even more strin- 
gent. On September 27th, she declared that all contracts con- 
cluded since the outbreak of war with a subject of her enemies 
should ipso facto become null and void, and that all contracts 
previously entered into might, on application by the French 
debtor, be declared void, provided they had not yet gone into 
effect. England's action was no surprise. In fact, the prohibi- 
tion of payment conforms with the provisions of English pri- 
vate law, which has not been able to rid itself of the antiquated 
idea that the individual citizen of the enemy state is in himself 
an "alien enemy." 

Sir Edward Grey, in 191 1, in agreement v/ith the majority of 
English legal writers, declared, that in the opinion of the British 
government this rule of the English law had not been elimi- 
nated by the stipulation referred to regarding the regulations 
of war on land; that Article 23 (h) simply provided that the 
military commanders of occupied enemy territory might not sus- 
pend or declare inadmissible in court rights and claims of the 
inhabitants of that territory. This interpretation is materially 
incorrect, if for no other reason than because it is not until we 
come to the third section (Article 42 et seq.) that the regulations 
concerning war on land discuss the rights and duties of the 
military authorities in occupied enemy territory, while in the 
second section, in which Article 23 is found, the general aim in 
view is to bring about a restriction of "the means of injuring 
the enemy." What fully settles the point is the fact that at 
the Hague negotiations the German delegates expressly pointed 
out the broader meaning which they gave to Article 23 (h) 
(which had been proposed by them), and that no opposition was 
raised from any quarter. This is recorded in the minutes of 
the meeting. It was the very purpose of the proposed Article 23 
(h) to counteract the existing English law; its aim was to se- 
cure respect for an important consequence resulting from the 
great principle of the law of war, viz., the inviolability of pri- 
vate property. If England held a different v'ltw, she should 
have brought it forvv^ard at that time. She should not have agreed 
to the article and — three years later — have ratified it, with the 
mental reservation to interpret it in a manner different to that 
in which it was meant by the other Powers. It is unnecessary 



6o8 MODERN GERMANY 

to state how such behavior would be characterized if occurring in 
other domains of law/ 

France's proceeding is even worse. That she understood Ar- 
ticle 23 (h) in the same manner as Germany, there cannot be 
the least doubt; practically the whole of her legal literature 
supports the correct interpretation. Since the war, however, she 
has simply disavowed her previous legal opinion, and, as the 
docile pupil of England, adopted English measures — nay, out- 
done the British themselves. A vassal's loyalty evidently gets 
the better of legal conscience. The less said about Russian ac- 
complishment the better; it seems that for Russia the bounds of 
international law have ceased to exist altogether. 

On the other hand, the search for what is law must not stop 
at the ascertainment of the meaning of the written word. Con- 
siderations based on the general principles lead to results which 
should take precedence of the words of the written law. The 
law-maker — and the state that by conventions creates regulations 
of international law is on a level with him — by his abstract rules 
always intends to regulate the real conditions as these are known 
to him. He is never in a position to foresee the entire manifold 
variety of cases that may occur in real life. Thus it may easily 
happen that he lays down a rule that is too general; a case of 
a peculiar character may arise which falls under the general 
rule, yet the conclusion may be justified that the law-maker, had 
he contemplated this case in advance, would have restricted his 
general rule. The idea which gave rise to that general rule does 
not apply in this case. And even if the rule at the time it was 
framed was really applicable in all cases then possible, it may 
be that after its creation conditions have changed, new facts 
have arisen and new cases have become possible, which at the 
time of framing the rule could not have been foreseen, and for 
which it is now no longer suitable. If in such a case the old rule 
were to be applied then, in the words of Mephistopheles, reason 
would become a sham, beneficence a vexation. 

In the jurisprudence of all nations it is recognized that in 
such cases the administration of the law must be at liberty to 
deviate from the letter; the legal rule remains inapplicable be- 
cause the supposition for which alone it is intended does not 
apply. The German commercial code formerly contained special 
legal rules for the conclusion of contracts between absent parties. 
Then the telephone was invented. Without hesitation, juris- 
prudence dealing with the conclusion of contracts by telephone 

* In this connection see Strupp's treatise in Zeitschrift fiir internationales Recht, 
19 13, Vol. XXIII, Sec. 2, p. 118 ff. 



MODERN GERMANY 609 

has treated as inapplicable the principles regulating the con- 
clusion of contract between absent parties, although these prin- 
ciples applied according to the letter. In this sense the old legal 
maxim holds good : "Cessante ratione legis cessat lex ipsa'' 
New actual conditions may call for new legal regulations; we 
then assume that the law has a gap, and we fill it in the same 
manner as we fill any other gap. 

This general maxim of jurisprudential procedure is particu- 
larly important in the case of the law of war. Technical science 
and politics may offer surprises which of necessity destroy the 
framework of the old rules of international law. Who at the 
time of the framing of the rules on naval warfare thought of 
the possibilities of submarine warfare as witnessed to-day? Had 
they been anticipated, special rules would have been made. The 
old principles of naval warfare cannot in this case be applied 
without modification, new rules are required. In this connec- 
tion, the principles of neutrality offer still another example in 
point: Although in the conventions concerning neutrality it is 
declared that a neutral power is not called upon to prevent the 
export of arms and ammunition for the benefit of one or the 
other of the belligerents, circumstances may be such that this 
stipulation; despite its general application, can no longer take 
effect. It is devoid of meaning, unless under existing condi- 
tions the delivery of munitions is possible to both parties, for the 
ultimate essence of neutrality is that the neutral state must not 
actually favor any party, it must treat both with impartiality. 
This general principle of impartiality in treatment has there- 
fore found expression in both of the Hague Conventions here in 
question (Convention No. 5, Article 9; Convention No. 13, Ar- 
ticle 9, and Introduction, fifth paragraph). 

In the present war Germany and Austria-Hungary are sur- 
rounded on almost all sides by belligerent enemies. The geo- 
graphical position is such that a delivery of munitions from the 
United States to Germany and Austria-Hungary is actually out 
of the question. In such a case it is the duty, the legal duty, 
despite the stipulations quoted from the Hague Conventions, to 
prevent the delivery to our enemies of war-material. That alone 
conforms with the legal nature of neutrality, and therefore with 
international law^ rightly conceived. A contrary procedure is 
opposed to it. Laws must be interpreted in this true spirit, not 
by mere verbal arguments — this truth is as old as jurisprudence 
itself: "Scire leges non hoc est verba earum tenere, sed vim ac 
potestatem/' says old Celsus. 



6io MODERN GERMANY 

And what will now happen? With sorrow we watch this 
whole spectacle, international law broken and shattered, a lofty 
possession of human civilization trodden in the dust. We can 
no longer close our eyes to the fact that international law has 
not stood the test in this war. If the law relating to war on 
land, though actually often broken, has to some extent at least 
remained recognized, the law relating to naval warfare has been 
almost completely rejected, leaving us face to face with a verit- 
able chaos. This is very significant. The whole international 
law is a community law; it depends, as was said in the be- 
ginning, on the recognition of the fact that the states are co- 
ordinated. This conception had become established on the Con- 
tinent, between the Continental Powers now at war, as can be 
seen from the manner in which war is being conducted on land. 
It is different, however, at sea. England has never actually rec- 
ognized the other states as standing on a footing of equality 
with her on the water. If the aim of her policy has always 
been to let no other naval Power arise, if she has consistently 
endeavored to be the strongest naval Power, the question in- 
volved was here one of actual strength. But in addition she 
has always regarded herself as the ruling sea Power in the sense 
that in questions of maritime law she considered her will as de- 
cisive for all other European Powers. 

One is justified in the assumption that the conception has not 
yet found unreserved acceptance in England, even in theory, that 
the law relating to naval w^arfare is the law of a community of 
states of equal rank, to which every state whether great or small 
must submit in like manner. Many of her breaches of mari- 
time lavv^ may, perhaps, be accounted for by this theoretic back- 
wardness: England does not regard them as breaches of law, be- 
cause she still innocently adheres to the opinion that international 
law in maritime matters is, in fact, English law. As a matter 
of fact her behavior in questions of naval warfare is altogether 
based on the principle, "Law at sea is only what I recognize as 
law, no matter what has been before, no matter what my previ- 
ous practice may have been, and I recognize only that as law 
which suits my purpose." All disputes concerning international 
law would, indeed, speedily cease, if all states had but the good 
sense to recognize this one maxim as absolute: Law at sea is 
what England decides to be law. 

What will now happen? Since international law is exter- 
nally powerless, in that there is no tribunal which can compel 
the observance of the law, only one remedy remains to the of- 
fended state; it must help itself. It has been previously men- 



MODERN GERMANY 6ii 

tioned that everywhere the right of retribution, the right of re- 
prisal, is recognized. Every state that has suffered injury in 
respect to international law^ acts lawfully when it returns one 
breach of international law by another. But the nature of the 
reprisals is altogether different in the two groups of breaches of 
the law which we have distinguished. Where the international 
law, though broken, is still recognized as valid, a reprisal means 
only that the injured state returns the injury by a similar in- 
jury, or if need be, by a breach of another kind. The state 
thereby breaks the law itself, but breaks it legally; the act is 
a permissible one. The state breaks the law because it recog- 
nizes the validity of the law which the opponent has violated 
and because it wishes to assert it. The reprisal is a breach of 
the law for the sake of protecting the law. Nevertheless, it is 
to be applied with great caution. It is useful in so far as the 
hope is justified that by applying the reprisal the enemy will be 
induced in the future to forbear from further breaches of in- 
ternational law. But it is liable to fail only too easily in its 
object and to conjure up even worse evil. 

According to the principles of international law, a reprisal, 
because it is a lawful action, does not by any means warrant 
counter-reprisals. In reality, the danger that a retaliative meas- 
ure will be reciprocated by a further retaliative measure is ob- 
vious; and thus, instead of compelling the opponent to respect 
international law, the reprisal may bring about an increase in 
breaches of it. Only in rare instances has Germany resorted to 
reprisals. When the news concerning the imprisonment of non- 
combatant German subjects in France proved to be true, the 
German government by way of retaliation imprisoned the 
French citizens who happened to be in Germany; she retaliated 
against the unpardonable confinement by England of Germ.an 
subjects in concentration camps, by imprisoning British sub- 
jects in Germany. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that the 
confinement of the French and British subjects in Germany is 
very lenient; they are deprived of their liberty, but for the rest 
every hardship is spared them, in striking contradistinction to 
what — according to unimpeachable reports — was, and still is, the 
lot of at least some of the unfortunate Germans abroad. It is 
difficult to restrain one's feeling in thinking of the treatment 
of German w^omen and children by the English in East Asia, 
or in remembering how a civilized state like France has dragged 
off Germans to unhealthy parts of tropical Africa, not to speak 
of that which is taking place in Russia. On the other hand, 
Germany has refrained from rendering like for like. On no 



6i2 MODERN GERMANY 

occasion has the violation of the Red Cross been reciprocated 
by any sort of retaliatory measure. The judicial murder of 
Casablanca could easily have been avenged, since we have a large 
portion of France in our possession. It has not been done. The 
respect for international law, the sense of duty which civiliza- 
tion imposes, was powerful enough to drown the call for retali- 
ation. 

Things are, however, different when legal rules are repudi- 
ated. All law of nations, according to its nature, is mutual, 
because it aims to regulate the relations of states to one another. 
As soon, therefore, as one state in its relation to its enemy refuses 
to acknowledge any longer the validity of a rule of law, such 
provision ceases to be binding on the enemy, also. That is, in- 
deed, the gist of the "general participation clause," which is con- 
tained in nearly all conventions: No belligerent state shall in 
regard to international law be more favorably situated than its 
opponent; a rule which is not binding for the one is not bind- 
ing for the other. All legal rules, therefore, which one party 
refuses to accept as binding lose their binding force for the op- 
ponent also, and if one party puts forward a new legal rule the 
enemy may do likewise. It must be admitted that international 
law is a law of weak vitality, in that an individual war-party, if 
evilly inclined, can render it invalid. Through the English and 
French prohibition against payments to us, the above-mentioned 
article of the regulations of war on land ceased to bind Ger- 
many: we were then at liberty to reply to this prohibition of 
payment by an identical one in respect to those states, and we 
did so — although in a very moderate manner. In Germany the 
foreign claims are merely suspended, not abolished, and foreign 
private property, though placed under supervision and admin- 
istration, has in no instance been illegally confiscated. 

England has from the start rendered invalid in its most im- 
portant provisions the Declaration of London, which according 
to its own wording must be treated as a whole and cannot be 
separated. Accordingly, its binding force automatically ceased 
to exist for Germany, who had at first recognized it. A legal 
norm cannot bind the one if it does not bind the other. There- 
fore, Germany was absolutely right when, in imitation of Eng- 
land's methods of carrying on naval warfare, she declared the 
English coastal waters a war zone. The rights of neutrals were 
not thereby prejudiced. If a subject of a neutral Power during 
a war on land ventures upon the battle-field, a bullet may hit him ; 
the belligerent is under no obligation to silence his rifles and ar- 
tillery because they may strike the subject of a neutral Power. 



MODERN GERMANY 613 

Nor is Germany responsible if, in the naval war which, after her 
own manner and with the means at her disposal, she is waging 
against England, a neutral ship that ventures into the war zone 
comes to grief. If in a duel a non-participant places himself so 
that one of the parties has to choose between not fighting or hurt- 
ing the onlooker, and if this onlooker insists that he must not be 
hurt, he prevents this duellist from defending himself and thereby 
actually favors the other party. Is this really to be called neu- 
trality? England not only wishes to damage Germany by her 
methods of procedure, she also abuses the rights of neutrals in the 
most barefaced manner. She represents her treatment of Ger- 
many as a retributive measure — wrongly so, for Germany had 
fully observed the Declaration of London, as well as all other 
maritime laws of war, until their breach by England. But even 
if she were entitled to retaliate upon Germany — she is not so 
entitled, as has been said — this would never excuse her viola- 
tion of the rights of neutrals. She is now going even further: 
in her latest measures she does not hesitate to discard the old- 
established rules of the Declaration of Paris, which have enjoyed 
undisputed validity from the formal point of view. The whole 
maritime law of war seems to collapse before our eyes. 

The procedure of our opponents, which runs counter to inter- 
national law, entails the danger that through resorting to re- 
prisals and counter-reprisals the evils of the war will grow 
more and more extensive, that the methods governing it will 
grow more and more merciless, bloody and ghastly. And even 
beyond this application of reprisals, there is the further danger 
that, on account of so many infractions, the rulers of states, 
armies and navies, and the nations generally, will in the end cease 
to believe in the sacredness of international law. It must be 
observed with sorrow that the consciousness of the nations regard- 
ing international law as a binding force, a consciousness which 
was happily growing, is now on the wane. For this reason it 
is to be feared that each individual state which suffers from the 
breaches of the law committed by its enemies will, in the end, 
cease to regard itself as bound by anything, and will consult 
only its own momentary advantage, with the sword as the sole 
arbiter. If this once comes to be the case, war will finally turn 
into a struggle for complete annihilation among the civilized 
nations. 

The loss which this war has caused and is apparently still 
going to cause to international law is immense. Nevertheless, 
we do not despair of the future of international law — at least 
not if, as we hope, Germany be victorious. It will be one of our 



6i4 MODERN GERMANY 

chief solicitudes then to see that a new international law is built 
up on broader and more liberal principles. All international law 
is founded on the conception of equal rights for all nations. 
Germany has never aspired to world-dominion, nor will she ever 
do so in the future; history has taught us, only too clearly, that 
world-supremacy is a delusive blessing. Germany wants light 
and air for herself, but she also wants every nation to live and 
prosper in its own individual way. We are convinced that there 
is room for all in the world, and that the happiness and well- 
being of one nation does not stand in the way of another's hap- 
piness, but that, on the contrary, it increases it. England, 
however, cannot free herself of the idea that at sea she is su- 
preme, that there her will alone is paramount. Too long have 
the peoples of the earth submitted to this. The hour is near, we 
trust, when they need do so no longer. We are waging this 
struggle not only for ourselves, for our maintenance as a state, 
for our existence as a nation, for our share in the culture of hu- 
mankind, but we are in the last resort fighting it in the interest 
of all nations. This may not be realized to-day, but the time 
will come when the war will be looked upon from this point 
of view. The word of the great Dutchman, that the sea is free, 
has not up to this time been a truth. It shall become a truth, 
and this will be due to Germany. 



CHAPTER III 

THE MEANING OF THE WAR 

PROFESSOR OTTO HINTZE, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 

THE English are fond of comparing the war which they and 
their aUies are waging against us to that waged against 
Napoleon I. They accuse us of purposing to subjugate the Conti- 
nent to our domination in order to crush and rob England. The re- 
quirements of w^arfare, it is true, make it imperative that we 
should gain to a certain point the ascendancy over our Conti- 
nental enemies, in order to grapple with England, and force 
her to make peace. But that our policy has been guided by this 
intention for years cannot be accepted by any impartial student 
of contemporary history. If this had been our purpose, we 
would have taken advantage of England's dilemma in the Boer 
War and of that of Russia in the Japanese War to render one or 
the other of our present adversaries innocuous. We made no 
attempt to do so. Rather has our policy been to keep peace as 
long as this was compatible with the honor and vital interests 
of our people. Our chances for further progress were vastly 
greater through the development of our forces in peaceful com- 
petition with other nations than by a world war, in which all 
the other Powers except ourselves had a clear and fixed aim in 
view as the prize of victory. The resemblance of the present 
war to the Napoleonic conflict consists only in the fact that Eng- 
land has again set her Continental allies against that Power 
which she at present regards as the chief opponent to her su- 
premacy at sea and in international trade. 

It is absurd — in view of the political history of the past 
twenty years — to speak of Germany's ambition for world domin- 
ion as like that of Napoleon I. From our point of view the 
present crisis resembles rather that which the Prussia of Fred- 
erick the Great endured in the Seven Years' War. To-day the 
German Empire is fighting for its existence as a Great Power 
just as the Prussian State did at that time. The question for us 
is whether we shall be able to maintain our position in the 
ranks of the World Powers, or whether our opponents will sue-, 
ceed in ousting us from that position. Allied with us, Austria- 
Hungary, too, is defending her existence as a Great Power. The 

615 



6i6 MODERN GERMANY 

two Central European Powers are in danger of being crushed by 
the border countries of our continent. These border countries, 
favored by greater possibilites of expanding beyond the boun- 
daries of Europe, and united by a community of interests — which 
is probably only temporary — are endeavoring to cut off the Cen- 
tral Powers from the outside world, and to reduce their strength 
to such an extent that they would be harmless as competitors in 
world politics. 

We must frustrate this attempt and prevent, if possible, a 
repetition of similar dangerous crises. Our chief and imme- 
diate goal is to overthrow the plans of our enemies, to teach them 
the necessary respect for our arms on land and sea, to break the 
iron ring which has paralyzed our world politics for so long with 
its concentric pressure, and to gain and secure the possibility for 
free development of our forces and for undisturbed pursuit of 
our vital interests in the world. We want to maintain our 
place in the sun. Nor shall we allow ourselves to be ousted 
from the ranks of World Powers, in spite of our confined posi- 
tion on the Continent. We must endeavor to strengthen our 
position in such a manner that the dangers now threatening us 
will be reduced as much as possible. But we are far from en- 
tertaining plans of world domination such as are pursued by 
England and perhaps Russia. The pubhc, it is true, has a 
rather hazy conception of the meaning of the phrase "World 
Power." Certain minor German publicists think that a World 
Power must be boundless in its demands and its ambition for 
power. That is not the real significance of this term. Such is 
certainly not the goal of practical German politics. We do not 
understand by a World Power one which dominates and dic- 
tates to the world, nor a new Rome that does not suffer any 
other Power besides itself to enjoy equal rights. We take the 
term as meaning a Great Power within the bounds of the new 
world system of states, a Power of that type which is at once 
a result and a requirement of the enlarged circumstances of the 
world. We wish to stand as a World Power next to other 
World Powers in the future community of states, just as we 
have stood as a Great Power next to Great Powers in the 
hitherto existing European state system. It would be contrary 
to the spirit in which we wage this war were we to lay claim 
to a supremacy such as England possesses or desires, which threat- 
ens the independence of other nations. This British supremacy 
must be ended, but it must not be transferred from one Power 
to another. Moreover, there is much to indicate that the world 
supremacy of one Power would be much more unbearable in the 



MODERN GERMANY 617 

new world system of states than it has been so far In the European 
state system. 

The idea on which our policy is based is, therefore, not that 
of world domination, but rather that of the balance of power. 
In this connection we must enter a protest against the way in 
which this conception has for centuries been falsified by England. 
That which is understood in England by the European balance 
of power is nothing more nor less than the principle that the Con- 
tinental Powers must fight, balance and neutralize one another, 
so that Britain can establish her maritime and commercial domi- 
nance without let or hindrance. Things are no different to-day in 
this respect than two hundred years ago. This S5^stem of the bal- 
ance of power is, according to England's idea, to be limited to 
Europe. As a World Power, England does not form an integral 
part of this system. She lays claim only to control and regulate it. 
In the future world system of states there is to be, according 
to England's conception, no balance of power, because this 
would be incompatible with England's supremacy at sea and in 
commerce. European balance of power is for England only a 
catchword, a deceptive formula which cloaks her plans of world 
domination. The real balance of power in the world system of 
states for which we are striving would be based on the premise 
that England renounce her claims to absolute supremacy at sea. 

This will be difficult to accomplish. The economic structure 
of modern England is so dependent on her supremacy at sea 
that its abolition might have the most disastrous results. Eng- 
land has become a purely industrial state and has allowed her 
agriculture to decay; she needs imperatively a regular overseas 
influx of provisions and raw materials to feed her population 
and keep her factories going. The safeguarding of these im- 
ports is the vital question for the United Kingdom; if in a 
war they were cut off for more than six weeks, or even seriously 
interrupted, England would be forced by starvation and unem- 
ployment to make peace. Absolute supremacy at sea, therefore, 
is regarded in England as a condition necessary to the existence 
of the British state. If you ask what divine or human law 
apportioned supremacy at sea to the Britons for all times, the 
Englishman will draw your attention to the conditions just 
analyzed, with that naivete with which he confounds his na- 
tional interests with those of the universe. 

Lust for world-dominion has always had a disintegrating ef- 
fect upon the national structure of states which have yielded to 
it. The British dependence on sea traffic is a weakness which 
has been produced by the lust for maritime and commercial 



6i8 MODERN GERMANY 

supremacy in the world. Is this weakness of England sufficient 
reason for the other Powers to tolerate forever her domination 
at sea? To a certain extent this seemed a passable excuse so 
long as England's requirements for existence did not come into 
irreconcilable conflict with those of other great nations. As 
matters stand in this war, however, England's supremacy at 
sea is meant not only to safeguard her own national existence, 
but to starve the German people, nearly seventy million souls. 
England is carrying on this war primarily not against our army 
and our fleet, but against our women and children. For us, 
therefore, the necessity is just as urgent that this British tyranny 
be abolished. The world may be sure that we are determined 
to resort to all possible means to defend our life in this war, 
which has been forced upon us by England. The relentlessness 
with which we are compelled to carry on the war is solely the 
fault of England. The solution of the underlying differences 
would have been very easy. England need only have agreed 
to what all nations demanded, that the right of capture at sea 
should be abolished, at least for provisions and raw material. 
Then the appeal to starvation as an ally in this war would have 
been impossible. England thought that in this she possessed a 
powerful weapon which she did not wish to surrender. Per- 
haps she will learn by experience that this weapon is two-edged 
and that its use is fraught with dangers which make it appear 
advisable to relinquish it. 

Though the English may cling to the idea which permeates 
all their political life that to them as God's chosen people is 
due an especially favored place in the world, they cannot expect 
us to agree to this conception and bow to its consequences. 
We hope, too, that the other nations on whom the yoke of 
British naval supremacy weighs heavily will pull themselves to- 
gether and cast it ofi. The British fleet Is not only a means 
of safeguarding British vital interests, but is also a very dan- 
gerous weapon which menaces all coasts and is able to subject 
all non-British shipping to a paralyzing control. England has 
at all times unscrupulously and arbitrarily twisted and manipu- 
lated the laws of naval warfare in the interest of her sole 
supremacy. She has always infringed on the rights of neutrals 
in naval warfare in order to damage as much as possible all her 
competitors — not alone her enemies — in trade and shipping. In 
the present war the timid protests, made not only by the small 
naval powers, but even by the United States — protests against 
the damage to their shipping and against misuse of their flag 
by England, the mistress of the seas — die timidly away. Has it 



MODERN GERMANY 619 

really come to such a pass that the world cannot make a stand 
against England's naval tyranny, and that the old call for free- 
dom of the seas has become only an empty word? We cannot 
and will not believe this. We have taken up arms against 
England's domination of the sea and of the world at large, be- 
cause she is menacing our vital interests by a murderous naval 
warfare contrary to international law. In answer to England's 
acts, we are carrying on the war with extreme measures and 
ruthlessness, not because superior power, but because the 
knavery and deceit of our enemies and our own consequent 
necessity force us to do so. But we are far removed from 
wishing to substitute a German tyranny for that of Eng- 
land. We are fighting for the freedom of the seas and the 
humane laws of naval warfare formulated in the Declaration 
of London of 1909, which are in accordance with the concep- 
tions of the rights and laws of all nations, but not with the 
special interests of England, who prevented the adoption of 
these laws. We want to supplement the balance of power on 
land with the balance of power at sea, to create the only perma- 
nent and sound foundation for a world system of states. 

In this struggle against British supremacy at sea and world 
dominion we are fighting for the interests of the world's traffic 
and trade and for an economic and political prerequisite to the 
state system of the future. If w^e do not fight this war to the 
end now, then later on other nations will take it up again. 

Even before the war, England had to relinquish the exercise 
to its full extent of her maritime supremacy; she had to with- 
draw a great part of the garrisons from her foreign naval 
stations, concentrating her forces in home waters. That was 
the effect of German naval armament. It had already visibly 
benefited other maritime nations. The pressure which Eng- 
land had hitherto exercised in foreign continents was decreas- 
ing perceptibly. 

The great Dominions — whose demonstrations of sympathy 
and active aid to the motherland are, after all, of only small 
politico-military value — are, more and more, tending to complete 
autonomy. The era of colonial rule in Asia and on the north 
coast of Africa will, it seems likely, soon come to an end, as 
that in America and Australia has already done. The former 
dream of the rule of the world by the white race has been de- 
stroyed by the rise of Japan, and who knows how short a time 
it may be before the slogan, "Asia for the Asiatics," is realized. 
The rise of Islam must inevitably be a powerful factor in this 
change of conditions in the world. Only in Central Africa, 



620 MODERN GERMANY 

among the uncivilized negro peoples, does there seem still to be 
a great future for colonial activity. That activity must, how- 
ever, limit itself to promoting v^^elfare and morality rather than 
engaging in the ruthless exploitation of natural treasures and hu- 
man forces, with an eye to large and immediate profits, as is the 
practice, for example, in the Belgian Congo. 

The irresistible progress of the littoral countries of the Pa- 
cific, which makes them the chief problem of trade and politics 
of the world, is also fateful for British maritime and world 
dominion. The present war is speeding this development by 
giving Japan a valuable opportunity, which will perhaps never 
recur, to make use of her military superiority over China. Will 
the United States look on quietly at this dangerous proceeding? 
Is the profit accruing to a few business men for the delivery of 
munitions of war to our enemies blinding the United States to 
the fact that this trade is prolonging the war and increasing 
Japan's opportunity to strengthen her power? Are American 
sympathies for England greater than American interests? 

But perhaps none of the neutral states has a greater interest in 
destroying England's naval supremacy than Italy.^ Nature has 
predestined Italy to the position of supreme Power in the Medi- 
terranean, but political development has brought it about that 
to-day the long coast-line of the Apennine peninsula is more a 
factor of weakness than of strength. England controls, by virtue 
of her possession of Gibraltar, the western basin of the Mediter- 
ranean, by her possession of Malta the eastern, and by that of 
Egypt the Suez Canal. Once Italy had in the all-powerful Brit- 
ish navy a protector against France, who had come threateningly 
near to her after the occupation of Tunis. The position of Italy 
was not ideal, but Great Britain offered her a moderate amount 
of security. Now England has allied herself with France and 
entrusted her, within certain limits, with the protection of the 
Mediterranean. What role could Italy play by the side of a 
victorious England and France? Of what use would even 
Trieste be to her, with a growing Slavonic population all around 
and a hostile hinterland in the rear? Trieste is indispensable to 
Austria; in Italy's hands it would become a waste place. It is 
useless now to recall the Dreibund, within the bounds of which 
Italy satisfactorily promoted her economic and political inter- 
ests for more than thirty years. We do not know the exact 
obligations which the Dreibund imposed — especially after the 
renewal in 191 2. If, in declaring her neutrality, Italy denied 

^ It is well to recall that this was written early in the year 1915, before 
Italy had decided to embrace the cause of the Allies. — Translator's note. 



MODERN GERMANY 621 

the defensive character of the war, she based her declaration on 
an interpretation which we naturally refuse to share. But be- 
hind this explanation are, of course, other reasons to the justice 
of which we do not, by any means, wish to turn a deaf ear. 
If, on the other hand, there is now a strong current of public 
opinion urging her to abandon neutrality and side with the 
Triple Entente, it is more a mixture of Latin race sentimentality, 
Irredentist hate of Austria and democratic-republican sympathies 
that is stirring the national soul, than the sound instinct of po- 
litical interests. Italy's political interests clearly require a weak- 
ening of France and England, her superior rivals in the Medi- 
terranean, and they also require a strengthening of Central 
Europe. Even in the event of victory, Italy's connection with 
Republican France would in a country of democratic unrest shake 
the last remnant of monarchical authority, thereby endangering 
the course of prudent politics and the very position of power of 
the country.^ 

Just as Italy is menaced by England and France, so too are 
the eastern Balkan states — especially Rumania — menaced by 
Russia. The candid declarations of the Russian ministers and 
party leaders in the last Duma session (February 9, 191 5) leave 
no room for doubt that Russia not only aims at the opening of 
the Dardanelles, but at their outright possession, together with 
Constantinople and the shores of the Black Sea in Asia Minor. 
But if the Black Sea thus becomes a Russian sea, how could 
Rumania escape the danger of complete dependence on her dom- 
ineering neighbor? In what a situation would she be placed 
economically, since she has no other access to the ocean except 
by way of the Dardanelles, through which 95 per cent, of her 
exports pass? Although the numerous influences which are at 
work in the country to induce Rumania to join the Triple 
Entente direct the nationalistic desires of the population towards 
Transylvanian territory, Rumania's real interests point beyond 
the Pruth; they demand that she join the Central European 
"block," with its front turned against Russia, whose victory 

1 While this book was going to press Italy's secession from the Triple 
Alliance to the side of our enemies took place. It is not possible to discuss 
this fact here and the literature it has produced, because the motives of the 
Italian government are not easy to determine. Italy's dependence on England 
evidently has played as important a part in this situation as the sympathies 
of the radical Irredentists and Free Masons for France. Article VII of the 
Triple Alliance treaty does not in any way justify Italy's action, nor had 
it been interpreted in this sense in August. It is even more difficult to 
reconcile Italy's stand with Article IV, which bound Italy to maintain a 
benevolent neutrality in case she should not think it advisable to join her 
allies in the war. We feel justified, therefore, in using such terms as breach 
of faith. 



622 MODERN GERMANY 

would make Serbia great, but would subject all other Balkan 
peoples to an insupportable pressure. 

The two great imperialistic currents — the British and the 
Russian — which have joined in this war against the Central 
European Powers, are au fond inimical to each other. If Russia 
holds the Dardanelles, then England's sovereignty in the Medi- 
terranean, Egypt and the Suez Canal is menaced. It remains to 
be seen w^hether England will really permit such a change when 
it becomes imminent. Her hitherto compliant attitude is prob- 
ably designed to leave to other Powers the odium of opposition 
to this plan and to gain Russia's sword by prospects which will 
not be realized for a long time to come. It is certain, however, 
that Russia and England would soon be at cross-purposes in 
Asia. Russian expansion in Asia — which Prince Uchtomski, in 
his great work on the Oriental journey of the then heir to the 
throne, written in the early nineties, described as the historical 
mission of Czardom ^ — involves a natural hostility towards the 
colonizing island people, who in the Far East are scoring signal 
successes in bringing the influence of west European culture to 
bear against the Russians, who feel themselves intellectually akin 
to the Asiatics. The common victory of the two chief exponents 
of imperialism would at first spell a sort of partition of the 
world betw^een them, but the final struggle for world dominion 
would inevitably and speedily follow. 

We are unable to see therein salvation for humanity. We are 
not only fighting for our own power and independence by trying 
to stave this off, but for the freedom of all nations. The earth 
is to be neither Anglo-Saxon nor Muscovite. We do not want 
world domination by one single nation, but that vigorous co- 
existence of free nations and states that has hitherto been the 
foundation of modern Kultur. The Kultur of the newer na- 
tions would be strangled in the octopus coils of a world-dominat- 
ing England or Russia, as was once the ancient world in the 
embrace of world-dominating Rome. British imperialism en- 
deavors, as Professor Cramb has put it, to give the dominated 
races an English soul.^ That is characteristic of a nation that 
has never sought to comprehend and adapt itself to the peculiari- 
ties of foreign races and nations. The British colonial official is, 
it is true, able to govern the inhabitants of India, but he does 
not understand their psycholog)^ English education may be 
able to impart certain exterior habits of life, but it is not able 

1 Orientreise S. M. des Kaisers von Russland Nikolaus II als Grossfurst- 
Thronfolger, Prince E. Uchtomski, Leipzig, 1899, Vol. II, p. 388 ff. 
^Germany and England, by J. A. Cramb, London, 1914, p. 125. 



MODERN GERMANY 623 

to dominate and form Oriental thinking and feeling. The Rus- 
sians seems to understand the soul of the Orient better, but only 
in so far as the dull uneducated masses are concerned, the masses 
who need to be ruled along patriarchal-despotic lines. Russians 
are essentially foreign to the cultural ideals of the Occident and do 
not understand them. Even to-day Russian imperialism pro- 
claims the principle: One God, one Czar, one Empire. With 
what religious and nationalistic intolerance and with what bar- 
baric methods this principle is carried out is shown by the treat- 
ment of the Ruthenians in East Galicia, whom Russia is trying 
by violent measures to rob of their nationality and of their old 
allegiance to the Roman Catholic Church. 

These methods are foreign to the German. We have always 
had a profounder understanding and higher regard for foreign 
peculiarities. What w^e regard as the future ideal is a system of 
World Powers who mutually recognize and respect one an- 
other's independence and equality, as was formerly the case with 
the Great Powers in the European community of states. And by 
the side of these World Powers we want also the smaller or 
less powerful and less developed states to be safeguarded in their 
independent existence, provided they do not, if they are our neigh- 
bors, secretly conspire with our enemies against us. We do not 
share Lord Salisbury's opinion that the big states must grow 
greater and ever greater and the small states smaller and fewer. 
If the necessities of world economics and world politics require 
a unification of greater political areas, we conceive it as a com- 
munity of interests of free, independent states, not as the estab- 
lishment of a world empire according to the British or Russian 
pattern. And we know that, in forming such a community, 
much care, tact and patience will be needed. 

We do not stand for any sort of world domination, but for the 
principle of freedom and equal rights for all the nations of the 
earth, in so far as they have attained to the necessary stage of civ- 
ilization. This is in accordance with German nature. It is in 
this sense that we desire to interpret the much-quoted prophetic 
words of Emanuel Geibel, one of our noblest poets: ''Am 
deutschen Wesen soil die Welt genesen." ^ That is the object of 
German W eltpolitik ; that is also the object of the war. We 
are not waging it as the aggressor in order to put an end to 
an untenable position. We are waging it in defense against a 
long prepared attack of our neighbors, the object of which is to 
strike us off the list of the World Powers. We are carrying 
on the war in order to maintain our position in the rank of 

^ "The spirit of the German race shall heal the sickness of the world." 



024 MODERN GERMAX^' 

World Powers, in order :o break the yoke of England's sea and 
world dominion, but not to succeed to England's position as the 
ruler of the world. 

We want to found a new balance of power in the world 
system of states. That is quite a different thing from what the 
English understand by European balance of power. The false. 
European balance of power of the EngHsh is a deceptive phan- 
tasm. It IS merely a means to England's world domination. 
Real balance of power amongst the World Powers excludes ab- 
solute domination at sea of any one single Power, and re-estab- 
lishes the old principle of the freedom of the seas. That it is 
also of higher ethical value than the English idea of world 
domination must be clear to every one who perceives a higher 
ideal in the possibility of free competition of all nations than in 
the gratification of the national egoism of a single nation, which 
regards its own welfare as the be-all and the end-ail of the his- 
torv of the world 



THE MEN WHO ^VRQTE THIS BOOK 

Professor Otto Hestze (''G^rm^nj sjid the ^Vcr.d Pc-^rers" 
and "The Meaning of the War"; is Pr'fess-'r c: Historr it 
the Univeisitv of Berlin. He is Secrerzrr c: the S>r:etv for 
the History of Mark Brandenburg. He is the author of 
y* Gtiomdism and Constitution^cJum ' I'jjI : Cr.z. St^^ice 
(1911) ; and British Plans 0/ fForld C':,nqu':rt cid ik. Pres- 
ent War ri9i5'i. 

Professor Erxst Trozltsch. Ph. D.. LL. D.. Tzt Spirit 
of German Kultur is Prcfessor of Theo.:/27 st the Unrrer- 
s:ty of Berlin " : - :_ ~ - - - 



(1912;. 

Professor Hermaxx Schitmachz-^ LL. D., Hon. LL. D.. 

("Germany's T- - ' ^ - ?" i.-sidon" ) is Prcfessor 

of Social aci_^ r UnTvers^tv of Bonn. 

From 1896 to lo: ; t . - 
istry of Publfr W '-- ? 

College at C h :- : t- ?- -t - : : ; j- - - z 

University or i^i-. 1:: -r- ^t Z : ' ' 

Coliimria Lniversity. He was ser: 7 i 

ment to the L'nitef Stite? t: ^~-:: - ■: : 

the author of Tr£s:\ 

China (1900); and i i t 

editor of Teubner's " H ' : . : T i' i-itry. 

Dr. Wilhzlm Solf ( T - - J 7 r is Serre- 

taiy of State for the C: -.-..::--. :.- : — 7 7 — : - 

He was the represenratrve of tr _ ~ 

He e ■ - i - : - c_ 

Gov, 



tr.e Ljrir.. ' .l^ pCu^* 

V - — i '- — - - 



625 



626 THE MEN WHO WROTE THIS BOOK 

Professor Hans Delbruck, Ph. D., ("The German Military 
System") is Professor of History at the University of Berlin, 
and a member of the Privy Council. He was a soldier in the 
Franco-Prussian War. In 1882 he wsls made a member of 
the House of Deputies, and in 1884 a member of the Reichs- 
tag. He is the author of The Strategy of Pericles and Fred- 
erick the Great (1890); Frederick, Napoleon, Moltke: An- 
cient and Modern Strategy (1892); The Polish Question 
(1893); History of Military Science (1900-1906). He is 
the editor of the "Preussische Jahrbucher." 

Professor Gustav von Schmoller ("The Origin and Nature 
of German Institutions") is Professor of Political Economy at 
the University of Berlin. He has held the same post at the 
Universities of Halle and Strassburg. In 1887 he was made 
Historiographer of the History of Brandenburg. Since 1899 
he has been the Representative of the University of Berlin in 
the Prussian Upper House. He is an Upper Privy Councillor 
and a member of the Academy of Science. He is the author 
of a number of books on questions of political economy and 
administrative and constitutional history. He is the editor of 
"Constitutional and Sociological Research" and "Annals of 
Legislation, Administration and Political Economy of the Ger- 
man Empire." 

Doctor Hans Luther ("The Spirit of Self-government in 
Germany") is City Councillor of Berlin. He was formerly 
City Councillor of Magdeburg, and from there he was called 
to Berlin and made Executive Commissioner of the "Diet of 
Cities," which is a union of Prussian cities for the purpose of 
study and improvement in communal and municipal adminis- 
tration. He is the author of numerous essays on financial and 
administrative questions. 

Professor Friedrich Tezner, LL. D., ("The Inner Structure 
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy") is Professor of Law 
at the University of Vienna. He is a member of the Royal 
Court Council. He is the author of a number of legal works 
and books on the history of law. 

Professor Ottocar Weber, Ph. D., ("Austria-Hungary's For- 
eign Policy") is Director of the Historical Seminary of the 
German University at Prague. He is the author of The Peace 
of Utrecht (1891) ; From Luther to Bismarck (1906) ; Ger- 
man History: From 1684 to 1806 (1913). 



THE MEN WHO WROTE THIS BOOK 627 

Professor Carl Becker ("Turkey") is Professor of Oriental 
History and Languages, and Director of the Oriental Sem- 
inary, at the University of Bonn. He was formerly Instruc- 
tor in Semitic Philology in the University of Heidelberg, 
and Professor of Oriental History and Civilization at the 
Colonial Institute of Hamburg. He is the author of a number 
of books about Mohammedan races, history and customs. He 
is the editor of "Islam." 

Professor Erich Marcks, Ph. D., ("England's Policy of 
Force") Is Professor of Modern History at the University of 
Munich. He was formerly Professor of Modern History at 
the Universities of Freiburg, Leipzig and Heidelberg. He Is 
a member of the Privy Council. He is the author of Queen 
Elizabeth and Her Times (1897); Germany and England 
(1900) ; Present-day Imperialism (1903). 

Professor Paul Darmstadter ("France's Policy of Force") 
Is Professor of Economics and Colonial History at the Univer- 
sity of Gottingen. He is the author of The Abolition of Serf- 
dom in Savoy, Sivitzerland and Lorraine (1897) '■> The United 
States of America: Its Political, Economic and Social Devel- 
opment (1909) ; The History of the Partition and Coloniza- 
tion of Africa Since the Period of Discoveries (Vol. I, 191 3). 

Professor Karl Hampe, Ph. D., ("Belgium and the Great 

Powers") is Professor of Medieval History at the University 
of Heidelberg. He formerly held the same chair at the Uni- 
versity of Bonn. He Is the author of Emperor Frederick II 
(1899) j History of German Emperors (1909). 

Professor Hans Uebersberger, Ph. D., ("Russia and Pan- 
Slavism" and "Serbia's Role") Is Professor of the History of 
Eastern Europe at the University of Vienna. He is the author 
of Austria and Russia Since the End of the iSth Century (Vol. 
I, 1906) ; Russia's Oriental Policy in the Last Two Centu- 
ries (Vol. I, 1913). He is associate editor of the "Magazine 
of East-European History." 

Professor Ottq Franke, Ph. D., ("The Great Powers in 
East Asia") Is Professor of the History and Languages of East 
Asia at the Colonial Institute of Hamburg. He was for many 
years In the German consular service in China and later In 
the Chinese diplomatic service. He is the author of numerous 



628 THE MEN WHO WROTE THIS BOOK 

essays on the subjects of Chinese history, literature, philosophy, 
politics and language. 

Professor Hermann Oncken, Ph. D., ("Events Leading Up 
to the World War" and "The Outbreak of the War") is Pro- 
fessor of Modern History at the University of Heidelberg. 
He was Professor of Modern History at the University of 
Chicago in 1905, and later at the University of Giessen. He 
is the author of America and the Great Powers (1910) ; The 
World War and the German Americans (1914). 

Professor Walther Schoenborn, Ph. D., ("Belgium's Neu- 
trality") is Professor of Public Law at the University of 
Heidelberg. He is the author of The Occupation of Vera 
Cruz, With an Appendix: Documents Concerning the Policy 
of President Wilson Towards Mexico (1914), and a number 
of books on law. 

Professor Friedrich Meinecke, Ph. D., {''Kultur, Policy 
of Power and Militarism") is Professor of History at the 
University- of Berlin. He has held the same chair in the Uni- 
versities of Strassburg and Freiburg. He was formerly in 
the Prussian Archive Service. He is a member of the Privy 
Council. He is the author of From Stein to Bismarck (1908) ; 
Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism (1911). He is the editor 
of "The Historical Review." 

Professor Ernst Zitelmann, LL. D., ("The War and Inter- 
national Law") is Professor of Law at the University of Bonn 
and Honorary Professor of Law at the University of Czerno- 
witz. He was formerly Professor of Law at the Universities 
of Leipzig, Gottingen and Halle. He is a Privy Councillor 
of Justice. He is the author of a number of legal w^orks and 
books on the history of law. 



